29 replies to this topic

[RollingWave]

There was certainly opposing forces on what direction Japan should have take, but as I pointed out earlier, they also had a foundation that was easier for the establishment to be toppled. and that was precisely what happened.

Meanwhile, one can not argue that China did not have forces that tried to overthrow the current status, but the Qing was designed in a way that gave strong incentives for most of the society, not to meantion just their officals, to stand with the imperial court.

So in the end, it took a far more greater and devastating force to really remove the impenetrable shield set up by the Qing dynasty. you can say that the old Chinese system was really successful in it's intention, though in the end it backfired in dramatic fashion. and the devastating forces required to truely end the old system also meant that it took even longer for China to actually begin moving onto the modern world, and IMHO that did not actually start until the 1970s, roughly about 100 years after Japan began there's

[Liubei]

There was certainly opposing forces on what direction Japan should have take, but as I pointed out earlier, they also had a foundation that was easier for the establishment to be toppled. and that was precisely what happened.

In the Meiji restoration the old establishment wasn't really toppled which is why it's called a "restoration" and not a "revolution" because the ruling elite (emperor, daimyos, Samurai) just converted to western political thought and capitalism. Prior to the Meiji restoration the traditional "samurai" class were largely bureaucrats and land owning gentry. The ruling elite just consolidated their position into a modern nation-state under the emperor and distributed industrial management and ministry roles out to the most trusted bureaucrats who were..the former samurai. The peasants in this era just became blue collar worker bees.

You also have to remember that the period during and after the Meiji restoration was full of radical Japanese intellectuals trying to carve out their own sphere of influence. Unfortunately for the rest of asia and Japan the right wing elements won through a campaign of terror and assassination later on.

Meanwhile, one can not argue that China did not have forces that tried to overthrow the current status, but the Qing was designed in a way that gave strong incentives for most of the society, not to mention just their officials, to stand with the imperial court.

The problem is that Emperors like Qianlong were completely arrogant and not very outward looking in their view. Hindsight is 20/20 but this view is justified to a certain extent because the Qing just finished the conquest of all the old enemies of the Chinese dynasties such as the central asian and steppe people within so the dynasty was feeling very self assured. Plus the Qing court was full of traditionalists and neo-confucianists who looked down on anyone who did not ascribe to their very narrow view of the world. These cultural ideologues considered _any_ outside foreign influence as a violation of the very empire they built.

Although it's possible to still be a "traditionalist" and progress your industry and political thought. Japan changed their political and economic system but they still maintained a very ethnocentric cultural outlook and kept most of their social traditions.

Edited by Liubei, 28 June 2010 - 03:22 AM.

[Yizheng]

In the Meiji restoration the old establishment wasn't really toppled which is why it's called a "restoration" and not a "revolution" because the ruling elite (emperor, daimyos, Samurai) just converted to western political thought and capitalism. Prior to the Meiji restoration the traditional "samurai" class were largely bureaucrats and land owning gentry. The ruling elite just consolidated their position into a modern nation-state under the emperor and distributed industrial management and ministry roles out to the most trusted bureaucrats who were..the former samurai. The peasants in this era just became blue collar worker bees.

The problem is that Emperors like Qianlong were completely arrogant and not very outward looking in their view. Hindsight is 20/20 but this view is justified to a certain extent because the Qing just finished the conquest of all the old enemies of the Chinese dynasties such as the central asian and steppe people within so the dynasty was feeling very self assured. Plus the Qing court was full of traditionalists and neo-confucianists who looked down on anyone who did not ascribe to their very narrow view of the world. These cultural ideologues considered _any_ outside foreign influence as a violation of the very empire they built.

i would say that even though indeed the ruling elite remained to a large extent in place, the change in terms of institutions and the impact it all had on society was quite substantial - substantial enough to represent something of a revolution, even if not given that name.

More important, it was a sustained and consistently implemented policy over several decades, and this is the big difference with the Qing. The Qing also had a kind of 'restoration' in the 1860s-70s, with increasing power of the regions, military strengthening, restoration of control over territory, and the rise of the what in many ways paralleled Meiji Japan thinking - taking elements of Western system and thinking to develop one's own country. In Qing China this produced the ti yong philosophy of chinese for the essence and western for the practical use. The problem was that this was never implemented as a sustained and consistent policy at the national level, but was either implemented in fits and starts, depending on battles among the various factions of the ruling elite for influence, or in individual regions but not at national level. Because this philosophy did not go as far as fundamental institutional change, problems and tensions would have arisen whatever the case, but consistent national-level implementation would have laid the foundations for perhaps a more gradual evolution on a stronger base, rather than leaving China so weakened and the dynasty in such a state as to be completely toppled by revolution.

[Liubei]

More important, it was a sustained and consistently implemented policy over several decades, and this is the big difference with the Qing. The Qing also had a kind of 'restoration' in the 1860s-70s, with increasing power of the regions, military strengthening, restoration of control over territory, and the rise of the what in many ways paralleled Meiji Japan thinking - taking elements of Western system and thinking to develop one's own country. In Qing China this produced the ti yong philosophy of chinese for the essence and western for the practical use. The problem was that this was never implemented as a sustained and consistent policy at the national level, but was either implemented in fits and starts, depending on battles among the various factions of the ruling elite for influence, or in individual regions but not at national level. Because this philosophy did not go as far as fundamental institutional change, problems and tensions would have arisen whatever the case, but consistent national-level implementation would have laid the foundations for perhaps a more gradual evolution on a stronger base, rather than leaving China so weakened and the dynasty in such a state as to be completely toppled by revolution.

The main difference between pre-meiji Japan and China is that Japan had to sign unequal treaties but wasn't actively being occupied or subjugated through force. Force was certainly threatened and on the periphery in Japan's situation but it was never used. I guess Japan was "fortunate" to meet Commodore Perry before the Brits first. This gave the ruling elite in Japan enough time to see the writing on the wall and force adoption of modernity when they saw the industrial power arrayed against them. Also Japan was already consolidated under a dominant shogunate and the people under their rule so it was a much easier task to delegate and rewrite the system to speak. Even with Japan's near perfect situation there were still samurai rebellions and such.

The Qing on the other hand were facing a much more complex set of circumstances. The British harmed the Qing dynasty's legitimacy a great deal through defeat in the first Opium war and there was already major unrest fomenting in the countryside even prior to the European invasion. All this just exacerbated the problems and prevented any kind of long term plan or consolidation. Not all this can be blamed on the British of course but even when they finally started to try and change it was far too late. Not to mention all the endemic corruption and intrigue during the death throes of the Qing dynasty.

Even during the end of Qianlong's reign when the Brits started scheming and creating cartels to force opium into China it was already too late to catch up. Britain already had military designs and war was inevitable.

However, if we could roll back time and look at a what if scenario I do think that during the early 18th century a successful "restoration" could have been instituted in China. As the country was still firmly under Qing rule and the people consolidated under a more forward thinking Emperor Kangxi. The fact that it didn't is just another one of those tragedies for the Chinese people to consider...

Edited by Liubei, 28 June 2010 - 11:13 AM.

[peger]

I think it still comes back to the fundamental question of having a general consensus among all main sections of the ruling elite on what direction the country is taking. In Meiji Japan this consensus was established but not in late Qing China.

This isn't entirely true, as the Satsuma rebellion illustrates. However, I definitely agree with you, there was a much wider consensus for reform in Japan than in late-Qing China. A crucial difference, which is also shown by the Satsuma rebellion, is that the early Meiji government was willing to eliminate reactionaries, while Qing reformists often found themselves being the ones eliminated by reactionaries.

An additional element has to do with the Mandate of Heaven system itself. All dynasties fall, and Qing officials were aware of this, so rather than attempt to permanently reform and strengthen the nation they took measures to simply keep the dynasty afloat longer.

Edited by peger, 28 June 2010 - 05:25 PM.

[Lu Su]

In the Meiji restoration the old establishment wasn't really toppled which is why it's called a "restoration" and not a "revolution" because the ruling elite (emperor, daimyos, Samurai) just converted to western political thought and capitalism. Prior to the Meiji restoration the traditional "samurai" class were largely bureaucrats and land owning gentry. The ruling elite just consolidated their position into a modern nation-state under the emperor and distributed industrial management and ministry roles out to the most trusted bureaucrats who were..the former samurai. The peasants in this era just became blue collar worker bees.

You also have to remember that the period during and after the Meiji restoration was full of radical Japanese intellectuals trying to carve out their own sphere of influence. Unfortunately for the rest of asia and Japan the right wing elements won through a campaign of terror and assassination later on.


The problem is that Emperors like Qianlong were completely arrogant and not very outward looking in their view. Hindsight is 20/20 but this view is justified to a certain extent because the Qing just finished the conquest of all the old enemies of the Chinese dynasties such as the central asian and steppe people within so the dynasty was feeling very self assured. Plus the Qing court was full of traditionalists and neo-confucianists who looked down on anyone who did not ascribe to their very narrow view of the world. These cultural ideologues considered _any_ outside foreign influence as a violation of the very empire they built.

Although it's possible to still be a "traditionalist" and progress your industry and political thought. Japan changed their political and economic system but they still maintained a very ethnocentric cultural outlook and kept most of their social traditions.

The Meiji Restoration is very different from the Meiji Revolution, and for good reason. Many bloody wars were fought throughout the Revolution between those loyal to the Emperor, and those loyal to the Shogunate, though both claimed they were fighting for the Emperor, and Japan's best interest. So, I am afraid you are incorrect. In modern history, and in Japanese text books, the 'Restoration' is referred to as the part after the final wars (Boshin, and last battles such as Toba-Fushimi)when wide reforms took place and a very political battle began within Japan's social structure to then solidify and form the new government. The events before are commonly called the Meiji Revolution. It is very inaccurate to group them together. Clans were the biggest players of forming sides in the war, such as the Aizu and Toshu, who were at constant odds until the end. Each, perhaps, seeking for influence in the new time.

Your assessment of the Samurai is also very off. Most were humiliated, executed, and all were banned from wearing their swords. They were completely neglected and forgotten by the new government, which is why so many additional revolts took place before the Revolution had officially ended. This was the hallmark of the 'Boshin Wars'. Very very few ever were given opportunity for an office, and most Samurai would not accept the shame of serving the new regime (in their eyes) even if offered, due to their feelings and dishonorable treatment by new regime members. A thorough study of the Code of Bushido will better explain this last argument, as well as accounts from both sides during the time period. A thorough study of the Shinsengumi is also recommended.

Right wing? That is an improper, and opinionated, political assessment that creates unneeded bias for historical study. There was no 'right wing' then, just two different culture groups. One very much believing and clinging to the old ways of the Tokugawa, and the new regime kindled by intense westernization and change which the Emperor had become very keen on. The Samurai believed things were changing too fast, and encouraged the Emperor to focus on Japan's own issues, without western involvement. They also believed that western leaders and diplomats were only influencing the Emperor for their own benefit, and in such, believed that they were fighting in service to the Emperor, as opposed to against him.

You are correct in one thing, though. The 'Revolutionaries' or 'Imperialists' as they were called in western translation, did often attempt assassinations and complicated plots, such as setting fire to the whole city of Kyoto. These tactics were considered horribly dishonorable to the Samurai, who were noted to fight with honor. Very few clans loyal to the Shogunate would ever match tactics or 'stoop so low' as they would think, to do such things. Retaliations by Shogunate 'Loyalists', were mostly in massive unexpected frontal raids on 'safehouses' and clan estates linked with the 'Imperialists.' Battles were most prominent in Kyoto, of course, but appeared all over Japan.

[brightness]

The main difference between pre-meiji Japan and China is that Japan had to sign unequal treaties but wasn't actively being occupied or subjugated through force. Force was certainly threatened and on the periphery in Japan's situation but it was never used. I guess Japan was "fortunate" to meet Commodore Perry before the Brits first. This gave the ruling elite in Japan enough time to see the writing on the wall and force adoption of modernity when they saw the industrial power arrayed against them. Also Japan was already consolidated under a dominant shogunate and the people under their rule so it was a much easier task to delegate and rewrite the system to speak. Even with Japan's near perfect situation there were still samurai rebellions and such.

The Qing on the other hand were facing a much more complex set of circumstances. The British harmed the Qing dynasty's legitimacy a great deal through defeat in the first Opium war and there was already major unrest fomenting in the countryside even prior to the European invasion. All this just exacerbated the problems and prevented any kind of long term plan or consolidation. Not all this can be blamed on the British of course but even when they finally started to try and change it was far too late. Not to mention all the endemic corruption and intrigue during the death throes of the Qing dynasty.

Even during the end of Qianlong's reign when the Brits started scheming and creating cartels to force opium into China it was already too late to catch up. Britain already had military designs and war was inevitable.

However, if we could roll back time and look at a what if scenario I do think that during the early 18th century a successful "restoration" could have been instituted in China. As the country was still firmly under Qing rule and the people consolidated under a more forward thinking Emperor Kangxi. The fact that it didn't is just another one of those tragedies for the Chinese people to consider...

Actually, there was someone from England that tried the diplomatic mission like Commodore Perry later did for Japan. Not once but twice. Read up on Lord Napier's Mission in 1834. And McCartney Mission in 1793, which tried to form an alliance with China. Even the appointment of Charles Elliot after Lord Napier's failed mission was not intended for war, but for trade. Then the over-zealous LinZeXu took the first steps towards resolving the differences using force, without realizing just how lopsided the two sides were.

McCartney Mission in 1793 failed because Qing Imperial arrogance at the court itself;

Napier's Mission in 1834 failed because despite a sharp gun fight demonstrating the superiority of British warships against Chinese coastal artillery platforms and junk fleet . . . a couple British frigates essentially wiped out Chinese defense without suffering any damage . . . in a demonstration that should have been far more convincing than what Commodore Perry did for Japan three decades later. The difference was that the Qing official might not even have reported the lop-sided losses to the emperor thousands of miles away. British merchants wanted trade not war, so they pressured Napier into leaving.

By 1839, Charles Eliot had replaced Napier and took a concilatory approach to China and trade disputes. The newly appointed Lin ZeXu however was a hard-liner. There wouldn't have been a fight at all if Lin had not seized British property and held British subjects as hostages. Lin should have known the superiority of British firepower from the incident 5 years earlier. Instead not only did he gravely misunderstand the power balance and starting a war that he never should have, but also mis-reported his own disastrous battle failures. That prompted British fleet to seek resolution to the war by sailing ships up the coast of China, so the imperial court could see the reality in the world for themselves (in a way, similar to Commodore Perry's demonstration for Japan two decades later). Even after the war, the terms of peace, unlike later "unequal treaties" with Japan and Russia and etc., the Treaty of Nanjing was extremely light considering the duration and cost of the war . . . mostly consisting of opening trade, something that the Chinese should have done on their own accord for their own benefit. There wasn't any territorial concession, except for the tiny island of Hongkong (not including New Territory, which comprise over 90% of the territory of HK today) that the British already had after Lin ZeXu made it unsafe for them to trade in Canton or Macao. British vacated all the land that it had seized during the war, especially the much much bigger and much more strategically important ZhouShan/DingHai islands in East China Sea.

[Liubei]

The Meiji Restoration is very different from the Meiji Revolution, and for good reason. Many bloody wars were fought throughout the Revolution between those loyal to the Emperor, and those loyal to the Shogunate, though both claimed they were fighting for the Emperor, and Japan's best interest. So, I am afraid you are incorrect.

No major transition is ever bloodless but everything i've read about this period assesses the events as a restoration simply because the declaration and establishment of "restoration" of Imperial authority and the consolidation of the elites was made prior to the Boshin War. The Boshin war and subsequent smaller scale rebellions was more of a "reactionary" response.

I hate to use wikipedia here but it has the obvious dates and the order of events.

The Tokugawa Shogunate came to its official end on November 9, 1867, when Tokugawa Yoshinobu, the 15th Tokugawa Shogun "put his prerogatives at the Emperor's disposal" and resigned 10 days later. This was effectively the "restoration" (Taisei Hōkan) of imperial rule - although Yoshinobu still was of significant influence.

....

Shortly thereafter in January 1868, the Boshin War (War of the Year of the Dragon) started with the Battle of Toba-Fushimi in which Chōshū and Satsuma's forces defeated the ex-shogun's army.

This wasn't a situation where the emperor had to declare or prove his authority after a major war (as what typically happens in an actual revolution) as he was already considered the supreme leader of the country. In the views of the government and majority of the elites at the time he was merely quashing a social insurrection. The _majority_ of the elite were still clearly on the side of the Emperor's will. It doesn't matter what the holdouts or peasants thought was "appropriate" for Japan's best interest because its expectations clearly did not line up with what the Emperor's actual intentions were.

Your assessment of the Samurai is also very off. Most were humiliated, executed, and all were banned from wearing their swords. They were completely neglected and forgotten by the new government, which is why so many additional revolts took place before the Revolution had officially ended. This was the hallmark of the 'Boshin Wars'. Very very few ever were given opportunity for an office, and most Samurai would not accept the shame of serving the new regime (in their eyes) even if offered, due to their feelings and dishonorable treatment by new regime members.

This seems like starry eyed romanticism of the Samurai. It's true that many Samurai were initially unhappy due mostly to uncertainty however the majority were still willing to follow the Emperor. The holdouts were in the minority and were never a legitimate threat. Also, what matters is that when industrialization kicked off the Samurai were assimilated into the upper tier of society during that time as they tended to be the most educated and skilled individuals. They were not treated badly unless they clearly had rebellion in mind as the newly formed nation state needed all the knowledgeable people it had at the time.

Also, during the Edo period prior to the meiji restoration the Samurai were much less "warriors" already but merely a symbolic warrior caste of mostly bureaucrats and landlords. Basically the equivalent of minor government officials. The days of Samurai mystique and military glory is something that existed only prior to the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate.

A thorough study of the Code of Bushido will better explain this last argument, as well as accounts from both sides during the time period. A thorough study of the Shinsengumi is also recommended.

I'm well aware of the doctrine and spiritual text of this period. Later all these cultural relics were "adapted" into the Prussian military order adopted by the IJA and other nationalistic theories to form the new backbone of militarism. So in effect this appeased later reactionaries who were still uneasy about modern transition and created the military foundation.

Right wing? That is an improper, and opinionated, political assessment that creates unneeded bias for historical study. There was no 'right wing' then, just two different culture groups.

It's not an improper assessment at all. Imperialism during that period in Japan was meant to mirror European imperialism which was definitely right wing and militaristic. I don't use the term with negative connotations but it is what it is. The whole long term intent was to act as a bulwark against European imperialism and then later to establish a homegrown "empire". The humiliation of being coerced to open up the ports was still a stinging memory in the minds of many of the ruling class.

Edited by Liubei, 30 June 2010 - 03:10 AM.

[Liubei]

Actually, there was someone from England that tried the diplomatic mission like Commodore Perry later did for Japan. Not once but twice. Read up on Lord Napier's Mission in 1834. And McCartney Mission in 1793, which tried to form an alliance with China. Even the appointment of Charles Elliot after Lord Napier's failed mission was not intended for war, but for trade. Then the over-zealous LinZeXu took the first steps towards resolving the differences using force, without realizing just how lopsided the two sides were.

I recommend reading :
http://www.amazon.co...77878759&sr=8-1

and

http://www.amazon.co...77878759&sr=8-9

Both of these books go over the economics and the modus operandi of the British imperial policy at the time. The "opening of trade" excuse was one of those classic long term asymmetric strategies trotted out from time to time to allow unfettered access to the population and ports so it could push "specific" goods and foment internal social divisions to wrest control. The same operating pattern occurred in India, Sri Lanka, and even in the U.S. colonies. The particular products and trade methods were different but the ulterior motive was always the same.

The refusal of the Qing courts was merely a Cassus Belli for the British who already had plans on the region. Cultural exchange or fair trade was never the actual intent. The opium business was consolidated into a ridiculously powerful and profitable cartel so it was obvious that with China being a wealthy and militarily weak target it was ripe for the British Empire.

http://en.wikipedia...._of_opium_trade

Following the Battle of Plassey in 1757, in which Britain annexed Bengal to its empire, the British East India Company pursued a monopoly on production and export of Indian opium. Monopoly began in earnest in 1773, as the British Governor-General of Bengal abolished the opium syndicate at Patna. For the next fifty years opium trade would be the key to the East India Company's hold on the subcontinent.

Considering that importation of opium into China had been virtually banned by Chinese law, the East India Company established an elaborate trading scheme partially relying on legal markets, and partially leveraging illicit ones. British merchants carrying no opium would buy tea in Canton on credit, and would balance their debts by selling opium at auction in Calcutta. From there, the opium would reach the Chinese coast hidden aboard British ships then smuggled into China by native merchants. [b]In 1797 the company further tightened its grip on the opium trade by enforcing direct trade between opium farmers and the British, and ending the role of Bengali purchasing agents.

British exports of opium to China grew from an estimated 15 tons in 1730 to 75 tons in 1773. The product was shipped in over two thousand chests, each containing 140 pounds (64 kg) of opium.[14]

McCartney Mission in 1793 failed because Qing Imperial arrogance at the court itself;

Arrogance certainly played a part but the old emperor had a pretty good feeling as to what the intent was and rejected the British petition for easing of the opium ban several times during McCartney's mission. Like I said..by the end of Qianlong's reign it was already too late as the gap in industrialization and military meant that the world powers that be would find an excuse no matter what to subjugate China. All the other trade missions were merely thinly veiled machiavellian justification to create a 19th century "Gulf of Tonkin" situation.

What's interesting is that the Qing's response by destroying British opium in later disputes in more ways than one mirrors the Boston Tea Party. The difference is the Qing was a declining dynasty amongst a sharply divided society unable to formulate a defense.

Edited by Liubei, 30 June 2010 - 02:05 AM.

[brightness]

[quote name='Liubei' date='30 June 2010 - 02:32 AM' timestamp='1277879555' post='4993331']
I recommend reading :
http://www.amazon.co...77878759&sr=8-1

and

http://www.amazon.co...77878759&sr=8-9

Both of these books go over the economics and the modus operandi of the British imperial policy at the time. The "opening of trade" excuse was one of those classic long term asymmetric strategies trotted out from time to time to allow unfettered access to the population and ports so it could push "specific" goods and foment internal social divisions to wrest control. The same operating pattern occurred in India, Sri Lanka, and even in the U.S. colonies. The particular products and trade methods were different but the ulterior motive was always the same.
[/quote]

One of the two books doesn't even pretend to be balanced in its presentation. The other mostly focused on late Victorian rule in the 2nd half of 19th century. British foreign policy was very much free trade oriented from late 1700's to the first half of 1800's; that's why they gave up control over the North America colonies in the 1780's and again in 1812. The imperialist policies in the 2nd half of the 1800's, especially after the 1860's Crown take-over of the India after the Sepoy Rebellion was a whole different story. We are talking about 1840 here.

It's funny to be complaining about "asymmetry" or even using the term "unequal treaties" . . . 'cuz asymmetry and unequal deals was all the Qing / traditional Chinese foreign policy knew of and practiced, up until the Opium War. The Treaty of Nanjing was more or less the first treaty that China entered into as an equal party, instead of as a superior dealing with inferiors.

"Unfettered access to the population" is also known as liberating the population from under the yoke of Manchu political/economic monopoly. Of course, the Brits were not running a charity organization in the first half of 19th century. It was driven by profit motives: as in mutually beneficial trade with local population without the Manchu madarins getting in the middle and enforcing trade monopolies. . . just like offering a higher paying job opportunity to someone who is underpaid because he is unfree; that's called emancipation (as in freeing slaves from slave owners). When in the 2nd half of 19th century, some British politicians did get into the grandiose nonsense of being the policemen of the world; that actually bred corruption and corruption. The first half of 19th century however was quite a different story.

[quote]
The refusal of the Qing courts was merely a Cassus Belli for the British who already had plans on the region. Cultural exchange or fair trade was never the actual intent. The opium business was consolidated into a ridiculously powerful and profitable cartel so it was obvious that with China being a wealthy and militarily weak target it was ripe for the British Empire.

http://en.wikipedia...._of_opium_trade

[/quote]

If Brits were looking for a war with Qing, it could have defeated Qing in the 1793's and 1834.

"Fair trade"? What the heck is that? Anything that is not mutually willing (i.e. free trade) has to be fair in one person's eye and not fair in the other; if it were fair in the eyes of both, the two would have traded on their own accord in free trade.

Monopoly and cartel characterized the Qing CongHong trade system. On the other side of the exchange, Brits were not the only ones bringing opium to China. What's ironic was that after the trade in opium was finally decriminalized after the 2nd Opium War, China became exporter of opium! Hence solving the Qing's fundamental problem with opium trade, the outflow of silver.

[quote]
Arrogance certainly played a part but the old emperor had a pretty good feeling as to what the intent was and rejected the British petition for easing of the opium ban several times during McCartney's mission.
[/quote]

The emperor and his bureaucratic corps was afraid of letting the millions of Chinese know that the imperial court was not the Tien god's representative on earth, and that there were other sovereigns on the planet. They were afraid that letting the foreign devils in and treating them on equal terms would upset the Chinese/Manchu Imperial authoritarian system. They were certainly correct in that assessment, just like the slave owners' assessment that literacy and knowledge of freedom would open the slaves' eyes to a world outside the slave plantation.

[qute]
Like I said..by the end of Qianlong's reign it was already too late as the gap in industrialization and military meant that the world powers that be would find an excuse no matter what to subjugate China. All the other trade missions were merely thinly veiled machiavellian justification to create a 19th century "Gulf of Tonkin" situation.
[/quote]

What subjugation? If Brits wanted to subjugate China in 1841, they could have demanded much more territories in the Treaty of Nanjing, not giving up the big and strategically important ZhouShang/DingHai that they already occupied during the war could have been a start. Trade was indeed the issue in 1840 time frame; it's the same reason why the British merchants defanged Lord Napier in 1834 after Napier's couple frigates already defeated Qing defenses. European imperialism after the 1860's was a different story altogether. The 1848 revolutions and 1860-70's unification wars in Italy, United States and Germany ushered in a much more socialistic/nationalistic/imperialistic/collectivist social mood in Europe. That was very different from the limited government approach in the first half of the 19th century, when the dominant mood of that of 1776, when both Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations were published. If Brits had the kind of empire building mood that was prevalent in the late 1900's, neither document would have found much success, and the rebellion in the North American colonies may well have been put down like the Cape Colonies in the Boer War. Britain gain a century of prosperity after letting the North American colonies go (self-imposed cost limit), but faced a century of decline after suppressing the Boer rebels' independence bid.

[quote]
What's interesting is that the Qing's response by destroying British opium in later disputes in more ways than one mirrors the Boston Tea Party. The difference is the Qing was a declining dynasty amongst a sharply divided society unable to formulate a defense.
[/quote]

The two were completely different. The Boston Tea Party was protesting against taxes and monopoly, whereas LinZeXu was trying to enforce government trade restrictions. The Boston Tea Party was a freedom/liberty movement; the over-reaction by the Brits to blockage Boston, hurting innocent civilians was what led to the general rebellion; LinZeXu on the other blockaded the British community using methods that were even more severe than the British blockade of Boston. You have the roles exactly reversed.

If you have to compare what LinZeXu did to what happened in American War of Independence/Secession, the closest thing would be Lexington/Concord: the incumbent government tried to seize and destroy what was illegal (opium in one case, and gun powder in the other).

[Liubei]

One of the two books doesn't even pretend to be balanced in its presentation.

You'll have to quote or reference material which you think is "not balanced" to back up your assertions.

The other mostly focused on late Victorian rule in the 2nd half of 19th century. British foreign policy was very much free trade oriented from late 1700's to the first half of 1800's; that's why they gave up control over the North America colonies in the 1780's and again in 1812. The imperialist policies in the 2nd half of the 1800's, especially after the 1860's Crown take-over of the India after the Sepoy Rebellion was a whole different story. We are talking about 1840 here.

Heh, there was no such thing as actual free trade in that age. It was all about controlling indigenous resources through military intrigue and monopolies, militarization of the shipping lanes, and gunboat diplomacy to enforce various "treaties" that favor the side with the most powerful military. I'm not going to play this game of white washing history since i'm well aware that all nations during that time (even the perceived victim nations like China) played by similar rules before. These days it's taken on a softer image with real politik in those days it was much more blatant in its militarism and amoral character.

Saying that Britain "gave up" America like it was done out of some moment of magnanimous generosity over free trade issues is laughable. The American revolution was a bitter struggle to overthrow the yoke of British rule that built up over a long series of conflicts. Independence was accomplished through violence and absolute attrition.

It's funny to be complaining about "asymmetry" or even using the term "unequal treaties" . . . 'cuz asymmetry and unequal deals was all the Qing / traditional Chinese foreign policy knew of and practiced, up until the Opium War. The Treaty of Nanjing was more or less the first treaty that China entered into as an equal party, instead of as a superior dealing with inferiors.

I was actually using the term "asymmetry" (aka asymmetrical warfare) to describe the military and diplomatic tactic of economic warfare and divisional social engineering used by the Brits. It was a pretty common strategy back in the day to attempt to cause stratification in lesser developed nations along race, class, or religious lines and then push the balance of power in favor of the Empire. Like I said the Brits used this in India, Sri Lanka, and several other non-european kingdoms. It's not just Brits that used it but most European powers at the time. I'm not pointing fingers but just stating it as a historical fact. I'm not going accept the white washing of that era that I know a lot of people attempt to do. It was a brutal dog eat dog period.

"Unfettered access to the population" is also known as liberating the population from under the yoke of Manchu political/economic monopoly.
Of course, the Brits were not running a charity organization in the first half of 19th century.

Yeah right. So the Brits were "liberating" the population through pushing opium cartels exploiting social unrest while land grabbing ports all throughout the 19th century. There's really not a big enough eye rolling face for this.

To try and morally justify the colonial power games of the 19th century under excuses of righteous providence is the most atrocious sort of revisionism. It's the same intellectual jiu-jitsu used to justify the "manifest destiny" or "rising sun empire" etc..

I'm not necessarily condemning any of it because people have been making war against each other since the beginning of time but there's no reason to engage in historical dishonesty.

If Brits were looking for a war with Qing, it could have defeated Qing in the 1793's and 1834.

It was not feasible at all. You're conveniently leaving out all the conflict occurring in Europe during 1789-1815(and the new world ie. war of 1812) as well.

That period was characterized by uncertain mutual checks and balances through other European imperial powers. The British empire didn't quite control all the sea lanes then and power boundaries were always being tested by the other European empires. The unrest in France and the early 19th century rise of Napoleon was a huge check on British power. This was especially true during the Napoleonic wars. Britain could not have afforded to divert resources and manpower into a potentially costly conflict with overseas expansion against the Qing especially with so much uncertainty in Europe.

This is why the Opium wars and later British domination only started after the fall of Napoleon. By that time the British had full control over the seas and enjoyed a period of relative prosperity free from serious competitors in the region.

The emperor and his bureaucratic corps was afraid of letting the millions of Chinese know that the imperial court was not the Tien god's representative on earth, and that there were other sovereigns on the planet. They were afraid that letting the foreign devils in and treating them on equal terms would upset the Chinese/Manchu Imperial authoritarian system. They were certainly correct in that assessment, just like the slave owners' assessment that literacy and knowledge of freedom would open the slaves' eyes to a world outside the slave plantation.

That's pure sociological conjecture and speculation that really has no historical merit. The Qing dynasty's authority was already in question long before foreign powers made their presence felt. It had less to do with the Qing's perception of foreign power than its own sharp decline due to inability to govern over localities. The reasons behind this lay in a series of famines in 1810 and 1811 which devastated much of the agrarian communities. There was also lots of tension between the Hakka southern Chinese and the Qing dynasty at the time as well. It was a "perfect storm" of events that left the dynasty in a weakened state while the Qing elites withdrew into a life of luxury behind city walls.

Qianlong's rule may have been characterized by a lot of negative moments but the dynasty really didn't start to unravel until after his death. He was the one keeping it together and the Brits knew this as well. George Macartney even pretty much says as much in his report about China at that time.

If Brits had the kind of empire building mood that was prevalent in the late 1900's, neither document would have found much success, and the rebellion in the North American colonies may well have been put down like the Cape Colonies in the Boer War.

Britain was always in an empire building mood but the resources simply weren't there to fight a prolonged conflict in the new world especially after they got their asses handed to them in both theaters of the revolutionary war culminating in the embarrassing surrender in Yorktown. Also there were several other European powers behind the scenes (France) checking Britain's power all along the way offering assistance to the colonies etc.. It's much more complex than what you describe and like I said Britain giving up on the American colonies wasn't due to some magnanimous farsighted political move but a costly necessity after getting whipped so badly.

The two were completely different. The Boston Tea Party was protesting against taxes and monopoly, whereas LinZeXu was trying to enforce government trade restrictions. The Boston Tea Party was a freedom/liberty movement; the over-reaction by the Brits to blockage Boston, hurting innocent civilians was what led to the general rebellion; LinZeXu on the other blockaded the British community using methods that were even more severe than the British blockade of Boston. You have the roles exactly reversed.

Part of it was self preservation of Qing authority but it was also enforcement of a social ban that was known to have a harmful deleterious effect on the people. What they were doing can best be characterized as self interested but also positive at the time considering that the ultimate British plan was to create a monopoly and economic dependence through gunboat diplomacy. In that sense it was about rebelling against tyranny..just a foreign British version of it that was even more socially debilitating than existing Qing policy.

Edited by Liubei, 01 July 2010 - 07:51 AM.

[Howard Fu]

BTW, China still had plenty silver in the late 19th century, before the enormous war indemnity paid to Japan after 1896, and especially before the introduction of FDR's silver purchase act and KMT FaBi in the 1930's. Enormous amount of silver went to China after the north American mines were worked on, followed by German and American demonetization of silver in the early 1870's.

Someone should do a research about where all the silver China accumulated over centuries gone. I suspect most of them was spent on trade. China was importing large amount of opium, cotton etc in the 19th century.

The average Chinese had become extremely poor by 1930s. Besides the wars, I think the most important reason was the continue rising of food price. One bag of flour worth 2 silver coins in 50s. Two silver coins can buy a cart of flour now. Civil wars in that kind of situation led to massive famines. Famines that caused millions even tens of millions of death happened every few years from late 19th century.

[brightness]

You'll have to quote or reference material which you think is "not balanced" to back up your assertions.

Read the title of Faye's book yourself. China was hardly unknown to the outside world before the 1830's. In any case, calling a book biased is a subjective opinion; you do not need to quote someone else' opinion. Everyone is entitled to his/her own opinion, just like Faye is entitled to his opinions about "babarians" and "celestial empire." To prove the validity of an opinion however does require proof, and that requires more than a couple sentences; you will see that below.

Heh, there was no such thing as actual free trade in that age. It was all about controlling indigenous resources through military intrigue and monopolies, militarization of the shipping lanes, and gunboat diplomacy to enforce various "treaties" that favor the side with the most powerful military. I'm not going to play this game of white washing history since i'm well aware that all nations during that time (even the perceived victim nations like China) played by similar rules before. These days it's taken on a softer image with real politik in those days it was much more blatant in its militarism and amoral character.

This logic suffer from two problems:

(1) If you truely believe that trade in the late 18th and early 19th century was just a disguise for military conquest, and everyone power did that, then there's no victimhood to speak of for China/Manchu Court, for it did exactly the same thing.

(2) The reality was quite different from how you described. There was a huge difference in the ethos between late 18th century vs. late 19th century. That can be illustrated by the dramatic difference between two extremely popular books: Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" in 1776 vs. Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" in 1890 Both were extremely popular and "epoch setting" because they ushered in new theories of understanding/encapsulating how the world works and therefore had profound influence on the populations (of the West then, and of the world today) and to a large degree reflected the thinkings of those who embraced the books in the next few decades respectively. Adam's book was about and advocated free unfettered trade. Mahan's book was about and advocated empire building.

Saying that Britain "gave up" America like it was done out of some moment of magnanimous generosity over free trade issues is laughable. The American revolution was a bitter struggle to overthrow the yoke of British rule that built up over a long series of conflicts. Independence was accomplished through violence and absolute attrition.

I did not say Brits gave up America because of some generosity. So stop making things up and engage in straw-man tactics. I said Brits gave up the 13 North American colonies because of self-imposed limit on effort/cost, how far the British military would go to impose an empire. The Yorktown battle only involved a small minority of all British troops in North America. The Parliament decided on peace for cost reasons; it would make little difference for trade whether the 13 colonies became independent or stayed within the British Empire. Contrast that wise decision with the Boer War a little over a century later, under the influence of Mahan's empire building theories. Boer War invented the first concentration camps in modern history as a way of fighting the South African white settlers engaged in their own war of independence.

As for the "yoke of British rule," it was actually much less severe than what is imposed on people today in the US, certainly much less than what's imposed on Chinese people under Manchu Dynasty. The most egregious part of "the yoke of British rule" was enforcing tea monopoly against smuggling, in a way rather similar to what the Qing mandarins were trying to do with Opium, except no where nearly as draconian as what the Qing mandarins did

I was actually using the term "asymmetry" (aka asymmetrical warfare) to describe the military and diplomatic tactic of economic warfare and divisional social engineering used by the Brits. It was a pretty common strategy back in the day to attempt to cause stratification in lesser developed nations along race, class, or religious lines and then push the balance of power in favor of the Empire. Like I said the Brits used this in India, Sri Lanka, and several other non-european kingdoms. It's not just Brits that used it but most European powers at the time. I'm not pointing fingers but just stating it as a historical fact. I'm not going accept the white washing of that era that I know a lot of people attempt to do. It was a brutal dog eat dog period.

If you truely believed that was a dog eat dog period, then there's no point singling out Brits or Europeans. While I can somewhat agree that much of history was dog eat dog (and the whole Chinese/Manchu world view was based on dog-like pack pecking order), but there was something very special between the period around 1776 to 1860 or so: well demonstrated by both the MaCartney/Napier/Elliot's dealing with China and Perry's dealing with Japan. Neither was about land grab as it was usually the case in history.

Yeah right. So the Brits were "liberating" the population through pushing opium cartels exploiting social unrest while land grabbing ports all throughout the 19th century. There's really not a big enough eye rolling face for this.

See, you are mixing up the late 19th century with earlier part of the century, just as I suspected. What the Brits brought to the Chinese people in 1840, and shortly afterwards, was indeed liberation compared to Manchu political and economic monopoly. That's why Chinese people flocked to the newly opened up ports and then built and enjoyed prosperity and modern society there.

To try and morally justify the colonial power games of the 19th century under excuses of righteous providence is the most atrocious sort of revisionism. It's the same intellectual jiu-jitsu used to justify the "manifest destiny" or "rising sun empire" etc..

Stop the pointless twisting and straw-man tactic. In my last post, I explicitly objected to the imperialism and "manifest destiny" that characterized the late 19th century. There was a huge difference between what Brits did North America in the late 18th century vs. what the imperial response to the Boer Independence War of the late 19th century; there was a huge difference between what Commodore Perry did to Japan vs. the Americans who followed in the steps of Admiral Dewey into the Phillipines. The former was a much "lighter" approach than the latter heavy duty imperialism. The world indeed changed after Mahan's book, changed for the worse. The Opium War was much closer to the former than the latter, especially given the events in the years leading up to it. It was a very different war from say the 1895 Sino-Japanese War. You can see the difference in the dramatically different terms of peace ending those wars.

I'm not necessarily condemning any of it because people have been making war against each other since the beginning of time but there's no reason to engage in historical dishonesty.

You should condemn imperialism, as I do. In this case however, Manchu (especially its representative in the person of Lin ZeXu) was the party engaging in heavy-handed imperialism.

It was not feasible at all. You're conveniently leaving out all the conflict occurring in Europe during 1789-1815(and the new world ie. war of 1812) as well.

In case it was not obvious, the fall of Napoleon was due to Russia's objection to his trade restricting "Continental System." Russia was an ally of Napoleon before being invaded.

That period was characterized by uncertain mutual checks and balances through other European imperial powers. The British empire didn't quite control all the sea lanes then and power boundaries were always being tested by the other European empires. The unrest in France and the early 19th century rise of Napoleon was a huge check on British power. This was especially true during the Napoleonic wars. Britain could not have afforded to divert resources and manpower into a potentially costly conflict with overseas expansion against the Qing especially with so much uncertainty in Europe.

Of course it could. The 72-gun ship that wiped out Manchu defences and opened up China to trade wasn't even built in Britain, but built in India. Look it up.

This is why the Opium wars and later British domination only started after the fall of Napoleon. By that time the British had full control over the seas and enjoyed a period of relative prosperity free from serious competitors in the region.

Yet they did not grab large tracts of land from China, did they? Not at the time of and during the years leading up to the Opium War anyway.

That's pure sociological conjecture and speculation that really has no historical merit. The Qing dynasty's authority was already in question long before foreign powers made their presence felt. It had less to do with the Qing's perception of foreign power than its own sharp decline due to inability to govern over localities. The reasons behind this lay in a series of famines in 1810 and 1811 which devastated much of the agrarian communities. There was also lots of tension between the Hakka southern Chinese and the Qing dynasty at the time as well. It was a "perfect storm" of events that left the dynasty in a weakened state while the Qing elites withdrew into a life of luxury behind city walls.

Those massive peasant rebellions happen in China every 70 years or so. There is something intrinsically unresolvable in the Chinese imperial top-down mindset . . . just like massive debt bubbles that appear every seculum for most parts of the world (60-70 years, the span of a life time for a human living to old age, not average life expectancy which is lower due to high infant and child mortality). Massive peasant rebellion seems to be the historical answer to correcting the discrepancy between the traditional Chinese top-down view vis. reality.

Qianlong's rule may have been characterized by a lot of negative moments but the dynasty really didn't start to unravel until after his death. He was the one keeping it together and the Brits knew this as well. George Macartney even pretty much says as much in his report about China at that time.

That's just typical of authoritarian regimes. Unlike most continental Europeans of the time (except for Montisqiue) who wrote admiringly and slavishly about the glamours of Manchu Court, the Brits were quite skeptical about the Chinese authoritarianism to begin with. And they were correct in their assessment.

Britain was always in an empire building mood but the resources simply weren't there to fight a prolonged conflict in the new world especially after they got their asses handed to them in both theaters of the revolutionary war culminating in the embarrassing surrender in Yorktown. Also there were several other European powers behind the scenes (France) checking Britain's power all along the way offering assistance to the colonies etc.. It's much more complex than what you describe and like I said Britain giving up on the American colonies wasn't due to some magnanimous farsighted political move but a costly necessity after getting whipped so badly.

"Magnanimous farsight" indicates a very imperialistic central manager's approach. The Parliament decision to end the war in North America was simply based on a matter of the war being cost ineffective, especially since it would make little difference in trade whether the colonies were independent. Yorktown only involved a small fraction of all British forces in North America. If Parliament wanted to fight on, they certainly could have, just like they did in the Boer Wars, until the rebels were put down and the empire was bankrupted and other powers became alarmed in the process.

Part of it was self preservation of Qing authority but it was also enforcement of a social ban that was known to have a harmful deleterious effect on the people. What they were doing can best be characterized as self interested but also positive at the time considering that the ultimate British plan was to create a monopoly and economic dependence through gunboat diplomacy. In that sense it was about rebelling against tyranny..just a foreign British version of it that was even more socially debilitating than existing Qing policy.

What British plan are you talking about? Opening up free trade was to be opened to all comers in 1841, not just British. All the nonsense about "sphere of influence" etc. came much later, when Russia and Japan got in the game and were indeed bent on land-grabbing. Even then, British and American influences were used by the Qing/Manchu/Chinese court as a way of slowing down land-grabbing by the more imperialistic powers. In 1840, the imperialist was the Manchu court itself and its representative in Canton and other coastal regions, getting in the way of mutually beneficial commerce between Chinese and foreign traders (not just British). The rebellion was against the Manchu monopoly, and the Brits took the lead in that rebellion. What followed was the modernization of China and eventual liberation of Chinese from Manchu imposed de facto slavery. That China did not follow a rapid path to that end like Japan did after Meiji restoration (trying hard to bring the topic back :-) was not exactly a British fault.

What's really interesting is that after China started modernizing after the 1860's, and built the world's 4th or 5th largest fleet in the early 1880's, the first thing that the Qing/Manchu/Chinese court decided to do with that fleet was to intimidate Japanese. Talk about imperialistic habits.

Edit:
A foot note on Alfred Mahan. Having graduated from Anapolis (US Naval Academy) near the bottom of the class, his career was really going nowhere before he wrote his book. The book served the interest of the precursors to the modern military-industrial complex, as the hugely expensive and rapidly obsolescent ironclad warships needed public funding. None of the empire building and "national greatness" in his book makes much sense unless you think people are slavish automatons to be ordered around. The Mahanian empire is actually not so much built on the loot from the conquered like in the ancient history, but in reality built on the backs of the country's own taxpayers who have to fund the military industrial complex; as proven by the history of the decline of British Empire and the American one. His book was heavily promoted by the ship builders (and steel magnates and munition makers), as were the politicians who embraced his book.

[brightness]

Someone should do a research about where all the silver China accumulated over centuries gone.

They are being pledged by big Wall Street firms as the physical silver that backs up their massive short position on the paper silver market ;-)

On a more serious note, a significant portion of the hoard was exported by the government of China in the 1930's when it banned private silver export (yes, such contradiction were common in Chinese history, and didn't seem to cause outrage among the populance aka sheeple).

I suspect most of them was spent on trade. China was importing large amount of opium, cotton etc in the 19th century.

There was a trade deficit (in silver) during the decades leading up to the Opium War. That was what made the Qing court alarmed over the opium trade. However, after legalization of opium after the 2nd Opium War, the net flow of silver was reversed; massive quantities of silver went to China, especially after the opening up of North American mines and the demonetization of silver in the US and in Germany (and later even in Japan). So much silver was flooding into China that the Chinese merchants became rather picky about what they'd accept as payment: the US silver dollar was low on the totem pole because it had marginally lower silver content than the Mexican/Spanish silver dollar (because Ben Franklin had caliberated the dollar definition on the Spanish silver dollar then circulating in the colonies, hence somewhat worn, not brand new from the mint), so the US Mint had to mint special heavy weight "Trade Dollar" coins, slightly heavier than even the Mexican/Spanish silver dollar (pesos), specifically for the Chinese market.

The average Chinese had become extremely poor by 1930s. Besides the wars, I think the most important reason was the continue rising of food price. One bag of flour worth 2 silver coins in 50s. Two silver coins can buy a cart of flour now. Civil wars in that kind of situation led to massive famines. Famines that caused millions even tens of millions of death happened every few years from late 19th century.

Depending on the size of the silver coins and the bag/cart ;-) If Chinese were mostly farmers back then, having a high grain price (or high price for any/all farm products) would actually be good for them. What happened in the 1930's was a sudden contraction of silver supply in China because FDR's silver legislation mandated US government to buy silver at prices much higher than then market price, as a way of (1) buying votes from silver producer states' senators to vote for his New Deal legislations; (2) as a way to balance the trade deficit (just like today's pressure to jack up Chinese currency valuation) because silver was money in China. Yes, China was exporting more to the outside world than importing in the late 19th and early 20th century just like it did/does 100 years later.

The contraction in silver supply in China caused all the debts previously taken out with expectations of low silver price to suddenly become much more expensive. That could/did lead to many bankruptcies. The KMT government response made the situation much worse: it essentially carried out a heist on the existing Chinese monetary system by forcing everyone in China to turn to FaBi ("Legal Tender") so it could sell silver abroad and carry out its political objectives (mostly self-enrichment to government officials and friends) on a fiat currency. We must not interpret famine as general lack of food across the entire country. Instead, localized famine could well be a reflection of farm productivity increase elsewhere causing farming in a particular location no longer competitive. That's how factory workers came about; their ancestors (or even themselves at an earlier time) were farmers. Farm productivity increase and transportation enabling moving food from regions of high productivity to regions of low productivity are blessings . . . however, an inflexible social structure that leave the relatively low productivity farmers bankrupt and unable to find alternative jobs would turn such a blessing into a curse. Even a farmer had to sell part of his crop to buy implements and supplies to keep his farm going. A collapse of farm product price due to abundance elsewhere or a sudden shrinkable in money supply while the farmer was already in debt taken out during times of more abundant money supply could indeed lead to localized famines due to inability to pay debt and pay for implements and supplies that the farmer can not produce himself. That's how today's third-world foreign-aid dependent countries became chronically dependent on foreign aid: the free food from abroad actually bankrupt local farmers and cause local famine that would need continued foreign aid.

The 1860's (after the Taiping Rebellion was over) through 1930 (and a few years after that until almost the mid 1930's) was actually a prosperous time in China. That's how the overthrow of Manchu could have been a relatively bloodless event (by Chinese standards anyway). China was rich enough to build the world's 4th or 5th largest navy in the first couple decades of that period; the final decade of that period was the "Nanjing Decade" (mid-1920's to mid-1930's, until the silver crisis took effect in China) or the most rapid period of Chinese industrialization/economic take-off prior to the 1980's. Chinese economy also benefited significantly from selling goods and supply to various powers engaged in WWI. That's why some Japanese militarists became very alarmed at the rise of China by the early 1930's. Many thought China was the one place in the world that was untouched by the Great Depression (like many thought this time around in 2009); little did they know what was to follow later.

[Lu Su]

No major transition is ever bloodless but everything i've read about this period assesses the events as a restoration simply because the declaration and establishment of "restoration" of Imperial authority and the consolidation of the elites was made prior to the Boshin War. The Boshin war and subsequent smaller scale rebellions was more of a "reactionary" response.

I hate to use wikipedia here but it has the obvious dates and the order of events.



This wasn't a situation where the emperor had to declare or prove his authority after a major war (as what typically happens in an actual revolution) as he was already considered the supreme leader of the country. In the views of the government and majority of the elites at the time he was merely quashing a social insurrection. The _majority_ of the elite were still clearly on the side of the Emperor's will. It doesn't matter what the holdouts or peasants thought was "appropriate" for Japan's best interest because its expectations clearly did not line up with what the Emperor's actual intentions were.


This seems like starry eyed romanticism of the Samurai. It's true that many Samurai were initially unhappy due mostly to uncertainty however the majority were still willing to follow the Emperor. The holdouts were in the minority and were never a legitimate threat. Also, what matters is that when industrialization kicked off the Samurai were assimilated into the upper tier of society during that time as they tended to be the most educated and skilled individuals. They were not treated badly unless they clearly had rebellion in mind as the newly formed nation state needed all the knowledgeable people it had at the time.

Also, during the Edo period prior to the meiji restoration the Samurai were much less "warriors" already but merely a symbolic warrior caste of mostly bureaucrats and landlords. Basically the equivalent of minor government officials. The days of Samurai mystique and military glory is something that existed only prior to the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate.


I'm well aware of the doctrine and spiritual text of this period. Later all these cultural relics were "adapted" into the Prussian military order adopted by the IJA and other nationalistic theories to form the new backbone of militarism. So in effect this appeased later reactionaries who were still uneasy about modern transition and created the military foundation.

It's not an improper assessment at all. Imperialism during that period in Japan was meant to mirror European imperialism which was definitely right wing and militaristic. I don't use the term with negative connotations but it is what it is. The whole long term intent was to act as a bulwark against European imperialism and then later to establish a homegrown "empire". The humiliation of being coerced to open up the ports was still a stinging memory in the minds of many of the ruling class.

You should know that wikipedia is not an acceptable scholarly source.

I wish you would be far more historical, rather than speculatively political with your posts. Perhaps you chose the wrong forum?

Here are a few of my sources. =) I should like to hear yours.

It is not romanticism at all, by the way. It is simply the history from those who lived it on both sides, and from a number of known historians and researchers. I would imagine these are reliable sources.

Basically everything on the subject by Stephen Turnbull
Heavenly Warriors - William Wayne Farris, Harvard 1995
Shinsengumi Tenmatsuki - Nagakura Shinpachi, Tokyo 1998 (reprint)
A History of Japan - Conrad Totman, Wiley-Blackwell 2005
Boshin sensō: Haisha no Meiji ishin - Sasaki Suguru, Tokyo 1977
Shinsengumi: Saigo no Bushi no Jitsuzō - Ōishi Manabu, Tokyo 2004 (reprint)
Shinsengumi: The Shogun's Last Samurai Corps - Romulus Hillsborough (2005)
Anti-foreignism and Western learning in Early-Modern Japan : The new theses of 1825. - Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Harvard 1986 (reprint)
Shinsengumi Jitsuroku - Kikuchi Akira and Aikawa Tsukasa, Tokyo 1996