Not sure why it was necessary to take up space with M2 .50cal specs. The only relevant spec to this discussion is that fact that it was an air-cooled machine gun, not water-cooled at all. So the story about using pee for water-cooling makes no sense at all. BTW, M2 .50cal was introduced into US service only in the 1920's, so it was quite improbable to have been purchased by Peking government in 1917.
The New 74th Division was certainly one of the top KMT divisions, regardless whether it was part of Y-Force or not. Over-confidence was a major contributor to its down fall. Not sure why the American lend-lease 155mm to soviets was even relevant to this discussion. None of them were used at MengLiangGu; plenty were probably used by the Communists at JinZhou. The real question there is how did KMT troops allow LinBiao to line up over a thousand field pieces in an open field when the KMT airforce had absolute air superiority. Where was the scouting and reconnasance work that one would normally expect? The Soviets received the 155mm through Lend-lease because they were facing German 15cm field pieces (and Hummel, the self-propelled version). Soviets probably tried to get rid of them because their domestic manufacture in the 6" range was the 152mm; most armies were streamlining ammo logistics after the war, with one uniform size in the 4" range, and one uniform size in the 6" range; CKS/KMT advance into Manchuria and whipping of public hysteria against soviets gave the perfect reason for the soviets to give those weapons to the communists. Americans did have a habit of giving allies (including KMT) only the 105mm instead of the 155mm under normal circumstances; the French found that out the hard way at DienBienFu.
The 1938 XuZhou Campaign involved 60+ divisions on the KMT side (and 8 divisions on the Japanese side). It was an army-group level engagement, much much (an order of maganitute) larger than the Division/Corps level engagement at MengLiangGu. It's quite understandable to have women aux at army-group level, especially since the army-group was being engaged in its own base area by advancing enemy. However, at the Division/Corps level on a forward deploymeb/attack like at MengLiangGu, it makes little sense to have women there. The single woman description makes it even more suspect. How was she housed the night before? With whom did she share a foxhole?
I was researching into the 1917 model versus 1921 model, and mistakenly pasted the wrong passage. -Sorry I tended to not look back at what I typed.
I guess I found some info on the equipment of the 74th Corps. (Note I was the only person who made Chinese Army into a Corps, and most of the wiki stuff using the "Corps" designation was a copy and paste of my stuff without giving me the credit.) At http://wenwen.soso.c.../q115736551.htm you will see a list of equipment:
What is shown here is that other than 12 pieces of 105-mm howitzer, some flame thrower, bazuka, most of the stuff were non-American. As I wrote previously, Chinese army reorganized the artillery units by absorbing the Japanese mountain guns which were abundant in supply at the end of the war. The majority of light weapons were Japanese rifles. It is a wonder that the Chinese army were still using the 1917 model for the heavy machine guns - stuff that must be purchased by the Peking government during WWI. In 1930s, Chinese army had a military equipment remodeling, and standardized the rifles and light machine guns on basis of the Czech/German model, and tweaked the gun barrel to have both rifles and machine guns use the same bullets. I am quite surprised to see the 74th Corps had 324 1917 water-cooled heavy machine guns. (It also exhibited an American accusation that Chinese troops treasure weapons so much that rarely did they destroy weapons at defeat - which was true in instances of warlord battles, not Sino-Japanese or CCP-KMT battles.)
I took some time reading through the History of CBI Theatre, and noted that the 74th Corps was treated as a reserved unit at Kunming, not part of the Y-force for penetration into Burma; however, it was to be part of the 30-division reorganization plan, which never took off since the manpower was never secured and the US supplies were constantly diverted to the airforce, to teh X-force in India, and to the US bomber bases. I checked the page about the supply of light weapons, and noted that the agreement said that China was to supply 74% of the machine guns, while the rest was to be supplied by the US. What happened was that the Comintern agent, Curries, ordered the weapons to be dumped into the Indian Ocean in 1945. There was a memoirs about one army corps using up 2/3rd training ammunition in spring 1945, and then sailed to Manchuria with one third ammunition left, and that could give you a hint as to the American weapons.
I recalled reading in more than a few places about the women soldiers. Wu Lili, who was in 1937 kicked out of Yenan, together with Smedley, was at one time working as a political indoctrination worker in Hu Zongnan's army. The practice of having women work in the army had its history in the northern expedition time period. Chiang, in 1945, adopted Wedemeyer's advice in kicking out political workers, but two years later, reinstated the political indoctrination department. (CCP had two lines: political commissar, and political director in the army, by the way.)
Now, why we are talking at length about the Menglianggu Battle. It was to clarify the myth about why the KMT lost the battle, and hence lost the country.
I found the following quote to be corroborating what I described about the "Odd Shoe" story. Check out http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=196484051 where you will see a citation that the communist side incurred 60,000 casualties in attacking Mengliangu. And you have the communist general Chen Yi said this: