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#16 MC420

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Posted 01 March 2006 - 07:06 PM

Ho chin Minh want to move its nation toward democracrtic path. Do you remember the Geneva agreement 1954 ? Need I explain further to make you understand ? As I already said, it is history not "fantasy or merely hallucination". Ho Chin Minh want the US to obey the agreement which is an free elections but was rejected. I wonder who is hallucinating.



Regarding the Geneva Convention which called for free general election two years after the formal division of North & South Vietnam to be taken place after 1954! Yes, it was the context for such general election to be done; nevertheless, who would recall the terrorizing tactics which employed by the communist agents during the 9 years struggle by Vietnamese to resist the French and Communist forces alike! Who would recall the fact that more than 1.5 millions Vietnamese was successfully escaped the communist control from North Vietnam while millions other couldn't? B) Pls keep in mind that Ho Chi Minh and the communist party did employ terror tactics not only against other Vietnamese nationalists but also other communist cadres who didn't follow or execute the hardline/terrorize policy which caused hundred thousand deaths from 1945-1954! :(

I personally still do not believe Ho & his followers were monopolizing the terror tactics but other Stalinist agents from Korea, China, Cambodia, Malaya, Thailand, and even Indonesia to the present Maorists from Nepal would have carried similiar deeds to achieve their objectives (obtain absolute power)! It's sorta personal but myself did escape death as a 4 years old child when I and my mother were being rounded up with 19 other civilians in central Vietnam to be executed. Only my mother and I cheated death after my mother brought me down to the stream to fetch water while the rest of our companions were all being shot. The two communist agents thought we were ghosts and ran away when they saw our sudden appearance after my mother brought me back up from the stream. I was 4 years old at that time and my mother was in her late 20's. My grand father did volunteer to follow the revolution (Ho Chi Minh's side) before the division of the country in 1954. My father was study to be a medic in Saigon at the time. Basically, the VCs were carried on their terror tactics againsted anyone who would not side with them or merely to be perceived and branded as "enemies of the people"! :angry:

Regarding the communist's aims and objectives, Ho Chi Minh and his followers in Vietnam would not only stop after "liberating" South Vietnam but they would move on to join other communist forces (from the USSA, Cuba, etc.) to liberate the rest of the world as well (it's well written within their own manifesto). Well, history has already settled, we have learned the fall of the communist & socialist system (the former USSR and eastern European block). The current CCP and VCP would have very limited option but to reform their political system so that they could survive. Regardless what one would believe; the communist or socialist ideal would have very little value to enhance democratic system or to improve people living standard in general. It was wrong from the very beginning; it was one of the biggest mistakes they made as part of us human beings; countless million deaths have had taken place in the USSR, China, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and ..... ?

What happens in Vietnam? Could we win the war? It's fairly easy for us to disect and analyze at the present since the ideal of communism or socialist system is basically defunct already! B) If we just look back at Vietnam's recent history, I would say that Ho & his comrades have failed badly on more than one occasions to improve the living condition of the Vietnamese people or to lead Vietnam to reach her potential. With time and opportunity we would discuss their three golden opportunities as follows:

1) The unification of Vietnamese force to gain independence in 1945

2) The second unification which took place after the Fall of Saigon in 1975

3) The disintergration of the USSA and Socialist bloc in 1989

As stated, Ho's followers (VCP) have had absolute control of Vietnam for over 30 years already; they've proclaimed themselves to be "the apex of human intelligence" and objectively what is Vietnam's status in the world now? B)

Edited by MC420, 01 March 2006 - 07:15 PM.


#17 jiangji

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Posted 01 March 2006 - 07:13 PM

But is it plausible to think that he was only interested in "democracy" this one time because it would serve his purpose? It is no secret that Communists are almost never interested in democracy because it runs counter to their philosophy. Democracy, in a way, represents the free market economy. It would take another decade before someone in the 2nd world would even attempt to make moves towards some sort of a free market economy.


Even long before Ho get the power or join the communists, he submit a "Eight point programme" to US president Wilson demand for "Constitution government". This we know that Ho prefer democarcy over War to reunify Vietnam. Eventhough he prefer democarcy path, his followers does not neccasary obey his wishes.
For example, Ho final wishes was that his ashes be buried in three hilltops in Vietnam but his followers put his body on display in a mausoleum.
Detach from emotions and desires; get rid of any fixations.

#18 jiangji

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Posted 01 March 2006 - 08:31 PM

Regarding the Geneva Convention which called for free general election two years after the formal division of North & South Vietnam to be taken place after 1954! (


The main purposes of Geneva agreement is to had a "free election". Ho bring the agreement up during the talk is to want US to obey the main term of agreement. The date is totally irrelevant.

Yes, it was the context for such general election to be done; nevertheless, who would recall the terrorizing tactics which employed by the communist agents during the 9 years struggle by Vietnamese to resist the French and Communist forces alike! Who would recall the fact that more than 1.5 millions Vietnamese was successfully escaped the communist control from North Vietnam while millions other couldn't?

Tell me one thing... Who started all this wars ? The US, french and the sourthern dictatorship government commit such terror tactics as well. USA use biological weapons against the Vietnamese and even mistakenly hit their own allies !

Tell me, what is the total population of Vietnam ? If 5%-10% of population was against Viet Minh , does the entire Vietnam belong to them ?

If the Viet Minh does not had such wide support, the northern Vietnam would long be conquered by US and sourthern government and the entire Vietnam will be reunified. So, why the situation is reversed with Viet cong conquer the southern quickly after US withdrawn without much resistence from people in the south.




Pls keep in mind that Ho Chi Minh and the communist party did employ terror tactics not only against other Vietnamese nationalists but also other communist cadres who didn't follow or execute the hardline/terrorize policy which caused hundred thousand deaths from 1945-1954!


First of all, read the history between 1945-1954 of Vietnam. A famine broke out in Tonkin killing millions of people, Viet Minh organized a massive resue effort which saves many lives and receives wide support from the people.

Furthermore, Emperor Bao Dai handed the power to the Viet Minh and Vietnam were declared independence in 1945. This creates a legimatcy for the government and receives wide support from the people eventhough the Emperor is only a puppet control by both French and Japan. French had no right to justify their continue colonization of Vietnam. Now tell me... Which Countries started the wars first ?

Now. Please provide reliable evidence to prove that Ho Chi Minh support terror tactics against his own supporter and causing hundred thousands death. These were not mention by any historians. Unless you tell me that you get it from the extremists webistes.


What happens in Vietnam? Could we win the war? It's fairly easy for us to disect and analyze at the present since the ideal of communism or socialist system is basically defunct already! If we just look back at Vietnam's recent history, I would say that Ho & his comrades have failed badly on more than one occasions to improve the living condition of the Vietnamese people or to lead Vietnam to reach her potential. With time and opportunity we would discuss their three golden opportunities as follows:


Why do you think Ho and his comrades fails to improve the living condition of the people ? Do you ever return to vietnam ? Read some history books. Living condition improved significantly with the war ended.








All you talk is about Communists crime and atrocities. Yes, they did. So do the US and sourthern government.

Edited by jiangji, 01 March 2006 - 08:55 PM.

Detach from emotions and desires; get rid of any fixations.

#19 MC420

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Posted 01 March 2006 - 10:53 PM

Jiangji:

The holocaust didn't exist!

The Rape of Nanjing didn't take place!

No, these events didn't happen at all but Ho Chi Minh and his followers committed no terrors and they are truthly democratic lovers! :haha:

Go read some history books ...! It's your advise for living witness and survivor of the VC! B)

Edited by MC420, 01 March 2006 - 10:57 PM.


#20 MC420

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Posted 01 March 2006 - 11:04 PM

Note: The following article was published in _The Indochina
Newsletter_, a newsletter I edited at the time, October-November
1982. Much has changed in the 16 years since this article was
written. So far as is known all of the former South Vietnam
government officials and officers have been released from the
re-education camps and many have been allowed to emigrate to the
U.S. under a special program, called Humanitarian Operation. But
many of former prisoners have experienced various problems
resulting from their long term incarceration under difficult
conditions. I hope this article might be of historical interest
in understanding what these prisoners have experienced; and also
in understanding conditions of imprisonment endured by those
dissidents and others still detained in Vietnam.
- Steve Denney

----------------------------------------------

THE INDOCHINA NEWSLETTER
October-November 1982


RE-EDUCATION IN UNLIBERATED VIETNAM:
LONELINESS, SUFFERING AND DEATH

by Ginetta Sagan and Stephen Denney

(Editor's Note: The following article is part of a preliminary
draft of a report that will be issued later this year on human
rights in Vietnam. The report is prepared for the Aurora
Foundation, of which Ginetta Sagan is the Executive Director.
Mrs. Sagan is a well-known human rights activist who interviewed
over 200 former prisoners from Vietnam in preparation for this
report. Details of the interviews will be brought out in fuller
detail when the report is issued.)


Ten years ago, demonstrations were held around the world to
protest political repression and imprisonment in South Vietnam.
Seven years ago, Communist forces completed their conquest of
South Vietnam. In June of 1975, the new regime ordered hundreds
of thousands of Vietnamese to report to authorities for
"re-education". Many are still held in the camps today, but the
world is mostly silent on their plight.

"Re-education" means different things to different people. To the
Hanoi regime and its more vocal defenders abroad, re-education is
seen as a very positive way to integrate the former enemy into
the new society. It is, according to Communist leaders of
Vietnam, an act of mercy, since those in the camps deserve the
death penalty or life imprisonment.(1). The former prisoners, on
the other hand, see re-education from quite a different
perspective.

Re-education as it has been implemented in Vietnam is both a
means of revenge and a sophisticated technique of repression and
indoctrination which developed for several years in the North and
was extended to the South following the 1975 Communist takeover.
Yet it has largely failed in its effort to remold individuals
because the ideology upon which it is based underestimates the
power of the human spirit.

In preparation for this report, we have interviewed over 200
former prisoners from Vietnam's re-education camps and examined
all available articles from the Hanoi press and the Western press
on the camps. The picture that emerges from our research is of
hard-labor camps where hunger and disease predominate, where
prisoners are harshly punished for minor infractions of camp
rules, subjected to political indoctrination and forced to write
long "confessions" denouncing themselves and others for alleged
misdeeds in the past.

Estimates of those still detained in the camps range from 20,000
(government estimate) to 200,000.(2). We know of at least 80
reeducation camps in Vietnam (although some of them may have been
consolidated since the prisoners we interviewed were released),
and estimate that 100,000 are still in the camps. Those detained
include military officers and government officials of the former
regime, medical doctors, religious leaders, artists, poets,
political leaders and schoolteachers, just to mention a few.(3)

In this article, we will begin with a brief description of the
beginnings of the re-education system in North Vietnam, and then
examine the re-education camps that have been instituted for the
South Vietnamese since 1975. We will focus this report on the
re-education camps in Vietnam, rather than the prisons, of which
there are many, because we have much less information about the
latter.

The Precedent in the North

According to Hoang Son, a spokesman for the Hanoi regime, the use
of "re-education" camps began in North Vietnam in 1961, at a
time, he says, when the United States and the South Vietnamese
government of Ngo Dinh Diem had sabotaged the 1954 Geneva
Accords, and were attempting to incite rebellion among
"counter-revolutionary elements" in the North, most notably among
former members of the pro-French army and government that existed
during the colonial period. Son cited acts that threatened public
security, such as "economic sabotage" and attempted
assassinations of Party cadres. It was under these circumstances,
said Son, that the DRV ("Democratic Republic of Vietnam") enacted
on 20 June 1961 Resolution 49-NQTVQH, with the task of
concentrating for educational reform "counter-revolutionary
elements who continue to be culpable of acts which threaten
public security." (4).

The method of implementing Resolution 49 was brought out in
General Circular No. 121-CP, dated 8 September 1961, of the DRV
Council of Ministers "regarding concentration for educational
reform of elements dangerous to society." The circular said
Resolution 49 was to apply to "all obstinate
counter-revolutionary elements who threaten public security" and
"all professional scoundrels." The "obstinate
counterrevolutionary elements," said the circular, included the
following groups:

"1) All old dangerous spies, guides or agents, all elements of
the old puppet army or administration, former Rangers with many
heinous crimes, who received clemency from the Government and
much education but who still obstinately refuse to reform and who
still have acts threatening public security.

"2) All hard core members of the former opposing organizations
and parties, who before committed many heinous crimes, who
received clemency from the Government and much education but who
still obstinately refuse to reform and who still have acts
threatening public security;

"3) Obstinate elements in the former exploiting class and all
other counter-revolutionaries with deep feelings of vengeance
towards our system always acting in opposition;

"4) All dangerous counter-revolutionaries having completed a
prison sentence but who refuse to reform."

The circular also described different categories of "professional
scoundrels," including thieves, pimps and "recalcitrant
hooligans," all of whom have been "educationally reformed" many
times, but "who refuse to mend their ways."(5) It is evident,
therefore, that "professional scoundrels" would mean common
criminals, while "obstinate counter-revolutionary elements" would
generally refer to political criminals, in the eyes of the
government, and those imprisoned on the latter basis should
therefore be regarded as political prisoners.

It is also evident, from the description of "professional
scoundrels", that these do not include the most dangerous
criminals, such as murderers. The system of re-education
developed in North Vietnam since 1961, and in all of Vietnam
since 1975, is not looked upon by Vietnamese Communist leaders as
punishment, but rather as a form of rehabilitation, in which
Vietnamese who do not conform to the government's norms are
deprived of citizenship rights until they are ready to return to
society. As stated in Resolution 49, "All persons given
educational reform shall not be considered as criminal offenders
who have been sentenced to punishment but during the period of
educational reform they shall not receive the benefits of the
rights of the citizens."

The system of re-education, according to the circular of the
Council of Ministers, is to follow the line of "combining labor
and political education," and the regimen is to include eight
hours of "productive labor" a day, two half-days set aside each
week for "political study," with cultural classes in the
evenings. Those who violate camp discipline, said Resolution 49,
depending on the seriousness of the violation, "shall be
prosecuted before a people's court or sanctioned
administratively."

Resolution 49 set the period of "educational reform" at three
years, but allowed for early releases for those who "genuinely
reform," while stating that those who "refuse to reform" will
have their period of "educational reform" extended. According to
Hoang Son, as of 1980 all those in North Vietnam who were
interned in the early 1960's for reeducation have since been
released (but how many of the released have since been
arrested?). On the other hand, he said, there are still "a small
number of counter- revolutionary elements interned in virtue of
Resolution 49 since the beginning of the early 70's."(6).

Vietnamese Communist leaders argue that the system of reeducation
is a humane alternative for those who deserve educational reform
but not punishment. From what we have discussed so far, however,
the difference between re-education and imprisonment is not
clear. The main difference, it seems, is that under re-education,
the inmate is subjected to an indefinite sentence, with its
length officially dependent upon how well the inmate submits to
political indoctrination and "productive labor." If the
re-education camps are more humane than the prisons of Vietnam,
then it is only in the truest sense of the "lesser of two evils."


Re-education Since 1975

Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements guaranteed the people of
South Vietnam the following rights:

1) freedom from reprisal and discrimination against those who
collaborated with one side or the other during the war, and

2) democratic freedoms, such as freedom of speech, press,
assembly, belief, movement, organization, meeting, residence and
freedom of political activities.

The Paris Agreements was proclaimed a victory for their side by
the DRV and NLF (National Liberation Front), and its
representatives pointed out that several portions of the treaty,
including Article 11, were virtually identical to statements made
in previous declarations of the NLF, including its founding
statement in 1960. While presenting themselves as genuine civil
libertarians (despite the police state in the North), while
proclaiming that Article 11 was in perfect agreement with
international law, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, DRV and NLF leaders severely criticized the South
Vietnamese government for not respecting the human rights
mentioned in Article 11.(7)

When the DRV and NLF launched the 1975 Spring Offensive, leading
to the military takeover of South Vietnam, they claimed they did
so in order to "enforce" the Paris Agreements. Yet upon taking
control over the South, these new leaders did not set about to
implement the rights mentioned in Article 11 but rather to
permanently destroy them through the establishment of a
"dictatorship of the proletariat."

The hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who have been imprisoned
in re-education camps since 1975 basically fall into two
categories:

(1) Those who have been detained in re-education camps since
1975 because they collaborated with the other side during the
war, and

(2) Those who have been arrested in the years since 1975 for
attempting to exercise such democratic freedoms as those
mentioned in Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements.

In other words, both categories of prisoners are held in direct
violation of Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements, an
international treaty, and therefore of international law.

Registration and Arrest

In May of 1975, various groups of Vietnamese were ordered to
register with the new regime that had established control over
the South on April 30, 1975. Then, in June, the new regime issued
orders instructing those who had registered in May to report to
various places for re-education. Soldiers, noncommissioned
officers and rank-and-file personnel of the former South
Vietnamese government were to undergo three-day "reform study,"
June 11-13, in which they would attend during the day and go home
at night.(8)

The others ordered to report for "reform study" were not allowed
to attend during the day and go home at night, but were instead
to be confined to their sites of "reform study" until the course
ended. Nevertheless, there was some hope, for the government gave
the clear impression that reform study would last no more than a
month for even the highest ranking officers and officials of the
former government in South Vietnam, and ten days for
lower-ranking officers and officials.

Thus, officers of the RVN (South Vietnam) armed forces from the
rank of second lieutenant to captain, along with low-ranking
police officers and intelligence cadres, were ordered to report
to various sites, bringing along "enough paper, pens, clothes,
mosquito nets, personal effects, food or money for use in ten
days beginning from the day of gathering."(9). High- ranking
military and police officers of the RVN, from major to general,
along with mid and high-ranking intelligence officers, members of
the RVN executive, judicial and legislative branches, including
all elected members of the House of Representatives and Senate,
and, finally, leaders of "reactionary" (i.e. non-communist)
political parties in South Vietnam, were ordered to report to
various sites bringing enough "paper, pens, clothes,
mosquito-nets, personal effects, food or money for a month
beginning the first meeting."(10)

Dr. Tran Xuan Ninh, a pediatrician who served as a medical
officer in the armed forces, was among those who eagerly reported
for re-education with ten days provisions, as prescribed by the
government. Compared to what had been expected, the deal was too
good, said Dr. Ninh - three days of re-education for RVN
soldiers, ten days for low-ranking officers and officials, and
one month for high-ranking RVN officers and officials. Many
teachers reported for reeducation, assuming that they would have
to undergo it sooner or later anyway. sick people also reported
for re-education, assured by the government (falsely) that there
would be medical doctors and facilities in the "schools" and the
patients would be well treated.(11). Yet, as we shall see, very
few, if any, of those ordered to report for ten days or thirty
days were released within that period, and many still suffer in
the camps seven-and-a-half years later, living under the most
inhuman conditions.

The Hanoi regime and its apologists defend the reeducation camps
by placing the "war criminal" label on the prisoners. A 1981
memorandum of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to Amnesty
International claimed that all those in the re-education camps
were guilty of acts of national treason as defined in Article 3
of the 30 October 1967 Law on Counter-revolutionary Crimes
(enacted for the government of North Vietnam) which specifies
punishment of 20 years to life imprisonment or the death penalty.
But because the regime was so merciful, it was instead allowing
the prisoners to experience "re-education without trial," which
"as applied in Vietnam is the most humanitarian system, and the
most advantageous for law offenders ... in accordance with the
tradition of generosity and humanitarianism of the Vietnamese
nation and the loftiest ideals of mankind."(12)

Thus we see that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese have been
detained in re-education camps since 1975 not for any specific
individual deeds, but for the act of collaborating with the other
side during the war. This applies not only to top-ranking
government officials and military officers of the former regime
in South Vietnam, but also to more ordinary people such as
medical doctors conscripted into the army (like Dr. Ninh), who
were told that in treating sick and wounded soldiers, they had
committed the crime of "strengthening the puppet forces." College
graduates, who attended officer's training school, as required by
law, and then became RVN reserve military officers were also sent
to the re-education camps. Others sent to the camps in June of
1975 included nearly 400 writers, poets and journalists and over
2,000 religious leaders, including 194 Buddhist, Catholic and
Protestant chaplains,and 516 Catholic priests and fathers.(13).
Even leaders of the opposition to U.S.-supported regimes, such as
the legislator Tran Van Tuyen (who died after three years
imprisonment) were sent to the camps.

Furthermore, Amnesty International has appealed to Hanoi on
behalf of many writers, scholars, priests, human rights activists
and others who had no connection with the Thieu regime or
previous South Vietnamese governments supported by the U.S., yet
were arrested "months and even years after the end of military
conflict in April 1975." Amnesty International believes that
"many were detained for the nonviolent expression of views
critical of the present government."'(14). Under the present
legal system in Vietnam, the government can, in political cases,
detain an individual for up to twelve months for interrogation
without formal charge or trial.(15). Some Vietnamese, such as
leaders of the Unified Buddhist Church arrested in April 1977
have been held for interrogation for much longer than twelve
months. Following this period, the prisoner may be (1) released
with a formal warning, (2) sent to a re-education camp in
accordance with the 1961 Resolution 49, or (3) brought to trial.

If brought to trial, the prisoner will be tried under laws
originally enacted for the government of North Vietnam, which
include penalties such as two to twelve years imprisonment for
"propagandizing the enslavement policy and depraved culture of
imperialism," three to twelve years imprisonment for attempting
to flee the country, and five to fifteen years imprisonment for
"undermining the religious policy" of the government or "causing
disunity among the various religions, between believers and
non-believers and between believers and the administration."(16).
Bui Dinh Ha, a former RVN soldier, was brought to trial on the
25th of June 1981 for selling and loaning "reactionary and
decadent books" and magazines in Saigon. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment,in accordance with articles 4,7 and 8 of the
Decree-law 267 promulgated on 15 June 1956 by the Council of
Ministers of North Vietnam.(17)

From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the Hanoi
government grants itself sweeping powers of arrest and
imprisonment, and these powers are based not on any sense of
justice, but on the desire to protect the security of a
totalitarian government. It is from these circumstances that so
many Vietnamese have fled the country over the last seven years.

Camp Conditions

We know of at least eighty re-education camps in northern and
southern Vietnam, although it is possible that some of them may
have been closed or consolidated since the prisoners we
interviewed were released. Many of the camps are arranged in
groups of three or four, with three to fifteen miles between each
sub-camp. In the South, the camps are generally located in the
remote jungle areas or near "safe" villages (pro-NLF before
1975). The high-ranking military officers and government
officials of the former regime in South Vietnam, along with other
Vietnamese considered high-security risks, were moved to camps in
the North, some near the Chinese border, in 1976 and 1977, but
they were moved away from the border with the outbreak of
hostilities in 1978.

According to Amnesty International, conditions vary widely in
thee camps, depending on their location, the composition of
prisoners in the particular camps and the administrators of the
camp, among other factors.(18). In its 1978 annual report on
world conditions, Amnesty International said there were four
categories of re-education camps in Vietnam, and described them
in the following manner: "(a) detention centers in towns where
the initial inquiries are held; (B) second category camps which
hold both criminal and political prisoners, where detainees are
encouraged to write accounts of their backgrounds; © third
category camps where prisoners are held according to the nature
of their alleged past offenses and (d) camps for former senior
officers and members of intelligence services who have been
judged to be `ac on' (wicked), which are mostly situated north of
Hanoi."(19). With regard to the third category camps mentioned,
this is apparently referring not to specific deeds committed in
the past but rather to positions held. For example, low-ranking
military officers would be in certain camps in the South, while
high-ranking officers and officials would be in other camps,
usually in the North.

Most of the former prisoners we have interviewed have been in
between three and five different re-education camps. It is our
belief that the movement of prisoners from one camp to another
may be intended to delay Vietnamese from knowing the whereabouts
of their relatives in the camps and to prevent prisoners from
forming bonds of friendship with each other or with some of the
guards. Some of the camps are administered by the military, some
by the security police, and some by both.

In assessing conditions within the camps, there are basically
three sources we can rely on: (1) official statements of the
Hanoi government, (2) accounts by visitors to the camps and (3)
accounts of the former prisoners. All three sources must be
considered, but the value of the first two sources is limited. We
have found translated articles from the official press to be very
useful, especially with regard to rules that prisoners and their
families are required to obey, and also with the attitude
displayed by the government in these articles. But articles for
foreign consumption tend to be highly self-serving and
propagandistic.

When foreign delegations visit the camps, the prisoners are
briefed on what to say to the visitors. In some cases, about half
of the prisoners would be taken out to the fields or jungles to
hide until the delegates departed. We know of at least one case
where government agents pretended to be prisoners during a
visit.(20). In another case, a prisoner was punished for reading
a prepared statement to a visiting delegation rather than
memorizing it.(21)

Nevertheless, such possibilities are not considered by most of
these delegations, and this attitude is precisely why they were
invited to tour the model camps. Since these visitors are
ideologically predisposed to support the Hanoi regime, committed
to improving relations between the regime and Western countries,
they naturally try to portray the reeducation camps in the beat
possible light -- as if the typical camp were merely a training
school rather than a prison. In defending the re-education camps,
these visitors encourage the Hanoi regime to continue this policy
and therefore bear a responsibility for the suffering of
Vietnam's political prisoners.

However, not all of the visitors to the re-education camps in
Vietnam have been so myopic. Among the exceptions would be an
Amnesty International delegation that visited Vietnam in December
of 1979 and Dermot Kinlen, a distinguished Irish lawyer who led a
delegation to Vietnam for nine days in April of 1980. The AI
delegation, which visited three re-education camps and one prison
in Vietnam, said it could not make a general assessment of camp
conditions based on the visit: "Amnesty International is not
professionally equipped to carry out prison visits in the manner
that the International Committee of the Red Cross can. Thorough
camp inspections necessitate lengthier visits to more camps and
would require medical expertise among the inspection team."(22)

Dermot Kinlen noted that the camps his delegation visited "were
exactly the same camps as Amnesty had visited some months earlier
and had also been visited by other groups. It is a pity that only
three camps are available for inspection." In all of the camps
they visited, he said, most of the inmates "were not seen as they
were absent at fieldwork." Kinlen also said: "Aa a lawyer of
thirty years experience and as a prison visitor and having made a
study of penology I am satisfied that there is wholesale and
widespread violation of human rights in Vietnam. The retention of
an uncertain but large number of people without trial in
detention and forcing them to do forced labor and subjecting them
to indoctrination and depriving them of support and social
contact with their families and friends, and providing inadequate
medical facilities, and denying them any spiritual administration
and allowing them no intellectual exercise other than the
absorption of selected texts for the purpose of indoctrination
are all negations of human rights."(23)

Camp Routine

While it is true that conditions vary widely in the camps, we
have also found a depressing quality of similarity with regard to
certain features of the re-education camps, which appear to be
universal. These include an emphasis on political indoctrination
and mandatory "confessions" during the early stages of
re-education, heavy and often dangerous physical labor, and
widespread disease due to a severe lack of food and medical care.
The variations occur mainly with regard to the various forms of
physical mistreatment inflicted on the prisoners, but even here
there are certain features widely practiced,such aa placing
recalcitrant prisoners in "connex" boxes, metal air freight
containers left behind by the United States, or in dark cella
underground.

During the early phase of re-education, lasting from a few week.
to a few months, inmates were subjected to intensive political
indoctrination. Subjects studied included the exploitation by
"American imperialism" of workers in other countries, the glory
of labor, the inevitable victory of Vietnam, led by the Communist
Party, over the U.S., and the generosity of the new government
toward the "rebels" (those who fought on the other aide during
the war). There were a total of nine courses, of variable length.
Each course would begin with lectures from the political cadres,
lasting one or two days, and following this the inmates would
divide into closely supervised groups where they would discuss
the lesson over the next five to seven days and write essays
summarizing each lesson. According to Ngo Trung Trong, a former
inmate in a camp for low-ranking RVN officers, the discussions
would last four hours in the morning and four hours in the
afternoon. In the afternoon sessions, the prisoners were required
to repeat the contents of the lectures. (24)

The nine-course political indoctrination session generally lasted
about two months, in the summer of 1975. Political indoctrination
classes have continued since then, but with much less emphasis. A
former inmate of Xuyen Moc camp in southern Vietnam reports that
the subsequent indoctrination has consisted mainly of dividing
prisoners into small groups in the evenings to review their work
through mutual criticism and self- criticism - but this
conversation never continues beyond the guards' presence.(25)

Another feature emphasized during the early stage of reeducation,
but continued throughout one's imprisonment, is confession of
one's alleged misdeeds in the past. In a March 1981 memorandum to
Amnesty International, the Hanoi government said "in all cases of
people being sent to re-education camps, the competent Vietnamese
authorities have established files recording the criminal acts
committed by the people concerned."(26) These files were
established through the mandatory confessions and denunciation of
others.

Such "confessions" provide the government with a retroactive
justification of its decision to imprison hundreds of thousands
of Vietnamese in the camps. It can point out, as it did to
Amnesty International, that the prisoners themselves had
confessed to committing crimes. Of course, such reasoning is
unlikely to convince many people outside of the leadership of the
Vietnamese Communist Party, but in any case the situation
provides much opportunity for false confessions by the prisoners
in order to satisfy their captors, as well as more ill-treatment
of the prisoners in order to produce the "confessions".

All prisoners in the camps are required to write confessions, no
matter how trivial their alleged crimes might be. Mail clerks,
for example, were told that they were guilty of aiding the
"puppet war machinery" through circulating the mail, while
religious chaplains were found guilty of providing spiritual
comfort and encouragement to the enemy troops.(27) A reserve
military officer who taught Vietnamese literature in high school
was told that he had "misled a whole generation of innocent
children."(28)

Besides confessing such "crimes", prisoners had to write their
autobiography and disclose their financial assets as described by
a former prisoner: "You had to write the story of your life,
including your father, grandfather and children, describing their
fortunes, how everyone died, what they owned, including
television, radio, camera. New ones had to be written twice each
month, both in re-education and in prison. If they found you had
left something out that you had included earlier, you were in
trouble. You would have to write new confessions many times each
day. Each confession was about 20 pages handwritten."(29)
Following the written confessions were the public confessions in
which prisoners would confess their "crimes" before the camp
authorities and other prisoners. Prisoners were encouraged to
criticize each other's confessions, said a former prisoner, which
was "very effective in getting us to hate each other." The more
"crimes" a prisoner confessed, the more he is praised as
"progressive" by camp authorities.

The incessant demand for confessions places much pressure on the
prisoners, leading to insanity in some cases. A former prisoner
who had previously been a medical doctor said he saw "many cases
-- screaming, yelling people." Despite his medical experience, he
was not allowed to treat them.(30)

The purpose of these confessions has not only been to produce a
sense of guilt in the prisoners and to establish files on them,
but also to get the prisoners to denounce other former soldiers
and government officials who had not yet reported for re-
education. The government has been very concerned about the
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who have not yet reported.


"Labor is Glory"

Much emphasis in the re-education camps is placed on "productive
labor." Such labor was described by SRV spokesman Hoang Son as
"absolutely necessary" for re-education because "under the former
regime, they (the prisoners) represented the upper strata of
society and got rich under US patronage. They could but scorn the
working people. Mow the former social order has been turned
upside down, and after they have finished their stay in camps
they have to earn their living by their own labour and live in a
society where work is held in honor."(31) Thus, in the eyes of
the Vietnamese rulers, "productive labor" is a necessary aspect
in the overturning of the social order. Yet in examining the
conditions under which this labor takes place, it seems that
there is also an element of revenge.

The labor is mostly hard physical work, some of it very
dangerous, such as mine field sweeping. No equipment is provided
for this extremely risky work, and as a result, many prisoners
have been killed or wounded in mine field explosions. Other work
includes cutting trees, planting corn and root crops, clearing
the jungle, digging wells, latrines and garbage pits, and
constructing barracks within the camp and fences around it. The
inmates are generally organized into platoons and work units,
where they are forced to compete with each other for better
records and work achievements. This has pushed inmates to
exhaustion and nervousness a former prisoners said: "Each person
and group had to strive to surpass or at least fulfill the norms
set by camp authorities, or they would be classified as `lazy'
and ordered to do 'compensation work' on Sundays."(32) Other
prisoners who missed their quota have been shackled and placed in
solitary confinement cells.(33)

The duration of the work has generally been eight hours a day,
six days a week, which might not seem so bad, except the work is
done in the hot tropical sun, by prisoners who are poorly
nourished and receive little or no medical care. The poor health,
combined with hard work, mandatory confessions and political
indoctrination, makes life very difficult for prisoners in
Vietnam, and has contributed to a high death rate in the camps.

Food and Medical Supplies

"My ideal, my glory, my dream, my love,
All these are remote and abstract things!
I confess to you that we, hungry prisoners,
Only dream of being as well fed as animals.
Why? Our dream to be Man, alas,
Has ceased to be a possibility;
That dream has led us to prison.
Now, only four things on the earth are meaningful:
Rice, manioc roots, potatoes and corn.
These four things bind us, harass us, torture us,
They never leave us in peace."(34)

It was acknowledged by the government spokesman Hoang Son in his
1980 essay that while poverty is a serious problem throughout the
country, "Neither food nor housing conditions can be considered
as satisfactory in some of the camps." However, Son maintains
that such conditions are "equally shared by the inmates and their
guards."(35). Former prisoners would use stronger language in
describing the lack of food in the camps, and deny that there is
such equal sharing. Former prisoners believe that the government
deliberately keeps the prisoners on low rations in order to
weaken their ability to unite and resist camp policies, so all
they think about will be the next meal.(36)

Since the inmates were originally told in 1975 to bring enough
food for up to 30 days, food supplies were generally adequate for
the first few weeks, but have gradually deteriorated since that
time. Prisoners interviewed in 1976 and 1977 reported that the
typical diet was only one or two bowls of rice a day with no meat
and few vegetables.(37) Since then, the diet has become even
worse, shifting from rice to corn and root crops - especially
common in the diet now is manioc, a starchy root crop which has
little nutritive value other than filling one's stomach. Besides
salt and water, the total amount of food for each prisoner is
about 400 to 500 grams a day, and much of it is spoiled. There is
virtually no protein in the diet, except on rare occasions,
perhaps two or three times a year on holidays such as Ho Chi
Minh's birthday, the Lunar New Year or Independence day, when the
diet is supplemented by a few tiny morsels of meat.(38) Under
such conditions, prisoners are constantly preoccupied with food,
as described in a letter smuggled out of the country:


"In my forced labor camp in the highland the event that dominates
everything is the experience of hunger. We are hungry
permanently. All we can think about, day and night, is eating!
During the first days of the harvest season we are allowed almost
our fill of corn and manioc roots. But that lasts only a few
days. During these days there are shining eyes and smiles. But
very soon the camp administration shuts up the eating. The
shining eyes and smiles disappear. We feel hungry again, so
hungry that we think of nothing else. Many of us catch lizards to
eat, knowing they provide protein. Very soon the lizards of the
whole area were exterminated. I know of a prisoner who one night
caught a millepede on the ceiling, hid it under the mat, and in
the morning roasted it on a fire and ate it. He said it was as
good as roast shrimp. There are those who are very clever to
invent devices to catch mice and birds; they will roast and eat
them while others watch with envy. Others catch grasshoppers and
crickets. Whenever someone catches a snake, that is a feast. In
our conversation, we only talk about eating, and how to find
things to eat. When we do not talk about eating, we silently
think about eating. As soon as we finish lunch, we begin to
imagine the supper awaiting us when we return from the field: The
food put into the mouth is like one breath of air blown into a
vast empty house. What little food is given is chewed very
slowly.

"Still, it makes no difference -- we feel even more hungry after
eating. Even in our sleep, our dreams are haunted by food. There
are those who chew noisily in their dreams...Such food as mice,
rats, birds, snakes, grasshoppers, must be caught and eaten
secretly. It is forbidden, and if the camp guards learn about it,
the prisoners will be punished."(39)

The lack of food has caused severe malnutrition for many
prisoners and weakened their resistance to various diseases. Most
common among the diseases are malaria, beriberi and
dysentery.(40) Tuberculosis is also widespread in some of the
camps. Medical supplies are generally nonexistent in the camps
and medical care is very inadequate, usually limited to a poorly
trained medic and perhaps a few prisoners who had formerly been
medical doctors. The result is a high death rate from diseases. A
prisoner in Dam Duong camp of Ha Nam Ninh province, for example,
witnessed twenty deaths, including three cases of intestinal
hemorrhage in which prisoners died because there was no
plasma.(41) In Tun Hoa camp, about thirty prisoners (out of a
camp population of 5,000) died of illness in the last three or
four months of 1978.(42). Some seriously ill prisoners have been
allowed to go to hospitals outside the camp or return to their
families. But others have not, and many have died in the camps,
without their families even being notified. It is official
government policy, as stated in the 1976 PRG decree No. 02/CS-76
that terminally ill prisoners will be allowed to return to their
families. Yet Amnesty International has brought to Hanoi's
attention cases of such prisoners not allowed to return. One such
prisoner was Truong Van Truoc, who "died in August 1980 of
stomach cancer in a detention camp, 90A TD 63/TC, Doi 11, Thanh
Hoa." Another prisoner AI mentioned was the writer Ho Huu Tuong,
who was sick for several months, but not transferred to a
hospital until June 2, 1980: "He died only three weeks later,
just after he was finally given permission to return to his
family."(43)

Rules and Punishment

In the appendix of his book Enfer Rouge, Mon Amour, Lucien Trong,
who was imprisoned in a camp of low-ranking officers, published a
list of rules which he said were posted by the authorities in his
camp. Other former prisoners have told us the same rules exist in
other camps. The authorities seek to maintain strict control over
the thoughts of the prisoners, and to this end forbid prisoners
from keeping and reading books or magazines of the former regime,
reminiscing in conversation about "imperialism and the puppet
south," singing old love songs of the former regime, discussing
political questions (outside authorized discussions), harboring
"reactionary" thoughts or possessing "superstitious" beliefs. It
is also forbidden to be impolite to the cadres of the camp, and
this rule has been abused to the point where the slightest
indication of a lack of reverence to the cadres has been
interpreted as rudeness and therefore harshly punished.

Violations of these and other rules lead to various forms of
punishment, including being tied up in contorted positions,
shackled in connex boxes or dark cells, forced to work extra
hours or reduced food rations. Many prisoners have been beaten,
some to death, or subjected to very harsh forms of punishment due
to the cruelty of certain camp officials and guards. Some have
been executed, especially for attempting to escape. Some of the
most brutal treatment occurs in camps in southern Vietnam around
the Mekong delta, where guards apparently have no fear of any
reprimand for mistreating the prisoners.(44)

The connex boxes vary in size, but are generally large enough to
accommodate a few prisoners crowded together. Some of the
containers are made of wood, some of metal. The metal containers
can become unbearable in the hot ,sun, prisoners can pass out or
die under such circumstances.(45)

Solitary confinement cells are also common in the camps, such as
the Gia Ray camp, where prisoners can receive ten days solitary
for minor infractions, fifteen for making "reactionary
statements" and one year (or the death penalty) for attempting to
escape the camp. Prisoners in these daring cells are forced to
eat and sleep on the spot, and carry out bodily functions while
shackled to the wall.(46) Prisoners in such cells in Ham Tam camp
(Thuan Hai province) lie on the floor with their legs raised and
feet locked in wooden stocks.(47) In a camp in Nghe Tinh, Than
Chuong district of Nghe Tinh province, some prisoners in the dark
cells had their hands and feet tied so tightly that they became
afflicted with gangrene and lost their hands or feet or died.(48)


Other forms of confinement include tiger cage cells and abandoned
wells. A prisoner in Long Khanh camp (a southern camp for
low-ran-ding officers) was put in such a well for five days
because he sang "Silent Night" on Christmas Eve, 1975.(49) In
some camps, such as Ben Gia, ditches, called "living graves" by
the prisoners, are dug around the outer perimeter, away from the
main camp, but visible from the watchtower. Prisoners confined to
these ditches in Ben Gia were fed once daily--a bowl of rice or
sorghum and water.(50)

Other forms of torture were reported by a former prisoner of Dam
Duong camp, composed of around 1,000 prisoners, with 200
Montagnards (tribal highlanders):

1. The Honda : with the prisoner's hands and feet tied together,
he is hung and swung to and fro while beaten. Nausea and vomiting
often follow.

2. The Auto : the prisoner is tied "butterfly" style with thumbs
tied together behind the back; one arm over the shoulder and the
other pulled around the trunk of the body. In another version of
this the prisoner's outstretched legs are tied by the toes to the
two middle fingers of the hands of the outstretched arms. A
prisoner could be kept in such positions for weeks or even
months.

3. The Airplane : the prisoner is tied either standing to a pole,
lying down, or sitting on cement for various periods, depending
on the prisoner's "mistakes" -- one week, sometimes longer,
sometimes a few days.

As one would expect, prisoners released after such treatment are
often unable to walk.(51)

A case where the airplane method was applied was described by
Nguyen Ngoc Ngan in his book, The Will of Heaven . This case
occurred in May of 1977 at Bu Gia Map camp, located in a malarial
jungle area near the Cambodian border. Tru, a prisoner, became
angry when he saw a guard using the flag of the former government
of South Vietnam as a dustcloth. He took the flag out of the
guard's hand and yelled at him for desecrating it. The next day,
Tru was brought before the prisoners in a "people's court," but
instead of confessing his "crime", Tru remained unrepentant,
praising the flag and criticizing the communists. The out- raged
camp commander sentenced Tru to be tied to a wooden column
outdoors, standing upright for three months. He was gagged and
his hands were tied behind the back and around the post, his
wrists lashed tightly with telephone wire. The wire cut through
his flesh by the end of the first day. Forced to stand bareheaded
all day long in the hot sun and the unusually cool nights of the
highlands, plagued by mosquitos, Tru contacted malaria by the
second week and became seriously ill. After a month, Tru was
untied and carried to meet the camp commander's superior who was
visiting the camp that day, and was given one more chance to
repent. But Tru remained unrepentant and was taken out of the
camp the next day.(52)

It has been acknowledged by Hanoi that violence has in fact been
directed against the prisoners, although it maintains that these
are isolated cases and not indicative of general camp policy.(53)
Former prisoners, on the other hand, report frequent beatings for
minor infractions, such as missing work because of illness. In
some cases, prisoners have been beaten to death, such as Colonel
Pham Ba Ham. Accused of helping an escape attempt of other
prisoners, he was bludgeoned before the other prisoners and left
without any medical treatment until he died.(54) Another
prisoner, a former noncommissioned RVN officer, insulted leaders
of the Vietnamese Communist Party while delirious with fever and
was beaten to death with chains.(55)

Prisoners have been executed, most commonly for attempting to
escape the camps. In some cases, the caught prisoners are tried
by "People's Courts" held before the other prisoners and then
killed.(56)

Suicides appear to be fairly common in the camps. In one camp, a
pharmacist who ended a letter to his wife asking her to pray for
his return was brought before the other prisoners and berated for
relying upon God for his release. For the next several nights he
was interrogated by camp authorities, until he committed suicide.
His family was not notified of his death.(57)

The Prisoners and Their Families

Family visits are important not only because of the personal need
for prisoners and their loved ones to have contact with each
other, but also because the families can bring food to their
relatives in some of the camps. It has been reported that the
prisoners in these camps could not survive without such food.(58)
However, the government does not allow many visits. As of 1980,
official regulations stated that prisoners in the camps could be
visited by their immediate family once every three months.(59).
The duration of the visits are not long, reported by former
prisoners to last from 15 to 30 minutes.(60) Moreover, family
visits can be suspended for prisoners who break rules: and it has
also been said that only families who have proven their loyalty
to the regime are allowed visiting privileges.(61) In its 1980
memorandum to the Hanoi government, Amnesty International
expressed its concern that visiting privileges are dependent on
the prisoner's conduct and "progress in re-education," and stated
its belief that "a prisoner's rights to visits and correspondence
should be inviolable and in no way conditional, except in cases
of serious violations of camp discipline and then only for a
limited period."(62) AI also said that if "visits by family or a
lawyer are not allowed, an officer may feel secure when ill-
treating a prisoner, knowing that no one concerned about the
prisoner's interests will see him or her soon and notice any
signs of physical or mental deterioration. (63)

The families of the prisoners are regarded as responsible for the
acts of the prisoners before 1975. According to the Hanoi
spokesman Hoang Son, 1.3 million Vietnamese were part of the
military or administrative apparatus of South Vietnam, members of
"so-called" political parties or of mass organizations which Son
says were American-controlled. On the basis of this estimate, and
on the estimate that there are an average of five members to each
Vietnamese family, Son concluded that there were 6.5 million
Vietnamese who were "compromised" by ties with the non- communist
regime in South Vietnam.(64) As a result of such logic, not only
the prisoners, but also their families, suffer discrimination in
access to health care, employment and higher education.(65)

As a way of redeeming their relatives for their past activities,
families of Vietnamese ordered to report to the re- education
camps were told in 1975 that they should "urge their dear ones to
devote themselves to reform study." (66). In order to attain the
release of their imprisoned relatives, to demonstrate that they
are good families, they have been pressured to move to the new
economic zones.(67) Some families of the prisoners have had their
food ration cards revoked until agreeing to move to these
areas.(68)

The new economic zones are theoretically for a good purpose, to
increase food production, but actually are more like
concentration camps located in malarial jungle areas where the
land is very difficult to cultivate. Conditions in these areas
are therefore not so different from life in the re- education
camps--living under harsh conditions and in isolated areas. Thus,
thousands of Vietnamese have fled these areas and returned to the
cities. In doing so, they become non-persons in the eyes of the
state, ineligible for food rations, an approved job, or housing.
Living in makeshift shelters on the streets of Saigon alone are
as many as 15,000 to 20,000 such people, according to a reporter
who visited the country in 1980.(69)

Besides being pressured to move to the new economic zones,
families of the prisoners have also been pressured to give up all
their possessions to the state and work extra hours in order to
demonstrate that they are good families so that their relatives
can be released.(70)

Release Policy

The policy of releasing prisoners from the re-education camps of
Vietnam has been a story of broken promises. The existence of the
camps in is itself a broken promise because it violates Article
11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements, which specifically prohibits
such imprisonment. Another broken promise, as we have already
noted, occurred when the Vietnamese who had reported for
re-education in June of 1975 were not released within 30 days, as
had been clearly implied by the new regime when it issued the
order to report. In June of 1976, the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam, in one of its last policy
announcements before the official reunification of Vietnam,
stated that those in the camps would either be tried or released
after three years imprisonment. But this promise was also broken.


Over one million Vietnamese have been re-educated and returned to
society since 1975, according to the Hanoi government. However,
this would seem to contradict another official statement from
Hanoi which said that 40,000 is the total number of Vietnamese
who have gone through the reeducation camps since 1975, and that
26,000 remained in the camps as of 1980.(71) So if we are to take
these figures seriously, and try to reconcile them with-each
other, then we might assume that the one million figure includes
those who attended "short-term, on-the-spot" re- education, in
which Vietnamese would come to the "classes" during the day and
go home at night, while the 40,000 figure refers to those who
underwent long-term re-education, meaning internment in the
camps. With regard to the latter, we must note that the estimates
of foreign observers of those detained in the camps since 1975
are much higher, ranging up to 300,000.(72) Our own estimate is
that 100,000 Vietnamese are still in the camps. It would be more
difficult for us to estimate the total number detained in the
camps since 1975, and we will not attempt to estimate the number
of dissidents detained in the many prisons of Vietnam.

From accounts in the official press of Vietnam, it appears that
the large-scale release of prisoners began in the last few months
of 1975. On Jan. 6, 1976 the government newspaper Giai Phong
(published in Saigon) announced the release of hundreds of
prisoners on the previous day, and added: "That was the 21st time
the Management-Training Section of the Military Management
Committee has allowed people who make progress in reform study to
return to their families." Assuming that hundreds of prisoners
were released on each occasion, one might very roughly estimate
from this statement that somewhere between 4,000 and 10,000
prisoners had been released from the camps by the end of 1975.

Articles that appeared in Saigon Giai Phong (Liberated Saigon) of
Ho Chi Minh City on August 24, Sept. 7,20,24 and 30, and Dec. 11
and 25, 1975, discussed categories of prisoners that could be
released at that time. The August 24 SGP article said certain
groups of prisoners were eligible for release. These included
prisoners with close relatives (parents, spouse, siblings) who
were revolutionary cadres or had "merit toward the revolution in
the locality," and scientific and technical specialists who did
not "commit crimes" or participate in non-communist political
parties or organizations. The Sept. 7 SGP article added another
category of prisoners eligible for release: old people, people
seriously ill and pregnant women. However, as with the other
categories, it stressed that "first and foremost" prisoners must
have shown "progress" in re-education and repentance over "past
mistakes" and also must not have been engaged in "criminal acts"
against the revolution before 1975. (73) We can see from such
vague wording that there were no guarantees for any category of
prisoners being released.

The most significant policy announcement on the re-education
camps was broadcast by Saigon Domestic Service on June 9, 1976.
This is the May 25 PRGRSV statement No. 02/CS-76, signed by
President Huynh Tan Phat. According to this broadcast, 95% of
those "attending reform courses had their cases examined and
their citizen's rights restored" in order that they could vote in
the April elections. This figure led some foreign observers to
estimate that 50,000 remained in the camps, according to official
figures, since the government had said that over one million had
been re-educated.

The policy announced that those still in the camps would stay
there for three years, but could be released earlier if they make
"real progress, confess their crimes and score merits." It also
said that some Vietnamese would be brought to trial, including
those who deserted the NLF during the war, those who owed "many
blood debts" to the people and those who fled to "foreign
countries with their U.S. masters."(74)

As far as we know, no such trials were held, or at least they
were not publicized. Nor were prisoners in the camps released
after three years. The excuses offered for the continued
detention beyond the three years are increased security tensions
with China and the 1961 Resolution 49, which Hanoi argues
supersedes the 1976 PRG decree and which allows for detention in
the camps beyond three years. According to Hoang Son, Resolution
49 allows for a new three year period to be established for those
in the camps who did not sufficiently reform during the first
three years.(75) Since it is now over seven years since many of
the prisoners were first arrested, we can presume that such
prisoners are in their third three- year period. In the words of
Amnesty International, "Grounds for the continued detention of
these people, therefore, seems to have shifted from past misdeeds
and present behavior to the external situation, namely national
security. These prisoners are therefore being held in what is
usually termed administrative detention without trial." The
result of such prolonged, indefinite detention is severe hardship
for the prisoners and their families, said Amnesty
International.(76)

Since there is no clear criteria for releasing the inmates from
the camps, bribery and family connections with high-ranking
officials are more likely to speed up release than the prisoner's
behavior. Released prisoners are put under probation and
surveillance for six months to one year, and during this time
they have no official status, no exit visas, no access to
government food rations and no right to send their children to
school.(77). If the progress of the former prisoners is judged
unsatisfactory during this period, they may be fired from their
jobs, put under surveillance for another six months to a year, or
sent back to the re-education camps.(78) Approximately 60% of
those released have been re-arrested, according to a high-ranking
Vietnamese official.(79)

Amnesty International has appealed to Hanoi to abolish Resolution
49 and the system of re-education camps in Vietnam. We agree.
Genuine peace and reconciliation in Vietnam cannot be brought
about through forcing the people to praise the regime or
"confess" their past opposition to the Communist side. On the
contrary, as stated in 1973 by NLF leader Nguyen Van Hieu
(presently Minister of Culture in Vietnam), "..democratic
freedoms are man's fundamental rights, ardent aspirations of all
social strata, of all political and religious forces in South
Vietnam. Only a full and total exercise of democratic liberties
can serve as a basis for the realization of national
reconciliation and concord, the settlement of the internal
affairs of South Viet Nam, and the exercise of the South
Vietnamese people's right to self-determination." (80)

We call upon the Vietnamese rulers to make these words a reality
in Vietnam today.

__________________________________

Footnotes

1. March 1981 written reply of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
(SRV) to Amnesty International, page 42 of Amnesty International
Report on Mission to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, June
1981.

2. estimate mentioned by Della Denman in the Far Eastern Economic
Review, August 6, 1982

3. see annual reports issued by Amnesty International

4. p.86, Which Human Rights?, published in Hanoi, 1980

5. The translated text of this document was published in the
appendix of a report on human rights in Vietnam prepared in 1978
by Stephen Young for the New York Bar Association.

6. ibid

7. discussed in detail in issue 1 (Oct. 79) of this newsletter.

8. 6/10/75 Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management Communique,
broadcast by Saigon Domestic Service on June, translated by the
Daily Report (Asia-Pacific) of Broadcasting Information Service
(hereafter as FBIS) on June 11, 1975.

9. 6/20/75 Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management Communique,
translated by FBIS, 6/23/75

10. 6/11/75 Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management translated by
FBIS, 6/12/75

11. from speech of Dr. Ninh at Amnesty International conference,
published in Amnesty Action (of AIUSA), Sept. 82

12. March 1981 written reply of SRV to AI, p. 42 of Amnesty
International Report on Mission to Socialist Republic of Vietnam

13. Nguc Tu Lao Dong Vietnam, Paris 1977, as cited by Stephen
Young in his 1978 report to New York Bar

14. p.272, Amnesty

#21 MC420

MC420

    Chief State Secretary (Shangshu Ling 尚书令)

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Posted 01 March 2006 - 11:10 PM

Statistics Of
Vietnamese Democide
Estimates, Calculations, And Sources*

By R.J. Rummel




Perhaps of all countries, democide in Vietnam and by Vietnamese is most difficult to unravel and assess. It is mixed in with six wars spanning 43 years (the Indochina War, Vietnam War, Cambodian War, subsequent guerrilla war in Cambodia, guerrilla war in Laos, and Sino-Vietnamese War), one of them involving the United States; a near twenty-one year formal division of the country into two sovereign North and South parts; the full communization of the North; occupation of neighboring countries by both North and South; defeat, absorption, and communization of the South; and the massive flight by sea of Vietnamese. As best as I can determine, through all this close to 3,800,000 Vietnamese lost their lives from political violence, or near one out of every ten men, women, and children.1 Of these, about 1,250,000, or near a third of those killed, were murdered.

Tables 6.1A and 6.1B give the sources, estimates and calculations of Vietnamese killed. As noted, Vietnam was involved in several wars and was for twenty-one years formally divided into two nation-states, North and South Vietnam. Moreover, both parts of Vietnam committed democide against their own people as well as in other countries, and democide was committed by foreigners against them. Not only is Vietnam's history complex, therefore, but the estimates of those killed in war and democide differ considerably by perpetrator, victims, time, and place. For these reasons I have made a special effort to divide the estimates into the smallest consistent groups and where possible to use the resulting consolidated figures to cross check totals and subtotals.

This will be seen, for example, in calculating the total war-dead (lines 1 to 261 in Table 6.1A). The first war was that against the French, defined here as beginning when the Viet Minh established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945 and lasting until July 1954. I divide estimates of war-dead and their calculations or consolidations into those for the Viet Minh (lines 3 to 4), France (lines 7 to 18), civilians (lines 22 to 25), military (lines 28 to 30), and total war-dead (lines 33 to 44). The total war-dead is the figure of interest here, but before accepting its consolidation (line 44) it can be checked against two other ways of getting the total. One is by adding together the separately determined figures for Viet Minh, French, and civilian war-dead (line 45); the other by adding civilian and military war-dead (line 46). This gives us three total war dead ranges for comparison (lines 44 to 46). The three mid-values tend to be relatively close, while the lows and highs are quite divergent. Since we generally want the higher high and lower low, I selected these for the final total and averaged the three mid-values (line 47). Subtracting then the non-Vietnamese war-dead (line 49) gives the cost of the Indochina War as 188,000 to 1,153,000, or 512,000 Vietnamese lives.

War-dead estimates for the Vietnam War abound (lines 53 to 214). I divide these first into civilian and total war-dead for North Vietnam and consolidate them (lines 54 to 67). Then I pull out estimates for Viet Cong war-dead (which may or may not also include North Vietnamese regulars--lines 69 to 83) and I give separately those estimates explicitly for both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead (lines 88 to 102). For both sets the estimates vary in the years and duration they cover. Accordingly, ignoring estimates for one year or those whose periods or coverage are unclear, I extrapolated the estimates for the years of the war. That is,

extrapolated estimate = (years of war)(estimate/years it covers).

Since many estimates here and later will be so extrapolated, the date taken for the beginning of the war is statistically important. I selected January 1960 based on those considerations given in Death By Government.2 That is, as evidenced by their activity, such as the building of the Ho Chi Minh trial, secret speeches by North Vietnamese leaders, orders to their operatives, and the creation of political front organizations in the south, by this date Hanoi clearly had prepared the way for and had begun a sustained guerrilla and military effort to take over the country. This means that the war lasted for 15.33 years.

However, the war was not equally violent and deadly for each of these years. It was far less intense in the early years than after the full American involvement in 1965. To take into account this possible shift in violence, therefore, I calculated three extrapolations for each estimate, where I made "years of war" successively equal to 12, 13, and 14. Even then this may seem to under or overly weight the estimates, especially for the early 1960s before the United States was fully involved; or those for the period of greatest violence during 1966 to 1969. In any case, I will subsequently check on these results by comparing them against total war-dead estimates.

Returning now to Table 6.1A and the consolidation of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead estimates and extrapolations (line 102), this may be checked against those consolidations of the separate war-dead estimates and extrapolations (line 67 and 83) by summing them (line 104). As can be seen, the two different ways of determining North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead yield roughly equal mid and high totals. For a preliminary war-dead range, I take the lowest low and highest high and average the two mid-values (line 105). This is preliminary since in the light of subsequent figures for war-deaths among South Vietnamese and other forces, it may have to be adjusted.

I follow similar procedures to determine a preliminary South Vietnamese war-dead range (lines 108 to 140). Note that the two ways of estimating this range (lines 138 and 139) yield fairly close mid and high totals, but still must be treated with caution. Unlike with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead estimates generally, civilian and total war-dead statistics for South Vietnam are not always clear as to whether they also cover democide. I have tried to separate out the ambiguous estimates, but sometimes this demands reading the mind of the source (e.g., lines 109, 132, 134). Even if labeled "war-dead" the estimate may cover all killed during the war, which would include democide (e.g., possibly line 133). In any case, keeping this in mind, I calculate a preliminary South Vietnamese war-dead total as I did for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (line 140).

Largely uncontroversial war-dead totals then are calculated for South Vietnam's allies (lines 142 to 179--the three estimates for South Vietnam and allies on lines 182 to 184 are for background only).

Finally I can calculate an overall war-dead total. I list related estimates and their consolidations for civilians (lines 188 to 193), military (lines 196 to 199), and combined (lines 202 to 206), and then check the latter by two sums. One is that of the separate civilian and military consolidations (line 207); the other is of the preliminary North Vietnam/Viet Cong, South Vietnam, United States, and other third party sub-totals (line 208). The three mid-values (lines 206 to 208) are relatively close, while one low is about a third lower than the others. Consistent with my approach, I take this low and the highest high to establish the final range. Its mid-value is the average of the three alternative mid-values (line 209). Subtracting foreign dead from this (line 210) gives a likely Vietnam War, war-dead total of 1,719,000 people (line 211). Since this is not the figure to which the preliminary North Vietnamese/Viet Cong and South Vietnamese war-dead figures summed, they must be adjusted such that they add up to this total. Proportionally adjusting them gives the final ranges and mid-values shown (lines 212 and 214).

Both North Vietnam and South Vietnam were involved in other wars and suffered rebellions of one-sort or another. In South Vietnam there was the suppression of various sects and their independent armies (line 219), rebellions of minorities (lines 222 to 223), the pre-Vietnam War communist inspired guerrilla war directed by North Vietnam from 1954 through 1959 (lines 227 and 228), and the incursion into Cambodia (line 239). For North Vietnam there was a severe local rebellion in 1957 (line 232); and the rebellion of S. Vietnamese against North Vietnam cadre and by National Liberation Front guerrillas after the Vietnam War (lines 233 to 235). And there was North Vietnam's war in Cambodia (lines 240 to 242), war in Laos (line 246), and war against China (lines 249 to 254). Totaling the consolidated estimates (line 258) and adding this to the other war-dead total gives an overall toll for the years 1945 to 1987 of 1,336,000 to 3,960,000, or a likely 2,509,000 Vietnamese (line 261). This was almost 7 percent of the mid-period population (line 867), or roughly one out of fourteen people

Finally, we can turn to democide. That for North Vietnam involved in the early years a terror devoted to eliminating non-communist nationalists, anti-communists, and those who were pro-French (lines 266 to 275). Once the war against the French was almost over Hanoi turned to destroying and rebuilding the rural economic and power structure. This period, from 1953 to 1956, is very significant and the estimates are very confused. I have accordingly outlined in the table all the estimates associated with it so that the mode of calculation and associated subtotals for this period can be clearly distinguished.

Among the first campaigns was that to "reduce rent," which really involved ridding the countryside of rich, powerful, and bourgeois peasants. (line 279). There is only one estimate of the associated democide, and for it the source (Hoang Van Chi, a Vietnamese nationalist with first hand experience) cites Professor Gerard Tongas who was in Hanoi during these years (he left in 1959), and which he claims to be accurate.3 I will therefore rely on this estimate in the subsequent calculations.

Once this campaign was completed and the countryside softened up, "land reform" proper took place (this was the taking of land from those who owned more than a defined amount and giving it to landless peasants-- a preliminary to full nationalization of the land). There are major problems in estimating those who were killed or died in the campaign. The estimates cover different periods; and some cover strictly the "land reform" campaign while others appear to mix up the "rent reduction" campaign with the "land reform" or "political struggle" campaigns, with on going repression and retaliation (lines 312 to 318), or with democide associated with the suppression of rebellions (lines 322 to 325). I try to handle this by dividing "land reform" estimates in terms of their ostensive inclusiveness. Thus I first present estimates of "executions" (lines 282 to 288); then those executed and otherwise "killed" (lines 292 to 298); and then those who also otherwise died (i.e., "dead"--lines 302 to 308), such as those tagged as wealthy peasants who were deprived of their land, officially ostracized and thus denied food and shelter. Consequently, in consolidating the "land reform" dead (line 309), I made sure that the figures subsumed the consolidated killed estimates (line 299), that this in turn subsumed the consolidated execution estimates (line 289), and that this subsumed the rent reduction killed (line 279). In determining the final democide "land reform" total, I only added the final "land reform" dead (line 309) to those killed in political struggle, etc. (line 319), and the suppression of uprisings (line 326). The probable democide for this four year period then totals 283,000 North Vietnamese (line 329).

But then there was also those who died in prison or at forced labor from 1945 to 1956. One estimate of 500,000 dead (line 335) from President Nixon, which may have been based on secret intelligence estimates, cannot be accepted without some publicly available confirming information or similar independent estimates. Based on other estimates of the prison/camp population I assumed a 50,000 camp population per year and an unnatural death rate of 2 percent per year, on par with the Chinese rate4 and much lower then for the Soviet gulag.5 This gives me a low of 24,000 dead (line 336). There is not enough information to estimate a high or mid number.

Then also there were the POWs from the French Expeditionary Force that were killed. Based on the sources,6 I only dare estimate this number at 13,000 (line 341).

Putting together all these consolidations and calculations, I figure that for the years 1945 to 1956 the Vietnamese communists likely killed 242,000 to 922,000 people (line 347). Above this range I show two other estimates of these dead (lines 344 and 345), one at 700,000 and the other at 500,000 dead. Both are contained within the range at which I arrived.

Through torture, executions, and incarceration the French also committed democide during the Indochina War. Although while hints of this are given in the sources, there is not enough information to even estimate a minimum. We can however count the Vietnamese killed when a French heavy cruiser shelled the civilian areas of Haiphong (lines 350 to 357) and add the consolidated range (line 358) in with the total democide (line 364).

I can now give a summary of the democide for this period (lines 361 to 365).

As to the 1954 to 1975 period, democide continued in North Vietnam (lines 370 to 371) and there is one estimate of it available for 1956 to 1959 from Todd Culbertson, a member of the Editorial Page staff of the Richmond Virginia News Leader. He does not justify or give his sources for this estimate. I guess that the 1956 portion of this estimate includes executions associated with political repression, rebellions, and the last year of "land reform." These may account for half or more of the estimate and the consolidated range takes this into account. Without giving figures, Bernard Fall (line 371) gives substance to the Culbertson estimate in his discussion of the execution of intellectuals over the years 1956-1960 as a result of the "hundred flowers" campaign similar to that carried out by Mao in China.7

The rest of the estimates for this period are for North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam during the pre-Vietnam War guerrilla struggle, during the war itself, and in Cambodia (lines 374-472). It is now clear from documents available since the end of the Vietnam War (similar documents were also available during the war but were considered by many academic area experts as possible South Vietnam or CIA disinformation--since then interviews and speeches by communist leaders and the defection of former communist, National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong high officials or officers, have verified their content)8 that the Viet Cong were not an independent force, but operated under the direction of Hanoi. As discussed in Death By Government, among the Viet Cong the major decisions about who should be killed were made by North Vietnamese operatives. This is not to deny that the Viet Cong, many of whom were recruited in South Vietnam, may have assassinated officials or executed civilians on their own. For these actions, however, they were ultimately answerable to North Vietnamese superiors. Therefore, I attributed all alleged Viet Cong democide to North Vietnam.

One more point. As a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreements that formally ended the Indochina War, Vietnam was officially split into North Vietnam and South Vietnam, all be it until Vietnam wide elections were to be held. As the possibility of these elections receded and both Hanoi and Saigon took on all the domestic and international functions of permanent governments, South Vietnam was also diplomatically recognized by a number of countries and carried out formal diplomatic interaction. Moreover, in the Paris Agreement of 1973 signed with the United States, North Vietnam officially recognized the sovereignty of South Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam is treated as foreign democide, not domestic.

The first estimates of this democide concern the North's assassination and execution of South Vietnamese officials (lines 376 to 387), civilians (lines 393 to 406), and both (lines 411 to 426). These estimates cover many different years and are, where it would help in their consolidation, extrapolated for the years 1954 to the end of the Vietnam War (lines 388, 407, and 428). A problem is that such killing increased in intensity from the early guerrilla years. To compensate for this over the twenty-one years, I extrapolated the low for only fourteen years, the high for eighteen.

Among the best of the estimates are those given by Guenter Lewy, themselves based on an error range of plus or minus 25 percent (which yields the low and high shown with his mid-estimate--lines 379, 395, and 424). When added together these estimates cover the period 1957 to 1972 (line 413) and their range is contained within the final consolidated one (line 428). I also check this consolidation by summing the separate ones for the officials and civilians (line 432). Clearly there is little difference between the two ways of assessing the democide and a final total is determined as usual (line 433).

Because of the disruption caused by the Tet offensive in 1968, South Vietnam was unable to keep count of assassinations during this period and their number usually do not appear in the above. I therefore treat them separately (lines 436 to 448).

Other democides by North Vietnam (lines 454 to 459) include the wanton killing of refugees, shelling of Saigon civilian areas, and killing of American and South Vietnamese POWs. Moreover, the North Vietnamese were heavily involved in Cambodia and also committed democide there (line 451).

The estimated range of refugees killed in one case (line 454) may seem relatively high but is probably conservative. Of the 200,000 refugees that fled the Highlands offensive by the North in March 1975, only 45,000 made it to Tuy-Hoa. Many of the 155,000 missing were killed by North Vietnamese troops; others were captured. Rebel highlanders also fired on the refugees, some were mistakenly bombed by government planes, and still others may have been run over by fleeing government vehicles. Some died by drowning and sheer exhaustion. I estimate that of those missing about 15 percent to 65 percent, most reasonably around one-third, were slaughtered by the North or died due to their actions. Because of the size of this missing figure, I should note that it comes from Phan Quang Dan,9 whose background (MAD., opposition leader, imprisoned by Dim, Chairman of the Interministerial Committee for the Relief of Refugees from Cambodia in 1970, former Secretary of State for Land Development and Hamlet Building, and Minister of Social Welfare and concurrent Deputy Prime Minister) gives much authority to the estimate. He was one of the officials who tried to provide food and camps for the refugees straggling into Tuby-Hoa. Weight is added to his description of this massacre by Louis A. Wiener, an international authority on refugees.10

North Vietnamese troops or their guerrilla Viet Cong surely committed more democide than that for which I have been able to find estimates. Throughout the guerrilla period and during the war they shelled and attacked civilians in strategic hamlets and refugee camps, attacked refugees fleeing on the roads in order to create chaos, shelled civilians in most government controlled cities and towns, and purposely mined and booby-trapped civilian areas (as of mining roads traveled by civilian buses). Moreover, thousands or tens of thousands were abducted to disappear forever, but are not included here under assassinations and executions. The sources give no estimates of these killings and to leave it at this would thus create a large hole in the total democide. Accordingly, I will assume that the additional deaths from these North Vietnam/Viet Cong atrocities and terror amounted to at least 200 a month over the twenty-one years from 1955 to the end of the war. This seems consistent with both sympathetic and unsympathetic descriptions of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong tactics and actions during the war, especially in considering that as a minimum the 200 dead covers the length and breadth of the unestimated North Vietnam/Viet Cong atrocities and terror throughout all of South Vietnam for some thirty days.

I can now total the overall domestic and foreign democide for North Vietnam during this period (lines 467 to 472). One estimate presumably of the overall National Liberation Front democide (line 468) is shown for comparison to the sum of North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam (line 467). It is much larger than even the high and is given in the source without explanation, justification, or citation.11 I therefore ignore it. In total then, North Vietnam probably murdered some 216,000 people (line 472).

Next, I consider the democide by South Vietnamese and others (lines 475 to 621in Table 6.1B). First there is that by the South Vietnamese Diem regime (lines 476 to 521). This includes those that died as a result of forced resettlement (lines 476 to 481), arrest and imprisonment (lines 484 to 494), executions and terror (lines 497 to 515), and from South Vietnamese bombing and shelling (line 518). For some of the consolidations or calculations, death rates had to be assumed (e.g., line 481). These were based on descriptions in the sources of the associated conditions and bits of information about deaths. In each case I attempted to bracket with the low and high what seemed to be the extremes.

Taking all these into account, the Diem democide amounts to 16,000 to 167,000 murdered Vietnamese (line 521).

Then I tabulate estimates of democide by the post-Diem regimes. For this the estimates cover much the same categories, but are fuller and apparently more complete. However, death rates also have to be assumed (e.g., line 556) in order to calculate the democide range. One estimate of a massacre in Quang Nam province allegedly by "U.S., puppet, satellite troops" is ambiguous and treated as by South Vietnam (line 569). There was also South Vietnamese democide during its incursion into Cambodia (line 572). Totaling all this (lines 575 and 576) gives South Vietnamese democide during these years as 42,000 to 118,000 people, virtually all Vietnamese (line 577).

A particularly controversial and difficult issue is American democide during the war. As clear from the literature this was a subject of intense propaganda on the one hand and denial on the other. There is no easy way of dealing with this except to study carefully those presumably more objective post-war accounts.12 To at least determine a provisional high, I recorded all estimates, even if manifestly propaganda (e.g., lines 595 and 597).

Consider first those killed in all Allied bombing and shelling (lines 581 to 589). No doubt some of this violated internationally accepted rules of warfare and those laid down by the American command to guide its forces.13 But that killing in defiance of command directives is not democide. The question is how many of these deaths then constituted democide by Allied forces, that is indiscriminate killing resulting from or consistent with higher commands. From the sources it seems that this was a small proportion of the overall toll, possibly 5 to 10 percent (line 590), and probably a tenth to a quarter of this democide was due to American action (line 592). This would mean that American forces murdered by shell and bomb some 400 to 5,000 Vietnamese, most likely some 800. For all American forces throughout South Vietnam, this works out to about 5 to 60 Vietnamese killed per month from 1965 to 1972, which seem prudent brackets on the monthly American democide by bomb or shell.

Then there are the massacres and atrocities that American forces were found or alleged to have done (lines 595 to 598). Most of these are given in North Vietnam/National Liberation Front documents or by their sympathizers. Some of these did occur, as at My Lai, but for some of the others it is unclear whether civilians killed during legitimate military action are being labeled as massacred or not. In any case, the consolidated low and mid-value are such as to assume that beyond those massacres we do know took place there is warrant to some others mentioned (line 601). There is simply not enough information to give a high.

The use of defoliation herbicides and potentially dangerous tear gas (which could kill very young or old civilians caught by the gas in confined areas, such as caves or bunkers) did cause some deaths for which the U.S. must be held responsible (lines 604 to 607).

Finally, we must recognize that aside from what was estimated above, there was throughout American involvement a background of small level atrocities (such as the killing of Viet Cong trying to surrender or of innocent peasants simply because they were running away) and massacres (such as wiping out the inhabitants of a village from which a sniper had been firing). Given the extent and nature of this war for Americans, it seems that a low of near 25 Vietnamese so murdered per month is probably a rock bottom figure, especially considering that this is less than one such killing per day for all American ground action in all of South Vietnam. This low amounts to 2,000 Vietnamese killed in total (line 610).

Summing these various estimates gives us a total American democide of around 4,000 to 10,000 Vietnamese, or a likely 5,500 (line 613). One way of judging whether this figure is way too low or high is to look at it as a monthly ratio to American troop strength. For the seven years of war 1965 to 1971, American troop strength averaged 365,571 personnel.14 This means that by bombing, shelling, and during ground combat, the equivalent of about one Vietnamese per month was murdered for every 5,583 American military personnel. This ratio seems about right to me, given the known atrocities and massacres, the indiscriminate bombing and shelling that did occur, and the confessions about killing POWs or those trying to surrender, all juxtaposed against the early insufficient but later extensive attempts by the High Command to limit such killing, hold soldiers and officers responsible for such acts, and better publicize rules of engagement that would protect civilians.

Other South Vietnamese allies also committed democide, specifically S. Korean troops. As with the estimates of American democide, estimates for the Koreans are usually from propaganda issued by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, although there is independent evidence that some democide was committed (lines 618 and 620). I estimate a low of 3,000 Vietnamese murdered, which also takes into account possible democide not given in the sources.

Now I can gather together (lines 624 to 628) and total (line 629) the various estimates of democide by South Vietnam and allies during the Vietnam War and pre-guerrilla period. This sum is then compared to one estimate of democide given by the National Liberation Front (line 630) and its extrapolation for the whole period 1954 to war's end (line 632). As can be seen, this estimate is contained within the range (line 629) already determined and which accordingly is taken as the final figure (line 633).

Considerable democide followed Hanoi's victory over South Vietnam in 1975. I show estimates of this or related information (lines 637 to 759), the first of which refer to re-education camps. To determine some range of deaths in these camps, I had to first establish their population. Estimates of this for various periods are shown in the table (line 638 to 668), and consolidated for 1975 to 1980, and 1981 to 1987 (lines 669 and 670). The reason for this periodization is that there were many more inmates during the earlier period and most important, this period was more deadly. Only one estimate of the number of deaths in the camps is available (line 672). Rather than accept this, however, I calculated the toll (line 673) based on an assumed death rate that for the early period was in deadliness closer to the Communist Chinese camps than the more lethal Soviet gulag.15 In the later period the annual toll is assumed about the same as for the later Chinese labor camps. The resulting range includes the one estimate (line 675) and I therefore accept it as final.

Next there are estimates (lines 679 to 683) of the number of forced laborers, including those forcibly deported to "new economic zones," from which consolidation (line 684) we can try to calculate the associated unnatural deaths. This I do (line 687), assuming a very low annual rate of .75 to 2 percent for the first six years and .5 percent thereafter. This also assumes that the zones were about a quarter to a third less deadly then the camps in the early period and half as deadly later.

Not all democide figures are indirect. Estimates are available on executions (lines 690 to 697), which I consolidate (line 698).

Then there are the boat people for whose deaths at sea Hanoi is responsible. Some of these Vietnamese were forced to flee, some fled out of terror and fear for their lives, some fled by virtue of unlivable conditions that the communists had created for them. To understand the drive to flee on the dangerous open ocean often in unseaworthy boats is to realize the deadly hazards they faced from the regime, as discussed in Death By Government. The table lists estimates of the number of Vietnamese boat people that fled or tried to flee (lines 702 to 711) and their consolidation (line 713). Estimates of the percent of these then dying at sea are also given and consolidated (lines 716 to 730), followed by death estimates (lines 733 to 748). The consolidation of these (749) gives us one overall range of deaths. I calculate another by applying the consolidated percentage mortality to the consolidated number fleeing (line 750). Neither of these totals especially commends itself. In the usual fashion, I therefore took the lowest low and highest high and averaged the two mid-values to get the final range (line 751).

How many of these deaths is the responsibility of the communist Vietnamese, that is, democide? Neither the extremes of "none" or "all" is reasonable. Surely those who were forced to face death at sea, or risked it out of mortal fear of the regime or because their lives and families had been irretrievably ruined by it, should be counted as democide (by analogy consider that if children fled their family in winter because they fear being killed or are brutally abused, and then die of exposure in the snow, the parents could be tried for murder). However, those boat people who left for non-vital reasons, such as for economic reasons, and died at sea should hardly be counted as democide. What the proportion is between the two types of refugees is unknown. I assume that those for which the regime must be held responsible could vary from one-third to two-thirds, most reasonably a half of them. Applying this to the number who fled yields a likely Vietnam democide of 250,000 boat people (line 753).

As calculated elsewhere in this book, the probable democide that Vietnam committed in Cambodia (line 756) and Laos (line 759) are listed in the table.

Finally, I can calculate the overall democide of Vietnam in the post-Vietnam War period (lines 762 to 764). This amounts to 346,000 to 2,438,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians, probably about 1,040,000.

In order to organize the many different kinds of subtotals and totals that have been calculated in the table, I summarize and collect the various statistics (lines 771 to 838) and now compare them to estimates of such totals in the sources. First I total the Vietnamese dead during the Indochina War (line 775) and then for the Vietnam War and its early guerrilla phase (line 785). The resulting range for North Vietnam (and their surrogate Viet Cong--line 787) brackets the one overall estimate available in the sources (line 786).

Next I give estimates of the overall civilian toll during the Vietnam War (lines 791 to 798) and then use their consolidation (line 800) to check the figures I previously calculated, as given by sum of civilians killed in war and all democide during this period (line 802). As can be seen, while the high is appropriately higher, the low is over 100,000 greater than the consolidated figure and raises some question as to the validity of the underlying sub-totals. As a result I reviewed the low of all the various calculations and consolidations going into this sum and find each appropriately conservative. The problem lies with that consolidated low based on extrapolating Lewy's estimate (line 797) for twelve years. In arriving at his estimate Lewy does not take into account the civilian democide by South Vietnam and Allies nor that by North Vietnam in the North; nor does it take into account those killed in rebellions in South Vietnam. The resulting dead, when added to the civilian war-dead determined above (line 800) would add near 100,000 to the low and bring it close to the summed low (line 802). I therefore accept the sum without adjustment.

Following this are listed estimates of the overall military and civilian toll (lines 805 to 814). As above, I use their consolidation (815) as a check on the overall sum (line 816) of the various calculations and sub-totals for this period. This time the whole range (line 816) is as it should be (the low is lower and high higher) and the mid-value is relatively close to the consolidated one (this also lends further support to the sum for civilians alone).

With these checks completed, I can pull together the various sub-totals and totals and present them in a summary fashion (lines 823 to 838). In total 3,760,000 Vietnamese probably died of political violence during over forty-two years (line 831). Some 1,250,000, or over 33 percent of them were murdered. This does not count Laotians and Cambodians killed by Vietnamese governments, virtually all by Hanoi. When these are added and those Vietnamese killed by foreigners subtracted, the total democide by Vietnamese is 1,760,000 people (line 838).

There are still the democide rates to calculate and other statistics to present. For information I list a number of estimates of Vietnamese refugees and consolidate them (lines 841-860). Then I give population estimates for the whole country (lines 864 to 876), North Vietnam (lines 879 to 890), and South Vietnam (lines 894 to 905). I will use them to calculate the democide rates (line 908 to 942).

Regarding these, the only issue is whether to include North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War as domestic or foreign democide. For reasons previously given, I consider South Vietnam a separate country during this period and accordingly treat it as foreign soil for North Vietnam. Another issue concerns whether to calculate a democide rate for North Vietnam that would include that portion of South Vietnam it controlled (which in 1964 could have been as high as 80 percent16). This I will not do, since so much of the North's democide in the South during 1954 to 1975 was in areas controlled by the government. Finally, for those rates that include the period when the North controlled Hanoi and then after its victory over the South, all of Vietnam, I had to calculate them using a weighted average as shown in the table (lines 920, 922, 927, 929). For all Vietnam, Hanoi killed about 1 percent of those Vietnamese under its control, or near 1 out of every 901 people per year. 

NOTES

* From the pre-publisher edited manuscript of Chapter 6 in R.J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide, 1997. For full reference to Statistics of Democide, the list of its contents, figures, and tables, and the text of its preface, click book.

1. Vietnam's population for 1967, the mid-year of the period, was 36,820,000 (UN Demographic Yearbook 1971, p. 135).

2. Rummel (1994, Chapter 11).

3. Chi (1964, p. 166).

4. Rummel (1991, Table IIA.1, lines 378-382).

5. Rummel (1990, p. 28).

6. Particularly, Lewy (1978, p. 341) and Hyman (1992, p. 42).

7. Fall (1966, pp. 188-90).

8. See, for example, Hosmer (1970), Lewy (1978), Tang (1985), Toai (1990), and Wiesner (1988).

9. Phan (1988, p. xiv).

10. Wiesner (1988, pp. 318-19).

11. I queried Harff and Gurr, the author's of the estimate, by letter, but received no response.

12. Among the most useful of these I would include Lewy (1978), Andradr (1990), Moss (1990), Wiesner (1988), and Moore (1990)

13. See Rummel (1994, Chapter 11).

14. Calculated from Thayer (1985, Table 4.4, p. 34).

15.See Rummel (1990, p. 28; 1991, Table IIA.1, lines 378-382

16.See O'Neill (1969, p. 7).


The Solzhenitsyn of Vietnam

By Michael Lind
Whitehead Senior Fellow

The New Leader
February 1, 2001

Bill Clinton's visit to Vietnam last November, during the closing months of his Presidency, revealed a split in the American elite over the interpretation of the Vietnam War. Democratic politicians, like Clinton, departing Vice President Al Gore and Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, argue that U.S. intervention in Indochina was imprudent, but no significant figure then in public office any longer claimed that the war was immoral. At the same time, the major metropolitan book reviews and journals of the dwindling Left such as Dissent and the Nation persisted in trotting out Frances FitzGerald, George C. Herring and other relics of the '60s to put their stamp of approval on the steady stream of volumes produced by Leftist professors to repeat, yet again, the discredited dogmas of the antiwar movement- that Ho Chi Minh was a benevolent figure, that former Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon were sinister mass murderers who waged the war solely to promote their short-term political ambitions.

In a decade or two, however, after middle-aged editors bent on keeping this line alive have retired, even the liberal press and the academy will acknowledge the truth: The Vietnam War was not an aberration, it was simply one battle in the half-century Cold War that ended with the collapse of Marxism-Leninism.

This is the view of the greatest living Vietnamese poet, Nguyen Chi Thien. If you haven't read his name in the New York Times or the New York Review of Books or Dissent or the Nation, there is a reason. By the 1980s, it became socially acceptable in American liberal intellectual circles to support anti-Communist dissident writers, but only on two conditions. First, they had to be European (like Vaclav Havel and Joseph Brodsky) and second, they had to criticize Communism from Social Democratic perspective (this disqualified the Orthodox Russian nationalist Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn). Nguyen Chi Thien fails both tests-he is Asian (what white American liberal or Leftist has heard of any anti-Communist Asian dissidents, other than Wei Jingsheng?), and he rejects Marxism in all its varieties. To make matters worse, he reminds American intellectuals of a war in which many of them rooted for the dictatorship that imprisoned him. This explains the curious fact that Nguyen Chi Thien, who has been suggested repeatedly for the Nobel Prize, is well-known everywhere in the world except the United States, his adopted home.

Now living in exile alternately in Virginia and Paris, Nguyen Chi Thien was born in 1939 to a lower-middle-class family (his father was a court clerk), and received a good education in French and Vietnamese culture. In 1954, at the age of 15, he welcomed the Geneva Accords' establishment of Communist North Vietnam. But like many North Vietnamese, he turned against the regime during the ensuing reign of terror.

The Hanoi dictatorship instituted the Soviet and Chinese collectivization models as its disastrous "land reform program." A "Population Classification Degree" of March 2, 1953, assigned everyone to categories invented by the Soviets in the 1920s, e.g. "landlord" and "agricultural worker." Notwithstanding the fact that the average landlord in North Vietnam owned less than two acres of rice land, somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 North Vietnamese were denounced as class enemies and shot.

During this period Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues were so impressed by Mao's large-scale class genocide that they brought in Chinese Communists to help them sort out who should live and who should die. Bui Tin, a former North Vietnamese official, described the case of Mrs. Nguyen Thi Nam. Although her sons were Communist Party officials, "the Chinese adviser concluded that she was a cruel landowner who had to be eliminated." This case was brought to Ho Chi Minh's attention, but he refused to intervene. "Mrs. Nam was quickly condemned to death on the advice of Mao Tse-tung's representative, who accused her of deceitfully entering the ranks of the revolution to destroy it from within."

Some peasants used the land reform process to settle scores, but as the imprisonment and murder grew in scale many were frightened into resistance. On November 2, 1956, villagers rebelled in Nghe-An, near Ho's birthplace, forcing the regime to send in the 325th Division of the People's Army to crush them.

As in Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China, in Ho's North Vietnam the land reform terror was called off when it had served its purpose of atomizing society and cementing the control of the communist party. Ho Chi Minh admitted that "errors" had been made, but blithely dismissed the victims of the mass murder: "One cannot waken the dead."

The atrocities of the North Vietnamese government appalled many intellectuals, including some in the Communist Party. Their protest took the form of articles in two publications, Nhan Van ("The Humanities") and Giai Pham ("Masterpieces"), from which the so-called Nhan Van-Giai Pham Affair (1956-58) took its name. The regime cracked down on the dissidents, but could not kill the spirit of dissent. Nguyen Chi Thien began composing poetry critical of the regime, which was privately circulated. The authorities jailed him in 1961.

In testimony before the U.S. Congress in 1995, the poet described what happened: "In 1961 Ho Chi Minh himself signed a decree ordering the re-education of several hundred thousand people, consisting of those who had served in the military or government of the Bao Dai regime, and those in the general population who were discontented with the regime, including Buddhist monks, Catholic priests, lay Catholics, bourgeois capitalists and intellectuals. They were all corralled in hard labor camps…The vast majority of these people were never brought to trial and their fate depended entirely on the dispositions made by the Public Security cadres."

Released in 1963, Nguyen Chi Thien was arrested again in 1966 and was imprisoned until 1977. Like Solzhenitsyn in the Gulag, he had to compose his work and commit it to memory. Whether he was in the city jail of Hoa Lo (the "Hanoi Hilton" where many American POWs spent time) or hard labor camps in the countryside, he spent days reciting his poems to himself. His greatest fear was that if he lost his memory his life's work would be obliterated.

After being released in 1977, he lived with a friend and wrote down almost 400 poems from memory. He chose Bastille Day, 1979 (July 14) to smuggle his work to diplomats in the French Embassy in Hanoi. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese security detail standing guard deterred him. Two days later, pursued by another security detail, he plunged into the British embassy, shouting in English, "I am not a madman, I am a poet and I have something important to give to you." To their credit, three British diplomats shut out the Vietnamese guards and asked him what he wanted. He gave them his manuscript and three photographs of himself, to establish that he did not seek to hide in anonymity. On leaving the embassy he was arrested. He spent 12 more years in prison and composed a second collection of poems. In 1991 he was released and emigrated to the United States.

Alluding to Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal ("Flowers of Evil"), Nguyen Chi Thien titled his first collection Hoa Dia Nguc ("Flowers of Hell"). In the letter accompanying his manuscript, he wrote: "Most of [the poems] were written during my years of detention. I think it is incumbent upon us, the victims, more so than upon anyone else, to show to the world the incredible suffering of our mercilessly oppressed and tortured people. Of my broken life there remains but one dream, that is to see the greatest possible number of people realize that Communism is a great calamity for mankind."

By 1980 poems from the first collection began to circulate among the Vietnamese in the U.S., France and other countries. In 1982, an article in Asiaweek, headlined "A Voice from the Hanoi Underground," followed by a BBC broadcast, brought wider attention to the dissident poet. He was awarded honors or membership by PEN clubs in the United States, France, Sweden, and Japan. His poems were translated into English, French, Japanese, German, Chinese, Czech, and Spanish. Some of his lyrics have been set to music by the Austrian composer Gunter Mattisch and the Vietnamese exile composer Pham Duy.

The poet's oeuvre consists of more than poems of political protest; it includes love lyrics, landscape scenes and poetic meditations. The originals are in rhyming meters from Vietnamese tradition, some of them complex, others simple folk forms. The nearest comparison might be the combination of political content and traditional prosody in the work of Bertolt Brecht (who was hardly a critic of Communism). Regrettably, the English renditions by Nguyen Ngoc Bich give no idea of the delicate form of the originals, but the content is clear.

These poems make hard reading, not only for pro-Communist Leftists but for the older generation of anti-anti-Communist liberals who rolled their eyes when President Ronald Reagan described the Soviet Union as "an evil empire" and predicted that Marxism-Leninism would soon end up on the trash heap of history.

From his early adulthood, Nguyen Chi Thien concluded, as the French authors of The Black Book of Communism did recently, that (in their words) "crime-mass crime, systematic crime, and crime against humanity" must be "a central factor in the analysis of Communism." In one of his "Scribblings" the poet wrote: "Oh, doleful Marxism-Leninism!/By the time you get here, to Vietnam, you've become a real crime!/ No matter how shameful you've been in Europe/All your crimes amount to but a thousandth of what took place here in Asia!"

Here is an early poem from 1960, "Should Providence Exist": "Should Providence exit and there remain a tomorrow/I will tell the stories of this horrible night/ So that the present generation and the next and the next/would wake up to this suffering/And animated by rightful anger, they would pool their forces/To kill this poisonous red snake, smashing its brain/ Thus liberating one third of mankind/Which is currently in its grasp, more dead than alive."

In 1973, when most of America's academic experts were insisting that Vietnamese Communism was an indigenous outgrowth of Vietnamese patriotism, Nguyen Chi Thien offered a different theory in "Under Party Guidance": "This Party in fact is nothing more than a gangster mob/…/Made possible by Russian and Chinese arms and the weapons of arrest..."

"Red Power" was composed in prison in 1975, shortly before President Jimmy Carter dismissed what he called an "inordinate fear of Communism": "Red Power: We must be of one mind to crush it/For if we let it roam, catastrophes will follow/…/One must write, thousands of us must write /About its colossal crimes, however subtly camouflaged /…/Knowledge then will be its destroyer, its grave."

Generation after generation of Westerners, taken on Potemkin village tours of the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba, were fooled into thinking that Marxism-Leninism offered a way out of poverty for developing nations. For example, Barbara Tuchman and John Kenneth Galbraith, visiting the People's Republic of China in the early 1970s, both declared that Mao had overseen remarkable economic progress (we now know that tens of millions of people had starved to death because of the Great Leap Forward only a decade earlier).

In 1974, Nguyen Chi Thien analyzed Socialist economics in "A Cut of Pork": "What a miracle, a cut of pork!/A double miracle, a beef cut, my friend!/Lime, banana, orange, sugar, peanut, bean, rice, yam/Everything and anything that one can chew on/At the Party's magic touch becomes a miracle hard to find…"

For writing such verses the poet spent most of his adult life in prison and had his health permanently shattered. Ho Chi Minh's government preferred poems like the one written by the party poet To Huu on the death of Stalin in 1953: "Stalin, oh Stalin, alas He is gone!/Do Heaven and Earth still exist?/Devotion to father, to mother, to husband/Devotion to Him ten times more than to oneself." (In The Flowers of Hell, Nguyen Chi Thien mocks such literary toadies as "pen pals" of the dictators).

The North Vietnamese dictatorship made sure that its prisoners (a category that included Vietnamese outside as well as inside the jails and re-education camps) knew of the latest statements and actions by anti-Vietnam War activists in the United States and Europe. Naturally, the participation of Bertrand Russell in the farcical Stockholm tribunal that judged the U.S. guilty of war crimes was a boost to the regime. Nguyen Chi Thien composed a response, in prison in 1968.

"Letter to Bertrand Russell.": "The world respects you as a philosopher/But in politics, you are only a novice./ After all your noisy defenses of the Vietcong,/Can you in truth say you really know them?/Please come and have a look at our country,/Come and see for yourself our system of slavery,/Come and visit our countless prisons/Where even pigs and cows fare better than people./Just come and seek one angry testimony:/ You will learn how we have been hushed forever./Only then will you understand them, your allies,/Whom you will want chopped into many pieces./My dear Sir, you're a hundred years of age/But in 'Communistology' you're a mere babe."

Also in 1968, while students on campuses across the U.S. and Europe were demonstrating in favor of the Vietcong, Nguyen Chi Thien composed "I can Eat," a poem whose meter, though not its content, suggests a folk song by Bob Dylan or Peter, Paul and Mary: "I can eat a few kilos of raw manioc/And enjoy them as if they were chocolate! / Aren't you impressed that I can outdo a hog?/It's because I am living in a Vietcong jail./In the winter when blow wintry blasts/I am half submerged in water gathering sharp bamboo./Do you think that I have copper skin and iron bones?/No, I am just living in a Vietcong jail./My bed is a piece of mat about two feet wide./On one side is a leper, on the other a TB case! /What do you think that I should do?/I am living, though, in a Vietcong jail."

In his testimony to Congress in 1995, Nguyen Chi Thien explained his views on the Vietnam War: "In actuality, this "war of liberation" was nothing more than a struggle to impose Communism, or its Marxist-Leninist brand, on the whole of Vietnam as a stepping stone to the domination of the rest of Southeast Asia. After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, hundreds of thousands of people were sent to the Vietnamese Gulags. There was no need for a bloodbath, since that would be too obvious. Instead, under the new regime, hundreds of thousands of people died of hunger and cold, or simply died without notice in godforsaken corners of the jungle."

The dissident poet continued: "Mr.[Robert S.] McNamara's recent book on the war in Vietnam [In Retrospect] shows how little he understands Vietnam and the Vietnamese people. Furthermore, he insulted the memory of those who have fought and sacrificed for the cause of freedom and democracy in Vietnam, which is closely linked to the same ideals in the world and in the United States itself…In retrospect, the war in Vietnam can be compared to a battle-a major battle if you want-that was lost, but in the end contributed to a victory on the grandest scale!"

The rapture with which young Vietnamese greeted President Clinton during his November trip to Vietnam suggests that Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in that impoverished, unfree nation will not outlive its gerontocratic Vietnamese leadership by more than a few years. But the future is likely to see the return of political evil elsewhere in the guise of new movements and ideologies. The most dangerous and misleading of these will, like Communism, appeal to the ideals of progress and enlightenment. The intellectual heroism of Nguyen Chi Thien, Solzhenitsyn, and the many other unarmed prophets who confronted the most lethal lie of the 20th century, will be needed then, to inspire their successors in countries battling other kinds of tyranny. Nguyen Chi Thien's "They Exiled Me" (1972) can serve as a timeless anthem of survival for dissidents everywhere:

"They exiled me to the heart of the jungle/Wishing to fertilize the manioc with my remains/I turned into an expert hunter/And came out full of snake wisdom and rhino fierceness./They sank me in the ocean/Wishing that I would remain in the depths/I became a deep sea diver/And came up covered with scintillating pearls./They squeezed me into the dirt/Hoping that I would become mire/I turned instead into a miner/And brought up stores of the most precious metal./No diamond or gold, though/The kind to adorn women's baubles/But uranium with which to manufacture the atom bomb."

#22 jiangji

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 01:54 AM

Jiangji:

The holocaust didn't exist!

The Rape of Nanjing didn't take place!

No, these events didn't happen at all but Ho Chi Minh and his followers committed no terrors and they are truthly democratic lovers! :haha:

Go read some history books ...! It's your advise for living witness and survivor of the VC! B)



Don't distort my argument. I never says the Ho and Viet Minh did not commit any atrocities or engaging terror tactics. I also never says the Ho followers support demoracry path. Apparently, you never read my posts carefully. I did states that Viet Minh commit atrocities but so as US and his allies too. From your posts, you seem to put all the blame on the Ho Chin Minh and his followers without realizing that US and his allies inflict more death on Vietnamese.

Finally, I ask you one question which you never give me an answer. Which countries started the Vietnam Wars (1965-1975) ? If this wars never happen, millions of vietnamese could had survive ! If US allow free election, most of this suffering would not had happen.

Edited by jiangji, 02 March 2006 - 02:04 AM.

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#23 MC420

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 08:48 AM

Jiangji:

Pls don't mix up the name; Viet Minh =/= Viet Cong; Viet Minh was the short name of Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội (Vietnam National Independent Alliance Association) whereas Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist). For those who understand a bit of recent Vietnam history, they would be able to distinguish these terms so that they could follow consequences of Vietnam modern history much clearer! During the national independent movements, there were quite a few groups alligned together under the banner of Viet Minh to fight against the French after 1945; however, due to the fact that Ho and his associates employed terror tactics to rid off their opponents mercilessly during that 9 years period therefore it lead to the separations of various nationalist groups and then eventually the division of Vietnam.

From your posts, you seem to put all the blame on the Ho Chin Minh and his followers without realizing that US and his allies inflict more death on Vietnamese.

Collateral damages would happen in any war! the intend is what we need to focus! The result was already done! The verdict was already issued! Communism in general was the worst thing Ho and his comrades brought to Vietnam. Communism in general was also the worst idea developed and implemented by their false believers! Of course, I expect those die hard communists would disagree with my viewpoint; however, I and millions other Vietnamese understand who was the cause of general sufferings and million deaths which took place in Vietnam since 1954. HCM and his communist comrades <--- definitely the ones! If trade for the lesser evils, we would accept Vietnam or at least South Vietnam would be in the position of South Korea or Taiwan in their present condition in comparing to their counterparts in North Korean or Mainland China! B)


Finally, I ask you one question which you never give me an answer. Which countries started the Vietnam Wars (1965-1975) ? If this wars never happen, millions of vietnamese could had survive ! If US allow free election, most of this suffering would not had happen.



My answer to you is short and simple; Ho and his comrades (including the USSR & Red China) started the Vietnam war; it was their original ambition not only for Vietnam but the rest of the free world as well. Vietnam was merely one of the battles after Korea theater, ect. B)

Free election <-- which would never happen under any communist system; especially in Vietnam after 1954 when Ho and his comrades already committed to employ terror tactic to intimidate the general Vietnamese population. :no: Let's look at inside Vietnam now (2006), any free election would be allowed to take place? Definitely no. Only the VCP would nominate their own candidates in any ballots for people to elect <-- if this is what you would call as democratic or free election! :haha:

Edited by MC420, 02 March 2006 - 09:05 AM.


#24 qrasy

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 09:09 AM

The holocaust didn't exist!

The Rape of Nanjing didn't take place!

What are you saying?

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#25 MC420

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 09:15 AM

What are you saying?


My comparision and response for those who might believe Ho Chi Minh and his comrades were democratic lover or didn't employ terror tactics to achieve their aims regardless of any methods! B)

#26 qrasy

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 09:21 AM

Viet Minh=越盟 (越南獨立同盟會)
Viet Cong=越共 (越南共產黨)

My answer to you is short and simple; Ho and his comrades (including the USSR & Red China) started the Vietnam war; it was their original ambition not only for Vietnam but the rest of the free world as well. Vietnam was merely one of the battles after Korea theater, ect. B)

:g: wasn't it that America who invaded Vietnam not Vietnam who invaded America? How can they start the war? They could be the cause of war but they should not be the starter of wars.

My comparision and response for those who might believe Ho Chi Minh and his comrades were democratic lover or didn't employ terror tactics to achieve their aims regardless of any methods! B)

:g: were you being serious or sarcastic on saying those things never happened?

Edited by qrasy, 02 March 2006 - 09:26 AM.

The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth, persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Belief in myths allows the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought. - JFK


#27 MC420

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 10:55 AM

Viet Minh=越盟 (越南獨立同盟會)
Viet Cong=越共 (越南共產黨)

:g: wasn't it that America who invaded Vietnam not Vietnam who invaded America? How can they start the war? They could be the cause of war but they should not be the starter of wars.


Americans were and still are present in many countries all over the world since the WWII; their present in those countries could be viewed under different context and angle as well! The American troops are still stationed in South Korea, Japan, England, Germany, Afghanistan, Iraq, and ... ! It's depend on which side one would portray as invaders, liberators, or allies, etc! B) Per my assessment, American's foreign policy would never have the "mandate" to invade or occupy any country (except for short-term & crisis situation) from the American people! :rolleyes:

Ho & his comrades <-- were no different than their associates from China, North Korea, Cambodia, etc. B) the war of liberation (for the whole world) had been waged and of course already defuncted! :haha:

Edited by MC420, 02 March 2006 - 10:58 AM.


#28 jiangji

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 11:08 AM

Jiangji:
Pls don't mix up the name; Viet Minh =/= Viet Cong; Viet Minh was the short name of Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội (Vietnam National Independent Alliance Association) whereas Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist). For those who understand a bit of recent Vietnam history, they would be able to distinguish these terms so that they could follow consequences of Vietnam modern history much clearer! During the national independent movements, there were quite a few groups alligned together under the banner of Viet Minh to fight against the French after 1945; however, due to the fact that


I don't think you understand both meaning of Viet Minh and Viet Cong and mix it up. Viet Cong is NOT Vietnamese Communists evethough some of its members are one. It is an army created after the Indo china war to ovethrown the Sourthern Vietnam government and fight US. For Viet Minh, it is a Party which take power in 1945 and are the one fighting the french not viet Cong.

For those who know Indo-china and vietnam war, they should know it ! Obviously you know nothing about it. :g:

Ho and his associates employed terror tactics to rid off their opponents mercilessly during that 9 years period therefore it lead to the separations of various nationalist groups and then eventually the division of Vietnam.

Refer to the Geneva agreement 1954.

US, French, Southern Vietnam government employed terror tactics as well to eliminate those that oppose them leading to millions of death.

Collateral damages would happen in any war! the intend is what we need to focus! The result was already done! The verdict was already issued! Communism in general was the worst thing Ho and his comrades brought to Vietnam. Communism in general was also the worst idea developed and implemented by their false believers! Of course, I expect those die hard communists would disagree with my viewpoint; however, I and millions other Vietnamese understand who was the cause of general sufferings and million deaths which took place in Vietnam since 1954. HCM and his communist comrades <--- definitely the ones! If trade for the lesser evils, we would accept Vietnam or at least South Vietnam would be in the position of South Korea or Taiwan in their present condition in comparing to their counterparts in North Korean or Mainland China! B)



Check the BBC news(UK) ,CNN news (US) , or any neutral history books. US inflicted more death and damage on Northern Vietnam than the Viet Cong. US drop more bomb than they did in WWII and uses biological weapons.

My answer to you is short and simple; Ho and his comrades (including the USSR & Red China) started the Vietnam war; it was their original ambition not only for Vietnam but the rest of the free world as well. Vietnam was merely one of the battles after Korea theater, ect. B)

Ho want free election and US rejected it.

From BBC news
1964 - US destroyer allegedly attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats. This triggers start of pre-planned American bombing raids on North Vietnam.


Free election <-- which would never happen under any communist system; especially in Vietnam after 1954 when Ho and his comrades already committed to employ terror tactic to intimidate the general Vietnamese population. :no: Let's look at inside Vietnam now (2006), any free election would be allowed to take place? Definitely no. Only the VCP would nominate their own candidates in any ballots for people to elect <-- if this is what you would call as democratic or free election! :haha:


Yes, it is because US doesn't allow it at first. By the time Ho died, any hope to democarcy is gone. Do remember one thing, majority Vietnamese support the Viet Minh in their fight against the colonists French.

Edited by jiangji, 02 March 2006 - 11:21 AM.

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#29 MC420

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Posted 02 March 2006 - 11:21 AM

I don't think you understand both meaning of Viet Minh and Viet Cong and mix it up. Viet Cong is NOT Vietnamese Communists evethough some of its members are one. It is an army created after the Indo china war to ovethrown the Sourthern Vietnam government and fight US. For Viet Minh, it is a Party which take power in 1945 and are the one fighting the french not viet Cong.

For those who know Indo-china and vietnam war, they should know it ! Obviously you know nothing about it.



For Viet Minh, it is a Party which take power in 1945 and are the one fighting the french! :haha:

Viet Cong is NOT Vietnamese Communists evethough some of its members are one. It is an army created after the Indo china war to ovethrown the Sourthern Vietnam government and fight US! :haha:

Wanna to teach me how to speak, read, and understand Vietnamese? :haha:
You know what you know! <-- I rest my case! B)

#30 qrasy

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Posted 03 March 2006 - 09:36 AM

Per my assessment, American's foreign policy would never have the "mandate" to invade or occupy any country (except for short-term & crisis situation) from the American people!

I don't think the government of America would really consider all the people in America, occupation in Phillippines, nuclear bombard of Japan, etc.
I didn't ask was it rightful or not, but wasn't it that America who invaded Vietnam not Vietnam who invaded America? How can they start the war? They could be the cause of war but they should not be the starter of wars.
I don't think it's because the communists deliberately kill the Americans in there wihtout good reason.
Is it before the merger of South-North Vietnam?
Then Vietnam lacked of anything except weapon, so it attacked Cambodia, an ally of China, so it happened to incite Sino-Viet war.. I think it's China who invaded Vietnam, not the reverse as if I like to follow your argument.

Ho & his comrades <-- were no different than their associates from China, North Korea, Cambodia, etc. B) the war of liberation (for the whole world) had been waged and of course already defuncted! :haha:

You interpreted "war of liberation" badly just because communists had "weird" principle.

I don't think you understand both meaning of Viet Minh and Viet Cong and mix it up. Viet Cong is NOT Vietnamese Communists evethough some of its members are one. It is an army created after the Indo china war to ovethrown the Sourthern Vietnam government and fight US. For Viet Minh, it is a Party which take power in 1945 and are the one fighting the french not viet Cong.

:g: I already said Viet Cong=越共; Cộng<=>共. 共產黨=communist. I've never seen any other 共* as parties.

Refer to the Geneva agreement 1954.

.....

Check the BBC news(UK) ,CNN news (US) , or any neutral history books. US inflicted more death and damage on Northern Vietnam than the Viet Cong. US drop more bomb than they did in WWII and uses biological weapons.

North Vietnam... wasn't the war around Central and Southern Vietnam?

1964 - US destroyer allegedly attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats. This triggers start of pre-planned American bombing raids on North Vietnam.

B)

Yes, it is because US doesn't allow it at first. By the time Ho died, any hope to democarcy is gone. Do remember one thing, majority Vietnamese support the Viet Minh in their fight against the colonists French.

Is it not different from America's attitude towards Phillippines in [forgot the year]?

The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth, persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Belief in myths allows the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought. - JFK





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