111 replies to this topic

[ROC_Citizen]

I think Chiang made one very big mistake. He continued to pursue his Red Extermination drives and ignored the Japanese encrouchments in the Northeast, a crucial decision that drove many of the common people into the hands of Red Anti-Japanese propaganda, swelling the ranks of the Red Army. Even whole units of Nationalist army divisions crossed over to the Reds because they saw their duty first towards repelling the Japanese invasion.

Chiang gambled on trading time and land with the Japanese as he kept retreating into the interior in the off chance that he can finish the Reds and then turn back to the task of expelling the Japanese. A little known armistice agreement was even signed with the Japanese in Changsha, applying to territories where Red armies were not active, and this was surprisingly, actually honoured by the Japanese.

Chiang was right in his extermination of the communist. The communist at that time under Chen Du Xiu 陳獨秀(correct me if I'm wrong) were just the puppet of the Comintern and the Soviet Union. They were taking direct orders from the Comintern and were already plotting for their own rebellion against their KMT allies. Chiang as the leader of the legal and legitimate government of China was a step ahead of the communist. He foresee the true nature of the communist as puppets of the Russians and the danger of communism after a tour of the Soviet Union. However, in my opinion, his method were too ruthless. Many innocent people were killed. I also sympathised with those peasants and workers who believed in the communist cause. Communism is very ideal in theory but is simply too good to be true as remarkably portrayed in George Orwell's Animal Farm.

It is exagerated that whole units of Nationalist army divisions were crossing over to the Reds. Only some factions from the Northeast army under Zhang Xue Liang surrendered to the communist without much fight after the communist manipulated with their homesick and anti-japanese emotions. This subsequently also led to the Xian Incident.

I agree that the whole nation were unhappy over the loss of the Northeast to the Japanese without a fight. Emotions were running high against the Japanese. However, as a leader, Chiang could not just give in to nationalistic emotions. It is obvious that to fight against such a powerful enemy, the whole nation must be united under the same leadership and be prepared economically and militarily.

In 1931, China did not have such luxuries. Moreover, 1931 was shortly after the end of the Battle of Central Plains 中原大戰 between Chiang and the KMT warlords such as Li Zongren, Yan Xi Shan. China does not have the means to fight head on against the Japanese after years of fighting since the death of Yuan Shi Kai. Chiang had to take the gamble in trading land for time to rebuild the economy and the military. It is 先安内，后攘外, 即安内又攘外。安内是為了攘外。

Chiang's policy of 先安内，后攘外 is therefore a correct policy. If not he would have to fight on 2 fronts instead of one. Which leader does not do this before exterminating foreign threat? Kangxi 康熙 did that against the 3 feudal lords 三藩 before turning his attention to Taiwan and the Russians. Genghis Khan eliminated his domestic rivals and unite the mongols before turning to the Jurchen 女真。 漢武帝 eliminated the powers of the feudal lords 藩王 before turning his attention to the Xiong Nu 匈奴。

I think the biggest mistake which he ever made in his life was to trust Zhang Xue Liang 張學良 too much. He would have wiped out the communist if not for Zhang. This partly explained the reason why he kept Zhang under house arrest for decades.

Could you elaborate more on the armistice agreement signed at Changsha?

[jlaporte]

Communism is very ideal in theory but is simply too good to be true as remarkably portrayed in George Orwell's Animal Farm.

And 1984 for good measure!

[Sephodwyrm]

About the villanous Chiang, maybe we should concentrate on what he did before and after the War of Resistance.

I know a little about what happened after the War of Resistance.

1. Japanese troops were given permission to shoot at Communists
2. Collaborators were given offices while Zhang Xueliang was shipped off to Taiwan
3. Immediate ignition of the civil war without consideration of the consequences
4. And shooting more students to top it off
5. Not to mention dropping the demand for reparations to keep Japan on his good side

[Zuo Zongtang]

With due respect, I beg to differ. The Nanjing Massacre occurred partly because the Japanese wanted to vent their frustration after being bogged down in Shanghai. The Japanese army faced strong Chinese resistance and both sides suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Shanghai, effectively destroying the possibility of conquering China in 3 months. They had thought that conquering China would be a breeze and it would take at most 3 months.

Yes, I have heard that reason for the Nanjing massacre. However, declaring Nanjing an open city might have not brought about the destruction of the city. Giving Japan a reason that they might succeed again would bring their old ideas of victory in 3 months back. This would raise their confidence, and at a more opportune time, such as Wuhan, China could deliver the snapping blow to their moral in another Shanghai style battle.

You are right, defending the city is not going to raise morale but abandoning the capital at such an early stage of the war without a fight would be detrimental to the morale of the whole nation. The morale of the whole nation, and not just that of the soldiers, is all important at that time. It is this morale and the stubborn resistance of the Chinese race that enabled China to survive the initial difficult stage of the war without much foreign aid. Moreover, abandoning the capital without a fight would also add more ammunition to the communist propaganda of labelling Chiang as non-resistant towards the Japanese.
I don't think it's fair to lay the blame of Nanjing Massacre on Chiang as I had mentioned above. It is also not objective to label him as stupid for that. Anyway, it did not cause more harm to the morale than ever before as mentioned by you. The massacre did the reverse. It further united the Chinese and increased their hatred towards the Japanese. This unity and hatred had remained even till today. The Chinese were definitely not demoralized by the Nanjing Massacre.

Okay, lets look at the result of Nanjing. The retreating Chinese forces exposed Wuhan, China's main war effort. If Japan had siezed the opportunity, she would have destroyed China. However, the Japanese didn't act on this quickly enough, and Wuhan was defended. However, the exposure of Wuhan is dangerous. Again, decide, raise moral in a battle where the chance of victory is like 1%, with the cost of defeat being an exposed industrial heartland for the enemy to chew up, or retreating from the city with a temporary blow to moral?

I agree with you that their "mobile warfare" tactics 運動戰 were effective in Korea. However, do not forget that they suffered high casualties in that war against a much well-equipped Americans. But against the same well-equipped Japanese, there were not such high casualties. Why is it so? This is because they only engaged in guerilla warfare 遊擊戰 against the Japanese and not mobile warfare 運動戰. That is to "fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines in order to reserve their strength for their "revolution" against the KMT in future." They simply did not used the same mobile warfare 運動戰 tactics which they would use later in Korea, against the Japanese. Mao Zedong only fully engaged his military tactics against the KMT and the Americans. Against the Japanese, they adopted the hide and seek gueriila warfare 遊擊戰 to reserve most of their strengths and avoid full confrontations with them.
The difference in the number of casualties suffered by the KMT and communist is too great for it to be so casually concluded that the communist were better led and the KMT were not. The communist only had 30,000 troops after their long march and after the war the had a force of almost 3 million. This is an increase of 10,000%! Is there any other major military force during the WWII that had such a tactician who could avoid heavy casualties, increased it's strength by such whopping percentage and later still claimed maximum credit for driving out foreign invaders?

Pingxing Pass. Ever heard of that battle?
Battle of Taiyuan. Heard of that?
Zhou Enlai's offers to win back Burma from Japan?
How the communists during 41-42 had "enaged more then twenty-four Japanese divisions, or 44 per cent of the total Japanese troops in China?" (When Tigers Fight)

You forget that the main reason why the Communists were so large was because the Nationalists focused more on killing Chinese then Japanese. Thus, many deserted the KMT and joined the Communists.

I'd like to see the source of your argument that the Communists reserved their strength for the Civil War later. All the sources I've read show that the Communists fought just as hard. The reason why the Communists did not take part in such a massive attack as the 100 regiments again was because they lacked the strength:

"The Chinese Communists were never again able to launch an offenseive of this magnitude against the Japanese...For this brief advantage the Red Army sacrificed too many men and too much ammunition, as they themselves later admitted. One of the Japanese staff officers in this sector described the Hundred Regiments campaign as the Chinese Communists' biggest blunder." (When Tigers Fight)

The KMT had a total force of 4.3 million and suffered a total casualties of 3.65million and 203 generals perished as compared to 1 communist general killed. If sending your best troops to war and fighting in 23 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,117 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and about 38,000 skirmishes, is not more contribution to the war, then what is? Is this then the so called non-resistant KMT as often propagated by communist propaganda?
In your opinion, the KMT should had used the same hide and seek guerilla tactics which the communist had used? These tactics were used with the main intention of reducing casualties and reserving their strengths. The best effect that these could do was to slow down the Japanese advance and harassed their supply lines.

However, this would be meaningless if not complemented with conventional warfare and battles by the KMT.
Guerilla warfare of hide and seek alone cannot effectively stop the enemy and could only result in abandoning of cities to the Japanese without a fight. If the communist had used the more effective mobile warfare 運動戰 or conventional warfare 陣地戰 against the Japanese, their casualties would be just as high.

At the same time, I would like to clarify another myth. Not all guerillas operating behing enemy lines were communist. There were KMT soldiers and other volunteers fighting behind Japanese line as well. The notion that the communist were leading the guerilla warfare behind enemy lines is therefore a myth.

No its not a myth, its the truth. Yes, the KMT had a very large partisan force. However, the main leader in guerilla operations is the Communists. The KMT forces themselves were in trouble just to survive. Many of them turned to the Communists to help themselves survive.

And for your arguments of casualties, heres a list of major author's casualties list of the war:

http://users.erols.c...28/ww2stats.htm

Along with that list, you can see how Chinese the Nationalists killed in comparason with the Communists. The Communists killed many, but compared to the Nationalists, they look like innocent bunnies.

Remember the quote from When Tigers Fight that I had put up? The Communists in Northern Chinafought 75% of the engagements, but only 35% of the POWs and 50% of the dead were Communist. These facts and figures were all taken from When Tigers Fight, the best written English book on the War. I'd like to see your sources on your absurd claims that the Communists lost so fewer troops then the Nationalist. For every Communist soldier saved for the Civil war, a Nationalist soldier is saved.

This statement is contradicting. Everyone know that it is not easy to lead a weak China against the powerful Japanese military during that time. The fact that Chiang was the only person capable and recognised for doing it speaks for his competence as a leader of a nation. To brush him off as totally incompetent to worth any mention is not justifiable.

No its not contradicting. Bush is able to win a 2nd term and he is a blundering baffon. Chiang might have held China together, but he cost China millions of unnessesary lives. You yourself admited that Mao was the better leader. If he was in command, I believe the war might have turned out much better. Chiang was not in control of China. The Communists occupied the North, Japan the Middle, and Chiang the south. China was split in three.

[ahxiang]

About the villanous Chiang, maybe we should concentrate on what he did before and after the War of Resistance.

I know a little about what happened after the War of Resistance.

1. Japanese troops were given permission to shoot at Communists
2. Collaborators were given offices while Zhang Xueliang was shipped off to Taiwan
3. Immediate ignition of the civil war without consideration of the consequences
4. And shooting more students to top it off
5. Not to mention dropping the demand for reparations to keep Japan on his good side

1) It was Chiang Kai-shek's naivety in following McArthur's route as to acceptance of Japan surrender. Chiang's order to Japanese was the same as McArthur's Supreme Allied Command, i.e., Japanese to surrneder to Chiang, only. Japanese was under McArthur's order to resist communists, not Chiang's order. You have to reread Yalta Betrayal to know the delicate international scenario of the time, with Chiang coersed into a friendship treaty with USSR days after Russians entered Manchuria. It was Russo-American guarantee that Chiang was foolishly putting his faith in. Chiang, at the cost of giving up Outer Mongolia, thought he got the promise from Stalin as to making sure that Mao was to participate in a coalition government that would be based on united administration and united army. Mao, in another sense, had complained about Russian betrayal frequently after the Sino-Russian breakup.

Myth 1: CCP got only Kalgan [Zhangjiakou]. Not true. CCP got Yantai with American auspice, and retained control till late 1948.

Myth 2: CCP had 1 million regular and 2 million militia in 1945. CCP claimed to have 400-500k regular in 1940, at the time of Hundred Regiment Campaign. Why another four years, their regular got merely doubled? You figured it out.

2. Collaborators

It was Xiong Bin's scheme in converting the collaborators since early 1945. That's why the "collaborators" had defended the major provincial cities for months against the communist troops. It was not something done overnight, but taking over half a year's work by secret emissaries. In another sense, those guys maintained peace in their jurisdictions. While people in communist controlled areas had to go through the horros of land reform whose only purpose was to SNOWBALL the ranks of communist troops, not increasing the impetus and productivity of peasants.

Perplexity: Why Xiong Bin failed to get Chiang Kai-shek allow the same policy applied to collaborators in Manchuria? No easy answers.


3. Civil War

The civil war was first started in and around Chunhua county in the spring of 1945 after Mao heard about the Yalta rumor. For the Yalta rumor, Mao had offered women to Russians GRU agents and doctors in Yenan, whom Mao had isolated and shunned away throughout the 1941-1945 years. Mao had decided to take out Wang Ming only after Stalin was busy dealing with Hitler's invasion, for which Mao thought Stalin could be ultimately killed by Germans. Mao's intrusion into Chunhua county was a drect result of his judgment call and sixth sense, i.e., Russian entry into Manchuria would offer Mao an unprecedented chance to take over China. See Vladimirov Diaries.

In fact, Mao launched civil war before that. Following Japanese Ichigo Campaign, Mao sent Wang Zhen's two brigades to Hunan-Guangdong provinces.

And, before that, you know how KMT trops in Shandong and Jiangsu were wiped out by communists before KMT hit back in a Wan-nan Incident. ANd, before that, KMT troops in Hebei was wiped out by the CCP.

After Chunhua Incident of 1945, Japan launched a Xixiakou Campaign. Commnist troops hit KMT armies who were engaged with Japanese

After Japanese surrender, CCP's first fight was directed at Fu Zuoyi in Suiyuan of Inner Mongolia. Neither CCP nor KMT was willing to write about Fu Zuoyi. That's why history was unknown to you.

CCP claimed Handang Battle was first shot. Before Handan, there was the Battle of Shangdang against Yan Xishan. Too many to enumerate.


4. Student protests

You have to read about Kunming's case to know the background. Governor Long Yun, to drive out Chiang influence, had converted Kunming into so-called "Bastion of Democarcy". Almost all CCP cadres who joined the party during WWII had their stories of joining the Pioneers which was the precursor to becoming an official CCP while studying at Southwest Allied University, i.e., Xi Nan Lan Da. For this, Chiang took out Long Yun right after Japanese surrender. Around early 1946, most professors and students had already gone back to their hometowns. However, communism activists decided toscore some points by taking advantage of KMT troubles with economy. The first wave of student movements subsided after Russian pillaging in Manchuria spread across the country which led to massive student protests against the Hairy Big Noses. It would take about 11 months before students rose up again, i.e., so-called Shen-Chong-rape-related Anti-American Protest in Dec of 1946 for sake of kicking Marshall and Americans out of China.

5. Reparations from Japan.

This is another myth. Chiang never dropped the demand as people thought his radio speech in AUg of 1945 was about. Numerous memoirs pointed out that ROC delagations were in japan dismantling Japan's factories. Several ships already returned to China with equipments. Only the civil wars stopped China from getting the goods from Japan. The ROC occupation force, originally destined for Japan, was rerouted for Manchuria's civil war. After the 1950 SF Treaty, US pressured Chiang on the matter of giving up material demands. US, however, also pressured Japan in going to Taipei for a treaty, not the other way around. After the Korean War, Japan was already disobedient and unremorseful. Zhang Qun spent months negotiating the treaty with Japan. ROC ambassador to Korea repeatedly demanded that Japan must reimburse China before a treaty could be signed, but did not understand how bad Taiwan's bargaining position vs Japan was in early 1950s, i.e., Chiang barely keeping his UN seat,not to mention being abandoned by US prior to Korean War.

Edited by ahxiang, 16 April 2006 - 01:33 AM.

[Optimus]

Mao Zedong has a free hand in controlling the Mainland after 1949 when KMT and the Warlords were completely defeated. There is no second power in China / basically no more war but still he came up with stuffs like "Culture Revolution" which caused millions to die.

KMT ROC had never controlled the whole of China from 1911-1949...they never had a chance like Mao Zedong had after 1949. - a sustained period of peace to do what they want.

compared to Mao, Chiang Kai Shek is def the lesser of two evils.

[Zuo Zongtang]

Mao Zedong has a free hand in controlling the Mainland after 1949 when KMT and the Warlords were completely defeated. There is no second power in China / basically no more war but still he came up with stuffs like "Culture Revolution" which caused millions to die.

KMT ROC had never controlled the whole of China from 1911-1949...they never had a chance like Mao Zedong had after 1949. - a sustained period of peace to do what they want.

Because Chiang was too weak an incompetent to hold China together. Believe me, he would have persecuted just as much if he remained in power.

[ahxiang]

Because Chiang was too weak an incompetent to hold China together. Believe me, he would have persecuted just as much if he remained in power.

You better read something before making a conclusion for yourself.


China's nation-building effort, 1927-1937;: The financial and economic record (Hoover Institution publications, 104)
by Arthur N Young

http://www.amazon.co...id=N7X8YFCENBIQ

[Optimus]

read that Chiang Kai Shek had tried several times to negoitate a peace settlement with the Japanese after 1937, even as late as in 1944. But the terms were way too harsh ( like - giving the Japanese free control of the southern chinese provinces ) Chiang would be regarded as a Traitor if he did so.

anyone know more about this?

[ahxiang]

read that Chiang Kai Shek had tried several times to negoitate a peace settlement with the Japanese after 1937, even as late as in 1944. But the terms were way too harsh ( like - giving the Japanese free control of the southern chinese provinces ) Chiang would be regarded as a Traitor if he did so.

anyone know more about this?

Chiang did leave the door open for peace with Japan. His demands would be the restoration of territory before July 7th 1937. Japan's prime minister Konoe Fumimaro had attempted to induce Chiang, but then declared a stupid policy called "No More Treating Chiang As ROC Leader". Konoe then induced Wang Jingwei out of hybernation since Wang Jingwei thought he was the only person to break the impasse. Wang's two assistants found out that Japan had a deal with Russians to halve China in Dec 1940, and fled to HK with the secret documents. Konoe biography repeatedly said Konoe was intending to have Japan withdraw its troops from southern China. However, Japan's appetite was insatiable. In WangJingwei puppet dealings, Japan army did not let go an inch of land their 'blood' had dropped to wrestle from China. This was Dec 1940.

After the turn of the year, America stepped in by sending Currie to China. US gave China a loan, the first time aid to China, in March of 1940 to make sure China stay in the war. Chiang played a trick in spreading a rumor that Chongqing government woudl merge with Nanking puppet government. Just a trick. I doubt anyone would believe that Chiang and Wang Jingwei would sit together on a bench.

Owen Lattimore, who was picked by Currie as Roosevelt's personal political adviser for China in 1940, knew better what Chiang Kai-shek did and wanted. Chiang had almost weekly and monthly meetings with Lattimore about all topics. Zhou Enlai had secret meetings with Lattimore as well. At one time, Zhou Enlai told Lattimore that without Chiang Kai-shek, you would already have a dozen Wang Jingwei in China. Lattimore, by the way, had two Chinese spies working for him back at Pacific Institute in San Francisco in 1930s and 1940s [now moved to Canada]. Chiang's biggest weakness of his life was his putting all his eggs in one basket, i.e., that of America. Even when he was courting Russians for arms shipment from 1937 to 1939, Chiang was asking his Soong family members pass on the signal that he wanted Americans to be his ally, not Russians.

Lattimore and Currie, later blasted by McArthur as the two responsible for provoking Japan into a war with US, had a mission in China,on behalf of Stalin. This was because Stalin had decided to sign a treaty with Japan in April 1941, but Stalin wanted to make sure that China could persist in the war against Japan, knowing that Japan would be on Russian's back once China was conquered.

Vladimirov was sent to Yenan to make sure that Mao would have the communist Eight Route Army attack the Peking-Kalgan Railway. Mao did nothing. When Germans were attacking Moscow, Russians were shown a cold face in yenan, up till after the rumor of Yalta Agreement spread to Mao in early 1945.

With US in the war after Pearl Harbor attack of Dec 1941, Chiang was assured of China's final victory and then never ever needed to play a Japan card.

Edited by ahxiang, 23 May 2006 - 02:45 AM.

[jlaporte]

Thanks for this precision.

[ahxiang]

Thanks for this precision.

Some corrections:

Lauchlin Currie, economic adviser to President Franklin Roosevelt from 1939 to 1945, went to China on an inspection mission in Jan 1941. Currie's field report to Roosevelt first proposed the notion of using the "lever of Lend-Lease to push Chiang towards reform" [by liberalizing and broadening the regime to include the communists].

On July 19th, Owen Lattimore arrived at Chungking to assume the post of a political adviser

McCarthy, not McArthur, accused Lattimore and Curri of being responsible for provoking Japan into a war with US.

Vladimirov was sent to Yenan in May 1942.

[lifezard]

Because Chiang was too weak an incompetent to hold China together. Believe me, he would have persecuted just as much if he remained in power.

I agree. What he did onwards in Taiwan is ample proof.

[ahxiang]

I agree. What he did onwards in Taiwan is ample proof.

Comment on
"Too Weak", "Incompetent"

This is not to defend Chiang Kai-shek.

The foreign, international and internal scheme to weaken or hurt Chiang Kai-shek shared the same agenda, i.e., to weaken and damage China and Chinese nationalists.

Currie, Lattimore, and others, who had visited Chiang, had come back to report to US that Chiang Kai-shek was way from 'dictatorship' since Chiang had no influence over large portion of Chinese continent, including Northwestern territory, Southwestern territories and etc. The label of 'dictatorship' on Chiang was merely to do with the foreign, international and internal scheme to force Chiang into accepting Chinese communists and [Democratic League].

Russians, though, in late 1930s, had turned wholeheartedly towards supporting Chiang. That was Russian's national interest to pop up China against Japan. Mao, being unhappy over Russian arms supply to Chiang alone, had turned his anger to the Moscow returnees, and intensified the persecutions when he though Russians were to be wiped out by Germans.

In contrast to Russians, Americans [in fact, American CP USA, American Russian proxy and American Chinese CP spoekesmen] had gone more than one step forward, i.e., using the lever of Lend-Lease to force Chiang into a coalition government with Chinese CP. The history of 1941 to 1947 was about this 'coalition government'.

Now to 'incompetent':

Did any of you think how could the tide turned in Manchuria? You could need to study battles one by one to figure out how. It changed at the turn of 1946-1947. At that time, Lin Biao had so-called THREE CROSSING SUNGARI and FOUR DEFENDING LINJIANG.

Before that, from Shanhaiguan to Sipingjie, it was defeat after defeat. CCP attributed the defeat of Sipingjie due to ammunition bombed at Meihekou. Namely, Luo Ronghuan had obtained eight trains of munitions and medicine from Russians in Dairen, shipped the goods to Korea by sea, and then transported via the international railway to Meihekou where the CCP Northeast Bureau was seated. However, government airplanes bombed 260 carriages of supplies to ashes on April 28th 1946.

Here, I am not to go too much into THREE CROSSING SUNGARI of Jan, Feb and March 1947. Lin Biao started the crossing in Nov 46 and Dec 46 but skipped the two since there were defeats. Lin Biao, with Russian supplies and Russian military advisers, still failed to make headway till late 1947. In May 1947, Lin Biao penetrated further to Sipingjie. Like the Dehui Siege of Feb 1947, the Spingjie Siege of 1947 still failed in debacle. In Harbin, Lin Biao reorhanized his cannons "zong dui", which was originally manned by Japanese Kwantung Army. Russians also assisted Lin Biao in setting up a so-called Railway "Zong Dui", i.e., Railway Army Corps.

To the south, the 3rd and 4th LINJIANG DEFENSE had nothing to do with Linjiang. In Feb-March 1947, 100,000 Koreans were sent to Liaodong to assist the Chinese communists. This was on top of Li Hongguang's detachment which was organized on basis of two Korean divisions of Kwnatung Army. While at the end of 1946, CCP had shipped women and wounded to Korea. In Feb 1947, 100k Koreans joined the battle against Chiang Kai-shek troops.

The tide turned right here. One day when Kim Il-sun archives are open, you would see how many Koreans were sent to China. In 1950, about 3-4 months ahead of Korean War, the same Koreans were sorted out for delivery back to Kim Il-sun, which was an obligation. Anyone who watched the TV series "Quelling KMT Banditry In Wulongshan Mountain [Hubei Province]" would remember how the Koreans were suddenly pulled from the battles for shipment to Korea in 1950.

[Optimus]

anyone read Jung Chang - Mao the Unknown Story?

I thought the section on Mao - the long March and the WWII relationship between KMT, CCP and the foreign powers was a great read.

I like this part...

The Long March was nothing more than a Farce... the KMT allowed the CCP to escape via the Long March because the time was not ripe to elimante the communists. Part was due to Chiang desire to use the Communists threats to send KMT armies to enter Sichuan and Yunnan which was then controlled by independent warlords.

Sichuan was important as Chiang see it as the best base for an eventual war against Japan. and also Chiang does not want to anger the Russians by destroying the CCP who held his son Chiang Ching Kuo hostage.

That Long March story remained secret and concealed by both the Nationalist and Communist Official Histories. Both share the same concern: that is not to reveal it was the Generalissimo himself who let the Reds go.
For the Nationalists...Chiang decision to use the communists to wrestle control of the southwestern regions that result in the fatal miscalculation to let off the reds was too humilating to admit.
For the Communists, it is embarrassing to acknowledge that the famed Long march was to a large extent steered by Chiang Kai-Shek.