2 replies to this topic

[blackriverdragon]

As we know, the ROC in Taiwan remained a one-party state ruling under martial law until July 15, 1987, when President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law. The first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, formed in 1986, became legal in 1991.

What people may not know is that from 1949-1953, Taiwan Governor K.C. Wu (吳國楨, Wú Gúozhēn) took a strong stand in attempting to implement Sun Yat-sen's ideals of a democratic Chinese republic after the ROC moved to Taiwan. He attempted to integrate Taiwanese into politics (including critics of Chen Yi, who was responsible for 228) and curb the powers of the police state. In doing so, he made many enemies within the KMT, particularly with both Chiang administrations, and had an assassination attempt on him in April 1953. Wu was then dismissed from his job as governor and went into exile in the United States, where he wrote an article in Look magazine titled, "Your tax dollars are building a police state in Taiwan."

So, my question is, do you think ROC on Taiwan had a society stable enough and ready to be a democratic republic in the time period 1953-1960? If Wu's ideals had won out and ROC on Taiwan became a democratic republic in deed as well as name around, say, 1955-1958, what would it look like? What would be the repercussions be for Taiwan and the rest of Asia?

I know that during the Japanese period, Taiwanese had experience with some degrees of self-governance. How would it translate into the ROC framework?

The 50s and 60s were particularly scary years for the Cold War and unresolved Civil War across the straits. Would an open society in Taiwan during that time period have lead to Communist subversion, invasion, and annexation of Taiwan by the PRC? Or do you think that the fears of such Communist subversion were overblown?

The strong executive powers of both Chiang administrations are credited with the Taiwan economic miracle that made first-world living standards available to middle-class Taiwanese. Would and open society prevent or delay such an economic miracle from happening?

My thoughts:

I personally cannot say if a more open political environment would have led to Communist subversion. Both Chiangs had much of the world stacked against them, and as this letter by Arthur Waldron of the University of Pennsylvania muses, the survival of ROC to this very day is nothing less than a miracle. If the Chiangs had been less vigilant in any one thing, it is possible that the ROC in Taiwan would not exist today.

However, I do think that civil society was ready for democracy by 1958. Apparently many Communist sympathizers, who were later instrumental in laying the foundations for the Taiwan independence movement and DPP, came back from the Mainland disillusioned by how the CCP was running things there. I do not know the timescale of this, however. But I think that the possibility that people in Taiwan would have a referendum to abolish to ROC and join the PRC would have been rather low.

Futhermore, I think that much of the damage done to the KMT's popularity was not due to 228, but due to the martial law period. Had the martial law period been cut short, Taiwan been an open society to air grievances, and KMT willing to recant on its past actions, we would not have the further "incidents" (for lack of a better word) and animosity between Mainlanders and benshengren bottled up all these decades, that, when finally uncorked in 1987, have polarized Taiwanese society. I also think that an open Taiwanese society early on in the ROC administration could have won over people who later became active in the Taiwanese independence movement, making more people willing to identify with the ROC and help shape and build it instead of trying to supplant it.

The political structure of such an ROC on Taiwan, I think, would still be heavily stacked with Mainlanders. However, instead of having 1,000-year legislators who were finally removed during the Lee Teng-hui administration, probably the legislative seats for "all of China" would have gone only to the people who had that province's ancestry. For instance, a first, second, third, etc., generation Taiwan-born Jiangsu(nese?) would be eligible to serve in the National Assembly to represent Jiangsu, but someone who did not have that provincial ancestry would not be. Elections still would happen on a regular basis.

I do not think that having an open society would put Taiwan at a disadvantage to have an economic miracle, since strong executives can coexist with open societies. However, not having Chiang Ching-kuo as president because of term limits or whatever could negatively impact Taiwan's economic growth, as he was basically the man with the plan to develop everything.

A developed democratic republic in Taiwan as early as 1960 could also influence the development of democracy in South Korea and Singapore, and maybe have repercussions on the Mainland. As Taiwan applies Sun Yat-sen's ideals and truly becomes a "model province of the ROC," the Mainland is embroiled in the chaos of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. A successful early Taiwan may be something the CCP would want to emulate. Could a successful Taiwanese democratization somehow deter the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution from happening or kick start some kind of similar democratization momentum within the CCP? A stretch, I know.

Thoughts?

[bhchao]

As we know, the ROC in Taiwan remained a one-party state ruling under martial law until July 15, 1987, when President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law. The first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, formed in 1986, became legal in 1991.

What people may not know is that from 1949-1953, Taiwan Governor K.C. Wu (吳國楨, Wú Gúozhēn) took a strong stand in attempting to implement Sun Yat-sen's ideals of a democratic Chinese republic after the ROC moved to Taiwan. He attempted to integrate Taiwanese into politics (including critics of Chen Yi, who was responsible for 228) and curb the powers of the police state. In doing so, he made many enemies within the KMT, particularly with both Chiang administrations, and had an assassination attempt on him in April 1953. Wu was then dismissed from his job as governor and went into exile in the United States, where he wrote an article in Look magazine titled, "Your tax dollars are building a police state in Taiwan."

So, my question is, do you think ROC on Taiwan had a society stable enough and ready to be a democratic republic in the time period 1953-1960? If Wu's ideals had won out and ROC on Taiwan became a democratic republic in deed as well as name around, say, 1955-1958, what would it look like? What would be the repercussions be for Taiwan and the rest of Asia?

I know that during the Japanese period, Taiwanese had experience with some degrees of self-governance. How would it translate into the ROC framework?

The 50s and 60s were particularly scary years for the Cold War and unresolved Civil War across the straits. Would an open society in Taiwan during that time period have lead to Communist subversion, invasion, and annexation of Taiwan by the PRC? Or do you think that the fears of such Communist subversion were overblown?

The strong executive powers of both Chiang administrations are credited with the Taiwan economic miracle that made first-world living standards available to middle-class Taiwanese. Would and open society prevent or delay such an economic miracle from happening?

My thoughts:

I personally cannot say if a more open political environment would have led to Communist subversion. Both Chiangs had much of the world stacked against them, and as this letter by Arthur Waldron of the University of Pennsylvania muses, the survival of ROC to this very day is nothing less than a miracle. If the Chiangs had been less vigilant in any one thing, it is possible that the ROC in Taiwan would not exist today.

However, I do think that civil society was ready for democracy by 1958. Apparently many Communist sympathizers, who were later instrumental in laying the foundations for the Taiwan independence movement and DPP, came back from the Mainland disillusioned by how the CCP was running things there. I do not know the timescale of this, however. But I think that the possibility that people in Taiwan would have a referendum to abolish to ROC and join the PRC would have been rather low.

Futhermore, I think that much of the damage done to the KMT's popularity was not due to 228, but due to the martial law period. Had the martial law period been cut short, Taiwan been an open society to air grievances, and KMT willing to recant on its past actions, we would not have the further "incidents" (for lack of a better word) and animosity between Mainlanders and benshengren bottled up all these decades, that, when finally uncorked in 1987, have polarized Taiwanese society. I also think that an open Taiwanese society early on in the ROC administration could have won over people who later became active in the Taiwanese independence movement, making more people willing to identify with the ROC and help shape and build it instead of trying to supplant it.

The political structure of such an ROC on Taiwan, I think, would still be heavily stacked with Mainlanders. However, instead of having 1,000-year legislators who were finally removed during the Lee Teng-hui administration, probably the legislative seats for "all of China" would have gone only to the people who had that province's ancestry. For instance, a first, second, third, etc., generation Taiwan-born Jiangsu(nese?) would be eligible to serve in the National Assembly to represent Jiangsu, but someone who did not have that provincial ancestry would not be. Elections still would happen on a regular basis.

I do not think that having an open society would put Taiwan at a disadvantage to have an economic miracle, since strong executives can coexist with open societies. However, not having Chiang Ching-kuo as president because of term limits or whatever could negatively impact Taiwan's economic growth, as he was basically the man with the plan to develop everything.

A developed democratic republic in Taiwan as early as 1960 could also influence the development of democracy in South Korea and Singapore, and maybe have repercussions on the Mainland. As Taiwan applies Sun Yat-sen's ideals and truly becomes a "model province of the ROC," the Mainland is embroiled in the chaos of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. A successful early Taiwan may be something the CCP would want to emulate. Could a successful Taiwanese democratization somehow deter the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution from happening or kick start some kind of similar democratization momentum within the CCP? A stretch, I know.

Thoughts?

Wu Guozhen was ahead of his time. His support for democracy in Taiwan aligned with Sun Yatsen's ideal of eventual democratization. But by opening arguing for democracy, Wu sowed the seeds of his own destruction. All power laid in the hands of father and son. Opening espousing these ideals was fruitless as long as the Chiangs were in power. It was political suicide. Not surprisingly, Wu eventually had to flee to the US for exile.

Having an open intellectual environment was also very risky during the 1950s, when Taiwan was still undeveloped and economically fragile. The CCP arose from intellectual activity during the May 4th movement, more specifically from Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao's ideas. The Chiang regime did not want to see a repeat of liberal ideas preceding economic growth in Taiwan. The Chinese mindset and temperament was unprepared for democracy in the Westernized form, at least not in the 1950s and 1960s. Very few Chinese had the democratic values ingrained in them for a democracy to work. The Chiangs knew that.

Wu was educated at Princeton University. Few Chinese at the time had the privilege of being educated overseas like him. Therefore Wu was way ahead of his time.

[ahxiang]

Wu Guozhen was ahead of his time. His support for democracy in Taiwan aligned with Sun Yatsen's ideal of eventual democratization. But by opening arguing for democracy, Wu sowed the seeds of his own destruction. All power laid in the hands of father and son. Opening espousing these ideals was fruitless as long as the Chiangs were in power. It was political suicide. Not surprisingly, Wu eventually had to flee to the US for exile.

Having an open intellectual environment was also very risky during the 1950s, when Taiwan was still undeveloped and economically fragile. The CCP arose from intellectual activity during the May 4th movement, more specifically from Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao's ideas. The Chiang regime did not want to see a repeat of liberal ideas preceding economic growth in Taiwan. The Chinese mindset and temperament was unprepared for democracy in the Westernized form, at least not in the 1950s and 1960s. Very few Chinese had the democratic values ingrained in them for a democracy to work. The Chiangs knew that.

Wu was educated at Princeton University. Few Chinese at the time had the privilege of being educated overseas like him. Therefore Wu was way ahead of his time.

We talked about Wu 3-4 years back. Wu was kind of arrogant, not knowing that his power came from Chiang. The only reason Wu was put on the front stage was that Chiang knew the Americans wanted to topple him, as they did from 1942 to 1950. Those Americans, in fact, were the British hands and the Soviet agents, not real patriotic Americans. ( You have VENONA scripts to prove that.) Even when Eisenhower came to power, the Americans had an inertia of continuing the Truman policy. We talked about Wu's attempt to have American reporters act as a detente and deliberately gave important documents to the said American in front of his housekeeper. You could tell Wu had a delusion about the American support for him. Chiang, at one time, told Wu that all his life there was not a second person whom Chiang had ever given this kind of [good] treatment. I would say Chiang did not owe Wu anything. From 1953, Chiang figured that it was safe to take action against Sun Liren and Wu Guozhen without worrying about antagonizing the Americans.

You have to examine the Chiang-Wu relationship in the light of Chiang first appeasing the Americans and then saying "No" to the Amercians, not something democracy or not.

Now about "blackriverdragon" question on Mao and the cultural revolution. There was a pattern of purging political enemies with Mao. There was no way that Mao would change his behavior to be democratic. Note that the cultural revolution was not an isolated incident that was 100% to do with Mao. The British, or the Cambridge Ring Spy No. 5 and his British Shell Company, had a hand in it. You see it was not a coincidence that Britain immediately recognized Mao at the turn of 1949-1950. The British, colonialists and Soviet spies combined, did everything possible to sabotage the ROC from 1942 to 1950. For the British colonialists, it was to make sure that Britain was to keep HK, and for a year, 1942-1943, Chiang and the British haggled over HK, back and forth. Chiang was tricked into a compromise through the lobbying by Wellington Koo, a big mistake. (If I was Chiang, I would rather break with the British in 1943 than to sign the alliance treaty.) British succeeded in destroying Chiang and the ROC, and got tacit agreement from Mao to keep HK. Remember British were supposedly hand over HK to ROC in 1946 or 1947, per memorandum reached in 1943. The civil war kept Chiang's hands tied, and weakened ROC's standing in the international community.

Now, should the British, i.e., the Soviet Cambridge spies and the British colonialists, had helped Mao in the 1940s and 1950s, the story changed in the 1960s. For the British colonialists, that was the case of "The British role in creating Maoism" shown at http://www.larouchep...nd_maoism.html. For the Cambridge spy, it was to make China implode. After Mao broke with the Soviets, the Cambridge Spy, through British Shell, conspired to have Mao agitate in launching various political movements, for the purpose of causing the PRC to implode from within.

(Somewhere else, at the thread http://www.chinahist...s05ixIWslxMZ-Q.
I gave the link http://www.mailstar.net/perry.html about this clandestine operation

Excerpts below:
Also in 1965, Rothschild was elevated to director of Shell International, and he acted as research coordinator for the Royal Dutch Shell Group. In short, he had taken charge of all Shell research whether it be for the Dutch, which owned 60 per cent of the group, or the British.

It allowed him to roam the world and was convenient as a cover, when he needed it in the Middle East or even China, where his agent-running took on an intensity with the build-up to the Cultural Revolution.

His secret work for Dick White and MI6 included running agents who were monitoring political events and the mood of Chairman Mao and his administration. As the Russians were even more nervous than the British and Americans about China's intentions concerning military expansion and weapons development, it's most likely that Rothschild's assessments of events would have been passed to the Moscow Centre. But Wright linked Rothschild to a bizarre plot that may have been based on some fact. Wright claimed to dose confidants that by the early 1960s the Chinese had frightened the Russians and the Americans with their development of nuclear and biological weapons, which they seemed willing to use. Chairman Mao Zedong had told India's Nehru in the late 1950s that nuclear war would be no bad thing. Even if half of mankind perished, the other half would survive and imperialism would vanish from the face of the earth.

This, the strange story continued, caused alarm in sections of the CIA and KGB. They then combined to run agents in China who encouraged Mao to purge the intellectual class, which would include the key scientists, particularly in the area of biological weaponry. Mao was apparently convinced that he could be murdered by 'a drop of invisible poison on his skin'.

In fact, the KGB and the CIA did draft in more Chinese experts and built up their Embassies in Beijing. The numbers increased further in 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao unleashed unprecedented terror across China. He stirred the youth of the country into forming Red Guards who were encouraged to root out 'bourgeois and revisionist tendencies'.

If the KGB did encourage the Cultural Revolution, the plan backfired on them a year later when families of Soviet diplomats and KGB of ficers were manhandled as they tried to escape at Beijing airport. However, during the terror, 'intellectuals' - which meant anyone qualified and working in a major university - became targets for assassination. About 50,000 of them were killed, including those working in important scientific research and development, such as biological weaponry. Mao boasted about this, comparing himself to previous emperors, who had butchered intellectuals. )

Edited by ahxiang, 13 December 2009 - 12:24 AM.