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#1 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 29 May 2008 - 06:04 PM

Hello,

I recently read an old journal article by Wang Yu-ch'uan entitled An Outline of The Central Government of The Former Han Dynasty, published in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1/2 (Jun., 1949), pp. 134-187. In it is a very long account of how "The structure of the central government of the Former Han Dynasty was that of an autocracy supported by a bureaucracy," as Wang describes it, but adds that there was a continual struggle between not only court factions of ministers but also of the Emperor and the civil bureaucracy. Although autocratic power in the hands of the emperor or one of his eunuchs, or "Grand Minister of Mount" regents, or "Masters of Documents", or "Colonel of Censure" at times became extremely abusive and excessive, there were certain "checks and balances" in the system as Wang describes them, one of many being the Court Conference.

I'm looking to understand more about the Court Conference in the following Eastern Han Dynasty, but I will summarize in a page-by-page account from Wang's article the nature of the Court Conference in the Western Han Dynasty to give you, the reader, a glimpse into how it functioned and why it was significant in terms of limiting autocratic control emanating from the Han throne.

Page 173-174: The Emperor was the sole policy-maker and legislator, but he would rarely proclaim a law or new policy without first consulting a minister or a group of ministers collectively. Hence, the importance of the Court Conference, or Tingyi, which discussed problems of enthronement of new emperors, enfeoffment of the Emperor's children, the system of Imperial ancestral temples, the state religion, the government monopoly on salt and iron, the tax system, the monetary system, the introduction of new laws, decisions on difficult lawsuits, as well as war and peace with foreign countries.

Page 174: Wang says that the enthronement of Emperor Wen (179–157 BC) in 180 BC and Emperor Xuan in 74 BC were "the outcome of debates by the Han nobles and ministers. Following a decision reached by a Court Conference, an edict was promulgated in 40 BC ordering all Imperial ancestral temples in the provinces and kingdoms to be abolished. A decision by a later Court Conference compelled Emepror Yuan to eliminate a number of the Imperial ancestral temples in the capital. In 121 BC Emperor Wu ordered his ministers to discuss whether the God of Earth (Houtu) should be worshipped; he accepted the affirmative solution arrived at by a Court Conference. The Shrine of the God of Earth was then erected in Ho-tung province. Following the majority opinion of fifty to eight at a Court Conference, Emperor Cheng in 32 BC moved the shrine of the God of Earth from Ho-tung province to the northern suburb of the Imperial capital and instituted the ceremonies of worship for the God of Earth in the northern suburb. In AD 5 Emperor P'ing accepted a unanimous decision of a Court Conference (with sixty-seven participants) and resumed the practice inaugurated in 32 BC after the shrine of the God of Earth at the capital had been abolished twice previously (16 BC and 4 BC). Accepting a unanimous decision of a Court Conference of eighty-nine ministers, he officially announced the title of the God of Heaven as Huang-t'ien-shang-ti (Supreme God of the Great Heaven) and that of the God of Earth as Hou-t'u (Sovereign of Earth)."

Page 175: An example of financial issues handled by the Court Conference would be their majority opinion in 44 BC that the age qualification for the head tax imposed on children should be raised from age 4 to age 7, an opinion that the Emperor agreed upon and implemented as policy.

Page 175-176: An example of foreign policy would be the Court Conference in 61 BC over the threat of the Qiang people at the western border. Zhao Chongguo, a general who had experience fighting the Qiang people, argued that instead of engaging in fruitless offensives into Qiang territory, the Han borders should be strengthened with permanent military settlements of farmers mixing farming duties with martial duties. At first he was opposed by 70% of those present at the Conference, but with further discussion he won over 50% of the debators, then the majority 80% and a victory for his proposal.

Page 176: Wang writes "It is unnecessary to continue enumerating events of this kind. Suffice it to say that the Court Conference of the Former Han dynasty served as an organ of deliberation on state politics, whether of a military or civil nature. It constituted an interministerial organization possessing an authority higher than that of the Chancellery and regency. Its decisions were based on the opinion of the majority regardless of the position or rank of the individuals on either side. As a rule they were accepted by the Emperor." The Conference was always called to assemble by the Emperor or the Empress Dowager. Its usual participants included the Chancellor, Imperial Secretary, the Generals, the Marquises, ministers who ranked as full-two-thousand-bushels and two-thousand bushels, the Grandees and Grandee Remonstrants, Palace Grandees, the Erudites, and the Court Gentlemen advisors. They can be classified into two groups, those being the Outer Court members comprising all the officials of the Outer Court, and the Inner Court, which consisted of the Grand Minister of Mount (Regent), the Generals, the Attendants within the Palace, and the Palace Regular Attendants.

Page 176: For smaller matters, smaller conferences could be assembled, usually of just a few officials; for example, on a minor issue involving a judiciary decision, the Commandant of Justice and a few others could be called to assemble a small conference.

Page 177: As emperors in the latter half of the Western Han began to distrust their ministers more and more and became closer to relatives-in-law and palace officials, they called upon their Inner Court far more often than the Outer Court for Court Conferences. However, for vital issues, a joint conference of the Inner and Outer courts was usually convened. The Chancellor acted as president of the Court Conference whether it was just the Outer Court in session or both the Outer and Inner courts convening together. Sometimes the Emperor attended the Conference, but as a rule he was to be absent from the discussion. The Chancellor would then summarize the discussion and resulting opinion of it in a report to the Emperor for decision-making. If the Court Conference was divided 50-50 or nearly 50-50 on an issue, the Chancellor would detail the positions held by both sides and number the members of each opposing side.

Page 177: Wang says that one should not overestimate the importance of the Court Conference, as it was not a legislative organ, but simply an advisory one. The majority opinions made by the Court Conference and delivered to the Emperor were suggestions, not laws; it was he who made the law or final decision. It was only customary for the Emperor to accept the Conferences decision, but he was by no means forced to do so. The Conference was also called into session by the Emperor, as ministers had no right to assemble a Conference on their own.

Page 177-178: It's significant, though, in that it usually swayed the decision of the Emperor, kept a small clique of ministers or even one minister from gaining too much power in decision-making, and "may have mitigated in good part the friction between government departments." It also respected majority opinion and strengthened the position of the ministers in the face of the autocratic Emperor. Wang says that "The setting up of the Court Conference of the Inner Court to counterbalance that of the Outer Court is good proof of this fact."

And on other matters related to limiting or expanding autocratic control:

Page 181-182: Wang says that the officials, although armed with the same Confucian ideology, did not represent a homogeneous body of thinkers and formed different competing factions advancing different interests and at times at odds with the desires of the Emperor. Officials were eager to restrain the Emperor by using Confucian ideology as their weapon as they fought for their faction or their own positions. In order to counter these ministers, the Emperor elevated the power of those close to him in the Inner Court and granting them greater power than the Outer Court. Wang writes "The establishment of the regency, the enhancing of the office of the Masters of Documents, the employment of relatives-in-laws and eunuchs, these were the most important measures adopted by the throne to achieve this purpose."

Page 182: However, the Emperor was not ultimately successful in dominating the Outer Court with his Inner Court, as the super-cabinet of the Masters of Documents expanded its bounds from the Inner Court to the Outer, becoming virtually an organ of the latter and "no closer to the person of the Emperor nor more subservient to his wishes than the former Chancellery."

Page 182: Wang says that the complementary disciplinary control of the Chancellery and Imperial Secretariat provided a mode of "checks and balances," as well as the installment of dual chancellors.

----

I hope everyone learned a little something about the complexity of the Western Han system by reading this, but I'm dying to learn more about the Court Conference, specifically its history during the Eastern Han. Does anyone have any information or sources that might be helpful in this regard? :g:

Eric (En Rui)
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#2 snowybeagle

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Posted 29 May 2008 - 08:22 PM

If I'm not mistaken, the most famous and detailed account of such a conference was the "Conference on Salt & Iron" 《盐铁论》in 81 BC during the 6th year of the reign of Emperor Zhao, recorded by Huan Kuan (桓宽).

The recorded text in Classical Chinese can be found in http://www.guoxue.co...ielun/ytlml.htm
I don't know if there is translation available.

The recently departed writer Bo Yang lamented that such detailed records of the numerous important decision-making processes in China's history were rare.

I think there were some previous posts in CHF somewhere about this particular event.

#3 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 29 May 2008 - 08:36 PM

If I'm not mistaken, the most famous and detailed account of such a conference was the "Conference on Salt & Iron" 《盐铁论》in 81 BC during the 6th year of the reign of Emperor Zhao, recorded by Huan Kuan (桓宽).

The recorded text in Classical Chinese can be found in http://www.guoxue.co...ielun/ytlml.htm
I don't know if there is translation available.

The recently departed writer Bo Yang lamented that such detailed records of the numerous important decision-making processes in China's history were rare.

I think there were some previous posts in CHF somewhere about this particular event.


Thank you very much! Wang mentions the debate about salt and iron as one of his examples about discussions at conferences, but he didn't elaborate too much.

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#4 Richard Lim

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Posted 31 May 2008 - 10:01 AM

Thank you very much! Wang mentions the debate about salt and iron as one of his examples about discussions at conferences, but he didn't elaborate too much.

Eric (En Rui)



Dear Eric,

Did you manage to have a look at Hans Bielenstein's Bureaucracy in Han Times (Cambridge 1980) about this? I went through the Cambridge Ancient History volume on Qin and Han and there is oddly enough very little - almost nothing - on this particular topic except for Michael Loewe's discussion on the Discourse on Salt and Iron mentioned above (pp. 187-90). He casts doubt on the accuracy of this (later) extended literary dialogue as a faithful account of what actually transpired during the earlier debate at court in 81 B.C., an episode that is recounted much more tersely in the Han shu.
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#5 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 31 May 2008 - 03:16 PM

Dear Eric,

Did you manage to have a look at Hans Bielenstein's Bureaucracy in Han Times (Cambridge 1980) about this? I went through the Cambridge Ancient History volume on Qin and Han and there is oddly enough very little - almost nothing - on this particular topic except for Michael Loewe's discussion on the Discourse on Salt and Iron mentioned above (pp. 187-90). He casts doubt on the accuracy of this (later) extended literary dialogue as a faithful account of what actually transpired during the earlier debate at court in 81 B.C., an episode that is recounted much more tersely in the Han shu.


Thank you for your post, Richard Lim. Now that you mention it, the book I quoted by Wang mentions Michael Loewe's work. There were many, many more Court Conferences than just the Salt and Iron discussion in 81 BC, although the latter was among the more important.

Speaking of which, I have recently been reading a book by Tansen Sen available here on Google Books, and it describes a debate on Buddhism amongst ministers who had to voice a majority opinion for Emperor Gaozong of Tang about monks not bowing to the laity or temporal ruler (539 officials voted in favor of continuing this past policy and 354 opted for change, the latter party losing). Although Sen does not specifically say it was a "Court Conference," it obviously is. Too bad, I was looking for Eastern Han, not Tang! :(

Eric (En Rui)
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#6 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 06 June 2008 - 08:13 PM

I've found some great new stuff on the Salt and Iron monopolies as well as Court Conference debates in this source here:

Wagner, Donald B. (2001). The State and the Iron Industry in Han China. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Publishing. ISBN 8787062836.

From my own website here at Wikipedia, where I have compiled notes that I intend to use for improving the main wiki article on the Han Dynasty, I will share with you now the information I have gleaned about these subjects in page-by-page format. This is some interesting stuff and I assure all that it is very interesting to read. :) Here goes...

Before Han

Page 1: In 120 BC, the salt industrialist Dongguo Xianyang and the iron industrialist Kong Jin were appointed as Assistants to the Minister of Agriculture; along with Sang Hongyang, a man of a wealthy merchant family, they oversaw revenues of government run industries in salt and iron. "In 117 BC they submitted a proposal for a state monopoly of the salt and iron industries."

Page 1-2: Wagner writes "The proposal was accepted, the monopoly was established, and thus began an immense upheaval in the Chinese iron industry which was long the subject of bitter contention. It has remained a matter of controversy through the centuries, as can be seen in discussions of it by Wang Anshi in connection with the New Policies of AD 1069 and by Thomas T. Read in an attack on Roosevelt's New Deal in 1935."

Page 4-5: It is known from inscriptions that Warring States Period kingdoms had officers in charge of bronze production, while archaeologists have discovered four State of Qi iron foundries at Linzi in Shandong where two of these were in the vicinity of the Qi palace, which has led Xu Xueshu to argue that they were under royal administration. Seals from the Western Han era found at the site also proclaim titles of men working for a Qi Kingdom iron office, which would signify iron smelting there before the iron monopoly of 117 BC. Therefore, state intervention in iron production was a continual process from the Warring States into the Han Dynasty period.

Page 5-7: From inscriptions on iron agricultural implements from the State of Yan found in an ancient foundry in Xinglong, Hebei, there is questionable evidence about Yan's involvement in the iron industry, but more substantial evidence comes from the State of Qin. In addition to evidence that Qin used private iron industrialists to enrich and bring areas up to production levels that benefited the government, there is 3rd century BC legal texts from a Qin tomb in Hubei found in 1975 which mention the penalty against iron extracting officers whose work or products were found to be substandard and not up to snuff.

Lead up to Monopoly

Page 7-8: The salt and iron industries managed by the state were under the direction of the Privy Treasurer (shaofu), the person in the palace who managed the Emperor's finances as well as the royal household's finances. "The non-agricultural natural resources of the Empire were considered the Emperor's personal property and responsibility, and the income from their exploitation was for his personal use." Yet this was not strictly followed, especially by the time of Emperor Wen of Han, when the people were allowed to "cast coins, smelt iron, and boil salt." Besides personal favorites of the Emperor such as Deng Tong, the King of Wu engaged in copper gathering and salt industries, as the revenues gained in these allowed him to lower taxes and gain the loyalty of his local subjects. He was the leader of the Rebellion of the Seven States in 154 BC.

Page 8: The only direct and contemporaneous information we have about the lead up to the state's salt and iron monopolies comes from Sima Qian's Records of the Grand Historian, as the Book of Han largely copies what Sima Qian had to say.

Page 9: Sima Qian claims that the breakdown of the state came when finances had to be raised to face the barbarian border peoples in battle, so that anyone who made financial contributions could be given official posts without merit; he says it got so bad that anyone who presented a sheep was given the position as a Court Gentleman (lang).

Page 9-10: At the beginning of the dynasty, merchants and tradesmen were barred from serving as officials; by Sima's time under Emperor Wu, some of the highest positions (i.e. Ministry of Agriculture) were held by those associated with the merchant class. Around 120 BC, Dongguo Xianyang, a salt-boiler of Qi (modern Shandong), and Kong Jin, a smelter from Nanyang (modern Nanyang, Henan), made fortunes from their businesses and were recommended to office by Zheng Dangshi, a Minister of Agriculture who had a canal built that linked the capital Chang'an with the Yellow River for expedient tax-grain transport. Sang Hongyang, a scion of a wealthy merchant family from Luoyang, was adept in arithmetic, and thus was made a Palace Attendant at the age of 13.

Page 11-12: Dongguo and Kong's proposal to the throne of establishing a monopoly was accepted in 117 BC on the grounds that the Emperor transferred his right to the resources of the land from his Privy Treasury to the Ministry of Agriculture (to supplement the poll tax), and that merchants dealing in these industries exploited the common people and obstructed affairs of state. Iron and salt were made monopolies together because iron vessels and cauldrons were needed to boil the salt. Anyone caught privately casting iron or boiling salt would be forced to wear a fetter on their left foot and have their equipment confiscated. However, the new offices of this monopoly invited the old merchants to take staff positions for the new monopoly, much to the detest of Confucians who did not want merchants in government positions.

Criticism of the Monopoly

Page 13: In 110 BC the state created an "equable transportation" (junshu) system where price variation over time and from place to place was eliminated, an act which wealthy farmers complained about, accusing Sang Hongyang of putting government officials in market stalls and describing the government's iron as inferior in quality. In 100 BC, Dong Zhongshu also felt the need to complain in favor of agriculture, demanding that salt and iron be returned to the people.

Page 13-14: As complaints surfaced more and more, a Grand Inquest (Court Conference) was held in 81 BC at the behest of the regent general Huo Guang (d. 68 BC), since Emperor Zhao of Han was still a child at this point. It asked for all 'Worthies' (xianliang, people recommended by local authorities for possible appointments) and 'Scholars' (wenxue, people approved by the government for their literary competence) to assemble for a meeting to discuss how the people's suffering could be alleviated. The 'Worthies' represented the interests of the provincial elite while the 'Scholars' represented the interests of the central government.

Page 14: The result of this Court Conference was the abolition of the fermented liquor monopoly established in 98 BC while there was only a minor adjustment to the salt and iron monopolies: closing of the Iron Offices 'within the passes' (capital region). This debate became the subject for the book Discourses on Salt and Iron.

Page 15: Sang Hongyang was appointed as Imperial Counsellor (yushi dafu) in 87 BC by regent Huo Guang, as Sang's policies were largely intact after the 81 BC Court Conference. However, Sang was executed for treason against Huo in 80 BC, meaning his biography (hence a lot of info about the monopoly) was not included in the Book of Han.

Page 15: the Salt and Iron monopolies were abolished in 44 BC but reinstated in 41 BC, due to either of two reasons: the state still needed more revenues, or immediate privatization caused problems for the whole economy in a short period of time, prompting officials to revert back to the monopolistic system. No real changes were seen until the time of Wang Mang.

Wang Mang and Eastern Han

Page 15-16: A lot of information about Wang Mang's salt and iron monopolies is unavailable due to the Book of Han's hostility towards its hated villain Wang Mang. It is known that it was one of his 'six controls' established in 10 AD. In 12 AD, severe penalties up to capital punishment were announced for violators of the law, which Wagner states is a clear sign that successful law and order was breaking down. In 22 BC, one of these 'six controls', the 'mountains and marshes', was lifted and not intended to be reinstated until 49 AD, although Wang Mang was killed long before that in 23 BC.

Page 16: Wagner writes: "The first century BC seems to have seen a gradual deterioration of the powers of the central government in favour of powerful families throughout the Empire, and Wang Mang's reforms should probably be seen as a last-ditch attempt to reassert central authority. After Wang Mang's fall and the Restoration of the Han in AD 25, a reorganization took place which in effect endorsed the central government's loss of power."

Page 16-17: With the establishment of Eastern Han, the Salt and Iron Offices of the Ministry of Agriculture were taken from it and transferred to the administrations overseeing the local prefectures and commanderies. The 'Chief Commandant of Waters and Parks' who had a large hand in the monopolies was reduced in power to a minor office overseeing a few seasonal tasks. Wagner says that a sparse amount of sources on this subject indicate that the salt and iron monopolies were no more, while local governments still engaged in large scale iron production.

Page 17: The official Zhang Lin suggested in 85 AD that the central government resume its role as the monopolistic power over salt and iron, a proposal that was at first rejected, then accepted despite the protest by the faction under Zhu Hui. However, this central monopoly was again abolished by Emperor Zhang of Han in 88 AD, who had his ten year old successor (later Emperor He of Han) announce his decision.

Discourses on Salt and Iron

Page 18-19: Huan Kuan, the author who wrote the Yan tie lun (Discourse on Salt and Iron), was an erudite scholar who was appointed as a Court Gentleman during the reign of Emperor Xuan of Han (r. 73–49) as well as Vice Governor of Lujiang. Wagner says that "One motivation for Huan Kuan to compile this work may have been a later debate, which led to the brief abolition of the monopoly in the period 44-41 BC. The abolition was a result of the general attack on the role fo government around this time, in which statesmen such as Gong Yu (123–43 BC) went so far as to demand the abolition of all forms of money and a return to natural economy."

Page 19-20: The Yan tie lun describes the debate in 81 BC as a meeting of some sixty-odd provincial Scholars and Worthies engaging in dialogue with Imperial Counsellor Sang Hongyang, who was assisted by ministers supporting the central government's position. The text described Emperor Zhao and Huo Guang as being present during the discussion where debators freely traded insults, labeling the other as "bigoted Confucians" and the other as "decadent toadies."

Page 20: Apparently, the martial regent Huo Guang was compelled to call forth Worthies for a Court Conference because of his associate Du Yannian hinting that recent crop failures and the people's resulting suffering might be signs that Heaven was displeased with the Han Dynasty's central government, and it needed to reform itself to be more frugal and modest.

Page 25: Both sides in the debate agreed that agriculture was the root (ben) of all society while other occupations were branches (mu), but the heart of the debate was how to best serve agriculture. The central government's side argued that the state's production of iron freed up the time and energy of the people so that they could focus on agriculture instead. However, critics of the monopolies argued that the state-produced iron was inferior in quality to privately-produced iron, therefore state-produced iron implements were only made to meet quotas and were no good for farming when needed.

Page 26: Imperial Counsellor Sang Hongyang shoots back at this with a retort of how private iron smelting does not have enough specialization, is poorly equipped, omits certain production techniques, and private smelters have no decent amount of spare time to engage in the industry. The Worthies make the counter-retort that former private smelting by small-scale family enterprises made better implements "because of pride of workmanship and because they were closer to the users" according to Wagner. Wagner says the lesson to be learned here is that large-scale enterprises can produce larger quantity of products while small-scale enterprises can produce better quality products. The government side points out a problem with the Worthies' argument though: before the monopoly, powerful families upheld large-scale enterprises, a successful smelting familiy employing over a thousand people, encouraging them to leave their ancestral grave sites to become dependents on great families. Wagner says the truth was perhaps a mixed one: "there were probably two sectors of the iron industry, one consisting of small units producing for local needs, the other of large units producing for trade over long distances."

Page 28: In the debate, the assistant to the Imperial Counsellor argues that the monopolies as well as selling of offices have enriched the state so that it can employ armed campaigns in the East and West without increasing taxation.

Page 29-30: In Huan Kuan's Discourses on Salt and Iron, there is some discussion on the state's superior ability to use calculation in order to operate and produce precisely what is necessary. Wagner says in relation to this is a chapter in the Han mathematical treatise The Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art called "Equable Transportation" (Junshu), the same name of one of the contentious policies established in Emperor Wu's time. The chapter states:

In the equable transportation of grain,

  • Prefecture A has 10,000 households and a journey of 8 days;
  • Prefecture B has 9,500 households and a journey of 10 days;
  • Prefecture C has 12,350 households and a journey of 13 days;
  • Prefecture D has 12,200 households and a journey of 20 days;

All [journeys] being to the place of [tax] transportation. The total liability of the four prefectures is the transportation of a tax of 250,000 hu in 10,000 carts. It is desired that this should be apportioned according to the distance travelled and the number of households. How much grain and how many carts does each supply?


Answer:


  • Prefecture A, 83,100 hu of grain, 3,324 carts.
  • Prefecture B, 63,175 hu of grain, 2527 carts.
  • Prefecture C, 63,175 hu of grain, 2527 carts.
  • Prefecture D, 40,550 hu of grain, 1,622 carts.

Page 30: In order to arrive at these answers, Wagner states that: "The calculated tax liabilities are proportional to the number of households divided by the number of days of the journey."

Iron Offices

Page 32-33: The Book of Han reveals the locations of 48 Salt and Iron Offices as they existed in the year 2 AD, and as Wagner shows on his map on page 32 (which also includes locations known from other written sources or archaeological sites), most of these offices were located in the Yellow River macroregion in what is today's modern Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, and Jiangsu provinces.

Page 33-34: Although the central government in the Eastern Han no longer produced iron, local authorities now took over this responsibility, as the Book of Later Han states, "If a commandery or prefecture produced large quantities of salt, a Salt Office was established to administer the salt tax; if it produced large quantities of iron, an Iron Office was established to administer production." Wagners says that from this description it appears that Salt Offices were merely financial offices which collected taxes, while the Iron Offices of local government still had some role in production, although the extent of their involvement is unknown. The Book of Later Han lists 36 localities that 'have iron' in 140 AD but says nothing else; Wagner assumes they are locations of the localized Iron Offices.

Page 36: Although there is scant evidence in written texts for Iron Offices existing in Wang Mang's time, archaeology has proven they did, such as iron implements with their place name of production being "Juye", a place name that existed only during the reign of Wang Mang.

Page 39-43: Here Wagner talks about the six wooden tablets and 156 wooden and bamboo strips found in Tomb M6 at Yinwan, Donghai County, Jiangsu, dated 10 BC. He not only used these texts to prove that the Book of Han had errors in its geographic section by using incorrect characters for certain place names, but that the population census figure of 50 million for the year 2 AD may be very false. The Yinwan documents report in 10 BC that the Donghai Commandery had 266,290 households with 1,397,343 persons, while the Book of Han states that the Donghai Commandery in 2 AD had 358,414 households and 1,559,357 persons. Wagner writes "This would imply a 10 percent increase in population in 12 years or less, which is not credible." Even Wang Mingsheng (1722–1798) of the Qing Dynasty believed that, since Wang Mang already had de facto rule over the court in 2 AD, he may have inflated the population figures in order to "prove his beneficial influence" as Wagner paraphrases.

Reasons for Monopoly and Opposition

Page 53-54: A typical argument of the government side was that Emperor Wu, having established border garrisons that needed to be properly funded if they were to successfully defend against the hostile Xiongnu, established the Salt and Iron Offices to pay for military expenses. Yet critics of the monopolies found the State's dealings in manufacture and commercial selling were demeaning and "not proper activities for the State."

Page 55-56: Wagner writes that "Blast furnace iron production is highly capital-intensive, and wealth is required for its exploitation." The central state argued that "brutal and tyrannical" salt and iron industrialists who gathered in 'deep mountains and remote marshes' were they were free to form household factions and gangs of evil-doers. The state saw independent wealthy industrialists as a potential threat, so a comprimise was made to make them officials in the government to oversee the industry and their followers and gangs were replaced by convict laborers that the state could control.

Page 56: The critics of the government felt that bringing in wealthy merchants as government leaders of the state monopoly was a mistake, and that only men learned in the Five Classics were qualified to work for the Emperor and administer the people.

Page 56: The government made the argument that the state monopolies provided abundant raw materials and good working conditions for producing iron of quality. This may have been true in certain cases, as several cast iron artifacts of the period show several complex stages thatt would require a high degree of trained skill and days of time. Wagner writes: "Several axeheads, for example, were cast, than annealed in an oxidising atmosphere to reduce the carbon content, then cold-hammered, then annealed in a reducing atmosphere to increase the carbon content at the surface...The two annealing processes required at least a day or two each, and maintaining the appropriate temperature and furnace atmosphere required skill on the part of the workers." However, there is evidence of mistakes in discarded iron axeheads in an excavated scrap-heap in Mianchi, Henan, iron axeheads which presumably failed quality inspection.

Page 57: Critics of the monopolies state that the monopoly ironworks made large and impractical implements that were made for mass-scale quotas rather than for practical use. They also criticized state iron as inferior in quality and too expensive to purchase.

Page 59: There were also other problems with the monopolies, such as when they "inappropriately standardised the implements without considering the different needs of peasants in different parts of the Empire. And there is sometimes over-production, in which case the Iron Offices force the peasants to purchase more than they need."

Page 62-63: Some people in the Han complained about deforestation as well as the nuisance of smoke produced by blast furnaces.

End of these Notes

Well, I hope everyone learned a bit more about Court Conference debates, as well as the iron and salt monopolies.

My friends, have a great weekend, ;)
Eric (En Rui)
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#7 William O'Chee

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Posted 06 June 2008 - 09:49 PM

Eric,

Thanks for posting this most illuminating topic. It is clearly at odds with some other topics on the forum where it has been argued that the Emperor was entirely autocratic, and not beholden in any way to the opinions of his Ministers and other officials.

My questions for you relate to the limits of the court conferences.

Are there any occasions where the majority opinion of the court conference was not implemented by the Emperor, either in whole or in part?

Is it a reasonable representation of the facts to say that it would only be convened by the Emperor when he had no fixed opinion on a matter, and would therefore be favourably disposed to accepting whatever decision was reached?

Were there any matters for which it was customary for the Emperor to convene a court conference? If so, what were they? This last question might in fact be the most interesting delimiter of imperial power if it did exist.

William

#8 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 07 June 2008 - 09:26 AM

Eric,

Thanks for posting this most illuminating topic. It is clearly at odds with some other topics on the forum where it has been argued that the Emperor was entirely autocratic, and not beholden in any way to the opinions of his Ministers and other officials.

My questions for you relate to the limits of the court conferences.


:thanks: You're very welcome. To better understand the system, you have to dig deep and learn the nuances. I just wish there were more sources available on this. Who knows? Maybe one day I will research primary source documents on this very important topic that does not seem to get much attention in the scholarly realm of sinology. A shame, really.

Are there any occasions where the majority opinion of the court conference was not implemented by the Emperor, either in whole or in part?


Wang did not bring up any examples of such, although I'm sure this was the case. Wagner kind of hints at it by saying in 88 AD Emperor Zhang flat-out rejected the decision of the Court Conference in 85 AD to reinstall the salt and iron monopolies. Wagner does not say if another meeting was held for the emperor to reach this decision. However, it is known that the faction led by Zhu Hui was already pushing to keep the monopolies abolished, and besides apparent disruptions in the economy due to the 85 AD decision, continued factional politics might have something to do with Emperor Zhang's decision to scrap the monopolies once more. Other than this example I don't see anything that would even hint the emperor disobeyed the majority opinion of the Court Conference he called into order.

Is it a reasonable representation of the facts to say that it would only be convened by the Emperor when he had no fixed opinion on a matter, and would therefore be favourably disposed to accepting whatever decision was reached?


Perhaps, but an emperor was quite literate and well-informed, so he might possibly have had an opinion on the subject the Court Conference was discussing before it even convened. The Emperor might want to see how his opinion could be harmful if implemented in policy by holding a Court Conference, as it was a good way to exhaust the opinions on both sides of an issue in order to see the strengths and weaknesses of both sides.

Were there any matters for which it was customary for the Emperor to convene a court conference? If so, what were they? This last question might in fact be the most interesting delimiter of imperial power if it did exist.


Wang says this was entirely up to the Emperor's discretion, however, obviously if there is widespread resentment or partisan bickering on an issue (such as the salt and iron monopolies which were commented on by scholars far and wide before the 81 BC Conference), the Emperor could use that gauge to determine what issues to hold Court Conferences on. I wish I could tell you more about this, but my own knowledge is very limited.

Until I find more! :)
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#9 William O'Chee

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Posted 07 June 2008 - 11:30 AM

That is really fascinating. :notworthy:

I shall await more!

#10 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 16 June 2008 - 02:17 PM

I recently found a small mentioning of a court conference in a biographical dictionary by Rafe de Crespigny (2007); in the passage for the Xin Dynasty and Later Han Dynasty philosopher Huan Tan (d. 28 AD), Crespigny says:

Huan Tan unsuccessfully proposed a number of reforms, including an overhaul of the legal code, and he argued against reliance on texts of divination and portents. Guangwu had great trust in these, however, and at a court conference held to consider the establishment of a Spiritual Terrace he proposed that apocryphal texts should be consulted to determine its site. Huan Tan observed to his sovereign that he never read the apocrypha, and despite his former favor he was very nearly executed. Sent out instead to minor office as assistant to the Administrator of Liu'an, he died on the journey, aged in his seventies.


He was almost executed by Guangwu for simply disregarding the apocryphal texts. Despite the coerciveness of these court conferences, a sovereign could still be quite despotic. I've read a bit about apocryphal texts elsewhere, specifically how it harmed the inventor and astronomer Zhang Heng's (78-139) career. Zhang paid the consequence when he too disregarded the apocryphal texts; this along with his view that Emperor Gengshi shoud not have been relegated to a minor position in the founding of Eastern Han compared to Guangwu, Zhang was seen as too controversial a figure to be elevated to the position of court historian, and was thus barred from serving on committees where histories were compiled.

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#11 Borjigin Ayurbarwada

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Posted 16 June 2008 - 05:33 PM

It is clearly at odds with some other topics on the forum where it has been argued that the Emperor was entirely autocratic, and not beholden in any way to the opinions of his Ministers and other officials.


I wrote a paper a while ago which compared the Athenian democracy with that of the Qin-Han bureaucracy, and I concluded that the Athenian democracy was probably more authoritarian. There is a stereotype that democracy has more elements of freedom than monarchy, when in fact it was the combination of a democracy and a liberal constitution which made the modern system effective. Democracy by itself was probably more oppressive than most forms of government at the time.
There was no checks and balances in the Athenian system, nor a set of law which could guide the principles of the state; the demos had the final say in practically everything. On the other hand, a monarchy with a bureaucy might be theoretically autocratic, but in reality, because one person could not govern every part of a large empire like that of China, he needs to rely on the bureaucracy to govern for him. This authomatically creates a balance between the central power and the regional power, between court ministers and the ruler which in turn checked the ruler's power. So every emperor in Chinese history had to follow certain legal precedents that his ancestors established at least to a certain extent from the pressures of the ministers. This can be seen in the case of choosing a successor; Liu Bang could not make his favourite son Liu Ruyi the ruler because all his ministers staunchly opposed the move. Furthermore, even if the ruler was tyrannical, the actual amount of influence he had on every individual in the empire was very limited. Therefore, most individuals were affected more by the local bureaucrats. And because these local bureaucrats had their superiors and the law to follow, their authorities were largely checked by the impartial mechanism of law. And even if they do get past the law, their authority could still be checked in a way by peasant rebellion. Hence a check was present at every level of the bureaucracy to limit the abuse of power. Athenian democracy on the other hand, was ran by the peasant mass, which meant that there was no other source to check the abuse of the majority in any way. Athenian law was unstable and shifted according to mass appeal, which was often manipulated by eloquent politicians. The law could not serve as a tool to protect the individual. Above all that was the fact that the Athenian democracy was extremely inefficient due to its lack of a division of labour(since almost all official was elected by lot) and because theoretically all the archons that led the army were equals, there was no subordinate relationship crucial in a war; strategic planning tends to be weak.

Edited by warhead, 16 June 2008 - 05:49 PM.


#12 William O'Chee

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Posted 16 June 2008 - 08:19 PM

I wrote a paper a while ago which compared the Athenian democracy with that of the Qin-Han bureaucracy, and I concluded that the Athenian democracy was probably more authoritarian. There is a stereotype that democracy has more elements of freedom than monarchy, when in fact it was the combination of a democracy and a liberal constitution which made the modern system effective. Democracy by itself was probably more oppressive than most forms of government at the time.
There was no checks and balances in the Athenian system, nor a set of law which could guide the principles of the state; the demos had the final say in practically everything. On the other hand, a monarchy with a bureaucy might be theoretically autocratic, but in reality, because one person could not govern every part of a large empire like that of China, he needs to rely on the bureaucracy to govern for him. This authomatically creates a balance between the central power and the regional power, between court ministers and the ruler which in turn checked the ruler's power. So every emperor in Chinese history had to follow certain legal precedents that his ancestors established at least to a certain extent from the pressures of the ministers. This can be seen in the case of choosing a successor; Liu Bang could not make his favourite son Liu Ruyi the ruler because all his ministers staunchly opposed the move. Furthermore, even if the ruler was tyrannical, the actual amount of influence he had on every individual in the empire was very limited. Therefore, most individuals were affected more by the local bureaucrats. And because these local bureaucrats had their superiors and the law to follow, their authorities were largely checked by the impartial mechanism of law. And even if they do get past the law, their authority could still be checked in a way by peasant rebellion. Hence a check was present at every level of the bureaucracy to limit the abuse of power. Athenian democracy on the other hand, was ran by the peasant mass, which meant that there was no other source to check the abuse of the majority in any way. Athenian law was unstable and shifted according to mass appeal, which was often manipulated by eloquent politicians. The law could not serve as a tool to protect the individual. Above all that was the fact that the Athenian democracy was extremely inefficient due to its lack of a division of labour(since almost all official was elected by lot) and because theoretically all the archons that led the army were equals, there was no subordinate relationship crucial in a war; strategic planning tends to be weak.

I do not disagree that democracies can be quite authritarian. Lots of philosophers have butted up against this problem, but the tensions between democracy and authoritarianism are best (if somewhat longwindedly) articulated by Isaiah Berlin in Two Concepts of Liberty.

The question is whether the Court Conference constitutes a check on Imperial authority. If I understand you correctly, you suggest that the check on authority was not formal, but informal. The succession to Liu Bang could be seen as an example of this. I would also ask, however, if there were particular issues relating to that succession (given Liu Bang founded the dynasty) which would have made the Emperor less able to impose his will because of the need to entrench the dynasty.

Elsewhere you suggest that the Emperor was governed by precedent. On one interpretation, this could be seen as precedent representing a binding constraint on Imperial authority. Another way to treat precedent is to see at it as being "strongly persuasive". I am not sure which would be the better characterisation here, and would be interested in your views, and why.

Edited by William O'Chee, 16 June 2008 - 08:20 PM.


#13 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 11 July 2008 - 01:41 PM

Found some more information about court conferences, majority rule among debating scholars, and Emperor Wu obeying the consensus of Court Conference on the issue of renewing the heqin treaty with the Xiongnu or choosing to attack them. I think most people here know the outcome of this. The court conferences took place in 135 BC and 134 BC, each with a different result. The info is taken from:

Di Cosmo, Nicola. (2002). Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521770645.

Additional notes can be found on my sandbox notes page at Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia....Athens/Sandbox2

Page 206: Discarding decades of heqin policy, Emperor Wu of Han kicked off the Sino-Xiongnu War in 133 BC. His expansion-driven policies broke apart the Xiongnu Empire until Huhanye Shanyu was forced to submit to Emperor Xuan of Han in 51 BC as a foreign leader of inferior status (the Xiongnu split apart, as Huhanye's rival was Zhizhi Chanyu, who fought against the Han Dynasty until he was killed at the Battle of Zhizhi in 36 BC). Moreover, the duality of two great powers in East Asia was no more, as China became the greatest power of the East.

Page 210: Statesmen such as Jia Yi and Chao Cuo provided some of the earliest arguments for scrapping the heqin policy and installing an aggressive military policy, but the latter wasn't seriously considered by the court until the scholarly debates of 135–134 BC during Emperor Wu of Han's reign. This Court Conference is used as a prologue in the Book of Han before discussing the misguided venture of the Battle of Mayi (133 BC), where Han troops failed to capture the shanyu of the Xiongnu. The second and more lengthy passage about the court conference of 134 BC is taken from Sima Qian's Shiji.

Page 210-211: The Xiongnu shanyu sent word to Chang'an in 135 BC, as the heqin treaty was about to expire and needed to be renewed, an event which sparked debate in the capital. Leading the debate at the Court Conference on either factional side were ministers Wang Hui and Han Anguo. Wang Hui argued that the heqin arrangement did not stop the Xiongnu from performing massive raids into Han territory, thus military force should be used against them. Han Anguo argued that heqin should be continued since it would be futile to send Han armies far into the wilderness to pursue the Xiongnu, as northern nomads were never conquered since even antiquity and the Xiongnu were better fighters in their own territory, able to trounce Han troops as proven before. Han Anguo argued that if Han armies spent too much time in the field, they would easily become exhausted and fall prey to bandits. Wang Hui rebutted by saying heqin was no permanent solution either. In this first Court Conference of 135 BC, Han Anguo gained the support of the majority of the ministers, so consensus in favor of his proposal to retain heqin won the day.

Page 211: In the second Court Conference taken place in 134 BC, when Nie Wengyi of Mayi convinced the high minister Wang Hui present his proposal that the Xiongnu shanyu should be lured to Mayi with the promise of gifts, where Han troops waiting in ambush would slaughter him. Di Cosmo writes that this Court Conference was most likely called into session due to the Emperor's aggrieved position with the Xiongnu, who were busy raiding the Chinese border while waiting for the Han to ratify a new heqin treaty.

Page 211-212: In the debate, Wang Hui presented pretty much the same argument, only slightly different. He noted that the Dai state during the Warring States Period was able to defend itself from the nomads and keep them from pillaging, but the great Han which united a gigantic empire could do barely anything to stop their raids. In his view, there was no other alternative but to stage an offensive. Han Anguo introduced his argument by first pointing out the humiliation of Emperor Gaozu of Han at the Battle of Baideng, a futile act which led to the very heqin policy being discussed, a policy that had so far provided relative peace for five generations. Han Anguo argued that it was wise to know one's limits, and even the Han Empire had its limits; hence, potentially disastrous conquests should be avoided. He praised Emperor Wen of Han for not conquering an inch of Xiongnu territory and renewing the treaty with them.

Page 212: To these points of Han Anguo, Wang Hui made this rebuttal, QUOTE: "Not so! I have heard that the Five Emperors did not follow each other's rituals, and the Three Kings did not repeat each other's music. This is not because they antagonized each other, but because every one followed what was appropriate to the epoch. Moreover, Kao-ti personally dressed in a strong armor, and armed with sharp weapons, hiding in fogs and mists, immersed in snow and frost had fought continuously for over ten years, and therefore he could not avenge the outrage of P'ing-ch'eng. Without force there is no ability, and therefore he put the hearts of the empire at rest. Today, however, there are frequent alarms along the frontiers, the soldiers are wounded and killed, and in China funerary processions follow one after the other. This is what grieves the benevolent man. For this reason I say that it is appropriate to strike."

Page 212: Di Cosmo clarifies that one point made by Wang Hui about Liu Bang, explaining that Liu had fought a long civil war and was in no position to continue fighting with the lack of resources and instability of his realm. Therefore he could not seek revenge for Baideng.

Page 212-213: Han Anguo replied to this by saying it would be nearly impossible to try and capture the Xiongnu, as they "arrive like a sudden wind and leave like a disappearing lightning. Their occupation is raising animals, they go hunting with bow and arrow; they follow their animals according to the availibility of pasture, and their abode is not permanent; they are difficult to capture and control. As for the present, since long they have caused the border regions to abandon tilling and weaving in order to support the common activities of the nomads. Their strength cannot be matched in a balanced way. For this reason I say it is not convenient to attack." Di Cosmo comments here that Han Anguo effectively displayed knowledge of the nomads' advantages and their absorbing of China's northern frontier regions into their sphere of economic influence.

Page 213: Wang Hui retorted by saying wise men act according to circumstance; when given the chance, Emperor Mu of Zhou defeated the Rong people and expanded his territory; the Qin general Meng Tian was able to take the Ordos region, opening up thousands of miles of land and building fortresses so that the Xiongnu "did not dare water their horses in the Yellow River". Furthermore, he said that the Xiongnu could not be cultivated with benevolence extended by the Chinese court; they could only be dealt with by using force. Wang Hui also pointed out that the Xiongnu's political position was rather unstable, as northern peoples dissatisfied with their subjugation by the Xiongnu could be persuaded to turn against their overlords, and explicitly mentioned the Yuezhi as a potential ally in such a scheme.

Page 213-214: Di Cosmo says that Han Anguo began to lose ground in the debate after Wang made this point, as Han merely repeated and reinforced his point about how the Xiongnu could not be fought in their own territory. Wang rebutted this by saying that penetrating deep into Xiongnu territory was not his proposal at all. It is at this moment where he introduced Nie Wengyi's plot to have the Xiongnu shanyu ambushed at Mayi under false pretense of providing him with gifts. In this way, Wang recognized that Han Anguo made a great point that prolonged wars fought in Xiongnu territory would be disastrous, but a limited engagement along the border with the capture of their leader would bring about political chaos for the Xiongnu, who would be likely to submit if not be severely weakened.

Page 213-214: Wang's idea, unfortunately, did not work in the field, as the botched Battle of Mayi proved to be disastrous for Han, since the shanyu did not fall into the intended trap and humiliated the Han armies. However, the unintended effect of this battle was that it proved to the Han ministers debating the subject that the Xiongnu did not obey peace treaties, they remained a constant threat, and limited engagement like the approach seen at Mayi did not work, so full-scale military action was the only other solution.
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#14 Non-Han Nan Ban

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Posted 15 July 2008 - 10:35 AM

I finally found something about court conferences in Eastern Han, from Bielenstein's book:

Bielenstein, Hans. (1980). The Bureaucracy of Han Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521225108.

Page 14: QUOTE: "Little is known about the particular duties of the Minister over the Masses in Later Han times. He presumably was still responsible for drawing up the annual budget, although the sources are silent on this point. He had the same censorial and advisory responsibilities as the other two Excellencies. It is not certain that he still presided over the Court Conference in the absence of the emperor, but the Great Conference was definitely held in his ministry."

Page 144: QUOTE: "Emperors made policy decisions usually after consultation. Various officials acted routinely as imperial advisers, in addition to which the rulers referred important matters for discussions and guidance. They might summon the appropriate officials to the palace and question them either personally or through delegates. At other times, officials were ordered to meet among themselves and then to summarize the results of their discussion. There were cases when officials stationed in the provinces participated in the deliberations through memorials. Important issues were debated at Court Conferences (tingyi or huiyi) in the palace. There also existed the institution of the Great Conference (dayi) which was not held in the palace but, at least in Later Han times, in the Hall for Court Meetings of the Hundred Officials. It was situated in the ministry of the Minister over the Masses. The emperor participated, and for that purpose travelled to the ministry. The discussions concerned such matters as the bureaucracy, the legal system, coinage, appointments and resignations of high officials, enfeoffments, ritual, banditry, and foreign policy. Participants were selected in accordance with the needs of the situation., and for full-scale debates might include the Three Excellencies, the Nine Ministers, Grand Palace Grandees, Gentleman Consultants, Attending Secretaries, Erudits, Division Heads, imperial sons, and fovoured nobles. The emperor was under pressure to accept unanimous advice. As a memorial of A.D. 31 expressed it, 'a hereditary ruler does not neglect precedents and the unanimous recommendations of officials.' But the very fact that this needed to be said in a memorial shows that the emperor had to be reminded. It is certain that he was not bound by majority proposals, and frequently accepted minority opinions."
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#15 William O'Chee

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Posted 15 July 2008 - 11:03 AM

Hey Eric,

Brilliant stuff. I shall have to take taime, again, to digest it all, and come back with some more questions.

Many thanks,

William




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