13 replies to this topic

[WangWu]

Hi, new to the forums.

My question is was the Battle of Shanghai in 1937 really necessary?

From what I've read Chiang wanted to make a demonstration of the Chinese will to resist, although his German advisors told him it was better to use his best troops to fight a wider front in Northern China against the Kwantung Army.

I mean with events like the valiant Defense of the Sihang Warehouse, how would history be different if excellent commanders like Xie Jinyuan didn't need to make the "last stand" sort of sacrifice that he did?

And additionally, even with the defense, did they really garner much support from the Western world? Other than Operation Zet and the Pittman Assistance act.

Thanks in advance for your replies.

[Zuo Zongtang]

Sure, it was nice to have all these heroic stories, but the defense of Shanghai and Nanjing was a waste of troops. We'd have even more heroic stories had we fought and defeated invading Japanese troops. And we might have gotten Germany's aid against Japan, which would have been extremely helpful, especially since we were getting nothing from America.

how would history be different if excellent commanders like Xie Jinyuan didn't need to make the "last stand" sort of sacrifice that he did?

Last stands, especially when they aren't "last" stands are retarded. It wastes troops for no other reason than to boost the moral of troops elsewhere in the country. It was unnessary. They had space to retreat to and places where they could fall back on and stage battles more advantageous to their side. Chiang Kaishek refused the council of Germans and Chinese alike. This was why he wasted China's elite troops within the first months and had to fight the rest of the war with 2nd rate troops.

[Optimus]

Last stands, especially when they aren't "last" stands are retarded. It wastes troops for no other reason than to boost the moral of troops elsewhere in the country. It was unnessary. They had space to retreat to and places where they could fall back on and stage battles more advantageous to their side.

I like the "Last stands, especially when they aren't "last" stands" logic

but sometimes war battles are unpredictable. In WWII, most Russians believed that Stalingrad was a hopeless cause and the whole Soviet Union armed forces could collapse because of Stalin refusal to let go of what he deemed the city is unlosable. ( just because the city is called stalingrad after him ) The Soviet troops and civilians just refused to surrendar the city and the rest is history.

Nanjing was the capital, It is hard to give up the soul of your country without a fight.
Emperor Chong Zhen of Ming believed that it's all over when Li Bandits overran Beijing. If he had read the situation earlier, he should have retreated to the south with some armies and regroup.

and in 1949, Chiang and KMT refused to make a "last stand" in mainland because they still have Taiwan no matter how bad the situation was. The best military forces were sent to Taiwan instead of fighting the mainland war. If the KMT had been braver? and made a "last stand" in southern china at the later stages, history might be different.

[JB_Xyooj]

and in 1949, Chiang and KMT refused to make a "last stand" in mainland because they still have Taiwan no matter how bad the situation was. The best military forces were sent to Taiwan instead of fighting the mainland war. If the KMT had been braver? and made a "last stand" in southern china at the later stages, history might be different.

No way... Chaing sealed his fate in the early 1940's not only did he lose the people trust....
but the cess pool of china might... neither way... Chaing was done for... after refusing to unite
with the Communist to face the Japanese Invader.

[ahxiang]

No way... Chaing sealed his fate in the early 1940's not only did he lose the people trust....
but the cess pool of china might... neither way... Chaing was done for... after refusing to unite
with the Communist to face the Japanese Invader.

Chiang losing the trust of the people was fabricated since 1944, with the inception of the Dixie Mission. Check Channault memoirs and Miles memoirs, and you could tell what Americans went to Yenan to fabricate the myth about the communists. - Check related threads about American arms embargo against Chiang, i.e., what they called "first arming China, and then disarming China", and also check the Russian supplies to CCP - which was ambiguous at the time, as seen in Wellington Koo's memoirs - because Russians and CCP were so tight-lipped and security-averse that nobody could slip into and out of their territories.

Back to Shanghai Battle of 1937: China had to fight a war to secure Northern China. Without Battle of Shanghai, you could bet that Northern China would become Manchuria the Second. Besides, police, i.e., former armies of 29th Corps, had slaughtered Japanese in Tongzhou on July 29th, and Japan had officially mobilized its army against China - the point of no return right there.

It was true that China picked the fight in SHanghai. Chiang merely wanted a replay of 1932. But foreign powers chose not to intervene, other than USSR with military support for China. Japan did not pick the fight because their aim was still silkworm eat-away. If you examine how wavering Japan was in attacking Qingdao, you would understand their psychology. Japan's military was still controlled by their financial conglomerates which in turn valued their properties in Qingdao more than anything else, i.e., a weak spot that China figured out and then used to hold Japan at bayonet and avoided a Japanese landing to cut the waist of the Peking-Nanking Railway. See the point?

As to Russians: They were saved by the Americans who gave USSR at least 20 billion US dollars. At least. And, do not forget about the Acheson 2 billion c**p to China, and the real number, military wise, was like less than 0.5 billion to Chiang Kai-shek, and done in the way of "first arming China, and then disarming China" [e.g., no machinegun bullets for the American weapons throughout 1946-1948]. I don't see any Russian bravery in resisting German. Just check out how many millions of Russian prisoners Germans had caught. The same 20 billion American lend lease weapons were then used for aiding CCP and N Korea, by the way.

[Ashura]

but sometimes war battles are unpredictable. In WWII, most Russians believed that Stalingrad was a hopeless cause and the whole Soviet Union armed forces could collapse because of Stalin refusal to let go of what he deemed the city is unlosable. ( just because the city is called stalingrad after him ) The Soviet troops and civilians just refused to surrendar the city and the rest is history.

Just to clarify, Stalingrad was really important and not just because it was name after Stalin. It was guarding the path to Caucasus oil field, which if fell into German's hand, USSR was pretty much done for.

Back to Shanghai, I think some kind of resistance needed to be put up, the people would see the government as coward. That said, it should not be fought as the "last stand" though.

[ahxiang]

Just to clarify, Stalingrad was really important and not just because it was name after Stalin. It was guarding the path to Caucasus oil field, which if fell into German's hand, USSR was pretty much done for.

Back to Shanghai, I think some kind of resistance needed to be put up, the people would see the government as coward. That said, it should not be fought as the "last stand" though.

It was not "last stand" or not. Chiang fell into the trap of thinking his war in Shanghai could ultimately be brokered by the international powers like in 1932. To know why he was misled, check Wellington Memoirs. Other than the misleading matter that related to European powers and America, there was another factor of China's hope that USSR would join the war - a factor that Japan was cautious in Manchuria area throughout 1937. USSR, before Xian Coup of Dec 1936, did want a military alliance treaty with Chiang, which China declined. Otherwise, Russians could be bound or Japan would think twice before attacking China.

[bayonet]

The consequence of the war in Shanghai is that China not only loss 300 thousand elite service soldiers and commanders and the city, a very crucial port and financial center in the far east. It also made the defensive line between Shanghai and Nanking which had been constructed years before totally lay at rest as troops fell back so badly in disorder. This directly resulted the fall of Nanking, the capital of China alone with the most rich and populated provinces. By achieving this, the japanese had the ability to converging attack the Chinese troops in Northern China from the north and south. This indirectly resulted the fall of the whole northern China.

[ahxiang]

The consequence of the war in Shanghai is that China not only loss 300 thousand elite service soldiers and commanders and the city, a very crucial port and financial center in the far east. It also made the defensive line between Shanghai and Nanking which had been constructed years before totally lay at rest as troops fell back so badly in disorder. This directly resulted the fall of Nanking, the capital of China alone with the most rich and populated provinces. By achieving this, the japanese had the ability to converging attack the Chinese troops in Northern China from the north and south. This indirectly resulted the fall of the whole northern China.

The war in Shanghai was tied to the Brussles Conference and the expectation that the League of Nations would intervene. In highsight, you were correct that China should not have persisted in Shanghai. But, if you read Wellington Koo memoirs, you would see that British, French and American repeatedly said that should China win some decisive battles, then it would be easier for the League of Nations to intervene on behalf of China. It was the international game at play.

As far as northern China was concerned, China would lose the five provinces the same way as Manchuria if no battle of Shanghai was waged. Japan was delayed by the Battle of Shanghai as well as its selfish capitalists' care for their properties in coastal Qingdao. Anybody who read China's map could tell that should Japan landed in Qingdao, they could go along Long-Hai Raiwlay to cut the whole China into two halves. In light of the fact that China successfully protracted in its resistance war, we could not tell the general atrategy was wrong. Important is not to look at the issues in hind sight.

[ahxiang]

The war in Shanghai was tied to the Brussles Conference and the expectation that the League of Nations would intervene. In highsight, you were correct that China should not have persisted in Shanghai. But, if you read Wellington Koo memoirs, you would see that British, French and American repeatedly said that should China win some decisive battles, then it would be easier for the League of Nations to intervene on behalf of China. It was the international game at play.

As far as northern China was concerned, China would lose the five provinces the same way as Manchuria if no battle of Shanghai was waged. Japan was delayed by the Battle of Shanghai as well as its selfish capitalists' care for their properties in coastal Qingdao. Anybody who read China's map could tell that should Japan landed in Qingdao, they could go along Long-Hai Raiwlay to cut the whole China into two halves. In light of the fact that China successfully protracted in its resistance war, we could not tell the general atrategy was wrong. Important is not to look at the issues in hind sight.

Update at http://www.republica...anghai-1937.pdf

Japan had tried to echo a war in Sept of 1936 for assisting Fengtai provocation in Northern China. And, Japan also had staged an incident of a missing Marine for provoking a war. The Battle of Shanghai was inevitable.

[thirdgumi]

From KMT general and later vice-president and president Li Zong Ren 李宗仁's point of view (from his memorial), the battle of Shanghai was a waste of good troops, and unecessary. Of course, his conclusion was taken from a purely military point of view.

[ahxiang]

From KMT general and later vice-president and president Li Zong Ren 李宗仁's point of view (from his memorial), the battle of Shanghai was a waste of good troops, and unecessary. Of course, his conclusion was taken from a purely military point of view.

Li Zongren was somehow smart in military tactics and strategy, but not diplomatically or geo-politics-wise.

Chiang Kai-shek committed a grave mistake in mijudging Americans throughout his early life. The time interval between the League of Nations resolutions in early October and the Brussles Conference in early Nov was crucial for China. Japan knew it and did its best to thwart China's diplomatic initiatives. The only reason that the British passed on the hot potato to the Nine Power Treaty countries was for the Americans to step in. The delay in the conference till Chinese defense was almost collapse should make every Chinese aware of the importance that a nation like China should not count on anybody else other than themselves.

[brightness]

Strategicly, Chiang's decision to pick a fight in Shanghai was a correct one:

(1) If Japanese army had advanced down the Beijing-Canton rail line, China would be cut in half, and the entire eastern seaboard would be a giant trap;

(2) Shanghai-Nanjing area contained the best defense network, built in the preceding decade.

(3) China lacked motor transport. It would have been much easier to supply Central Army units fighting in east China than supplying the same units fighting in northern China; on top of that, it would have been easier for other warlords' armies to reach eastern China than to reach northern China.

(4) Given the low motorized mobility and low artillery firepower, it would be easier (still not easy) to seek technical parity with the better equipped Japanese units in the built-up areas of eastern China than in the plains of Northern China. There is one exception to this issue: naval artillery.

The execution of Chinese military in the battle/campaign however left much to be desired:

(1) Chinese armies should have been withdrawn much sooner from the exposed position in Shanghai (exposed to naval landing behind the line, as eventually happened), into the built-up areas along the Shanghai-Nanjing railline, and fought a defense in depth. It's ludicrous to use up all the manpower in and around Shanghai, then left nobody to use the defense network that took tens of millions of dollars (billions in today's dollars) to build in the preceding years. The distance from the sea, and a judicious use of naval mines along the Yantze River would have negated Japanese naval artillery advantage if the fighting were stretched out along the rail line leading from Shanghai to Nanjing.

(2) The lack of technical preparation to breach Japanse fortified compounds in the city of Shanghai was inexcusable. The military had more than half a decade to prepare for the battle; it was a disgrace to see those 15cm shells bouncing off Japanese walls and the Chinese military not having anything else to do the job. Any of a number of technical solutions could have solved the problem: Sabot AP shells, guns of bigger caliber, shaped charge (invented in the 1910's), siege mortar with arched trajectories . . . any one of these solutions would have solved the problem.

[YU THE GREAT]

i agree