[William O'Chee]

Can anyone assist in describing the western limits of Han authority? I can vaguely recall their establishing a military outpost in the Pamirs, but I might be mistaken.

What was their relationship with neighbouring kingdoms to the west, and to what extent were these vassal states, or did they merely pay tribute without ceding any authority or sovereignty to the Han emperor?

[JohnD]

Yu Ying-Shih, Cambridge History of China Vol.1, pg. 412-413 said:

With the completion of the administrative network, Han finally succeeded
in bringing the Western Regions into the tributary system. The operation of the system is well summed up by Fan Yeh, compiler of the Hou-Han shu, as follows:

Records of the customs and lands of the Western Regions were unheard of in ancient times. During the Han period, however, Chang Ch'ien . . . and Pan Ch'ao . . . eventually succeeded in carrying out expansion to the far west and in bringing foreign territories into submission. Overawed by military strength and attracted by wealth, none [of the rulers of the states in the Western Regions] did not present strange local products as tribute and his beloved sons as hostages. They bared their heads and kneeled down toward the east to pay homage to the Son of Heaven. Thereupon, the offices of wu-chi [hsiao-wi] were instituted separately to take care of their affairs and the command of the protector-general was established to exercise general authority. Those who were submissive from the very beginning received money and official seals as imperial gifts, but those who surrendered later were taken to the capital to receive punishment. Agricultural garrisons were set up in fertile fields and post stations built along the main highways. Messengers and interpreters travelled without cessation, and barbarian merchants and peddlers came to the border [for trade] everyday.

In spite of the somewhat excessive sinocentrism of the author's language, this characterization has the merit of bringing out the basic features of the relations between the Han empire and the western states, particularly during the Former Han period. (Analysis of Fan Yeh's statement follows below; see pp. 416f.).

Yu Ying-Shih, Cambridge History of China Vol.1, pg. 416-417 said:

In the summary made by Fan Yeh, which is cited above, attention is drawn to a number of crucial elements in the relations between the Han empire and the states of the Western Regions. First, the exchange of gifts and tribute figured centrally in the arrangements. Each time a Han diplomatic
mission was sent to the Western Regions it would carry imperial gifts, normally consisting of gold and silk, to the various states. At other times, such gifts could also be distributed by the protector-general or the wu-chi colonel. In return, the states were expected to send envoys to the Han court to present their "local products" as tribute. Khotan jade, horses from Ferghana, and wine,108 for example, were all among tributary items of the day.

Tribute from the Western Regions was important to the Han court chiefly as a symbol of political submission, rather than for its intrinsic value. On the other hand, tribute meant little more to the western states than an official cloak for trade. The state of (Kashmir), for example, was never a party to the Han tributary system, but it frequently sent envoys with "tribute" to China. As an official during the reign of Ch'eng-ti (33-7 B.C.) pointed out, the so-called tribute bearers from Kashmir were neither officials nor nobles, but ordinary merchants who came for trade. In the same period another state, Sogdiana (K'ang-chii), also insisted on joining the Han tributary system. According to the report of the protector-general, Sogdiana never showed due respect for Han authority. It was solely for the purpose of trade that this distant state (said to be 12,300 li, more than 5,000 kilometers or 3,225 miles, from Ch'ang-an) sought to participate in the system."

Hostages, a standard feature of the tributary system, served as an important political link between Han and the Western Regions. From 108 B.C. till the end of the dynasty in A.D. 220, numerous hostage princes had been sent to the Han court from the tributary states. Like their Hsiung-nu counterparts, hostages from the Western Regions were lodged in the capital. In Han times, the number of foreign hostages together with their own followers must have been quite large; the court had to build special residences to accommodate them. In 94 A.D., for instance, special "quarters for the barbarians" (Man-l ti) were provided in Lo-yang where people, presumably hostages, from the Western Regions lived."' They were generally subject to Chinese law and punishment. Some of them may even have received a Chinese education, as in the case of a king of Yarkand who spent his early years in Ch'ang-an as a hostage prince during the reign of Yiian-ti (49-33 B.C.). He assimilated so much to a Chinese way of life that he introduced some Han institutions into his own state." Since all the hostage princes were potential royal successors, it is probable that the Han court made deliberate efforts to promote pro-Han sentiments among them. Throughout this period, Han consistently sought opportunities to support its hostages in their bids for power in their homes.

A map showing the Western Regions, from the Cambridge History of China, Vol. 1, page 406:

Yu Ying-Shih, Cambridge History of China Vol.1, pg.410 said:

The second major military victory which helped to establish Han domination over the Western Regions was the conquest of Ferghana in 101 B.C. by the Han general Li Kuang-li.94 Ferghana was very far from the Han empire, and the campaign involved numerous logistical difficulties for the Chinese army. However, it was determined to take the risk in order to obtain the fabled horses of the region and to demonstrate Han military strength. If Han could subdue a state as far off as Ferghana, then all the states in the Western Regions would be at the mercy of China. After learning about the Han move, the Hsiung-nu made an attempt to intercept Li Kuang-li, but were outnumbered by his forces and failed to check his advance. The campaign, which lasted four years, was clearly the most expensive to be mounted in the entire history of the dynasty, involving two expeditionary forces: Li Kuang-li was unable to achieve his goals until he had returned to Tun-huang to request reinforcements. As the Han shu says: "After the Erh-shih general conquered Ta-yiian, all the states of the Western Regions were shocked and frightened."96 Most sent envoys to present tribute to Han.

This post has been edited by JohnD: 30 September 2009 - 02:52 PM

[somechineseperson]

The Han control over what is now Xinjiang was relatively loose compared with the Tang, which directly established multiple military garrisons in the region. The Tang even directly ruled over Mongolia in the 7th century.

Partly this is due to a different kind of military system that was present during the Han and the Tang. The Tang fubing system, based on individual peasant-soldiers, inherited from the Northern Wei, was a more effective system than the buqu system of the Han.

[William O'Chee]

somechineseperson, on 01 October 2009 - 01:49 PM, said:

The Han control over what is now Xinjiang was relatively loose compared with the Tang, which directly established multiple military garrisons in the region. The Tang even directly ruled over Mongolia in the 7th century.

Partly this is due to a different kind of military system that was present during the Han and the Tang. The Tang fubing system, based on individual peasant-soldiers, inherited from the Northern Wei, was a more effective system than the buqu system of the Han.

Thanks for this point. What were the primary differences in the two military systems - the fubing and the buqu?

[somechineseperson]

See:

http://en.wikipedia....ilitary_history


A new military system did not come until the invasions of the Xianbei in the 5th Century CE, by which time most of the Wu Hu had been destroyed and much of North China had been reconquered by The Jin Dynasty. Nevertheless, the Xianbei won many successes against the Chinese, conquering all of North China by 468 CE. The Xianbei state of Northern Wei created the earliest forms of the equal field (均田) land system and the Fubing system (府兵) military system, both of which became major institutions under Sui and Tang. Under the fubing system each headquarters (府) commanded about one thousand farmer-soldiers who could be mobilized for war. In peacetime they were self-sustaining on their land allotments, and were obliged to do tours of active duty in the capital.


Southern Chinese dynasties, being descended from the Han and Jin, prided themselves on being the successors of the Chinese civilization and disdained the Northern dynasties, who were ruled by non-Chinese. Southern armies continued the military system of Buqu or hereditary soldiers from the Jin Dynasty. However, the growing power of aristocratic landowners, who also provided many of the buqu, meant that the Southern dynasties were very unstable; after the fall of the Jin, four dynasties ruled in just two centuries.

This is not to say that the Southern armies did not work well. Southern armies won great victories in the late 4th Century CE, such as the battle of Fei at which an 80,000-man Jin army crushed the 300,000-man army of Former Qin, an empire founded by one of the Wu Hu tribes that had briefly unified North China. In addition, under the brilliant general Liu Yu, Chinese armies briefly reconquered much of North China.

In 581 CE, the Chinese Yang Jian forced the Xianbei ruler to abdicate, founding the Sui Dynasty and restoring Chinese rule in the North. By 589 CE, he had unified much of China.

The Sui's unification of China sparked a new golden age. During the Sui and Tang, Chinese armies, based on the Fubing system invented during the era of division, won military successes that restored the empire of the Han Dynasty and reasserted Chinese power. A key component of the success of Sui and Tang armies, just like the earlier Qin and Han armies, was the adoption of large elements of cavalry. These powerful horsemen, combined with the superior firepower of the Chinese infantry, made Chinese armies the best of their day.

However, during the Tang Dynasty the Fubing (府兵)system began to break down. Based on state ownership of the land in the Juntian (均田)system, the prosperity of the Tang Dynasty meant that the state's lands were being bought up in ever increasing quantities. Consequently, the state could no longer provide land to the farmers, and the Juntian system broke down. By the 8th Century, the Tang had reverted to the centralized military system of the Han. However, this also did not last and it broke down during the disorder of the Anshi Rebellion, which saw many Fanzhen (藩鎮)or local generals become extraordinarily powerful. These Fanzhen were so powerful they collected taxes, raised armies, and made their positions hereditary. Because of this, the central army of the Tang was greatly weakened. Eventually, the Tang Dynasty collapsed and the various Fanzhen were made into separate kingdoms, a situation that would last until the Song Dynasty.

During the Tang, professional military writing and schools began to be set up to train officiers, an institution that would be expanded during the Song.

This post has been edited by somechineseperson: 04 October 2009 - 04:49 AM

[William O'Chee]

Much obliged for the clarification on the military systems.