41 replies to this topic

[Taran ap Dafydd]

The point is that he very much did not break the Allied centre by an artillery bombardment, because the Allied troops were deployed on the reverse slopes of the ridge, thus depriving the French of the benefit of their superiority in artillery.

Sorry it took me so long to get back to this. I've been away for awhile...

Anyway, unless there was an overhang, there's no way to prevent the artillery from eventually "Getting the range" which Napoleon's did. It's just a question of figuring out the right angle to fire on, thus creating the right arc in the shot. It's a very simple application of the "D=ViT+1/2 AT^2" formula.

And before you retort that canon can't typically fire above a certain angle, remember that Napoleon Did have mortars on hand. Lots of them.

[Hrestol]

Sorry it took me so long to get back to this. I've been away for awhile...

Anyway, unless there was an overhang, there's no way to prevent the artillery from eventually "Getting the range" which Napoleon's did. It's just a question of figuring out the right angle to fire on, thus creating the right arc in the shot. It's a very simple application of the "D=ViT+1/2 AT^2" formula.

And before you retort that canon can't typically fire above a certain angle, remember that Napoleon Did have mortars on hand. Lots of them.

Where did you get the idea that the French had mortars at Waterloo? You are quite wrong, they had none. As Nosworthy writes in his Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies, "Mortars were used primarily in siege operations and only rarely in the open field." If you examine the French order of battle, you will see Waterloo was no exception.

[DurstigerMann]

Well, you've already gotten quite a bit of good info on it, so I won't add much.


No. It was his last. He had already been defeated in Russia before his original exile and in several smaller and certainly less strategically important battles throughout his career.

I only noticed this just now, so please excuse the late reply.
However, I wouldn't call the Battle of Leipzig a small or less (strategically) important, as it was on a scale which was never reached again until WWI.
It also foreshadowed the characteristics of modern warfare seen in the later years of the American Civil War and throughout WWI.
Now I am aware, that Russian tropps participated in this battle, but it wasn't just Russia who defeated the French.
Strategically it meant the end of French reign over central Europe and the rise of Prussia to a European power.

[Lu Su]

I think Napoleon had made too many mistakes before Waterloo. He was destined to fall eventually with his careless policies and penchant for tyrannical oppression, as well as giving his troops free reign to commit atrocities wherever they conquered. There was certainly no shortage of inspiration given on his behalf to the people of Europe and Russia to put him down.

I'll let you argue the battle details, but I believe this simple fact remains.
In his arrogance, Napoleon placed trust in people as maniacal and diabolical as himself, simply looking for their own opportunity to gain power to some trivial advantage in life. The results in history of this is always the same. His attitude and sickening policies, much like many tyrants before and after him, I would argue was the real cause of his downfall. You simply cannot build a lasting future based on a rampant hypocrisy of atrocities and without any concrete policies for sustaining public trust. Much like others in history, he never once realized this simple logical fact. His own selfish ambitions took priority. Such a leader of party, no matter how powerful, is doomed to continuous widespread resistance, and eventual fall, as they will have anyone not as corrupt as they against them in time.

[dagann]

I think Napoleon had made too many mistakes before Waterloo. He was destined to fall eventually with his careless policies and penchant for tyrannical oppression, as well as giving his troops free reign to commit atrocities wherever they conquered. There was certainly no shortage of inspiration given on his behalf to the people of Europe and Russia to put him down.

I'll let you argue the battle details, but I believe this simple fact remains.
In his arrogance, Napoleon placed trust in people as maniacal and diabolical as himself, simply looking for their own opportunity to gain power to some trivial advantage in life. The results in history of this is always the same. His attitude and sickening policies, much like many tyrants before and after him, I would argue was the real cause of his downfall. You simply cannot build a lasting future based on a rampant hypocrisy of atrocities and without any concrete policies for sustaining public trust. Much like others in history, he never once realized this simple logical fact. His own selfish ambitions took priority. Such a leader of party, no matter how powerful, is doomed to continuous widespread resistance, and eventual fall, as they will have anyone not as corrupt as they against them in time.

I don't want to hurt you Lu Su, but your statements are only general points and clichés.
Or please provide us a deeper analyse with facts and examples.
Moreover, when talking about history, words such as "diabolical" should not be used cause they bring nothing to the point and are only the expression of the writer's emotions/feelings.

About Napoleon, there are 2 legends: the golden one and the dark one.

Edited by dagann, 03 August 2010 - 10:04 AM.

[Lu Su]

I don't want to hurt you Lu Su, but your statements are only general points and clichés.
Or please provide us a deeper analyse with facts and examples.
Moreover, when talking about history, words such as "diabolical" should not be used cause they bring nothing to the point and are only the expression of the writer's emotions/feelings.

About Napoleon, there are 2 legends: the golden one and the dark one.

Oh, don't worry about that. XD I have dated some of the most evil women on earth before finally having a little luck. =3 I can tell you, disagreement is not hurt. XD Disagreement and/or question is natural and healthy, as is demand for evidence to support unscrupulous outcries. Why should I be hurt? I was being pompous and challenging anyways, so I appreciate the patience of your request actually. XD

Indeed, it is a bit cliche', and most certainly slanderous, however, I do not see any flaw in what I said that can be proven otherwise. I do not have time at the moment, but I will give you a good reply as you rightfully ask for. I can tell you now though, that all I said was taken upon the very basics of his life. Had he not been betrayed and made countless mistakes, he may have won Waterloo. It's easy for me to judge with hindsight, and I do not question his intelligence. I think he was very intelligent. But I also know he was insane and had wild visions of world domination, as well as a penchant for atrocity as previously mentioned. When I reply you will see much of my information comes from France.

If we are going to talk about notable Frenchmen (and women), then I think the Maquis are better suited for that.

[Lu Su]

Oh yes! forgive me as it slipped my mind. I will also compose a reply about my theory as you asked. I am pleased you are interested actually. =)

[LinDynasty]

It was my understanding that at the battle of Waterloo, Napolean was out numbered again with 128,000 to 234,000 Allies troops (coalition of British, Dutch, Belgian and Prussian forces.) Plus Napoleon's diplomacy did not go well a couple of years before the battle of Waterloo. In October of 1813, he faced four powers in what was to be known as the Battle of the Nations: Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden. It was a 3 days war that Napoleon was outnumbered and suffered heavily from his enemy's 1,400 artillery pieces. Napoleon's army had 38,000 casualties and lost 30,000 as prisoners. Napoleon's total losses for the year were around 400,000. It sent Napoleon retreating back toward France, Napoleon crossing westward over the Rhine River on November 2, 1813. Since 1813, France began to witness more invasion from the Allied and ultimately head Napolean to be exiled to Elba Island.

The battle of Waterloo was the last draw from the great Napolean who I believe was not well prepared for the battle as he had just overthrown Louis XVI in February and marched into Belgium by June of the same year.

[William O'Chee]

It was my understanding that at the battle of Waterloo, Napolean was out numbered again with 128,000 to 234,000 Allies troops (coalition of British, Dutch, Belgian and Prussian forces.) Plus Napoleon's diplomacy did not go well a couple of years before the battle of Waterloo. In October of 1813, he faced four powers in what was to be known as the Battle of the Nations: Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden. It was a 3 days war that Napoleon was outnumbered and suffered heavily from his enemy's 1,400 artillery pieces. Napoleon's army had 38,000 casualties and lost 30,000 as prisoners. Napoleon's total losses for the year were around 400,000. It sent Napoleon retreating back toward France, Napoleon crossing westward over the Rhine River on November 2, 1813. Since 1813, France began to witness more invasion from the Allied and ultimately head Napolean to be exiled to Elba Island.

The battle of Waterloo was the last draw from the great Napolean who I believe was not well prepared for the battle as he had just overthrown Louis XVI in February and marched into Belgium by June of the same year.

Umm, the numbers are not quite as you suggest they were in the 100 Days campaign. In any event, for most of the battle the Prussians were not engaged. They did not arrive at Plancenoit in numbers until around 1700. By this time the French had thrown away most of their cavalry in massed attacks on the Allied centre, although the final straw was the failure of the Guards to break through the Allied line after the fall of La Haye Sainte.

Arguably, the day could have been won by Napoleon if Grouchy had marched to the sound of guns and prevented the Prussians from reaching Plancenoit. Had he done so, Napoleon's left flank would have remained secure, and he would have had an additional ten battalions of Guard to throw at the Allied centre.

In the 100 days campaign, Napoleon set out to pin the Prussians while destroying the Anglo-Belgian army in detail, and then turn to fight the Prussians.

To understand how Napoleon felt so confident in fighting two larger armies, it is important to understand the typical disposition of his army, and tactics. Napoleon typically marched his army in four bodies - an advance guard, a corps or more marching in parallel on each flank, and the vanguard. This diamond formation allowed easier foraging, less congestion on the roads (and hence faster movement), and the ability to change direction of advance by 90 or 180 degrees by changing the designation of each of the four formations. For a fuller explanation see David Chandler's seminal work, Campaigns of Napoleon.

[fcharton]

In the 100 days campaign, Napoleon set out to pin the Prussians while destroying the Anglo-Belgian army in detail, and then turn to fight the Prussians.

Hi William,

In this specific case, I think it is the other way around. Napoleon thought the prussians had been defeated in Ligny, and that Grouchy, pursuing them, would prevent any rally and counter attack. In his mind, Waterloo was the second move in his central position strategy, since the prussians were already defeated.

Else, he would certainly not have let Ney attack the British right, which exposed his right flank to a possible prussian counterattack. Or, if he believed the british left was impregnable, he would have attacked earlier. The central strategy had been Napoleon's main battle plan for almost 20 years, I doubt he'd have commited such a bunder if he thought Blucher had even a remote chance of making it to the field.

@lindynasty : being outnumbered was the typical situation Napoleon faced in the revolutionary wars and during the empire. It never really seemed to bother him. The actually was the gist of the Armée du Nord campaign : trying to defeat prussians and brits piecemeal, before they had the time for muster all their armies, and the numerical advantage became unbearable.

Francois

Edited by fcharton, 04 August 2010 - 12:49 PM.

[William O'Chee]

Hi William,

In this specific case, I think it is the other way around. Napoleon thought the prussians had been defeated in Ligny, and that Grouchy, pursuing them, would prevent any rally and counter attack. In his mind, Waterloo was the second move in his central position strategy, since the prussians were already defeated.

Else, he would certainly not have let Ney attack the British right, which exposed his right flank to a possible prussian counterattack. Or, if he believed the british left was impregnable, he would have attacked earlier. The central strategy had been Napoleon's main battle plan for almost 20 years, I doubt he'd have commited such a bunder if he thought Blucher had even a remote chance of making it to the field.

Francois

Farncois,

It is a while since I studied the 100 Days campaign, and am inclined to defer to you on the finer details of the campaign. My copy of Chandler is not to hand as I am moving offices, but I shall reread him on the details. It was always my understanding that Grouchy had an overrarching order to march to the sound of guns, and that he let Napoleon down by remaining static most of the day, and only effecting battle the following day at Wavre.

I'll check the details and post again later.

[Lu Su]

Farncois,

It is a while since I studied the 100 Days campaign, and am inclined to defer to you on the finer details of the campaign. My copy of Chandler is not to hand as I am moving offices, but I shall reread him on the details. It was always my understanding that Grouchy had an overrarching order to march to the sound of guns, and that he let Napoleon down by remaining static most of the day, and only effecting battle the following day at Wavre.

I'll check the details and post again later.

This was my understanding of things as well. I still have to compose a worthy reply for dagaan though on my precepts of calling him immoral and maniacal.