47 replies to this topic

[light]

What do you think are the reasons why the Qing dynasty went through 1st and 2nd opium war, taiping rebellion, sino japanese war, boxer uprising and many other wars and it could survive for such a long time until 1912 before it get overthrowed?

I think they managed to survive because the western powers was not really interested in conquering Qing and more interested in their land and money. As such, the Qing could simply solve this problem by giving them money and land and regain back the money by imposing higher taxes on its people.

When its people rebelled, for small rebellions Qing could easily crash them. For big rebellions which the Qing cannot supress like taiping rebellion, Qing simply sought military help from the western power to supress the rebellion and give them benefits in return.

I think that was how they manged to survive until 1912.

[fireball]

I think the foreign powers did want to conquer China. However, they sort of balanced each other out. It ended up nobody could really take over all of China without having other foreign powers ganging up on it.

[tung2sai]

I think the foreign powers did want to conquer China. However, they sort of balanced each other out. It ended up nobody could really take over all of China without having other foreign powers ganging up on it.

Yeah all the major powers at that time wanted China, sort of like the last frontier to rule or the prize jewel for all conquerors. But I think all their greed did balance out the turmoil, (they only got bits and pieces along with some spheres of influence), Qing was too large to really take, and it wasn't really that backward as some would assume. Even before Republican era, there were people who ventured outside China and learn the best there is and returned with a lot of knowledge.
So my opinion is that the sheer size (geography and people), intense competition from all who wanted Qing lands, and the many individuals in China who wanted to improve their society in whatever way they believe was good, prevented this dynasty from totally collapsing until the 20th Century.
And many more reasons if anyone could add.

Edited by tung2sai, 02 December 2007 - 04:11 AM.

[Iovah]

I do not think it was the Western powers were "not interested" in conquest of China. After all, it's hard to define "interest" in a group of people with varying opinions and ideas. I think it was more so a question of physical limitations. Western powers could defeat Chinese forces in quick decisive battles, but the question is could they maintain a war from the other side of the planet and then occupy the land. If one looks at the forces used by these Western empires in the Far East, they were generally the best equipped of their time, but were extremely small in number. How could a small force be able to hold a city, much less a continent sized country, against a determined resistive local force. I think any Western statesmen and general realized the futility of militarily occupying the vastness of China at such a distance. They could only settle for minor territorial, political and economic concessions. Some may point out the British experience in India, but many are under the incorrect assumption that the British conquest of India was a "cake walk" and that it was Britain fighting the "Indians." When the British arrived in India, it was fiercely divided into many states. The British and other European powers slowly through manipulation this division and long drawn out wars using large armies of local auxiliaries managed to carve out a territory, then the British eliminated other European powers, and slowly conquered other Indian states. China, however, was a united empire that was ethnically united albeit not a nationalist state. It was therefore difficult in the Qing dynasty for Western powers to fathom the conquest of China. At the worst, they could de-stabilize the empire. A good example would be the Japanese attempt of conquering China in the 1930's and 40's: Even with a well trained army of well over a million (not counting Chinese auxiliary units), they could only occupy major cities and the railway lines.

Let me return to the original question: Why did the Qing Dynasty last so long? I find it amazing that some people find this surprising. Many Westerners think that the legitimacy of a ruler is what determines the longevity of a state and our shocked to see Chinese continued support at a de-legitimized Manchu-ruled state, where as others look in disbelief at the continued functioning and support of the Qing war machine in the face of large military threats. I do not find these conditions any different then why the current communist party regime remains in power.

Few in China today look at the communist party as a benevolent model government. In fact, it has long been de-legitimized to most Chinese today, in my experience. So why do Chinese still support it? Why don't they rebel? A couple factors: rebellion means uncertainty of a source of an income. rebellion may mean no food tomorrow and no roof over your head. Why cause a ruckus, lose your life, get your family murdered in order to change the person on top who just is a different rich person to collect your taxes afterall. Also, it's a choice of a "lesser of two evils." As my best friend Wang Yu put it "干吗要闹事？没共产党那有什么？混乱、内乱、内战、不停地不稳定" - "Why go and cause trouble? If there ain't a communist party, then what'll there be? chaos, disorder, civil strife, non-stop instability." This may be an exaggeration, but it's not without precedence. The fact is that is exactly what happened at the fall of the Qing, which is what most people wanted to avoid. Most people seem to think that with the fall of the Qing a "Republic" was founded, but the reality was more so the average person's nightmare: 38 years of war followed the fall of the Qing. There were quiet years. the first 2 years of the republic were calm until Yuan Shikai attacked the GMD. Afterwards was nothing but political division, warlords, Japaneses invasion, then the GMD and CCP war. For the average citizen it meant hardship and further entrenchment in poverty. The only break was in the early 30's. It was this kind of instability, decentralization and conflict that people would have sought to avoid by continuing their support for the dynasty that had preserved stability most their life. The fact is that the fall of the Qing brought about their worst nightmare. Over a generation of violence.

I believe it was Lao She (老舍) who wrote in his short story "This Life of mine" (我这一辈子) something like: "had we only kept the empire [under the Qing], before the republic, the warlords and the instability, things wouldn't have been such a mess." in reference to the looting and chaos when Duan Qirui's army took back Beijing from Zhang Xun's Bianzi Jun (张醺的辫子军).

A last quick note, I think the Western assistance with the "Ever Victorious Army" and other western technology equipped units was only marginal in the victory. It is only highlighted in Western literature on Chinese history because it was written by Western historians concentrating on a certain aspect they understood more easily (ie. the language of documents). Most battles against the Taipings that were victorious were done so without the help of Western guns, but through fierece hand-to-hand combat. I think it's a mistake to overplay the effect of Westerns on Chinese history at this stage.

[fireball]

Excellent explanation from Iovah. You said what many of us suspected but could not confirm. I was looking at today's Afghanistan and Iraq and thought they were just like China after the fall of Qing dynasty. I wonder how many more years the chaos would last in those two countries.

[ahxiang]

I do not think it was the Western powers were "not interested" in conquest of China. After all, it's hard to define "interest" in a group of people with varying opinions and ideas. I think it was more so a question of physical limitations. Western powers could defeat Chinese forces in quick decisive battles, but the question is could they maintain a war from the other side of the planet and then occupy the land. If one looks at the forces used by these Western empires in the Far East, they were generally the best equipped of their time, but were extremely small in number. How could a small force be able to hold a city, much less a continent sized country, against a determined resistive local force. I think any Western statesmen and general realized the futility of militarily occupying the vastness of China at such a distance. They could only settle for minor territorial, political and economic concessions. Some may point out the British experience in India, but many are under the incorrect assumption that the British conquest of India was a "cake walk" and that it was Britain fighting the "Indians." When the British arrived in India, it was fiercely divided into many states. The British and other European powers slowly through manipulation this division and long drawn out wars using large armies of local auxiliaries managed to carve out a territory, then the British eliminated other European powers, and slowly conquered other Indian states. China, however, was a united empire that was ethnically united albeit not a nationalist state. It was therefore difficult in the Qing dynasty for Western powers to fathom the conquest of China. At the worst, they could de-stabilize the empire. A good example would be the Japanese attempt of conquering China in the 1930's and 40's: Even with a well trained army of well over a million (not counting Chinese auxiliary units), they could only occupy major cities and the railway lines.

Let me return to the original question: Why did the Qing Dynasty last so long? I find it amazing that some people find this surprising. Many Westerners think that the legitimacy of a ruler is what determines the longevity of a state and our shocked to see Chinese continued support at a de-legitimized Manchu-ruled state, where as others look in disbelief at the continued functioning and support of the Qing war machine in the face of large military threats. I do not find these conditions any different then why the current communist party regime remains in power.

Few in China today look at the communist party as a benevolent model government. In fact, it has long been de-legitimized to most Chinese today, in my experience. So why do Chinese still support it? Why don't they rebel? A couple factors: rebellion means uncertainty of a source of an income. rebellion may mean no food tomorrow and no roof over your head. Why cause a ruckus, lose your life, get your family murdered in order to change the person on top who just is a different rich person to collect your taxes afterall. Also, it's a choice of a "lesser of two evils." As my best friend Wang Yu put it "干吗要闹事？没共产党那有什么？混乱、内乱、内战、不停地不稳定" - "Why go and cause trouble? If there ain't a communist party, then what'll there be? chaos, disorder, civil strife, non-stop instability." This may be an exaggeration, but it's not without precedence. The fact is that is exactly what happened at the fall of the Qing, which is what most people wanted to avoid. Most people seem to think that with the fall of the Qing a "Republic" was founded, but the reality was more so the average person's nightmare: 38 years of war followed the fall of the Qing. There were quiet years. the first 2 years of the republic were calm until Yuan Shikai attacked the GMD. Afterwards was nothing but political division, warlords, Japaneses invasion, then the GMD and CCP war. For the average citizen it meant hardship and further entrenchment in poverty. The only break was in the early 30's. It was this kind of instability, decentralization and conflict that people would have sought to avoid by continuing their support for the dynasty that had preserved stability most their life. The fact is that the fall of the Qing brought about their worst nightmare. Over a generation of violence.

I believe it was Lao She (老舍) who wrote in his short story "This Life of mine" (我这一辈子) something like: "had we only kept the empire [under the Qing], before the republic, the warlords and the instability, things wouldn't have been such a mess." in reference to the looting and chaos when Duan Qirui's army took back Beijing from Zhang Xun's Bianzi Jun (张醺的辫子军).

A last quick note, I think the Western assistance with the "Ever Victorious Army" and other western technology equipped units was only marginal in the victory. It is only highlighted in Western literature on Chinese history because it was written by Western historians concentrating on a certain aspect they understood more easily (ie. the language of documents). Most battles against the Taipings that were victorious were done so without the help of Western guns, but through fierece hand-to-hand combat. I think it's a mistake to overplay the effect of Westerns on Chinese history at this stage.

First, we need to point out that LAO SHE was a Manchu, and most of the street poeple of Peking were "slaves" of the Manchu rulers. Their opinions did not count. 1911 revolution was the efforts of southerners, i.e., Sun Yat-sen's Cantonese Band, Zhang Taiyan & Tao Chengzhang's Zhejiang Band, and Huang Xing & Song Jiaoren's Hubei-Hunan Band.

The reason 1911 revolution was successful was attributed to two-time debacles of Manchu, i.e., Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and 1900-1901 Boxer Rebellion. Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary pioneer, was a rare figure who had contrived the idea of overthrowing Manchus after exposure to Western ideas. He was called a bandit. He was lonely, with a few comrades. Fortunately, some Japanese friends found Sun Yat-sen to be a man of expectations and ideals, and supported Sun Yat-sen before the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. After Boxer rebellion, Manchu lost credibility altogether, as well as its legitimacy. The fatal mistake by the Manchus were the dispatch of students to overseas, US,Europe and Japan. With the New Administration and New Army, all Manchu government and military were taken over by returnee-students. It was in this environment that Sun Yat-sen was first introduced to student organizations, and hence recruited his members for the ultimate revolution. The mistake before hiring overseas students was Manchu abolition of imperial exam, the only social ladder for Chinese to ascend to the officialdom, by the way.

The brilliant scheme started here: In the spring of 1905, Sun Yat-sen visited Europe. In the spring, he knocked on the door of Wu ZHihui who had refused to see him while in Japan in 1901, thinking that Sun might just be a robinhood kind of figure. With Liu Chengyu's referral letter sent from San Francisco, Sun Yat-sen obtained invitation from overseas students in Brussels and Berlin. While Sun touted the role of secret societies, Zhu Hezhong alerted to the influences of students and soldiers in Hunan-Hubei provinces as well as the possible unrestrained ambitions of secret society members. After 3 day and 3 night talks, Sun Yat-sen was convinced by Zhu Hezhong. About 30 students held an oath, and later in 1905, called themselves the European Branch of "Allied Societies", with the inclusion of the students from Berlin and Paris area.

Now, why could Chinese communists continue to hold on to their power? Because Chinese communist party had mastered the essence of Russian party commissar system and secret police scheme. Would any of the PLA general be someone who graduated from West Point? No way. Worst yet. Nowsdays, you have laptop-guided precision missile that could strike at your den via GPS. So, there was no comparable between Manchu CHina and communist China. The most likely scenario of a communist China collapse would be its confrontation with another power or superpower, Japan and US included, or a conflict in the process of attacking 'renegade' Taiwan. Should that happen, then there could be a chance of a replay of Tang Dynasty's debacle in battling Nanzhao Kingdom or Sui Dynasty's battling Koguryeo.

When Chiang Kai-shek saw no chance of returning to mainland, by signing the bilateral mutual defense treaty with US - atreaty that bound his hands as to free action against mainland, then why would any letover "loyalists" in mainland China would still hold out hope for a free China? One has to count on 1) either a suicidal attempt by mainland China in provoking a war against Taiwan, US or Japan; or 2) possibly a rogue US president's action to take some premeptive strike against CHina. Chinese communists were and are cunning enough to play the Russian card, knowing that Russians were HALF-TARtars. I doubt anyone would break the impasse. Besides, all capitalists around the world are making money out of China in a win-win scenario. Why would anyone change the status quo?

[light]

First, we need to point out that LAO SHE was a Manchu, and most of the street poeple of Peking were "slaves" of the Manchu rulers. Their opinions did not count. 1911 revolution was the efforts of southerners, i.e., Sun Yat-sen's Cantonese Band, Zhang Taiyan & Tao Chengzhang's Zhejiang Band, and Huang Xing & Song Jiaoren's Hubei-Hunan Band.

The reason 1911 revolution was successful was attributed to two-time debacles of Manchu, i.e., Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and 1900-1901 Boxer Rebellion. Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary pioneer, was a rare figure who had contrived the idea of overthrowing Manchus after exposure to Western ideas. He was called a bandit. He was lonely, with a few comrades. Fortunately, some Japanese friends found Sun Yat-sen to be a man of expectations and ideals, and supported Sun Yat-sen before the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. After Boxer rebellion, Manchu lost credibility altogether, as well as its legitimacy. The fatal mistake by the Manchus were the dispatch of students to overseas, US,Europe and Japan. With the New Administration and New Army, all Manchu government and military were taken over by returnee-students. It was in this environment that Sun Yat-sen was first introduced to student organizations, and hence recruited his members for the ultimate revolution. The mistake before hiring overseas students was Manchu abolition of imperial exam, the only social ladder for Chinese to ascend to the officialdom, by the way.

The brilliant scheme started here: In the spring of 1905, Sun Yat-sen visited Europe. In the spring, he knocked on the door of Wu ZHihui who had refused to see him while in Japan in 1901, thinking that Sun might just be a robinhood kind of figure. With Liu Chengyu's referral letter sent from San Francisco, Sun Yat-sen obtained invitation from overseas students in Brussels and Berlin. While Sun touted the role of secret societies, Zhu Hezhong alerted to the influences of students and soldiers in Hunan-Hubei provinces as well as the possible unrestrained ambitions of secret society members. After 3 day and 3 night talks, Sun Yat-sen was convinced by Zhu Hezhong. About 30 students held an oath, and later in 1905, called themselves the European Branch of "Allied Societies", with the inclusion of the students from Berlin and Paris area.

Now, why could Chinese communists continue to hold on to their power? Because Chinese communist party had mastered the essence of Russian party commissar system and secret police scheme. Would any of the PLA general be someone who graduated from West Point? No way. Worst yet. Nowsdays, you have laptop-guided precision missile that could strike at your den via GPS. So, there was no comparable between Manchu CHina and communist China. The most likely scenario of a communist China collapse would be its confrontation with another power or superpower, Japan and US included, or a conflict in the process of attacking 'renegade' Taiwan. Should that happen, then there could be a chance of a replay of Tang Dynasty's debacle in battling Nanzhao Kingdom or Sui Dynasty's battling Koguryeo.

When Chiang Kai-shek saw no chance of returning to mainland, by signing the bilateral mutual defense treaty with US - atreaty that bound his hands as to free action against mainland, then why would any letover "loyalists" in mainland China would still hold out hope for a free China? One has to count on 1) either a suicidal attempt by mainland China in provoking a war against Taiwan, US or Japan; or 2) possibly a rogue US president's action to take some premeptive strike against CHina. Chinese communists were and are cunning enough to play the Russian card, knowing that Russians were HALF-TARtars. I doubt anyone would break the impasse. Besides, all capitalists around the world are making money out of China in a win-win scenario. Why would anyone change the status quo?

I totally agree with you.

Anyway today communist party is definetly doing a better job than the late Qing dynasty so there shouldn't be this saying that the chinese supported the communist party just like how they support the late Qing dynasty.

[Iovah]

I'm not too clear about your main point about "why the Qing lasted so long." You seem to be saying that it only ended because the Qing made "two debacles."

My point was simply:
- Their survival was not due to a lack of intrest of Western powers, they were simply unable to conquer China result however being the same.
- Legitimacy was not important to the state, because the average person is more so synical to revolution as long as they can etch a living. Only when a living cannot be maintained, then do the rebel (or turn to banditry which turns into rebellion).
- Overthrowing a government puts oneself and ones family in trouble, and the Qing, obviously, as they put down the Taiping, Nian, Muslim, Uighur and Miao rebellions simultaneously, could put down rebellions still.

I do concer that Lao She was a Manchu, but it does not change the fact that much of China, do to the chaos after the fall of the Qing went, went through a time of instability that meant intense hardship to the average person. For those especially in Beijing, the sentiment Lao She expressed was common for a simple reason: in the Qing, maybe it was an unjust governement, but they did not, like the Beiyang gov., have soldiers with guns break into their homes and steal a years worth of millet or sweet potatoes or brutalize family members. Every time a new warlord took Beijing, they looted the city, impressed citizens and caused harm and insecurity among the populace. Given the choice in the 1910's, 20's and 30's, wouldn't you have preferred the stability of the Qing?

You're issue on the reason for the fall of the Qing, elaborate further in a seperate post and I'll respond. You're forgetting two more very important issue in the 1911 revolution: Provincial authority and railroad development.

[ahxiang]

I'm not too clear about your main point about "why the Qing lasted so long." You seem to be saying that it only ended because the Qing made "two debacles."

My point was simply:
- Their survival was not due to a lack of intrest of Western powers, they were simply unable to conquer China result however being the same.
- Legitimacy was not important to the state, because the average person is more so synical to revolution as long as they can etch a living. Only when a living cannot be maintained, then do the rebel (or turn to banditry which turns into rebellion).
- Overthrowing a government puts oneself and ones family in trouble, and the Qing, obviously, as they put down the Taiping, Nian, Muslim, Uighur and Miao rebellions simultaneously, could put down rebellions still.

I do concer that Lao She was a Manchu, but it does not change the fact that much of China, do to the chaos after the fall of the Qing went, went through a time of instability that meant intense hardship to the average person. For those especially in Beijing, the sentiment Lao She expressed was common for a simple reason: in the Qing, maybe it was an unjust governement, but they did not, like the Beiyang gov., have soldiers with guns break into their homes and steal a years worth of millet or sweet potatoes or brutalize family members. Every time a new warlord took Beijing, they looted the city, impressed citizens and caused harm and insecurity among the populace. Given the choice in the 1910's, 20's and 30's, wouldn't you have preferred the stability of the Qing?

You're issue on the reason for the fall of the Qing, elaborate further in a seperate post and I'll respond. You're forgetting two more very important issue in the 1911 revolution: Provincial authority and railroad development.

Why the Manchu lasted so long? We could explain through one of the two fatal mistakes they made, i.e., abolition of imperial exams. Manchus were smart enough to use Chinese to rule Chinese after the massacres of 17th century. Once the imperial exam was restored, leftover Chinese Confucians began to turn coat. A society like China had survived for thousands of years by relying on the bureacratic structure called the "emperor's men". Chinese communists know the essence of the stability of Chinese society and system, hence destroyed the ancient tombs in 1960s as well as routed the elderlies and the "clan control" during the revolution. Parallel to the imperial bureacratic system would be so-called "ZONG [ancestral or clan] FA [laws]". Example, women who adultered got drowned by the clan patriarch. The leaders of clans were renowned figured in villages and towns. Should those people defect to the manchu side, then the Manchu control of Chinese society was guaranteed. Everybody knows the story of Vatican attempt at having manchu emperors abolish "ancestor worshipping", right? This is an alternative way to show how Manchus had mastered the essence of Chinese culture.


- Their survival was not due to a lack of intrest of Western powers, they were simply unable to conquer China result however being the same.

Manchu China was merely dragging its centepede feet. The demise could come any time. Imperialists had wrestled over their spheres of influence in the expectation of an eventual foldup of Manchu "empire". Li Hongzhang's luring Russians into building a railway in Manchuria was a last straw he had to pit the pack of wolves against each other. Every imperialist nation in the world knew the importance of controlling China, i.e., the immense manpower. Genghis Khan and the Yellow Peril already taught them a lesson, namely, the conquest of the world could be achieved by hijacking China and using the manpower as fodder of the war. Thus, no imperialist nation would allow another imperialist nation to put China under its exclusive control, not in 19th century, nor 20th century.


- Legitimacy was not important to the state, because the average person is more so synical to revolution as long as they can etch a living. Only when a living cannot be maintained, then do the rebel (or turn to banditry which turns into rebellion).

Human beings, like horses, need a leader. True leaders rarely came about, maybe once every few hundred years. China was fortunate to have Sun Yat-sen [and then Chiang kai-shek] live at the turn of the century. Only a few people saw the value of armed revolution in Sun. Zhang Jingjiang was an exception. Zhang donated his fortune in Paris to Sun for sake of revolution. IS there another Zhang Jingjiang and another Sun Yat-sen today? (When I said "then Chiang Kai-shek", this is because China could have surrendered to Japan absent the existence of Chiang.)



- Overthrowing a government puts oneself and ones family in trouble, and the Qing, obviously, as they put down the Taiping, Nian, Muslim, Uighur and Miao rebellions simultaneously, could put down rebellions still.

Today's China is not short of risks that could lead to the rebellions as seen before. China's population, in a year of famine, could be the time-bomb. For China to disintegrate, there would need more corruption at the provincial and regional levels to cause havoc to the central government's control. When the central government continues to lose tax revenue and epicenter influence, then some change may occur. In any case, external factors, like a conflict with Japan, taiwan or US, could be the last drip of sand on the camel before its breaks down.



-I do concer that Lao She was a Manchu, but it does not change the fact that much of China, do to the chaos after the fall of the Qing went, went through a time of instability that meant intense hardship to the average person. For those especially in Beijing, the sentiment Lao She expressed was common for a simple reason: in the Qing, maybe it was an unjust governement, but they did not, like the Beiyang gov., have soldiers with guns break into their homes and steal a years worth of millet or sweet potatoes or brutalize family members. Every time a new warlord took Beijing, they looted the city, impressed citizens and caused harm and insecurity among the populace. Given the choice in the 1910's, 20's and 30's, wouldn't you have preferred the stability of the Qing?


Warlord looting Peking? Unimaginable. At most, the warlord military put the finance minister under house arrest to make sure that the stipends were paid. Wellington Koo memoirs had several episodes about officers escorting cashier to the banks to get money. Sun Dianying, the most notorious warlord, merely dug up Cixi's tomb. Starggler soldiers could have robbed civilians. rarely an army general would openly rob a city. Foreigners had good observation about the chaos of early Republcian years. Most of the armed conflicts were settled by talks, not guns. According to Jaegher, this "norm" of business dealings with the military had finally been broken by the communists. Because the communist army, once they entered a village, would take down the "clan system" and install first of all women's society to stir up divorce and family breakdowns - which was a good inducement towards recuitment. Zhang Guotao's mother had commented that their life was turned upside down with the launch of Soviet enclaves.


-Provincial authority and railroad development.

The railway movement had strengthened the will of southern Chinese, especially Sichuan people, in fighting back against Manchu central government. It was not a revolution till Wuchang Uprising. The reason they were related was because Manchu, to rein in control of Sichuan, had relocated about half of the garrison armies of Wuchang for Sichuan, hence giving revolutionaries a chance to strike at Wuchang.

The provincial authorities that Han-ethnic Chinese enjoyed came in the aftermath of cracking down on the rebellions, like Taiping. When manchu, after the boxer debacle, stipulated the build of the New Army, they made a mistake in allowing provincial governor-generals to establish the New Army separately across the nation. Alternatively speaking, it was manchu attempt to utilize the local financial resource for the build of the New Army. Tang Degang commented: Manchus planted the seeds of beans, they reaped the fruits of cucumbers.

[polar_zen]

I think people exaggerate the differences between Han and Manchu and the hostilities between the two. There were many Han who were loyal to the Qing.

[Andy Lau]

remember the Taiping rebellion which was led by a half hakka-zhuang leader from Guangdong, and fought against the Qing army all the way up to Nanjing from Guangxi. I doubt many Han were pro-Qing. There is a cultural and genetic differences between the Hans and Manchus, but more in the cultural sense.. where they dress differently, the hair style for men (pig tale) is different, the language is different and the writing system is different.

To answer the question of the topic: i guess because the Qing dynasty had a good military strategy to keep the country stable and prevent rebelions from happening, until the Sino-British war that occured in the 1800s which led to the defeat of the Qing's army, due to the Qing's Isolation Policy, which prevented China from trading with foreigners and as a result prevented china from modernizing. In contrast with the Tang and Han dynasties where both were open to learning from foreigners and help China become a leading super power in the world at that time... which is happening right now in Modern China - which proves communism = isolation, doesn't work.

Edited by Andy Lau, 04 December 2007 - 10:28 PM.

[Iovah]

Why the Manchu lasted so long? We could explain through one of the two fatal mistakes they made, i.e., abolition of imperial exams. Manchus were smart enough to use Chinese to rule Chinese after the massacres of 17th century. Once the imperial exam was restored, leftover Chinese Confucians began to turn coat. A society like China had survived for thousands of years by relying on the bureacratic structure called the "emperor's men". Chinese communists know the essence of the stability of Chinese society and system, hence destroyed the ancient tombs in 1960s as well as routed the elderlies and the "clan control" during the revolution. Parallel to the imperial bureacratic system would be so-called "ZONG [ancestral or clan] FA [laws]". Example, women who adultered got drowned by the clan patriarch. The leaders of clans were renowned figured in villages and towns. Should those people defect to the manchu side, then the Manchu control of Chinese society was guaranteed. Everybody knows the story of Vatican attempt at having manchu emperors abolish "ancestor worshipping", right? This is an alternative way to show how Manchus had mastered the essence of Chinese culture.


- Their survival was not due to a lack of intrest of Western powers, they were simply unable to conquer China result however being the same.

Manchu China was merely dragging its centepede feet. The demise could come any time. Imperialists had wrestled over their spheres of influence in the expectation of an eventual foldup of Manchu "empire". Li Hongzhang's luring Russians into building a railway in Manchuria was a last straw he had to pit the pack of wolves against each other. Every imperialist nation in the world knew the importance of controlling China, i.e., the immense manpower. Genghis Khan and the Yellow Peril already taught them a lesson, namely, the conquest of the world could be achieved by hijacking China and using the manpower as fodder of the war. Thus, no imperialist nation would allow another imperialist nation to put China under its exclusive control, not in 19th century, nor 20th century.


- Legitimacy was not important to the state, because the average person is more so synical to revolution as long as they can etch a living. Only when a living cannot be maintained, then do the rebel (or turn to banditry which turns into rebellion).

Human beings, like horses, need a leader. True leaders rarely came about, maybe once every few hundred years. China was fortunate to have Sun Yat-sen [and then Chiang kai-shek] live at the turn of the century. Only a few people saw the value of armed revolution in Sun. Zhang Jingjiang was an exception. Zhang donated his fortune in Paris to Sun for sake of revolution. IS there another Zhang Jingjiang and another Sun Yat-sen today? (When I said "then Chiang Kai-shek", this is because China could have surrendered to Japan absent the existence of Chiang.)



- Overthrowing a government puts oneself and ones family in trouble, and the Qing, obviously, as they put down the Taiping, Nian, Muslim, Uighur and Miao rebellions simultaneously, could put down rebellions still.

Today's China is not short of risks that could lead to the rebellions as seen before. China's population, in a year of famine, could be the time-bomb. For China to disintegrate, there would need more corruption at the provincial and regional levels to cause havoc to the central government's control. When the central government continues to lose tax revenue and epicenter influence, then some change may occur. In any case, external factors, like a conflict with Japan, taiwan or US, could be the last drip of sand on the camel before its breaks down.



-I do concer that Lao She was a Manchu, but it does not change the fact that much of China, do to the chaos after the fall of the Qing went, went through a time of instability that meant intense hardship to the average person. For those especially in Beijing, the sentiment Lao She expressed was common for a simple reason: in the Qing, maybe it was an unjust governement, but they did not, like the Beiyang gov., have soldiers with guns break into their homes and steal a years worth of millet or sweet potatoes or brutalize family members. Every time a new warlord took Beijing, they looted the city, impressed citizens and caused harm and insecurity among the populace. Given the choice in the 1910's, 20's and 30's, wouldn't you have preferred the stability of the Qing?


Warlord looting Peking? Unimaginable. At most, the warlord military put the finance minister under house arrest to make sure that the stipends were paid. Wellington Koo memoirs had several episodes about officers escorting cashier to the banks to get money. Sun Dianying, the most notorious warlord, merely dug up Cixi's tomb. Starggler soldiers could have robbed civilians. rarely an army general would openly rob a city. Foreigners had good observation about the chaos of early Republcian years. Most of the armed conflicts were settled by talks, not guns. According to Jaegher, this "norm" of business dealings with the military had finally been broken by the communists. Because the communist army, once they entered a village, would take down the "clan system" and install first of all women's society to stir up divorce and family breakdowns - which was a good inducement towards recuitment. Zhang Guotao's mother had commented that their life was turned upside down with the launch of Soviet enclaves.


-Provincial authority and railroad development.

The railway movement had strengthened the will of southern Chinese, especially Sichuan people, in fighting back against Manchu central government. It was not a revolution till Wuchang Uprising. The reason they were related was because Manchu, to rein in control of Sichuan, had relocated about half of the garrison armies of Wuchang for Sichuan, hence giving revolutionaries a chance to strike at Wuchang.

The provincial authorities that Han-ethnic Chinese enjoyed came in the aftermath of cracking down on the rebellions, like Taiping. When manchu, after the boxer debacle, stipulated the build of the New Army, they made a mistake in allowing provincial governor-generals to establish the New Army separately across the nation. Alternatively speaking, it was manchu attempt to utilize the local financial resource for the build of the New Army. Tang Degang commented: Manchus planted the seeds of beans, they reaped the fruits of cucumbers.

You're point isn't exactly clear, but you were getting on a good point. The question is "why did the Qing last so long?" not "Why did the Qing get cut short?"; by saying that they made "two mistakes" that led two their downfall according to your thesis statement, it sounds like you're saying, 'The Qing wasn't long, it could have been longer, it only fell apart due to mistakes made by the Qing'. This means that their demise was not predictable because these mistakes led to the downfall; this contradicts, however, other ideas you said, namely "Manchu China was merely dragging its centepede feet," which means their demise is inevitable. Which one is it, their demise was inevitable or unpredictable.

You makes some good point and some I do not agree with, and one I know to be false:

--You make an extremely good point about the Zongfa, in English generally referred to the "Clan Society." The Clan society and the Qing mastery of manipulating it is a key reason to Manchu preservation of power. The Zongfa, if on the Manchu side, could assist, and did assist in keeping the Empire together. However, we should remember, that the power of the Clan Society was much more powerful in Southern regions, expecially Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Zhejiang, and was weaker further North though it was still potent.

-- You understand slightly the role of the railroad, but not entirely. I suggest you read Gao Zheng's (高峥) book "Modernization's Advance" where in several chapter he talks about how in many Southern provinces the provincial government's frequently conflicted with the central government over railroad funding, construction and authority. In general there was a clash of interest between province and central government since the Taiping rebellion as provinces had more autonomy from the central gov., but the railroad set it off, especially in Sichuan. This led to many Southern Provinces supporting the uprisers.

-- You are right that most of the fighting was resolved by fighting, and NO BATTLES occurred in Beijing, though in 1917 and 1924 they were extremely close. Several acts of looting and rioting occurred in Beijing allow me to list them:
1917 - Zhang Xun's Pigtail Army wantonly loots many shops and businesses,
1917 - Duan Qirui's Army, after taking back Beijing, for the first night goes on a looting spree, which was stopped the next day.
1918 - Soldier Mutiny leads to two night of lawlessness, looting and arson.
1919 - May fourth Movement.
1920 - Cao Kun's army loots banks, guild headquarters and many large business.
1922 - (I beleive 22 or maybe 23, I forgot) Beijing Police on Strike leads to lawlessness and civilian looting in the West district and Tianqiao area through relatively quiet and quickly resolved when the army took over.
1922 - The First Zhili-Fengtian War was fought around Beijing resulting in impressment, fear, price gouging, hording.
1924 - Feng Yuxiang takes Beijing, as Cao Kun's army retreats, Cao impresses a couple thousand Beijing men into military service (mainly coolies and rickshaw drivers). There are several days between the occupation that were chaotic with much soldier and civilian looting.
1925 - 1926 civil disturbances between different guildes (such as the Nightsoil collectors guilde) and chambers of commerce, several boil over into Riots
1926 - Zhang Zuolin takes Beijing, relatively peaceful and organized transfer, but the people quite terrified I imagine considering their previous experience.
1927 - Oct 22 The famous Tram Riots nearly half of the trams in Beijng are burned or destroyed beyond repair.
1928 - Zhang Zuolin retreats back behind Shanhaiguan, impressing many (I don't know how many, but it is talked about like it's many) and looting all financial institutions, large businesses and wealthy individuals. GMD take the city pretty peacefully, but have to re institute order.
In the 30's you have the Japaneses making their way slowly towards Beijing.

You also obviously didn't read Wellington Koo's memoirs as I've read all 10,000 odd pages of his memoirs at Columbia University on microfilm for my dissertation "V.K. Wellington Koo and the Westernization of Chinese Diplomacy". He never made any reference to "several episodes about officers escorting cashier to the banks to get money" in the parts involving the warlord years he was in Beijing (1924 to 1928) He would never have been involved in such transactions as he primarily worked in the Waijiaobu. Although technically acting president in 1927 because there was no one else, even as president he would not have been involved with escorting cashiers to the bank as president. It wasn't his job!

It's too late. I don't feel like discussing this anymore as we're way off topic. continue this in another post. Put simply, if you had to live through the events just listed in those 10 years, as a normal citizen, wouldn't you want to bring back a more peaceful government? I believe that's the sentiment of most now and then. That's the main reason people supported the Qing for so long: stability and avoiding the chaos of regime change.

[Prince of the South]

Iovah, I don't understand this last point of your well-researched comment.

That's the main reason people supported the Qing for so long: stability and avoiding the chaos of regime change.

How do we see the Qing (especially the late Qing era) as one of stability?

Perhaps why the Qing lasted so long was because there was never a concerted effort to overthrow the Qing. Even when Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionaries overthrew the Qing, who stepped in as the first President? Yuan Shikai, perhaps the most powerful figure of the Qing government at that time. Without his participation in forcing the abdication of the emperor, the Qing might have lasted longer.....?

[ahxiang]

You're point isn't exactly clear, but you were getting on a good point. The question is "why did the Qing last so long?" not "Why did the Qing get cut short?"; by saying that they made "two mistakes" that led two their downfall according to your thesis statement, it sounds like you're saying, 'The Qing wasn't long, it could have been longer, it only fell apart due to mistakes made by the Qing'. This means that their demise was not predictable because these mistakes led to the downfall; this contradicts, however, other ideas you said, namely "Manchu China was merely dragging its centepede feet," which means their demise is inevitable. Which one is it, their demise was inevitable or unpredictable.

You makes some good point and some I do not agree with, and one I know to be false:

--You make an extremely good point about the Zongfa, in English generally referred to the "Clan Society." The Clan society and the Qing mastery of manipulating it is a key reason to Manchu preservation of power. The Zongfa, if on the Manchu side, could assist, and did assist in keeping the Empire together. However, we should remember, that the power of the Clan Society was much more powerful in Southern regions, expecially Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Zhejiang, and was weaker further North though it was still potent.

-- You understand slightly the role of the railroad, but not entirely. I suggest you read Gao Zheng's (高峥) book "Modernization's Advance" where in several chapter he talks about how in many Southern provinces the provincial government's frequently conflicted with the central government over railroad funding, construction and authority. In general there was a clash of interest between province and central government since the Taiping rebellion as provinces had more autonomy from the central gov., but the railroad set it off, especially in Sichuan. This led to many Southern Provinces supporting the uprisers.

-- You are right that most of the fighting was resolved by fighting, and NO BATTLES occurred in Beijing, though in 1917 and 1924 they were extremely close. Several acts of looting and rioting occurred in Beijing allow me to list them:
1917 - Zhang Xun's Pigtail Army wantonly loots many shops and businesses,
1917 - Duan Qirui's Army, after taking back Beijing, for the first night goes on a looting spree, which was stopped the next day.
1918 - Soldier Mutiny leads to two night of lawlessness, looting and arson.
1919 - May fourth Movement.
1920 - Cao Kun's army loots banks, guild headquarters and many large business.
1922 - (I beleive 22 or maybe 23, I forgot) Beijing Police on Strike leads to lawlessness and civilian looting in the West district and Tianqiao area through relatively quiet and quickly resolved when the army took over.
1922 - The First Zhili-Fengtian War was fought around Beijing resulting in impressment, fear, price gouging, hording.
1924 - Feng Yuxiang takes Beijing, as Cao Kun's army retreats, Cao impresses a couple thousand Beijing men into military service (mainly coolies and rickshaw drivers). There are several days between the occupation that were chaotic with much soldier and civilian looting.
1925 - 1926 civil disturbances between different guildes (such as the Nightsoil collectors guilde) and chambers of commerce, several boil over into Riots
1926 - Zhang Zuolin takes Beijing, relatively peaceful and organized transfer, but the people quite terrified I imagine considering their previous experience.
1927 - Oct 22 The famous Tram Riots nearly half of the trams in Beijng are burned or destroyed beyond repair.
1928 - Zhang Zuolin retreats back behind Shanhaiguan, impressing many (I don't know how many, but it is talked about like it's many) and looting all financial institutions, large businesses and wealthy individuals. GMD take the city pretty peacefully, but have to re institute order.
In the 30's you have the Japaneses making their way slowly towards Beijing.

You also obviously didn't read Wellington Koo's memoirs as I've read all 10,000 odd pages of his memoirs at Columbia University on microfilm for my dissertation "V.K. Wellington Koo and the Westernization of Chinese Diplomacy". He never made any reference to "several episodes about officers escorting cashier to the banks to get money" in the parts involving the warlord years he was in Beijing (1924 to 1928) He would never have been involved in such transactions as he primarily worked in the Waijiaobu. Although technically acting president in 1927 because there was no one else, even as president he would not have been involved with escorting cashiers to the bank as president. It wasn't his job!

It's too late. I don't feel like discussing this anymore as we're way off topic. continue this in another post. Put simply, if you had to live through the events just listed in those 10 years, as a normal citizen, wouldn't you want to bring back a more peaceful government? I believe that's the sentiment of most now and then. That's the main reason people supported the Qing for so long: stability and avoiding the chaos of regime change.

For 3 years, I spent one hour a day reading Wellington Koo. So far, I completely browsed volumes 1-10, about 1/4th of volume 11, and still have volume 12 left. I could scan the pages where Koo talked about the cashier's trip to the bank as well as another episode when the bank deliberately stopped payment to force the oustinbg of the cabinet - on which occasion an European bank saved Koo. We could start up a thread about Wellington Koo exclusively, and like to find out what you see the most valuable information he had provided.

In the passage on the 'Flowery Republic', at http://www.republica...revolution.html I had discussed why the European powers and the USA had supported Yuan Shi-kai as the president. This is not to say that all Americans acted the same. Like Japanese of Black Dragon Society, there was one American who acted as mercenary for Sun Yat-sen, playing a similar role as Corocan and Chennault as in 1930s and 1940s. (Wellington Koo had masked some of the dealings in relation to Corocan, including numerous White women spies, in his books, by the way.)

Now, about the topic of this thread. What I will more precisely state is that Manchu demise was inevitable, but when Manchu was to have its demise was unpreditable. What Manchus did, including Foreign Enterprise Movement, and New Army and New Administration, and Constitutional Monarchy Movement, was their futile attempts to save their regime from collapse. Along the way, Manchu made mistakes in abolishing the exams, which turned Chinese to alternative pursuits, like overseas studies; and worse yet, Manchu court hired too too many revolutionaries for its government and army, not knowing that the feud and blood that their ancestors caused to ethnic-Han Chinese, 76% loss of China's population during the invasion, was something 250 years of enslavement and forgeries could not wipe out.

You have some points about people's aspiration for peace and stability. Now the examples you gave, like Lao She, are interesting as well. I had asked myself a question: What so many officers and generals under Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army went to the communist side? And why some famous communist spymasters kept on talking about their family background as "shi [hereditary] jia [family]"? I figured that those Northeastern Army officers were in fact Manchu, and those communist spymasters, including Chen Jieru's son-in-law, Liu Jiuzhi, the Comintern agent, in deed shared one thing in common, namely, their fathers being some kind of Manchu-era county magistrates or the sort. Hence, it is easy to tell why those guys were hostile to Repuiblican China. Because they had lost some of the ancestors' status quo and glory.

We will find another time to discuss more.

[Iovah]

For 3 years, I spent one hour a day reading Wellington Koo. So far, I completely browsed volumes 1-10, about 1/4th of volume 11, and still have volume 12 left. I could scan the pages where Koo talked about the cashier's trip to the bank as well as another episode when the bank deliberately stopped payment to force the oustinbg of the cabinet - on which occasion an European bank saved Koo. We could start up a thread about Wellington Koo exclusively, and like to find out what you see the most valuable information he had provided.

In the passage on the 'Flowery Republic', at http://www.republica...revolution.html I had discussed why the European powers and the USA had supported Yuan Shi-kai as the president. This is not to say that all Americans acted the same. Like Japanese of Black Dragon Society, there was one American who acted as mercenary for Sun Yat-sen, playing a similar role as Corocan and Chennault as in 1930s and 1940s. (Wellington Koo had masked some of the dealings in relation to Corocan, including numerous White women spies, in his books, by the way.)

Now, about the topic of this thread. What I will more precisely state is that Manchu demise was inevitable, but when Manchu was to have its demise was unpreditable. What Manchus did, including Foreign Enterprise Movement, and New Army and New Administration, and Constitutional Monarchy Movement, was their futile attempts to save their regime from collapse. Along the way, Manchu made mistakes in abolishing the exams, which turned Chinese to alternative pursuits, like overseas studies; and worse yet, Manchu court hired too too many revolutionaries for its government and army, not knowing that the feud and blood that their ancestors caused to ethnic-Han Chinese, 76% loss of China's population during the invasion, was something 250 years of enslavement and forgeries could not wipe out.

You have some points about people's aspiration for peace and stability. Now the examples you gave, like Lao She, are interesting as well. I had asked myself a question: What so many officers and generals under Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army went to the communist side? And why some famous communist spymasters kept on talking about their family background as "shi [hereditary] jia [family]"? I figured that those Northeastern Army officers were in fact Manchu, and those communist spymasters, including Chen Jieru's son-in-law, Liu Jiuzhi, the Comintern agent, in deed shared one thing in common, namely, their fathers being some kind of Manchu-era county magistrates or the sort. Hence, it is easy to tell why those guys were hostile to Repuiblican China. Because they had lost some of the ancestors' status quo and glory.

We will find another time to discuss more.

Much clearer! Thank you!

I despise using the term "inevitable" in any historical context. It implies fate, but I would agree that it was "highly probable." The sentitment among many of the elites in the 1900's to 1910's was that great change was afoot. The Qing establishment of provincial assemblies and the promise of a constitutional monarchy definately left people wondering about the future. And the Boxer rebellion and the cancellation of the Imperial exams were definately factors in its demise, but a better question is, how did it last 11 years after the Boxer rebellion and 6 years after the cancellation of the Imperial examination system? Why did Sun's revolution or other revolutionary groups fail to topple the Qing earlier? Other regimes could be toppled within a year of discontent, why not the Qing? It appears to me, that the average citizens fervor for revolution was quite ambivalent or luke warm.

When you word it "the bank deliberately stopped payment to force the ousting of the cabinet" I do recall that instance. I beleive it was in 1924, but I don't recall off the top of my head. I concentrated mainly on the Pre-1922 Washington Conference Activities. You apparently are aware of Koo's career, and I'm glad to know of someone else who did, but as I recall, and I'm confused, Koo's memoirs, the one wrote in the 70's while living in New York in English, only have 6 volumes. I've read the very originals his secretary wrote up on the type writter. Are you reading another version? Does he have a Chinese version or something? Because the original copy I read at the Columbia Library certainly didn't have 12 volumes. Just 6 books, 6 volumes.