36 replies to this topic

[Yun]

RollingWave asked for info on the Western Xia (Xi Xia) military. Here it is, from the same book - "Imperial Chinese Armies (2)" by C.J. Peers, published by Osprey.

"During the reign of Yuan Hao (1032-48), the Xi Xia state is said to have deployed a total of 158,000 troops, of which 100,000 were stationed on the border with Song China, and another 30,000 on the Western frontier facing the Uighurs and Tibetans. There were also 8,000 imperial guards - including 3,000 heavily armoured cavalry - based on the capital, Zhongxing. Little is known of Xi Xia military equipment and organisation, but their territory contained what in Tang times had been the best horse-raising pastures in the empire, and they are known to have relied heavily on their cavalry; it was superior in both number and quality to that of the Song.

Xi Xia armies were at first simply a collection of tribal contingents, but a Chinese-style bureaucracy was eventually set up, and the country was divided into 12 military districts under two commanding generals. Tenth-century pictures from Dunhuang show dismounted warriors wearing long, Turkish-style coats of armour and wielding bows and lances, as well as infantry equipped with fire-lances and explosive bombs. A Jin source pays tribute to the Xi Xia people (Tanguts) as 'fiercely stubborn... and valiant in battle.' The country was also well provided with fortified towns, and these played a major role in their defensive strategy."

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

Yun, are there any detailed description of the mongol army vs. the Jin army? How come the Jin were so easily defeated? Did they even employ powerful heavy cavalry at this time? And also what is the number of the mongol and Jin armies exactly from primary sources, since many of my sources contradict each other. Also one account saids the xi xia army against the mongols was 300,000, is that possible?


About the Song army, it depend on how ones mseasures strength, compared to other imperial dynasties, its indeed weak (but the fact that it united most of the central plain shows it's still impressive) but on world standar its far from weak, the Liao is a formidable opponent, it defeated many armies from the Kirghiz to Bo Hai and later the Seljuk turks. Thus Liao defeating Song doesn't show Song weakness. Song is the exact opposite of late Tang which emphasized the military over central control (but that's because the Tang need this military against the Tubo and Uighurs) while Song found a better way by paying annual subsidies with the Liao. It shows that either extreme is bad and something in between is the successful thing.

Also would the Song army be categorized as a professional one? The soldiers are paid and they serve life time, wouldn't that be professional?

[Yun]

Warhead, here's Peers' passage about why the Jurchen were unable to stand against the Mongols. It isn't as bad as you say - the Jurchen did put up quite a fierce fight against the Mongols for about 13 years (1211 to 1234):

After the conquest of the Liao Empire, Khitan, Bohai 渤海 (another Manchurian state that the Khitan had conquered) and Chinese troops were incorporated into the Jurchen forces, which came to rely heavily on Chinese infantry and artillery (i.e. trebuchets). For the campaign of 1161 [i.e. the disastrous invasion of Southern Song that was repulsed on the Yangzi River], Hailing Wang [海陵王, i.e. Wanyan Liang 完颜亮, the notorious Jin emperor who was assassinated after his failed invasion] raised 120,000 Jurchen and 150,000 Chinese - the latter including 30,000 sailors. A regular Chinese infantry force, the 'Ever-Victorious Army' - which had originally been raised by the Liao - defected to the Jin from the Song in the 1120s [i.e. during the fall of the Northern Song]. Other native soldiers, the zhongxiao jun 忠孝军, or 'loyal and filial' troops, were less well disciplined, but could nevertheless fight well. As often happened when invaders from the north established themselves in China, the cavalry eventually declined in effectiveness due to horse shortages, the difficulty of administering the traditional recruitment system under new social conditions, and the growing distaste of the aristocracy for military affairs as they began to adopt the values of the Chinese gentry. In the wars against the Mongols, therefore, the Jin relied heavily on subjects or allies like the Uighurs, Tanguts and Khitans to supply cavalry. These could be very effective, and the stubbornness of Jin resistance to the Mongols testifies to the quality of many of their troops even at this late stage: at the siege of Zhongdu, 5,000 Imperial Guards initially repulsed the Mongols, while at Dachangyuan in 1228, Wanyan Chengheshan defeated 8,000 Mongols with just 400 cavalry and an unknown number of Chinese infantry.

[Yun]

As for the Xi Xia, my sources tell me that at the initial battle of Wulahai in 1209, where the Crown Prince and Commander in Chief Gao Yi were defeated by the Mongol army and Gao Yi was captured and killed, their command had 50,000 troops. A few months later, the Mongols moved on to attack the Xi Xia capital of Zhongxing. The Xi Xia general Weiming Linggong 嵬名令公 was ordered to bring his 50,000 men to reinforce the 70,000 Imperial Guards already defending the capital. After a stand-off of more than two months, the Xi Xia grew complacent and were defeated by a Mongol ambush. Chinggis Khan then began a siege of Zhongxing, building dykes to channel the Yellow River into flooding the city. Just when the city was about to fall, the dykes collapsed and the Mongol army was wiped out by its own flood. Still, the Xi Xia emperor decided that further resistance was useless and submitted as a vassal, contributing troops to the Mongol war against the Jin.

After this, the Xi Xia bore much of the manpower burden of the Jin-Mongol war, further weakening its army. In 1217, the Xi Xia finally backed out of its obligations, and the Mongols invaded again, forcing the Xi Xia emperor to renew his vasslage. In 1223, the Xi Xia army was besieging the Jin city of Fengxiang in concert with Mongol forces, but left the field believing that the siege was doomed to fail. The Mongols invaded Xi Xia again, and only withdrew when the Jin actually responded to a Xi Xia plea for reinforcements!

The Xi Xia was in a dilemma - it was being bled dry from fighting the Jin for the Mongols, but it could not defy the Mongol demands without risking war with the Mongols themselves. At this point, the Xi Xia emperor was forced to hand the throne to his more decisive Crown Prince, who quickly sealed an alliance with the Jin to resist the Mongols together. This could have worked earlier on, but by this time the Jin was also near the end of its tether. Making peace with the Southern Song and the Xi Xia was a pragmatic move to take pressure off itself, not part of some grand strategy for a coordinated counteroffensive against the Mongols.

In 1226, the Mongols invaded the Xi Xia with 100,000 troops, taking city after city. The Xi Xia lost the western half of its territory (the Gansu Corridor), and the new emperor died a broken man. He was succeeded by his nephew, the last emperor of the Xi Xia. That winter, Weiming Linggong led 100,000 men into battle against the Mongol army, personally commanded by Chinggis Khan, on the banks of the frozen Yellow River at Lingzhou. The Xi Xia army was soundly defeated again. Zhongxing held out for half a year, as casualties mounted and supplies ran out, until an earthquake caused such destruction in the city that the defenders finally lost their will. In mid-1227, the Xi Xia emperor came out of the city with his ministers and generals (including Weiming Linggong) to negotiate terms of surrender. One of their terms was to be given one month to prepare for the surrender, and Chinggis Khan agreed to this. But Chinggis Khan died of illness one month later, leaving instructions to keep his death a secret and massacre the entire population of Zhongxing to prevent any rebellions during the period of instability following his death. Sure enough, when the Xi Xia emperor offered his city up to the Mongols, he was killed and the whole city was massacred. The Xi Xia empire thus came to a bloody end just after the death of Chinggis Khan.

OK, I've digressed too much because this was just such an interesting and seldom-told story about the Mongol conquests. My original point was this: the Xi Xia forces resisting the Mongols, whether in 1209 or 1226, seem never to have exceeded 170,000 in total. One of my sources, the general military history chronology "Timelines of War", says that an estimated 300,000 Xi Xia died in the battle of Lingzhou, but the reliability of this book is often poor (the authors relying mainly on secondary sources). I think that a figure of 300,000 deaths at the fall of the Xi Xia is only possible if we include civilian casualties (such as the massacre at Zhongxing).

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

"It isn't as bad as you say - the Jurchen did put up quite a fierce fight against the Mongols for about 13 years (1211 to 1234):"

this was not my point, thirteen years is a short time with the standard of an empire that had nearly all of northern China under its control. All previous central plain empires was able to successfully defend against the mongolian nomads even those that are on the defensice such as early Han at least held xiongnu at bay and prevented them from conquering the whole empire, and the mongolians would suffer at least many heavy loss had they attempt to invade full scale. Yet it seem that the mongols won just about every major battle on the field and only lost at sieges despite been outnumbered, the Jin couldn't have declined that much, none of the previous nomads did, look at Wei's victorious campaigns against Rouran. It seems according to you Xi Xia is a major factor to the mongol's victory. You still haven't told me what the primary source's record of the size of the mongol invading army is and the Jin army's size. I also herd that Jin suffered heavy loss against Song and had much of its troops in the south guarding against Song so when the mongol struck the Jin did not have as much defensive power.



"In the wars against the Mongols, therefore, the Jin relied heavily on subjects or allies like the Uighurs, Tanguts and Khitans to supply cavalry. These could be very effective, and the stubbornness of Jin resistance to the Mongols testifies to the quality of many of their troops even at this late stage: at the siege of Zhongdu, 5,000 Imperial Guards initially repulsed the Mongols, while at Dachangyuan in 1228, Wanyan Chengheshan defeated 8,000 Mongols with just 400 cavalry and an unknown number of Chinese infantry. "

I've herd of some Mongol defeats such as in one siege in which the Jin counter attacked mongol and broke their formation and shattered their forces, another Jin army is suppose to attack from another direction and wipe the mongol out once and for all, yet this commander delayed the attack and the mongols manage to reform. What primary source is this from? And again I ask for the number of the mongol invasion force and if possible the total force that mongols possess at this time.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

"OK, I've digressed too much because this was just such an interesting and seldom-told story about the Mongol conquests. My original point was this: the Xi Xia forces resisting the Mongols, whether in 1209 or 1226, seem never to have exceeded 170,000 in total. One of my sources, the general military history chronology "Timelines of War", says that an estimated 300,000 Xi Xia died in the battle of Lingzhou, but the reliability of this book is often poor (the authors relying mainly on secondary sources). I think that a figure of 300,000 deaths at the fall of the Xi Xia is only possible if we include civilian casualties (such as the massacre at Zhongxing). "

This is what I've came across too, they claim the xi xia army in Ling Zhou was 300,000 while the mongol force was 180,000, I came to have doubt in many western sources on mongol campaigns in China since they usually exaggerate the forces of the central plain and point out how badly outnumbered the mongols were and still win to glorify their victory, but I came to have doubts about these since I don't think a small state such as Xi Xia could ever muster a far larger force than a big empire such as Mongolia. So whcih primary source is this and they recorded the mongol and xi xia to be each around 100,000?


"For since the Qin dynasty the power of the Chinese armies had been based on conscription [note: not exactly true - many armies of the Age of Fragmentation were partly hereditary soldiers, partly mercenaries and partly slaves]. "

Thats wrong, isn't the Sui-early Tang Fu Bing a professional force as well? And the decree of 738 changed all of Tang's border troops and conscripts into full time professional forces and fu bing along with conscripts were abolished.

[Yun]

All previous central plain empires was able to successfully defend against the mongolian nomads even those that are on the defensice such as early Han at least held xiongnu at bay and prevented them from conquering the whole empire, and the mongolians would suffer at least many heavy loss had they attempt to invade full scale. Yet it seem that the mongols won just about every major battle on the field and only lost at sieges despite been outnumbered, the Jin couldn't have declined that much, none of the previous nomads did, look at Wei's victorious campaigns against Rouran.

Some reasons that have been suggested for the Jurchen weakness:

- Political coups led by Shuhu Gaoqi 术虎高琪 (1213-1219), Pucha Guannu 蒲察官奴 (1232-33), and Cui Li 崔立 (1233-34) caused infighting, instability and bloodshed in the Jin imperial court even as it tried to organise the resistance against the Mongols.

- Continual revolts by the Chinese peasantry had exhausted the resources of the state, especially after a change in the course of the Yellow River in 1194, which brought catastrophic floods.

- When the Mongols besieged Zhongdu (Beijing) in 1213, Li Ying 李英, Li Xiong 李雄 and a few other Jin generals assembled a militia of more than 10,000 men who inflicted several defeats on the Mongols. But when the Mongols withdrew in 1214 after being given a large tribute by the Jin, and Li Ying wanted to ambush them on the way with his forces (which had grown to several tens of thousands), the Jin emperor Aizong (Wanyan Shouxu 完颜守绪) was afraid of offending the Mongols again and stopped him. The emperor and Shuhu Gaoqi then decided to shift the capital south to Kaifeng, above the objections of many courtiers including Li Ying. From then on, the Jin was strictly on the defensive and Zhongdu fell to the Mongols in 1215.

- When Shuhu Gaoqi was in control of the the imperial court in 1217, he foolishly decided to invade the Southern Song for the first time in nearly 30 years. This war lasted until 1224 and was a total failure for the Jin. In 1224, the Wanyan Shouxu declared that the Jin would never again invade the Song. But the damage had already been done - the Jin forces had been split between north and south at a critical stage in the war with the Mongols when Zhongdu, Hebei and Shandong had fallen and Shanxi was being attacked.

So whcih primary source is this and they recorded the mongol and xi xia to be each around 100,000?

The source I'm using is 《中国历史大事典》 (Encyclopedia of Major Events in Chinese History), a very comprehensive work by an editorial team of historians from various Chinese universities. Chief editor Zhang Haipeng (Anhui Teachers' College 安徽师范大学), published by Shandong University Press, 2000.

From the same source, here is some info on the strength and tactics of the Jin armies at the battle of Zhongdu in 1215 and the battle of the Three-peaked Hill (Sanfengshan 三峰山) in 1232, two decisive battles in the Mongol invasion of the Jin.

Zhongdu, 1215:
After the shift of the Jin capital to Kaifeng, Prime Minister Wanyan Chenghui 完颜承晖 and General Moran Jinzhong 抹然尽忠 were left to guard Zhongdu. At this point, one of the Jin armies defected to the Mongols and launched an attack on Zhongdu from the south, taking the Lugou Bridge 芦沟桥. Chinggis Khan then despatched his troops to attack Zhongdu again, led by the surrendered Khitan generals Shimo Ming'an 石抹明安, Yelu Ahai 耶律阿海, and the Tuhua 秃花 brothers. Moran Jingzhong's second-in-command, Pucha Qijin 蒲察七斤 surrendered to the Mongols with all the troops under him, throwing Zhongdu into a crisis. The Jin emperor then sent reinforcements north: Yongxi 永锡 leading the troops from Zhending 真定 and Zhongshan 中山 (numbers not given), and Wugulun Qingshou 乌古论庆寿 leading 18,000 Imperial Guards, 11,000 infantry and cavalry from the Southwestern Route 西南路, and 10,000 soldiers from Hebei, with Li Ying in charge of the supply train.

But at Whirlwind Fort (Xuanfengzhai 旋风寨), Yongxi's force encountered the Mongol troops and were soundly defeated (Mongol troop numbers are not given). Li Ying then gathered several tens and thousands of militia from the area and engaged the Mongols again at Bazhou 霸州, but they were defeated again, with Li Ying dying in battle. After this, because Shuhu Gaoqi (who controlled the imperial court) was enemies with Wanyan Chenghui, he refused to send any more reinforcements to Zhongdu. Wugulun Qingshou's demoralised army of 39,000 then scattered without putting up much of a fight.

Wanyan Chenghui had originally entrusted military affairs in Zhongdu to Moran Jinzhong, knowing him to be an experienced general, and had sworn a pact with Jinzhong to defend the city with their lives. But now he found out that Jinzhong had already made secret plans to flee. Thoroughly disappointed, he wrote a letter expressing his views on how to save the dynasty and attacking Shuhu Gaoqi for his selfishness and treachery. Then he took poison and died. That night, Moran Jinzhong fled back to Kaifeng, and Zhongdu fell to the Mongols.

Three-peaked Hill, 1232:
In 1223, the Mongol general Muhuali 木华黎 had struck into Shaanxi, attacking Chang'an. The garrison in Chang'an, 200,000 under Wanyan Heda 完颜合达, was too strong and Muhuali had to turn to besieging Fengxiang 凤翔 with 100,000 men. The siege dragged on for months and the Mongols were harassed by local militia, while Jin reinforcements were about to arrive. Muhuali then died of illness, and the Mongols retreated. [This was the siege in which the Xi Xia troops supporting the Mongols gave up and went home, incurring the wrath of Chinggis Khan]

In 1231, the Mongols attacked again and finally took Fengxiang. The Jin garrison in Chang'an panicked and abandoned the city, pulling back to Henan with all the city's population. One month later, the Mongols decided to use a three-pronged attack to converge on Kaifeng from north, east and west. The western force under Tolui 拖雷 would start from Fengxiang, enter the Tong Pass 潼关, and then pass through Song territory at the Han River (near Xiangyang) to reemerge south of Kaifeng to catch the Jin by surprise.

Wanyan Heda learned of this plan and led 200,000 men to intercept Tolui. At Dengzhou 邓州, he set an ambush in a valley with several tens of thousands of cavalry hidden behind the crest of either mountain, but Tolui's spies alerted him and he kept his main force with the supply train, sending only a smaller force of light cavalry to skirt around the valley and attack the Jin troops from behind. Wanyan Heda saw that his plan had been foiled and prepared his troops for a Mongol assault. At Mount Yu 禹山, southwest of Dengzhou, the two armies met in a pitched battle. The Jin army had an advantage in numbers, and fought fiercely. The Mongols then withdrew from Mount Yu by about 30 li, and Tolui changed his strategy. Leaving a part of his force to keep Wanyan Heda occupied, he sent most of his men to strike northwards at Kaifeng in several dispersed contingents to avoid alerting Heda.

On the way from Dengzhou to Kaifeng, the Mongols easily took county after county, and burned all the supplies they captured so as to cut off Wanyan Heda's supply lines. Heda was forced to withdraw, and ran into the Mongols at Three-peaked Hill 三峰山 in Junzhou 均州. At this point, the Jin troops on the Yellow River were also diverted southwards to meet Tolui's attack, and the Mongol northern force under Khan Ogodei 窝阔台 seized this opportunity to cross the forzen river and join up with Tolui - even at this point, their combined strength was only about 50,000!

Wanyan Heda's Jin army still had more than 100,000 men after the battle at Mount Yu, and the Mongols adopted a strategy of exhausting the enemy. The Jin troops had had little rest all the way from Dengzhou, and had not eaten for three days because of the severing of their supply lines. Their morale was plummetting and their commanders were losing confidence. When they reached Three-peaked Hill, a snowstorm suddenly broke out, and it was so cold that the faces of the Jin troops went as white as corpses, and they could hardly march. Rather than attack them when they were desperate with their backs to the wall, the Mongols left them an escape route and then ambushed them when they let down their guard during the retreat. The Jin army collapsed without a fight, and the Mongols pursued the fleeing Jin troops relentlessly. Wanyan Heda was killed, and most of his commanders also lost their lives. After the Battle of Three-peaked Hill, Kaifeng was doomed and the Jin emperor soon abandoned the city and entered Hebei in a vain attempt to reestablish himself there. He was driven south again, and by this time Kaifeng had been taken by the Mongols so he established his new capital at Caizhou 蔡州 (Runan, in Henan). After half a year (in early 1234), the Song and Mongol allied forces besieged Caizhou, Wanyan Shouxu committed suicide, and the Jin dynasty was finally destroyed.

[Yun]

I've herd of some Mongol defeats such as in one siege in which the Jin counter attacked mongol and broke their formation and shattered their forces, another Jin army is suppose to attack from another direction and wipe the mongol out once and for all, yet this commander delayed the attack and the mongols manage to reform. What primary source is this from? And again I ask for the number of the mongol invasion force and if possible the total force that mongols possess at this time.

As you can see, I have very little information on the numbers of the Mongol armies, as compared to the numbers of the Jin armies facing them. But here is one example I've found of a great Mongol defeat at the hands of the Jin, one that came much too late:

In 1233, after Wanyan Shouxu (the Jin emperor Aizong) had abandoned Kaifeng and failed to raise a new army for himself in Hebei, he returned to Henan and established his base in Gui'de 归德 (present-day Anyang). Scattered Jin armies began to gather at Gui'de from the surrounding region and Hebei, and the supplies in the city could no longer feed all these soldiers. Thus Wanyan Shouxu left only 450 Han Chinese troops (Zhongxiao Jun 忠孝军) under Commander in Chief Pucha Guannu 蒲察官奴 and 280 men under Commander Ma Yong 马用 to guard the city, and dispersed the rest of the troops to forage in Su 宿 (in Anhui), Xu 徐 (modern Xuzhou in Jiangsu), and Chen 陈 (modern Huaiyang in Henan).

Pucha Guannu then launched a coup with his troops, killing Ma Yong and more than 300 other courtiers, as well as about 3,000 officers, palace guards and civilians who refused to cooperate with him. He made the emperor his puppet and became the real master of the imperial court. At this point the Mongols had arrived outside Gui'de and were preparing to besiege the city. The Mongol general Sajisibuhua 撒吉思卜华 had set up camp north of the city, on the bank of a river. Guannu then led his 450 troops out on boats from the southern gate at night, armed with fire-lances (huoqiang 火枪). They rowed along the river by the eastern side of the city, reaching the Mongol camp early in the morning. Wanyan Shouxu watched the battle from the northern gate of the city, with his imperial boat prepared for him to flee to Xuzhou if the Jin troops were defeated.

The Jin troops assaulted the Mongol camp from two directions, using their fire-lances to throw the Mongols into a panic. More than 3,500 Mongols drowned in the river while trying to flee, and the Mongol stockades were all burned to the ground. Sajisibuhua was also killed in the battle. Guannu had achieved a remarkable victory and was promoted by the emperor (who after all was under his control). But Gui'de was not defensible in the long term, and the other courtiers urged the emperor to move to Caizhou, which had stronger walls and more provisions and troops. Pucha Guannu opposed the move, afraid that his power base would be weakened and arguing that Caizhou's advantages had been overstated.

Three months later, Wanyan Shouxu used a plot to assassinate Guannu, and then quickly began preparations to move to Caizhou. By the time new reports reached him that Caizhou was still too weak in defences, troops and supplies, he was already on the way there. The fate of the Jin dynasty was then sealed for good, despite the earlier victory against great odds at Gui'de.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

"Three-peaked Hill, 1232:
In 1223, the Mongol general Muhuali 木华黎 had struck into Shaanxi, attacking Chang'an. The garrison in Chang'an, 200,000 under Wanyan Heda 完颜合达, was too strong and Muhuali had to turn to besieging Fengxiang 凤翔 with 100,000 men. The siege dragged on for months and the Mongols were harassed by local militia, while Jin reinforcements were about to arrive. Muhuali then died of illness, and the Mongols retreated. [This was the siege in which the Xi Xia troops supporting the Mongols gave up and went home, incurring the wrath of Chinggis Khan]

In 1231, the Mongols attacked again and finally took Fengxiang. The Jin garrison in Chang'an panicked and abandoned the city, pulling back to Henan with all the city's population. One month later, the Mongols decided to use a three-pronged attack to converge on Kaifeng from north, east and west. The western force under Tolui 拖雷 would start from Fengxiang, enter the Tong Pass 潼关, and then pass through Song territory at the Han River (near Xiangyang) to reemerge south of Kaifeng to catch the Jin by surprise.

Wanyan Heda learned of this plan and led 200,000 men to intercept Tolui. At Dengzhou 邓州, he set an ambush in a valley with several tens of thousands of cavalry hidden behind the crest of either mountain, but Tolui's spies alerted him and he kept his main force with the supply train, sending only a smaller force of light cavalry to skirt around the valley and attack the Jin troops from behind. Wanyan Heda saw that his plan had been foiled and prepared his troops for a Mongol assault. At Mount Yu 禹山, southwest of Dengzhou, the two armies met in a pitched battle. The Jin army had an advantage in numbers, and fought fiercely. The Mongols then withdrew from Mount Yu by about 30 li, and Tolui changed his strategy. Leaving a part of his force to keep Wanyan Heda occupied, he sent most of his men to strike northwards at Kaifeng in several dispersed contingents to avoid alerting Heda.

On the way from Dengzhou to Kaifeng, the Mongols easily took county after county, and burned all the supplies they captured so as to cut off Wanyan Heda's supply lines. Heda was forced to withdraw, and ran into the Mongols at Three-peaked Hill 三峰山 in Junzhou 均州. At this point, the Jin troops on the Yellow River were also diverted southwards to meet Tolui's attack, and the Mongol northern force under Khan Ogodei 窝阔台 seized this opportunity to cross the forzen river and join up with Tolui - even at this point, their combined strength was only about 50,000!"


Why it is only 50,000, didn't Muhuali have 100,000 general? So you are saying that there is no record whatsoever on the total number of mongol forces that invaded Jin and the total forces that the mongols possess at that time? So how did historians came up with their numbers? And you still haven't told me what PRIMARY source these are drawn from, is it the Yuan Shi?

[Yun]

Why it is only 50,000, didn't Muhuali have 100,000 general? So you are saying that there is no record whatsoever on the total number of mongol forces that invaded Jin and the total forces that the mongols possess at that time? So how did historians came up with their numbers? And you still haven't told me what PRIMARY source these are drawn from, is it the Yuan Shi?

Well, I can only make a guess that Muhuali's 100,000 included the Xi Xia contingent. The secondary sources that I have don't indicate the primary sources that they used, but I would think that the Jin Shi, Yuan Shi, and Xin Yuan Shi were all referred to. I haven't read these texts myself (my copies are over in Shanghai), so I'm afraid I can't confirm that with you.

BTW, the battle of Dachangyuan mentioned by Peers in which 400 Jin cavalry defeated 8,000 Mongols was at Qingyang (in Gansu) in 1229. The Jin troops were Zhongxiao Jun, comprising Uyghurs, Naiman, and Qiang.

So far, I have never seen any mention of a Mongol force larger than 100,000 men. Another interesting thing is that when the Jurchen destroyed the Liao empire, they are said to have started out with just over 10,000 troops. The popular saying at the time was that "once the Jurchen have 10,000 men, they will be unbeatable", and this was considered prophetic.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

Thats interesting, it bugs me how the mongols only have 100,000(at least the invasion force) while the xiongnu and Tu Jue both seem to have some 400,000-500,000 troops in their disposal. This seem to be the average number of all the unified mongolian empires, yet somehow the mongol force is so low in number. Do you have anything about the total number of Jin troops at this time?

[General_Zhaoyun]

I think, I remember a battle where the Mongols numbered 100,000 defeated a large army of 400,000 Jin troops, when Genghis khan led an invasion of Jin empire.

[Yun]

I haven't got the total, but this passage:

The Jin emperor then sent reinforcements north: Yongxi 永锡 leading the troops from Zhending 真定 and Zhongshan 中山 (numbers not given), and Wugulun Qingshou 乌古论庆寿 leading 18,000 Imperial Guards, 11,000 infantry and cavalry from the Southwestern Route 西南路, and 10,000 soldiers from Hebei, with Li Ying in charge of the supply train.

would suggest that the Jin could asemble a regular army of more than 39,000 at short notice. Also, Wanyan Heda had an army of 200,000 men in both 1223 and 1232.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

"I think, I remember a battle where the Mongols numbered 100,000 defeated a large army of 400,000 Jin troops, when Genghis khan led an invasion of Jin empire. "

I think this number for Jin is exaggerated, it is in primary sources? the Jin couldn't have mustered that many troops in the north alone in one battle. Not even the Han and Tang had that much in one battle against the mongolians.

[ih8eurocentrix]

would wanyan henyans battle before three peaked hill be considered a vicotry if the mongols had to retreat 30 miles.any idea of the total mongol casualties in invading jin .were did they get the manpower to attack kwarezerem empire if they were attacking jin at the same time.

Edited by ih8eurocentrix, 04 July 2005 - 12:23 AM.