ive read in turnballs book that thew ming lost a battle where 30,000 ming lost.
1 votes
Ming Military in Imjin War
Started by
Moping4U
, Jan 18 2005 11:39 PM
210 replies to this topic
#46
ih8eurocentrix
-
- Novice Scholar (Tongsheng)
-
- 618 posts
State Undersecretary (Shangshu Lang 尚书郎)
-
Main Interest in CHF:
Chinese Art of War
-
Specialisation / Expertise:
Ancient Chinese Military
Posted 12 March 2005 - 09:42 PM
#47
TMPikachu
-
- CHF Grand Historian Award
-
- 2,542 posts
Emperor (Huangdi 皇帝)
Posted 15 March 2005 - 03:03 PM
I think Ming eventually had greater numbers total, but that was towards the end of the war when more reinforcements came. I think someone posted the number of Ming and/or Japanese soldiers in comparison somewhere.No man... Ming had a bigger number. And the Japanese LOST. They only beat the Joseon army on land initially because of surprise. Then they got beat up by Ming. On the sea the Japanese asses got whipped hard by Joseon as well.
"the way has more than one name, and wise men have more than one method. Knowledge is such that it may suit all countries, so that all creatures may be saved..."
#48
Grigori
-
- CHF Beginner
-
- 334 posts
Grand Tutor (Taifu 太傅)
Posted 15 March 2005 - 08:01 PM
i recently was reading steven turnballs book samurai invasion,ive heard this book is biased ,the book mentions that the chinese were defeated in a few battles.the first being where japanese carried off 6000 ming soldiers head.another defeat called soch'on(not sure about the name) where something like 30,000 ming were lost in that battle,He says the chinese were scared of the sharp japanese blades;and that these blades could easily penetrate the big coats of the ming.IS THIS TRUE?
Don't know much about this war but, who wouldn't be scared of sharp blades? Like any other war, soldiers on both sides were scared sh*tless.
This was the period when Japanese swords were made in huge quantities and in inferior quality. Collectors don't want katanas from this period because they are often junk. Many were made by inexperienced smiths who didn't temper them and as a result they chipped badly.
The katana's main advantage is the quickdraw, which is irrelevant in battle. I can say from experience that a swordsman with a singlehanded sword and shield can hold his own very nicely. So all this talk about the katana swordsman enjoying an advantage makes me suspecious. In reality it would come down to skill.
Swords are not the most important weapons on the battlefield anyways. First it's the bow, then the spear, finally the sword. That's the order of things in Japan as well as China. Anyone claiming the awesome Japanese swordsman winning battles is full of crock.
Once again I don't know much about this war, but it seems to me the Japanese did have the advantage of recent battlefield experience over the Ming. Hideyoshi had recently unified a Japan which had been at war for centuries where as Ming China was in decline at the time. The Ming army had swelled to twice its old size a few decades earlier but the quality had suffered. Mateo Ricci note the Ming army then was made of unmotivated salary seekers who did not care about the emperor nor personal glory.
They didn't do badly though. Hideyoshi's larger, musket armed army was ultimatly defeated.
#49
Grigori
-
- CHF Beginner
-
- 334 posts
Grand Tutor (Taifu 太傅)
Posted 15 March 2005 - 08:22 PM
Seven-Year War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
(Redirected from Battle of Keicho)
For the 1756–1763 war, see Seven Years' War.
The Seven-Year War (Chinese:壬辰倭亂; Korean: 임진 왜란 -- Imjin Waeran, lit. "Japanese Turmoil of the Year Imjin"); Japanese: 文禄, 慶長の役, lit. "Battles of Bunroku and Keicho") was the conflict from 1592 to 1598 on the Korean peninsula, following two successive Japanese invasions of Korea.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi initiated two invasions of Korea, in 1592 and again in 1597, with the professed aim of conquering China. In both campaigns, the Japanese were defeated by the expeditionary armies of Ming Dynasty China and local Korean forces, notably the naval fleet of Yi Sun-sin.
The war brought the local political, economic, and social order in Korea to a state of complete collapse. It also carried dramatic consequences for East Asian history. For Korea, the horrible devastation would leave the country in a perpetually weakened state until the Japanese returned and annexed Korea in 1910. In addition, the cost of the conflict also helped to bankrupt the Ming Dynasty and led to its eventual collapse at the hand of the Manchus.
The first invasion
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who established his hegemony in Japan in the latter part of the 16th century, had hoped but failed to receive cooperation from the Ming Dynasty in his attempt to make himself the new Shogun. Motivated in part also by a need to satisfy the perpetual land hunger of his vassals and find employment for restive samurai, he began making plans for the conquest of China. He first made his intentions to conquer China known to Mori Terumoto in 1586, then set about trying to realize it after he defeated the clans of Shimazu and Hojo. First he intended to secure the Korean peninsula as an invasion route for his forces. After King Sonjo refused his offer of an alliance against China and military access for the Japanese troops, Hideyoshi launched a war against Korea in 1592 to secure passage to China.
The Japanese invasion of 1592 with 160,000 troops had great initial success mainly due to the element of surprise and its use of firearms. Two armies, under Konishi Yukinaga and Kato Kiyomasa, landed on the 25th and 26th of May and marched north. Konishi reached the Han River south of Seoul and entered the city on June 12, just 18 days after landing at Busan. King Seonjo and his court withdrew first to Songdo, then Pyongyang and finally to Uiju, on the Yalu River. Japanese troops ravaged many key towns in the southern part of Korea, took Pyongyang and advanced as far north as the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Korean marines and irregulars harassed the Japanese rear so no attempt was made by the Japanese to exploit their initial advantage.
In May and June, a small Korean fleet commanded by Yi Sun-sin destroyed several Japanese flotillas and wrought havoc on Japanese logistics. The Korean iron-roofed Geobukseon, or turtle ships, were technologically superior in almost every way. In all perhaps 72 Japanese vessels were sunk by the end of June.
In July, the Wanli Emperor, responding to King Seonjo's request for aid, sent a small force of 5,000, which was not enough to fend off the Japanese. At this juncture Hideyoshi, after suffering numerous setbacks, including logistical problems caused by Korean saboteurs and major naval defeats at the hands of the Korean navy, proposed to China the division of Korea — the north as a self-governing Chinese satellite, and the south to remain in Japanese hands. The peace talks were mostly carried out by Konishi Yukinaga, who did most of the fighting against the Chinese. The offer was promptly rejected.
Having seen the token forces they had sent to Korea wiped out, China sent a much large force in January 1593 under Song Yingchang and Li Rusong. The expeditionary army had a prescribed strength of 100,000, made up of 42,000 from five northern military districts, a contingent of 3000 soldiers proficient in the use of firearms from South China, and far more from Siam and the Ryukyus. Seaports in China were closed for fear that the Wokou invasions of the 1550s would be repreated. In February 1593 a large combined force of Chinese and Korean soldiers attacked Pyongyang and drove the Japanese into southward retreat. Li Rusong personally led a pursuit with a force of 1000 cavalry. He was checked by a large Japanese formation outside Seoul and thoroughly routed.
These engagements ended the first phase of the war, and peace negotiations followed. The Japanese evacuated Seoul in May and retreated to fortifications around Busan. Some Japanese soldiers left the army and settled down in Korea, even marrying Korean women. The ensuing truce was to last for close to four years.
The interlude
In the summer of 1593 a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce. An envoy from Hideyoshi reached Beijing in 1594. Satisfied with Japanese overtures, the imperial court in Beijing dispatched an embassy to invest Hideyoshi with the title of "King of Japan" on condition of complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea. Most of the Japanese army had left Korea by autumn 1596; a small garrison was nevertheless left in Busan. The Ming embassy was granted an audience with Hideyoshi in October 1596 but there was a great deal of misunderstanding about the context of the meeting. Hideyoshi considered himself the victor in the war, and was enraged to find out that he was to be installed as a tribute-bearing vassal. He demand among other things, a royal marriage with the Wanli Emperor's daughter, the delivery of a Korean prince as hostage, and four of Korea's southern provinces. Peace negotiations soon ceased and the war entered its second phase. Early in 1597 both sides resumed hostilities.
The second invasion
Soon after the Chinese embassy was given safe conduct home, 200 Japanese ships carrying a force of 140,000 were sent to Korea. The court in Beijing appointed Yan Hao as supreme commander of an initial mobilisation of 38,000 troops from as far away as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong. These were assisted by a naval force of 21,000 men. Ray Huang has estimated the combined strength of the Ming army and navy at the height of the second campaign at 75,000 men.
The second invasion differed from the first in that the Japanese met with stronger resistance. They pushed to just south of Seoul in August 1597 but were turned back by a large Korean and Ming force that winter. As the Japanese retreated south through Gyeongsang-do they burned Gyeongju and destroyed and stole much of the historic and artistic legacy of Silla. Thereafter they were on the defensive. Naval operations, already deemed important in the first campaign, had a decisive influence on the outcome of the second. Following the loss of Hansan Island, Yi Sun-sin, who had been sent to jail, was reinstated. With his return the Koreans soon regained control over the waters of the straits, forcing the Japanese to land men to take defensive positions along the coast from Ulsan in the east to Suncheon in the west. On September 16, 1597, Yi led 12 ships against 133 Japanese ships in the Myongnyang Straits. The Koreans sank 31 enemy ships and forced a Japanese retreat. In November, the Japanese fleet was lured by Yi into a tide-race where the oar-driven turtle ships caused wholesale destruction.
By early 1598, the Japanese forces, hemmed in by Korean and Chinese armies, found themselves unable to break out of the south despite fierce fighting. The Wanli Emperor sent a Chinese fleet under artillery expert Chen Lin in May 1598; this naval force saw action in join manouvres with the Koreans. Konishi Yukinage warned that the Japanese position in Korea was untenable. Hideyoshi in turn ordered the withdrawal of close to half of the invading force, leaving mostly Satsuma warriors under Shimazu clan member commanders. The remaining Japanse forces fought fiercely, turning back Chinese attacks on Suncheon and Sacheon. The invasion was suddenly abandoned only when news of Hideyoshi's death on 18 September 1598 reached the Japanese camp late in Ocotber.
The Seven-Year War left deep scars in Korea. Farmlands were devastated, irrigation dikes were destroyed, villages and towns were burned down, the population was first plundered and then dispersed, and tens of thousands of skilled workers (celadon ware makers, craftsmen, artisans, etc) were either killed during the war or kidnapped to Japan as captives to help Japanese develop their crafts. In 1598 alone, the Japanese took some 38,000 ears as horrific trophies. The long war reduced the productive capacity of farmlands from 1,708,000 kyol to 541,000 kyol. Pillage and foraging by Chinese troops only added to the unmitigated tragedy of a war from which the peninsula kingdom never fully recovered.
Following the war, relations between Korea and Japan had been completely suspended. Japan was cut off from the technology of continental Asia. After the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, however, negotiations between the Korean court and the Tokugawa shogunate were carried out via the Japanese lord on Tsushima. In 1604, Tokugawa Ieyasu, needing to restore commercial relations with Korea in order to have access to the technology of the mainland again, met Korea's demands and released some 3000 captive Koreans. As a result, in 1607, a Korean mission visited Edo, and diplomatic and trade relations were restored on a limited basis.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
(Redirected from Battle of Keicho)
For the 1756–1763 war, see Seven Years' War.
The Seven-Year War (Chinese:壬辰倭亂; Korean: 임진 왜란 -- Imjin Waeran, lit. "Japanese Turmoil of the Year Imjin"); Japanese: 文禄, 慶長の役, lit. "Battles of Bunroku and Keicho") was the conflict from 1592 to 1598 on the Korean peninsula, following two successive Japanese invasions of Korea.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi initiated two invasions of Korea, in 1592 and again in 1597, with the professed aim of conquering China. In both campaigns, the Japanese were defeated by the expeditionary armies of Ming Dynasty China and local Korean forces, notably the naval fleet of Yi Sun-sin.
The war brought the local political, economic, and social order in Korea to a state of complete collapse. It also carried dramatic consequences for East Asian history. For Korea, the horrible devastation would leave the country in a perpetually weakened state until the Japanese returned and annexed Korea in 1910. In addition, the cost of the conflict also helped to bankrupt the Ming Dynasty and led to its eventual collapse at the hand of the Manchus.
The first invasion
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who established his hegemony in Japan in the latter part of the 16th century, had hoped but failed to receive cooperation from the Ming Dynasty in his attempt to make himself the new Shogun. Motivated in part also by a need to satisfy the perpetual land hunger of his vassals and find employment for restive samurai, he began making plans for the conquest of China. He first made his intentions to conquer China known to Mori Terumoto in 1586, then set about trying to realize it after he defeated the clans of Shimazu and Hojo. First he intended to secure the Korean peninsula as an invasion route for his forces. After King Sonjo refused his offer of an alliance against China and military access for the Japanese troops, Hideyoshi launched a war against Korea in 1592 to secure passage to China.
The Japanese invasion of 1592 with 160,000 troops had great initial success mainly due to the element of surprise and its use of firearms. Two armies, under Konishi Yukinaga and Kato Kiyomasa, landed on the 25th and 26th of May and marched north. Konishi reached the Han River south of Seoul and entered the city on June 12, just 18 days after landing at Busan. King Seonjo and his court withdrew first to Songdo, then Pyongyang and finally to Uiju, on the Yalu River. Japanese troops ravaged many key towns in the southern part of Korea, took Pyongyang and advanced as far north as the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Korean marines and irregulars harassed the Japanese rear so no attempt was made by the Japanese to exploit their initial advantage.
In May and June, a small Korean fleet commanded by Yi Sun-sin destroyed several Japanese flotillas and wrought havoc on Japanese logistics. The Korean iron-roofed Geobukseon, or turtle ships, were technologically superior in almost every way. In all perhaps 72 Japanese vessels were sunk by the end of June.
In July, the Wanli Emperor, responding to King Seonjo's request for aid, sent a small force of 5,000, which was not enough to fend off the Japanese. At this juncture Hideyoshi, after suffering numerous setbacks, including logistical problems caused by Korean saboteurs and major naval defeats at the hands of the Korean navy, proposed to China the division of Korea — the north as a self-governing Chinese satellite, and the south to remain in Japanese hands. The peace talks were mostly carried out by Konishi Yukinaga, who did most of the fighting against the Chinese. The offer was promptly rejected.
Having seen the token forces they had sent to Korea wiped out, China sent a much large force in January 1593 under Song Yingchang and Li Rusong. The expeditionary army had a prescribed strength of 100,000, made up of 42,000 from five northern military districts, a contingent of 3000 soldiers proficient in the use of firearms from South China, and far more from Siam and the Ryukyus. Seaports in China were closed for fear that the Wokou invasions of the 1550s would be repreated. In February 1593 a large combined force of Chinese and Korean soldiers attacked Pyongyang and drove the Japanese into southward retreat. Li Rusong personally led a pursuit with a force of 1000 cavalry. He was checked by a large Japanese formation outside Seoul and thoroughly routed.
These engagements ended the first phase of the war, and peace negotiations followed. The Japanese evacuated Seoul in May and retreated to fortifications around Busan. Some Japanese soldiers left the army and settled down in Korea, even marrying Korean women. The ensuing truce was to last for close to four years.
The interlude
In the summer of 1593 a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce. An envoy from Hideyoshi reached Beijing in 1594. Satisfied with Japanese overtures, the imperial court in Beijing dispatched an embassy to invest Hideyoshi with the title of "King of Japan" on condition of complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea. Most of the Japanese army had left Korea by autumn 1596; a small garrison was nevertheless left in Busan. The Ming embassy was granted an audience with Hideyoshi in October 1596 but there was a great deal of misunderstanding about the context of the meeting. Hideyoshi considered himself the victor in the war, and was enraged to find out that he was to be installed as a tribute-bearing vassal. He demand among other things, a royal marriage with the Wanli Emperor's daughter, the delivery of a Korean prince as hostage, and four of Korea's southern provinces. Peace negotiations soon ceased and the war entered its second phase. Early in 1597 both sides resumed hostilities.
The second invasion
Soon after the Chinese embassy was given safe conduct home, 200 Japanese ships carrying a force of 140,000 were sent to Korea. The court in Beijing appointed Yan Hao as supreme commander of an initial mobilisation of 38,000 troops from as far away as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong. These were assisted by a naval force of 21,000 men. Ray Huang has estimated the combined strength of the Ming army and navy at the height of the second campaign at 75,000 men.
The second invasion differed from the first in that the Japanese met with stronger resistance. They pushed to just south of Seoul in August 1597 but were turned back by a large Korean and Ming force that winter. As the Japanese retreated south through Gyeongsang-do they burned Gyeongju and destroyed and stole much of the historic and artistic legacy of Silla. Thereafter they were on the defensive. Naval operations, already deemed important in the first campaign, had a decisive influence on the outcome of the second. Following the loss of Hansan Island, Yi Sun-sin, who had been sent to jail, was reinstated. With his return the Koreans soon regained control over the waters of the straits, forcing the Japanese to land men to take defensive positions along the coast from Ulsan in the east to Suncheon in the west. On September 16, 1597, Yi led 12 ships against 133 Japanese ships in the Myongnyang Straits. The Koreans sank 31 enemy ships and forced a Japanese retreat. In November, the Japanese fleet was lured by Yi into a tide-race where the oar-driven turtle ships caused wholesale destruction.
By early 1598, the Japanese forces, hemmed in by Korean and Chinese armies, found themselves unable to break out of the south despite fierce fighting. The Wanli Emperor sent a Chinese fleet under artillery expert Chen Lin in May 1598; this naval force saw action in join manouvres with the Koreans. Konishi Yukinage warned that the Japanese position in Korea was untenable. Hideyoshi in turn ordered the withdrawal of close to half of the invading force, leaving mostly Satsuma warriors under Shimazu clan member commanders. The remaining Japanse forces fought fiercely, turning back Chinese attacks on Suncheon and Sacheon. The invasion was suddenly abandoned only when news of Hideyoshi's death on 18 September 1598 reached the Japanese camp late in Ocotber.
The Seven-Year War left deep scars in Korea. Farmlands were devastated, irrigation dikes were destroyed, villages and towns were burned down, the population was first plundered and then dispersed, and tens of thousands of skilled workers (celadon ware makers, craftsmen, artisans, etc) were either killed during the war or kidnapped to Japan as captives to help Japanese develop their crafts. In 1598 alone, the Japanese took some 38,000 ears as horrific trophies. The long war reduced the productive capacity of farmlands from 1,708,000 kyol to 541,000 kyol. Pillage and foraging by Chinese troops only added to the unmitigated tragedy of a war from which the peninsula kingdom never fully recovered.
Following the war, relations between Korea and Japan had been completely suspended. Japan was cut off from the technology of continental Asia. After the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, however, negotiations between the Korean court and the Tokugawa shogunate were carried out via the Japanese lord on Tsushima. In 1604, Tokugawa Ieyasu, needing to restore commercial relations with Korea in order to have access to the technology of the mainland again, met Korea's demands and released some 3000 captive Koreans. As a result, in 1607, a Korean mission visited Edo, and diplomatic and trade relations were restored on a limited basis.
#50
Zuo Zongtang
-
- Entry Scholar (Xiucai)
-
- 1,448 posts
Grand Marshal (Da Sima/Taiwei 大司马/太尉)
- Gender:Male
- Location:Charlottesville, VA USA
- Interests:Sleeping, Eating, and Watching TV
-
Main Interest in CHF:
Chinese History
Posted 15 March 2005 - 09:21 PM
Great Articles Guys.
One thing that really strikes me is why Ming China didn't push Japan all the way back to its boarders. To me, it seems like Ming definately had the power to do so.
One thing that really strikes me is why Ming China didn't push Japan all the way back to its boarders. To me, it seems like Ming definately had the power to do so.
"嗟乎，燕雀安知鸿鹄之志哉" -陈胜
Sun Tzu found alive!
Help your moderators, use the "Report Post to Moderator" button.
Sun Tzu found alive!
Help your moderators, use the "Report Post to Moderator" button.
#51
HaSY
-
- Entry Scholar (Xiucai)
-
- 550 posts
State Undersecretary (Shangshu Lang 尚书郎)
- Location:Still studying in Malaysia
- Interests:World history!!!
Posted 17 March 2005 - 09:51 AM
Great Articles Guys.
One thing that really strikes me is why Ming China didn't push Japan all the way back to its boarders. To me, it seems like Ming definately had the power to do so.
Perhaps financial matters?
''Fear leads to anger,anger leads to hate,hate leads to
suffering'' -Yoda
아론 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
---------谭伟伦-----------------------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
suffering'' -Yoda
아론 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
---------谭伟伦-----------------------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#52
lobster
-
- CHF Grand Historian Award
-
- 1,047 posts
Supreme Censor (Yushi Dafu 御史大夫)
Posted 17 March 2005 - 10:41 AM
Hmm, some thoughts:Perhaps financial matters?
1. This would really over-extend the Ming army.
2. No motives. If Ming didn't take over the Joseon lands (Joseon was effectively finished if Ming didn't intervene), why would they go to Japan, a land so far away and unknown to them.
3. There were other things to handle, e.g. Manchu, revolts in the northwest, etc.
4. Death of some high profile generals in the war.
5. Ming was almost broke after the war.
#53
Grigori
-
- CHF Beginner
-
- 334 posts
Grand Tutor (Taifu 太傅)
Posted 21 March 2005 - 12:57 AM
Ming had practically no navy at this time. Japan was already defeated and Chinese had no history of invading a country across the sea.
If the Ming had a decent fleet, Spain wouldn't have dared massacring 20,000 Chinese in Mannila and the Dutch wouldn't have occupied Taiwan. If the Ming couldn't prevent these things how was it going to invade Japan?
If the Ming had a decent fleet, Spain wouldn't have dared massacring 20,000 Chinese in Mannila and the Dutch wouldn't have occupied Taiwan. If the Ming couldn't prevent these things how was it going to invade Japan?
#54
ih8eurocentrix
-
- Novice Scholar (Tongsheng)
-
- 618 posts
State Undersecretary (Shangshu Lang 尚书郎)
-
Main Interest in CHF:
Chinese Art of War
-
Specialisation / Expertise:
Ancient Chinese Military
Posted 21 March 2005 - 04:05 AM
god dam spanish massacre eveyone
#55
lobster
-
- CHF Grand Historian Award
-
- 1,047 posts
Supreme Censor (Yushi Dafu 御史大夫)
Posted 21 March 2005 - 09:00 AM
The Ming emperors couldn't care less about Chinese people being massared overseas. They considered them stupid people who abandoned the kingdom of heavens for some uncivilized land so they deserved anything. So even if Manila was within their reach I don't think they would have done anything.
Also Ming's navy wasn't all that non-existent. They did send navy from Zhejiang which at least had some numbers. Admiral Chen Lin was also quite good. But I guess Korea had the best ships and admirals.
Also Ming's navy wasn't all that non-existent. They did send navy from Zhejiang which at least had some numbers. Admiral Chen Lin was also quite good. But I guess Korea had the best ships and admirals.
#56
Moping4U
-
- Entry Scholar (Xiucai)
-
- 225 posts
Grand Guardian (Taibao 太保)
Posted 24 March 2005 - 10:57 PM
Didn't Zheng Chengong had plans for invading Phillipines after the massacre?
#57
HaSY
-
- Entry Scholar (Xiucai)
-
- 550 posts
State Undersecretary (Shangshu Lang 尚书郎)
- Location:Still studying in Malaysia
- Interests:World history!!!
Posted 25 March 2005 - 03:03 AM
no...he has to build up Taiwan to invade the mainland..........
''Fear leads to anger,anger leads to hate,hate leads to
suffering'' -Yoda
아론 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
---------谭伟伦-----------------------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
suffering'' -Yoda
아론 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
---------谭伟伦-----------------------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#58
Borjigin Ayurbarwada
-
- CHF Han Lin Scholar
-
- 4,010 posts
Emperor (Huangdi 皇帝)
-
Main Interest in CHF:
Chinese History
-
Specialisation / Expertise:
Chinese History, Chinese Military History, Qing dynasty history
Posted 25 March 2005 - 12:50 PM
"If the Ming had a decent fleet, Spain wouldn't have dared massacring 20,000 Chinese in Mannila and the Dutch wouldn't have occupied Taiwan. If the Ming couldn't prevent these things how was it going to invade Japan? "
I find it funny how you apply modern concept of ethnicity into imperial history. The overseas people aren't Chinese, they are local to that area, they however just like all the other overseas were considered Ming subjects. And the Ming with its inward approach merely did nothing against the European conquests in the southeast asian islands, it WOULD however intervene had the immediate subject state of Vietnam was invaded, but Europe at the time had no power to take Vietnam over.
I find it funny how you apply modern concept of ethnicity into imperial history. The overseas people aren't Chinese, they are local to that area, they however just like all the other overseas were considered Ming subjects. And the Ming with its inward approach merely did nothing against the European conquests in the southeast asian islands, it WOULD however intervene had the immediate subject state of Vietnam was invaded, but Europe at the time had no power to take Vietnam over.
#59
Grigori
-
- CHF Beginner
-
- 334 posts
Grand Tutor (Taifu 太傅)
Posted 25 March 2005 - 05:42 PM
"If the Ming had a decent fleet, Spain wouldn't have dared massacring 20,000 Chinese in Mannila and the Dutch wouldn't have occupied Taiwan. If the Ming couldn't prevent these things how was it going to invade Japan? "
I find it funny how you apply modern concept of ethnicity into imperial history. The overseas people aren't Chinese, they are local to that area, they however just like all the other overseas were considered Ming subjects. And the Ming with its inward approach merely did nothing against the European conquests in the southeast asian islands, it WOULD however intervene had the immediate subject state of Vietnam was invaded, but Europe at the time had no power to take Vietnam over.
It passes as conventional wisdom now that the emperors had no desire to protect overseas Chinese. We draw that conclusion from the massacres and pogroms of three centuries in which the imperial court did nothing. However, this was not always so apparant. When the Spaniards and their Japanese mercenaries slaughtered Chinese in 1603, it was a diplomatically unprecedented move.
The massacre itself was triggered by a visit to the Phillipines by Ming Mandarines which the Spaniards feared was a sign of official desire to takeover the islands. If Ming had a serious navy, the Spaniards wouldn't have risked the confrontation they were trying to diffuse.
Sadly by the late 16th century Spain wasn't at all concerned with Ming naval power. They actually planned an invasion of China with the help of Japanese mercenaries. This plan didn't happen only because the Armada was destroyed trying to invade England. But even so in 1603 they knew perfectly well that they could massacre 20,000 Chinese and get away with it. Because whatever the emperor felt about the whole thing, he couldn't do anything about it.
#60
Borjigin Ayurbarwada
-
- CHF Han Lin Scholar
-
- 4,010 posts
Emperor (Huangdi 皇帝)
-
Main Interest in CHF:
Chinese History
-
Specialisation / Expertise:
Chinese History, Chinese Military History, Qing dynasty history
Posted 13 April 2005 - 11:52 AM
"It passes as conventional wisdom now that the emperors had no desire to protect overseas Chinese. We draw that conclusion from the massacres and pogroms of three centuries in which the imperial court did nothing. However, this was not always so apparant. When the Spaniards and their Japanese mercenaries slaughtered Chinese in 1603, it was a diplomatically unprecedented move. "
Its not his problem, since Wan Li is far from a merciful ruler himself. The overseas "Chinese" are not Ming registered population, thus theyre not Min's responsible.
"The massacre itself was triggered by a visit to the Phillipines by Ming Mandarines which the Spaniards feared was a sign of official desire to takeover the islands. If Ming had a serious navy, the Spaniards wouldn't have risked the confrontation they were trying to diffuse."
Spaniard's own hyper activity, and total misunderstanding of Chinese political system.
"Sadly by the late 16th century Spain wasn't at all concerned with Ming naval power. They actually planned an invasion of China with the help of Japanese mercenaries."
Which was not accepted. smarter Jesuits know the real situation.
"This plan didn't happen only because the Armada was destroyed trying to invade England. "
Still ino that Spanish Armanda myth? The English boasted this so much even though its pin **** to Spanish power. Spain only declined after Philip's death in 1598. Not to mention, the date of the armada is after the massacre.
"But even so in 1603 they knew perfectly well that they could massacre 20,000 Chinese and get away with it. Because whatever the emperor felt about the whole thing, he couldn't do anything about it."
The emperor doesn't even participate in his own court. What do you expect of him protecting tributary nations? In fact had the Ming so wished, they could have taken Philipines in he early 17th cenury. A small force like Zheng Chen Gong already threantened Manilla so much that gathered all its east indies arrison for a stand, fortunately for them, Zheng Cheng Gong dies.
Its not his problem, since Wan Li is far from a merciful ruler himself. The overseas "Chinese" are not Ming registered population, thus theyre not Min's responsible.
"The massacre itself was triggered by a visit to the Phillipines by Ming Mandarines which the Spaniards feared was a sign of official desire to takeover the islands. If Ming had a serious navy, the Spaniards wouldn't have risked the confrontation they were trying to diffuse."
Spaniard's own hyper activity, and total misunderstanding of Chinese political system.
"Sadly by the late 16th century Spain wasn't at all concerned with Ming naval power. They actually planned an invasion of China with the help of Japanese mercenaries."
Which was not accepted. smarter Jesuits know the real situation.
"This plan didn't happen only because the Armada was destroyed trying to invade England. "
Still ino that Spanish Armanda myth? The English boasted this so much even though its pin **** to Spanish power. Spain only declined after Philip's death in 1598. Not to mention, the date of the armada is after the massacre.
"But even so in 1603 they knew perfectly well that they could massacre 20,000 Chinese and get away with it. Because whatever the emperor felt about the whole thing, he couldn't do anything about it."
The emperor doesn't even participate in his own court. What do you expect of him protecting tributary nations? In fact had the Ming so wished, they could have taken Philipines in he early 17th cenury. A small force like Zheng Chen Gong already threantened Manilla so much that gathered all its east indies arrison for a stand, fortunately for them, Zheng Cheng Gong dies.
3 user(s) are reading this topic
0 members, 3 guests, 0 anonymous users
