16 replies to this topic

[jhong]

Hi all,
I'm currently researching to write an essay regarding the above: 'To what extent was the downfall of the Qing dynasty a result of a system of Imperial governance?'
I'm not an expert on Qing history, and asides from Immanuel Hsu's 'The Rise of Modern China', around 20 or so articles from academic journals and Google I'm not really sure where to start looking for information.

If anyone could provide any titles or sources (Including Chinese texts) that could help me, as well as your own opinions on the question I'd be incredibly grateful!

[f0ma]

I consistently hear good things about Jonathan Spence's 'The Search for Modern China'. It has a chapter on the fall of Qing which looks to go into the dynasty's constitution, which sounds like what you're after. I can't vouch for it personally though, having not read it myself. I'm sure someone else will pop up with more information Best of luck with your essay!

[jhong]

I consistently hear good things about Jonathan Spence's 'The Search for Modern China'. It has a chapter on the fall of Qing which looks to go into the dynasty's constitution, which sounds like what you're after. I can't vouch for it personally though, having not read it myself. I'm sure someone else will pop up with more information Best of luck with your essay!

Thanks, I'll check it out!

[mohistManiac]

I believe many in China think it was the Qing government's fault and that by extension it was their own backwardness that made China weak against dealing with the Western and Japanese powers. The reasoning is that there would have been no backwardness had China allowed trade to flourish with the British ambassadors. There would have been eventually be a point where the Chinese would have to compete on the level of British technology. So basically the Qing failed to engage in opportunities because of its pride which led to a real collapse of its own economy. I think for analysis there could be some elemental cut off points. 1) The dates of certain Chinese rebellions which occur before the fall of a dynasty and the nature of such rebellions 2) How much of these rebellions have in common with the eventual revolution which took place to overthrow the Qing and usher in the new government in 1911 3) When did trade ambassadors from English empire or from the west actually begin to conduct trade with China and how much of the product which came to be known about was eventually copied to give rise to a competitive base which would eventually compete within the market. I am reminded of a certain Chinese general during the Ming who fought against the Japanese pirates by studying their weaponry and methods of attack before formulating competitive strategies against them. 4) Did the Chinese really think that it required a Western and Japanese "brutality" to shake the Chinese out of oblivious sleep in order to "wake the dragon" and can this "dragon" be equated to the Qing government. Hope this helps.

[jhong]

I believe many in China think it was the Qing government's fault and that by extension it was their own backwardness that made China weak against dealing with the Western and Japanese powers. The reasoning is that there would have been no backwardness had China allowed trade to flourish with the British ambassadors. There would have been eventually be a point where the Chinese would have to compete on the level of British technology. So basically the Qing failed to engage in opportunities because of its pride which led to a real collapse of its own economy. I think for analysis there could be some elemental cut off points. 1) The dates of certain Chinese rebellions which occur before the fall of a dynasty and the nature of such rebellions 2) How much of these rebellions have in common with the eventual revolution which took place to overthrow the Qing and usher in the new government in 1911 3) When did trade ambassadors from English empire or from the west actually begin to conduct trade with China and how much of the product which came to be known about was eventually copied to give rise to a competitive base which would eventually compete within the market. I am reminded of a certain Chinese general during the Ming who fought against the Japanese pirates by studying their weaponry and methods of attack before formulating competitive strategies against them. 4) Did the Chinese really think that it required a Western and Japanese "brutality" to shake the Chinese out of oblivious sleep in order to "wake the dragon" and can this "dragon" be equated to the Qing government. Hope this helps.

Thanks for the informative post, some very helpful information there

In regards to the isolationism/dismissal of trade with the British, I don't suppose you know any names/ sources where I can read more about Qing economic/foreign policy?

Edited by jhong, 19 June 2012 - 01:52 PM.

[mohistManiac]

Thanks for the informative post, some very helpful information there

In regards to the isolationism/dismissal of trade with the British, I don't suppose you know any names/ sources where I can read more about Qing economic/foreign policy?

I don't remember a specific book detailing whose fault it was for Qing's government end at 1911 because there are a lot of factors that it seems almost every book talking about Qing might cover some aspect of it.

[Yizheng]

Yes, Jonathan Spence's book is a decent overview of the Qing period. However, I am a bit puzzled about the topic, because the system of imperial governance is a continuity throughout the Qing if you are talking about an imperial system with power undiluted by a constitution or whatever, the first steps towards which only came at the very end of the Qing. But the system changed at various times throughout the Qing, adapting to various needs of the time, or later more often just trying to keep with demands of the time.
Recommending books is thus a little bit difficult. If it is books on the government system, there are some good ones, but focused often more on particular periods. I can recommend some if you say which period precisely is useful. The better Chinese ones I know in particular are focused specifically on particular emperors, periods.
In terms of adding my own point of view, I don't fully agree with the view of late Qing as simply doomed to downfall because of not trading with the British or being more open to the West. I think that is in many ways our modern day reading of history from our present standpoint, and so much gets made of Qianlong dismissing Macartney's embassy and its trade proposals, as if that was the single great turning point of the Qing's fortunes.
It would do well to remember that this was at a time when many in Europe thought of Qianlong as a 'sage king', a great philosopher ruler of a magnificent land (this was influenced by the accounts of Jesuits working for the Qing court). The trade issue is more complex I think, and we look at it too much from our modern point of view.
By late Qing, there are many elements contributing to decline, not just missed trade opportunities or technology lag. Apart from things like the Taiping rebellion, opium wars, foreign pressure, there were institutional problems, policy was not always very consistent, corruption had become so widespread, keeping the balance in the system led to trying to preserve a status quo sort of approach that meant no or only half-hearted reforms in areas where far more radical reform was required. The Guangxu emperor attempted deeper reform but did not have the power base to implement it, and was defeated. The only way to reform operating from within the imperial system was really to be a strong emperor like Yongzheng, who first consolidated his power base and then was able to push through his reforms.
Also a big factor I think is the ethnic issue, because regardless of the government system, the Qing was inevitably coming up against the ethnic issue. That was clear in the Boxer rebellion buildup, but the Qing channeled it into anti-foreign sentiment and away from the Manchus, but that soon enough changed.

[jhong]

Yes, Jonathan Spence's book is a decent overview of the Qing period. However, I am a bit puzzled about the topic, because the system of imperial governance is a continuity throughout the Qing if you are talking about an imperial system with power undiluted by a constitution or whatever, the first steps towards which only came at the very end of the Qing. But the system changed at various times throughout the Qing, adapting to various needs of the time, or later more often just trying to keep with demands of the time.
Recommending books is thus a little bit difficult. If it is books on the government system, there are some good ones, but focused often more on particular periods. I can recommend some if you say which period precisely is useful. The better Chinese ones I know in particular are focused specifically on particular emperors, periods.
In terms of adding my own point of view, I don't fully agree with the view of late Qing as simply doomed to downfall because of not trading with the British or being more open to the West. I think that is in many ways our modern day reading of history from our present standpoint, and so much gets made of Qianlong dismissing Macartney's embassy and its trade proposals, as if that was the single great turning point of the Qing's fortunes.
It would do well to remember that this was at a time when many in Europe thought of Qianlong as a 'sage king', a great philosopher ruler of a magnificent land (this was influenced by the accounts of Jesuits working for the Qing court). The trade issue is more complex I think, and we look at it too much from our modern point of view.
By late Qing, there are many elements contributing to decline, not just missed trade opportunities or technology lag. Apart from things like the Taiping rebellion, opium wars, foreign pressure, there were institutional problems, policy was not always very consistent, corruption had become so widespread, keeping the balance in the system led to trying to preserve a status quo sort of approach that meant no or only half-hearted reforms in areas where far more radical reform was required. The Guangxu emperor attempted deeper reform but did not have the power base to implement it, and was defeated. The only way to reform operating from within the imperial system was really to be a strong emperor like Yongzheng, who first consolidated his power base and then was able to push through his reforms.
Also a big factor I think is the ethnic issue, because regardless of the government system, the Qing was inevitably coming up against the ethnic issue. That was clear in the Boxer rebellion buildup, but the Qing channeled it into anti-foreign sentiment and away from the Manchus, but that soon enough changed.

In that case, would it be possible for you to recommend any books regarding the system of government during the Kangxi/Qianlong/Yongzheng periods? Or preferrably some reputable sources regarding governance under Cixi/GuangXu? Also, do you have any information regarding ethnic policies, particularly towards Han chinese? The info you've provided is very helpful, so I'd be very gratful if you could provide some more

Edited by jhong, 22 June 2012 - 09:51 AM.

[Yizheng]

In that case, would it be possible for you to recommend any books regarding the system of government during the Kangxi/Qianlong/Yongzheng periods? Or preferrably some reputable sources regarding governance under Cixi/GuangXu? Also, do you have any information regarding ethnic policies, particularly towards Han chinese? The info you've provided is very helpful, so I'd be very gratful if you could provide some more

Yes, for general overview of Yongzheng or Guangxu period, the biography of Yongzheng by Feng Erkang (雍正传 - 冯尔康) and the biography of Guangxu by Sun Xiao En (光绪传 - 孙孝恩) both have quite a lot about the general system of government and are, in my opinion, quite reliable biographies, especially the Yongzheng biography is one of the more reliable studies of Yongzheng in Chinese, I think. Feng Erkang also has a book on Yongzheng's accession to the throne, which is good.
On the government system in the 18th century period (Yongzheng-Qianlong) it is worth reading Beatrice Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, for how the government worked, and also useful on many government issues and ethnic policy among other things is Mark Eliott, The Manchu Way.
Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors, also has useful information on various institutions and their functioning.
On Guangxu period, though it is specifically more focused on the 1898 events, Luke Kwong's Mosaic of the Hundred Days has some good insight into how the power system worked during Cixi's regencies.
I am sure there are other books no doubt more focused on actual government system, but these are just some I can think of for a start that seem to me well researched books.

[jhong]

Yes, for general overview of Yongzheng or Guangxu period, the biography of Yongzheng by Feng Erkang (雍正传 - 冯尔康) and the biography of Guangxu by Sun Xiao En (光绪传 - 孙孝恩) both have quite a lot about the general system of government and are, in my opinion, quite reliable biographies, especially the Yongzheng biography is one of the more reliable studies of Yongzheng in Chinese, I think. Feng Erkang also has a book on Yongzheng's accession to the throne, which is good.
On the government system in the 18th century period (Yongzheng-Qianlong) it is worth reading Beatrice Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, for how the government worked, and also useful on many government issues and ethnic policy among other things is Mark Eliott, The Manchu Way.
Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors, also has useful information on various institutions and their functioning.
On Guangxu period, though it is specifically more focused on the 1898 events, Luke Kwong's Mosaic of the Hundred Days has some good insight into how the power system worked during Cixi's regencies.
I am sure there are other books no doubt more focused on actual government system, but these are just some I can think of for a start that seem to me well researched books.

Thats perfect, I'll try and get some copies straight away
Thanks so much!

[Yizheng]

Actually, your question was making me think about the idea of imperial system as a way of government in general. Thinking about the Qing, I actually think the Qing was overall quite a successful example of an imperial system based on autocratic power. I think in its earlier emperors, especially, it showed how autocratic government could be quite an adaptable and innovative system, so long as the emperor was strong enough to keep the various forces under him in balance, and there weren't too many outside pressures all at once. If you have too many inside and outside pressures all at once, it gets hard too deal with everything, but that would be true for any regime, whether autocracy or democracy.

The thing is, when the Qing fell, I think first, they missed their last real chance to reform the system enough to strengthen it after the coup against Guangxu in 1898, and then, when you look at the fates of imperial systems around the world, there was a whole wave of imperial systems coming apart (Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, Russian Empire, Kaiser Germany, France had already gone definitely republican a bit earlier). Whereas the ones that continued were the ones that became constitutional monarchies, like England already long since on that road, and Japan, that went through the Meiji-era reform. So it really wasn't just the Qing, but a global trend that was like a tide turning against imperial government, unless it was able to reinvent itself and voluntarily give up at least part of its powers.

In the same way, everywhere where there was breakup of empires, there was also the rise of nationalisms, the development of new senses of ethnic identity, nation-state idea and so on, that in most cases tore apart the multiethnic empires. As empires their foundations usually rested on different visions of state and ethnic identities anyway compared to the new ideals and concepts introduced by new types of regimes. It is enough to look at the debates and redefinition of China and its ethnic identity/identities after the Qing's fall. Does the new state inherit the old multiethnic empire, or does it assert the dominant ethnic group's identity? And on what basis once the figure of emperor is gone?

Actually, for an interesting look at that place and identity of the emperor within the framework of concepts and so on underlying the state's identity, there is an interesting discussion of Qianlong in A Translucent Mirror, by Pamela Crossley.

[mohistManiac]

I just thought of something with regards to the post by Yizheng. Would the conclusions arrived by be due to applying most Marxist viewpoints. Something which represents class struggle, chiefly the Qing's refusal to engage in more competition with outside trade influences for the fear of losing power, had fueled the destruction of the old system. China had discovered this continual anomaly fed itself into a great wide empire as the predecessors' power shifted around to those which had the military power to enforce an imperial unity. It was as though China was stuck in its feudal mode where the fall of the empire was usually treated as a posturing for the transition into imperial unity once again but to be led by a different power. However on the global scale when the Qing dynasty happened to be in charge, imperial unity was simply at a loss to make up for the huge differences China had against the other nations exercising capitalism. Incidentally these nations were making the most out of the newly established competitive forces that newly enabled a European led global economy.

[Yizheng]

I just thought of something with regards to the post by Yizheng. Would the conclusions arrived by be due to applying most Marxist viewpoints. Something which represents class struggle, chiefly the Qing's refusal to engage in more competition with outside trade influences for the fear of losing power, had fueled the destruction of the old system. China had discovered this continual anomaly fed itself into a great wide empire as the predecessors' power shifted around to those which had the military power to enforce an imperial unity. It was as though China was stuck in its feudal mode where the fall of the empire was usually treated as a posturing for the transition into imperial unity once again but to be led by a different power. However on the global scale when the Qing dynasty happened to be in charge, imperial unity was simply at a loss to make up for the huge differences China had against the other nations exercising capitalism. Incidentally these nations were making the most out of the newly established competitive forces that newly enabled a European led global economy.

I'm not a marxist or supporter of marxist reading of history, though I definitely agree that things such as antagonism between social groups/ classes, trade, control of markets etc do certainly play a part.
I also think when it comes to trade issues, openness of trade, we tend to read things from our 21st century free trade perspective, and with the hindsight of knowing just how important a factor trade was going to be. I think too, the view of Qing and its attitudes are to some extent conditioned by Western views of Qing history coupled with the views prevalent in China itself among intellectuals at the very end of Qing and just after, when the whole dynasty came to be seen as just a 'backward' feudal alien regime locked in the past, refusing to open to the world, too stupid to realise the importance of joining the modern world. I think that is a simplistic view.

Certainly, it's true that trade issues became intertwined with military considerations. For Kangxi that was inevitable with the case of the coastal areas, for example, and the Qing had some very restrictive policies, but from their point of view the priority was to consolidate their power throughout the country. Later, they had reservations about the extent to which to allow trade, it is true. It is equally true that foreigners did use trade missions as a pretext for spying and meddling in domestic affairs. From the point of view of the 17th-18th century, say, if your country is developing and on the whole has the goods it needs to meet its demands, and if you are very uncertain about the real motives of the foreigners seeking to enter your country, why would you do more than make selective use of the things they have to offer, and keep them more or less under control. This is precisely what the early Qing did.
There were debates among them about trade, about how free to make it. It wasn't as if there was just some total anti-trade mindset. It's more that there were big issues on both sides, potential economic benefits on the one hand, but potential loss of political and military control on the other. You can see this in the very cautious policies they took, like with regard to trade from Guangzhou, Fujian to other places. Yongzheng, for example, allowed it, but only under set conditions, not really keen to see who knows who and what coming and going completely uncontrolled.
The easiest way was simply to fit it into the existing trade system, and the West made such a lot of the protocol side, the sovereign-vassal relationship implied, but that's making a lot of fuss about what was in many ways just formal designations.
Actually, I read a book by a Russian academic recently that talked a lot about the big fashion for China in 18th century Europe, and all the factories in China that started making porcelain and stuff for Europe, but making it for Western taste, so they worked out what colours and designs etc the Europeans liked and sold it to them. That's just one small example. Trade overall is a much more kind of spotty picture, not one monotone picture of 'closed to trade' or open.
Anyway, we don't even know that it would have changed things. Europe was so intent on colonialism then, would it have mattered if there was more or less trade? They'd still have tried the same colonial policies.
The military lag was a different matter. For so long the Qing's main rivals militarily were armies of similar style, and so its own army and weaponry was perfectly adequate for the tasks. How were they supposed to guess that the British would come with a completely different kind of warfare?
Of course they later tried to close the gap, building a modern navy, but problems such as corruption got in the way then.
Ultimately, I think the political issues are more fundamental. What's more, the ability to transform politically and make the system less rigid goes hand in hand with the ability to develop economically and be more effective. If Japan had only developed its military but not undertaken any political transformation I don't think they would have had the success they had then. The two go together.
I think it's all very well saying with hindsight that they should have done this or that, but if you look at it from their time, with their priorities, its not so clear. If you were Emperor Daoguang, what would you do about the opium? If you were Kangxi or Yongzheng and worried about the possibility of anti-Qing movements in the south and how solid your power really was there, would you be liberal about it all, or try to keep it under close state supervision?

[Jaak]

The thing is, when the Qing fell, I think first, they missed their last real chance to reform the system enough to strengthen it after the coup against Guangxu in 1898, and then, when you look at the fates of imperial systems around the world, there was a whole wave of imperial systems coming apart (Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, Russian Empire, Kaiser Germany, France had already gone definitely republican a bit earlier).

Wrong.
France was the only major, established republic in Europe - republic since 1870, stabilized as such only since 1880s.
Russian Empire was absolute monarchy till 1905, Turkey till 1908. And the revolutions then were for constitutional monarcy, not republic - Russia was not a republic till 1917, nor Turkey till 1922.

Whereas the ones that continued were the ones that became constitutional monarchies, like England already long since on that road, and Japan, that went through the Meiji-era reform. So it really wasn't just the Qing, but a global trend that was like a tide turning against imperial government, unless it was able to reinvent itself and voluntarily give up at least part of its powers.

Germany/Prussia had been constitutional ever since 1848, Austria ever since 1859.

It is hard to claim that Germany or Austria of 1913 was less constitutional than Japan of 1931. Meiji Japan was (deliberately) modelled on Prussian military oligarchy, and unlike the original survived the First World War.

[Yizheng]

Wrong.
France was the only major, established republic in Europe - republic since 1870, stabilized as such only since 1880s.
Russian Empire was absolute monarchy till 1905, Turkey till 1908. And the revolutions then were for constitutional monarcy, not republic - Russia was not a republic till 1917, nor Turkey till 1922.


Germany/Prussia had been constitutional ever since 1848, Austria ever since 1859.

It is hard to claim that Germany or Austria of 1913 was less constitutional than Japan of 1931. Meiji Japan was (deliberately) modelled on Prussian military oligarchy, and unlike the original survived the First World War.

I think that in the general historical perspective, 1870 can be considered 'a bit earlier' than the first decades of the 20th century. In general, it's like a period of several decades of political transformation or disintegration of existing systems.

My point is not really about constitutional monarchy vs other kinds of monarchy. Yes, indeed, Japan's system was very much modelled on Prussia with its military emphasis. And Austria, Germany, and indeed Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire had all been implementing constitutional reforms over a period of years, although it is a different matter of how much was on paper only and how much things were carried out in practice, how much parliaments had any real say, etc. Ottoman Empire officially ended in 1922, but its moves towards constitutional reforms went back to the 1870s, Russia was later, abolished serfdom and made some reforms in 1861, but only really started changing in 1905, pretty similar to Qing in timeframe, and same problems, conservatives protecting vested interests, others saying it's all too late and too slow.
Really, nowhere was the process easy, and there were outside factors involved. WWI in Europe played a big part in undoing empires, Russian Empire, Ottoman, Germany, say.
Also important is the ethnic makeup of empires. The 19th century saw increasing change in national identities with a move to separatist ideologies and emergence of new states based on ethnic groups. This was a huge factor in Ottoman, Austro-Hungary, and Russian empires. Japan, on the other hand, had no ethnic issue to deal with, as a monoethnic state.
Each case has its own specific features and factors, but I think one cannot deny a convergence of various factors - especially ethnic and pressure for political change - that pulled many previously long established and stable-seeming political systems apart.