15 replies to this topic

[somechineseperson]

According to the Classical Picture of Epistemology, it is a moral obligation for humans to only believe in two kinds of things: Either things that are self-evidently true, such as 1+1=2, our own mental states and the most direct sensory experiences, or things that can be rationally justified using things that are self-evidently true and/or other already justified non-self-evident things that can nevertheless be justified by self-evidently things iteratively as proof and/or supporting evidence through deduction, induction or inference to the best explanation. To do otherwise would not just be irrational in a descriptive way, but literally unethical in a normative sense. Locke for instance believe that we have a moral duty commanded by God for us to use our God-given reasoning powers to only believe in things that are justifiable.

What do you think? Do you believe we can only hold a belief or faith when it is rationally justifiable?

Edited by somechineseperson, 20 October 2005 - 10:47 PM.

[LYY]

Do you believe we can only hold a belief or faith when it is rationally justifiable?

Yes, if the context is static.
No, if it is context sensitive.

[somechineseperson]

Yes, if the context is static.
No, if it is context sensitive.

Well I think probably it is not context-dependent, for the definition of justification is clearly given:

We are only justified in believing:

1. Self-evident truths:
Category One: Mathematical/logic truths, such as 1+1=2 and "all men die. Socrates is a man. So Socrates must die"
Category Two: Our own mental states. This doesn't mean a belief in that our mental states always reflect the truth, but only that they are unmistakably our own mental states even if they are false. Example: I am in pain because I have eaten poisoned food. Therefore I believe I am in pain. This belief is self-evidently true even if the fact that I have eaten poisoned food is false. Our knowledge of our own internal states is always self-evident truth, even though our belief for what we think as causes for such internal states are often false.
Category Three: Our most direct and immediate sensory experiences. The most primitive kinds of sensory experiences, similar to say a child's experience before he or she learned any complex conceptual constructs of such experiences.

2. Things that can be justified using things that are self-evidently true and/or other already justified non-self-evident things that can nevertheless be justified by self-evidently things iteratively as proof and/or supporting evidence through deduction, induction or inference to the best explanation.

[MengTzu]

According to the Classical Picture of Epistemology, it is a moral obligation for humans to only believe in two kinds of things: Either things that are self-evidently true, such as 1+1=2, our own mental states and the most direct sensory experiences, or things that can be rationally justified using things that are self-evidently true and/or other already justified non-self-evident things that can nevertheless be justified by self-evidently things iteratively as proof and/or supporting evidence through deduction, induction or inference to the best explanation. To do otherwise would not just be irrational in a descriptive way, but literally unethical in a normative sense. Locke for instance believe that we have a moral duty commanded by God for us to use our God-given reasoning powers to only believe in things that are justifiable.

What do you think? Do you believe we can only hold a belief or faith when it is rationally justifiable?

This is a good question. One can argue that if one is not sure whether something is a moral obligation, just do it anyway to be safe. One can, however, also argue the opposite, that we are inculpably ignorant in such a case, hence not obliged.

But there's another issue. Let's say we know A is true, and A proves B, then we don't need to make an act of belief in B -- we already know it's true by inferences. If something is proven, we need not believe in it -- we already know it.

If someone, say, believes in something he's not certain of, but to be safe he believes anyway, his decision wasn't made out of being compelled by truth, but an affective reason (to be on the safe side.) Notice that I've shifted the issue to a matter of safety rather than a matter of moral obligation.

This might be a good chance to talk a bit about my experience, as you might wonder why someone like me who had at one point spent so much time learning Theology would now be a non-believer. I had wondered the same thing as the question you raised here, and the above is my conclusion. However, even if the truth of religion is uncertain, IF there are ONLY two possibilities -- be religious, be not religious -- I probably would have stayed religious even in uncertainty just to be on the safe side (think of Pascal wager). But reality is much more complex -- there are many religions. Let's say one is not certain which religion is right, so he chooses A, is he then choosing a safer course? Not if religion A is condemned by religion B. If there are contradictions between religions, then choosing any one of them is not necessarily a safe thing. This was pretty much what I went through: the question I was involved with is actually not the topic we are debating now -- the existence of God. It was a debate about whether Jesus is the Messiah. It turns out that the possibility is not between Jesus is Messiah v. Jesus is not the Messiah -- but that if Jesus is not the Messiah, believing so is to believe in a false Messiah. That is a big problem, and not a safe thing (or at least not a wise thing) to do. If you have been going to Christian churches, you might react right away -- oh, come on, there are so many fulfillments of prophecies, so many miracles, Jesus has to be the Messiah. Turns out all of these proofs are questionable. I had a debate with an Orthodox Jew for a long time (may be 3/4 of a year), and I spent a whole year trying to figure this out (hence the decision was not quick and arbitrary,) and you know what my final decisions were. My precise problem is the one raised by you: my belief was not justified.

This may come as a surprise that right now I actually don't feel very strongly about believing or not believing Theism. A lot of these metaphysical debates are more about constructs than arguments, that in a given construct one can argue in favor of it and in another one can argue against it. Hence despite I debated you in that debate, I personally don't feel very strongly about Theism, whether for or against it. In fact, regarding Theism, I should find more agreement with you than with the atheist, or perhaps even the agnostics. Theism was never the issue that caused my doubt.

Like I said, I'm a skeptic, not an atheist, perhaps not even an agnostic. To some extent I'm still religious (and I choose to be) because after all these, I've conluded that religiosity is not about belief. I still pray some of the Catholic prayers because 1) the religion is still at least possibly true, so there's a possibility of Divine help, and 2) prayers give me comfort. But the only reason I prefer Catholic prayers (instead of, say, Buddhist) is because of familiarity, not because I think Catholicism is more true than others (I certainly find it one of the most beautiful religions, but that is, again, a personal preference, not a matter of verifiability.) Thus I have no problem praying Buddhist prayers (in fact, I recite the Heart Sutra sometimes.) Religiosity has become for me a matter of spiritual growth and a matter of seeking comfort. I've adopted the Confucian concept of religiosity (and I have pretty much adopted Confucianism as my religion now, in a way), that to practice religion is not about what you believe, but about a way to cultivate oneself and is an expression of affection.

Addendum: the idea of having a belief based on reasons might not be scientific, because the scientists never really seek to prove -- they seek to disprove. When there is a theory that cannot be proven, it would appear that they hold it to be true, but in real scientific principles we should hold it to be true until disproven. This means we always leave room for doubt, even room for completely overturning a theory. Does faith allow this much room for doubt? That is a much more complex question.

[LYY]

Well I think probably it is not context-dependent, for the definition of justification is clearly given:

We are only justified in believing:

1. Self-evident truths:
Category One: Mathematical/logic truths, such as 1+1=2 and "all men die. Socrates is a man. So Socrates must die"

These are typical examples of static context.

[somechineseperson]

I like the words said by Nietzsche most:

All the passions of different directions are struggling in your mind, finally only one wins out and dominate your rationality.

That is only asserting that emotion plays the primary role in our thinking process. It does not answer the normative question - should we believe in things that are not justified.

I think our reasonings are subject to our emotions, if we believe, then it will become rationally justifiable one way or the other.

So you think generally every belief is justifiable by people who hold the belief? But if there exists an objective standard of truth and falsity this simply cannot be true. If say A believes in X and B believes in Y which directly opposes X, then it cannot be the case that both X and Y are justified.

[nguoiVietchanhtong]

Southern Chinese believe themselves derived from the Han Chinese, which I think should be a faith also. In history, the Han Chinese derived from Yellow River, whose population was nearly homologous. Now the Han Chinese are diversed. That's right it's the emotion drive that make them believe that they are from the Han Chinese, which I think is an irrational faith.

[somechineseperson]

This is a good question. One can argue that if one is not sure whether something is a moral obligation, just do it anyway to be safe. One can, however, also argue the opposite, that we are inculpably ignorant in such a case, hence not obliged.

But there's another issue. Let's say we know A is true, and A proves B, then we don't need to make an act of belief in B -- we already know it's true by inferences. If something is proven, we need not believe in it -- we already know it.

If someone, say, believes in something he's not certain of, but to be safe he believes anyway, his decision wasn't made out of being compelled by truth, but an affective reason (to be on the safe side.) Notice that I've shifted the issue to a matter of safety rather than a matter of moral obligation.

This might be a good chance to talk a bit about my experience, as you might wonder why someone like me who had at one point spent so much time learning Theology would now be a non-believer. I had wondered the same thing as the question you raised here, and the above is my conclusion. However, even if the truth of religion is uncertain, IF there are ONLY two possibilities -- be religious, be not religious -- I probably would have stayed religious even in uncertainty just to be on the safe side (think of Pascal wager). But reality is much more complex -- there are many religions. Let's say one is not certain which religion is right, so he chooses A, is he then choosing a safer course? Not if religion A is condemned by religion B. If there are contradictions between religions, then choosing any one of them is not necessarily a safe thing. This was pretty much what I went through: the question I was involved with is actually not the topic we are debating now -- the existence of God. It was a debate about whether Jesus is the Messiah. It turns out that the possibility is not between Jesus is Messiah v. Jesus is not the Messiah -- but that if Jesus is not the Messiah, believing so is to believe in a false Messiah. That is a big problem, and not a safe thing (or at least not a wise thing) to do. If you have been going to Christian churches, you might react right away -- oh, come on, there are so many fulfillments of prophecies, so many miracles, Jesus has to be the Messiah. Turns out all of these proofs are questionable. I had a debate with an Orthodox Jew for a long time (may be 3/4 of a year), and I spent a whole year trying to figure this out (hence the decision was not quick and arbitrary,) and you know what my final decisions were. My precise problem is the one raised by you: my belief was not justified.

This may come as a surprise that right now I actually don't feel very strongly about believing or not believing Theism. A lot of these metaphysical debates are more about constructs than arguments, that in a given construct one can argue in favor of it and in another one can argue against it. Hence despite I debated you in that debate, I personally don't feel very strongly about Theism, whether for or against it. In fact, regarding Theism, I should find more agreement with you than with the atheist, or perhaps even the agnostics. Theism was never the issue that caused my doubt.

Like I said, I'm a skeptic, not an atheist, perhaps not even an agnostic. To some extent I'm still religious (and I choose to be) because after all these, I've conluded that religiosity is not about belief. I still pray some of the Catholic prayers because 1) the religion is still at least possibly true, so there's a possibility of Divine help, and 2) prayers give me comfort. But the only reason I prefer Catholic prayers (instead of, say, Buddhist) is because of familiarity, not because I think Catholicism is more true than others (I certainly find it one of the most beautiful religions, but that is, again, a personal preference, not a matter of verifiability.) Thus I have no problem praying Buddhist prayers (in fact, I recite the Heart Sutra sometimes.) Religiosity has become for me a matter of spiritual growth and a matter of seeking comfort. I've adopted the Confucian concept of religiosity (and I have pretty much adopted Confucianism as my religion now, in a way), that to practice religion is not about what you believe, but about a way to cultivate oneself and is an expression of affection.

Addendum: the idea of having a belief based on reasons might not be scientific, because the scientists never really seek to prove -- they seek to disprove. When there is a theory that cannot be proven, it would appear that they hold it to be true, but in real scientific principles we should hold it to be true until disproven. This means we always leave room for doubt, even room for completely overturning a theory. Does faith allow this much room for doubt? That is a much more complex question.

To say proposition A justifies proposition B is not necessarily saying A proves B. Strictly speaking prove can only be used in the deductive case. But the concept of justification is wider and more inclusive. There are also the cases of inductive inference and inference to the best explanation. For instance, I cannot prove that the sun will rise tomorrow, because I cannot deductively show that it is the case in the same way I can deductively infer a mathematical theorem. However, the belief that the sun will rise toworrow is justified because it can inferred inductively using scientific evidence. I think the concept of justification bears more resemblence with a court of law than with proving mathematical theorems. Though certainly deductive inference is a subset of justification procedures.

If a proposition has been justified, then I do not necessarily need to explicitly make the act of believing, but if I believe in the Classical Picture of Epistemology, then implicitly I must have a belief in the propostion.

Actually, do you think the Classical Picture is itself justifiable? Certainly it is not a self-evident truth by its own definitions of self-evident truths. But can it be justified from other beliefs that are justified? Notice there is a degree of circularity in this, because the other beliefs we are using will be justified within the Classical Picture framework. Thus it is like trying to justify X using beliefs Y, Z etc already justified within the framework of X.

Edited by somechineseperson, 21 October 2005 - 07:16 AM.

[somechineseperson]

Addendum: the idea of having a belief based on reasons might not be scientific, because the scientists never really seek to prove -- they seek to disprove. When there is a theory that cannot be proven, it would appear that they hold it to be true, but in real scientific principles we should hold it to be true until disproven. This means we always leave room for doubt, even room for completely overturning a theory. Does faith allow this much room for doubt? That is a much more complex question.

I think the idea of having reason-based beliefs is not unscientific, for to have reasons to believe in something is not the same as proving something. Proving is a more narrow concept. Certainly scientists don't believe their theories are proven in the same sense that mathematicians believe their mathematical theorems are proven, becuase to do so would not leave any room for doubt in science. But for a scientist working with certain theoretical frameworks the theories themselves must be justified, that is to say, have a rational basis.

As for faith, there are IMO two levels of considerations here. One level is what I am addressing in this thread, namely is faith justifiable. However, if one just have this then it is not enough, because to justify is not to conclusively prove, and there will always be some room for doubt. Nonetheless, IMO for a person holding a particular faith, there is virtually no room for doubt because he or she holds onto the faith with a degree of certainty, which although is not inferred from the faith's rational justification, is nevertheless believed through "faith". In other words, reasoning can justify a faith, but never conclusively prove it, just like it can never conclusively prove scientific theories. But where faith differs from scientific theories is that unlike scientific theories, a believer hold his or her faith with certainty not based on rational justification (the certainty is not based on justification), but through "faith".

[MengTzu]

If a proposition has been justified, then I do not necessarily need to explicitly make the act of believing, but if I believe in the Classical Picture of Epistemology, then implicitly I must have a belief in the propostion.

If a proposition is justified, then I know it is justified. There's no need to believe that it is justified (I already know that,) and there is no need to believe anything more. To believe anything more requires an extra consideration that is not motivated by truth.

I think the idea of having reason-based beliefs is not unscientific, for to have reasons to believe in something is not the same as proving something. Proving is a more narrow concept. Certainly scientists don't believe their theories are proven in the same sense that mathematicians believe their mathematical theorems are proven, becuase to do so would not leave any room for doubt in science. But for a scientist working with certain theoretical frameworks the theories themselves must be justified, that is to say, have a rational basis.

I first thought about writing about the difference between scientific proof and mathematical proof, but thought it's not really relevant to my point. But since you brought it up: I invite you to read over my first post carefully again. I didn't say that scientists believe their theories are proven. I wrote: "in real scientific principles we should hold it to be true until disproven. This means we always leave room for doubt, even room for completely overturning a theory." Thus in science the "default" attitude is doubt, to assume that every theory might be false. Next time please read my post carefully, I get impatient about explaining myself repeatedly.

Now, if something has a justified basis, then why not leave it at that? Let's say the principle A has a rational basis, if someone asks me, "Is principle A true?" I can simply answer precisely what I know, "principle A has a rational basis." To say that I believe it firmly would require a motivation outside of my intellect.

As for faith, there are IMO two levels of considerations here. One level is what I am addressing in this thread, namely is faith justifiable. However, if one just have this then it is not enough, because to justify is not to conclusively prove, and there will always be some room for doubt. Nonetheless, IMO for a person holding a particular faith, there is virtually no room for doubt because he or she holds onto the faith with a degree of certainty, which although is not inferred from the faith's rational justification, is nevertheless believed through "faith". In other words, reasoning can justify a faith, but never conclusively prove it, just like it can never conclusively prove scientific theories. But where faith differs from scientific theories is that unlike scientific theories, a believer hold his or her faith with certainty not based on rational justification (the certainty is not based on justification), but through "faith".

You have a tendency to confuse two different things. You need to be careful about not getting lost in your own words.

First you were discussing whether one should have faith in what is justifiable but not proven.

Now you are discussing whether faith is justifiable. They are two different things.

In any case, I go back to what I said repeatedly: I know something is true, I already know it, I don't need to believe. If I don't know it to be true, then there is no reason to believe it. If I know it to be justifiable, then I know it is justifiable, there is also no need to believe it. If, to you, belief is simply "well this makes sense," then you essentially agree with me. But belief, in the Christian context, is a conscious act. It is something extra, something more than the intellect.

Southern Chinese believe themselves derived from the Han Chinese, which I think should be a faith also. In history, the Han Chinese derived from Yellow River, whose population was nearly homologous. Now the Han Chinese are diversed. That's right it's the emotion drive that make them believe that they are from the Han Chinese, which I think is an irrational faith.

Yup, nationalism is a faith.

[somechineseperson]

Frankly, I don't think we have any serious disagreement here. I never mentioned that you said scientists believe their theories are proven. I essentially agree with your views on science. But it is you who misunderstood me. The primary point of my reply wasn't to counter you in the first place. I was just explaining a certain point since you mentioned "the idea of having a belief based on reasons might not be scientific" where in fact it is (indeed, I believe you agree with me on this one) scientific if we interpret "a belief based on reasons" as "a justified belief" according to the Classical Picture.

I think a distinction needs to be made between "to believe" and "to firmly believe". The Classical Picture suggests that we are warranted to believe in anything that is justified, but not necessarily firmly believe in it. When a proposition is justified, we know it is justified, and this would include "we believe it is justified", because epistemologically "to know" something must fit three criteria: In order to know A one must 1. believe in A 2. know A is true 3. have a justification for A. So "to know" includes "to believe". However, "to know" does not include "to firmly believe".

In the Christian context the situation is different, since the believer does not just believe but firmly believes. The difference is that the former leaves room for doubt (To believe in something does not mean I cannot have doubts about it) while the latter doesn't. To firmly believe something justification is usually not sufficient (unless it is a deductively conclusive proof), thus we say faith is required.

My original question is not "should one have faith in what is justifiable but not proven", my original question is "should one have faith in what is not justifiable". Please read the title of this thread again.

[MengTzu]

I think a distinction needs to be made between "to believe" and "to firmly believe". The Classical Picture suggests that we are warranted to believe in anything that is justified, but not necessarily firmly believe in it. When a proposition is justified, we know it is justified, and this would include "we believe it is justified", because epistemologically "to know" something must fit three criteria: In order to know A one must 1. believe in A 2. know A is true 3. have a justification for A. So "to know" includes "to believe". However, "to know" does not include "to firmly believe".

According to your terminology of "belief", "firm belief," I essentially have no disagreement. I personally find it extraneous to include "belief" in "knowledge." In any case, Christianity demands people to what you call "firmly believe."

In the Christian context the situation is different, since the believer does not just believe but firmly believes. The difference is that the former leaves room for doubt (To believe in something does not mean I cannot have doubts about it) while the latter doesn't. To firmly believe something justification is usually not sufficient (unless it is a deductively conclusive proof), thus we say faith is required.

This is where it gets ambiguous. I first heard the phrase "leave room for doubt," actually, from a Catholic Dominican novice (who is now, I think, a priest. A novice is somebody studying to become a monk or a friar. Dominican here refers to the religious order, not the country.) In any case, however, it is still necessary for Christians to make that act of belief despite of doubt. Belief in Christianity is not simply an intellectual recognition, but an act of choice.

My original question is not "should one have faith in what is justifiable but not proven", my original question is "should one have faith in what is not justifiable". Please read the title of this thread again.

I'm sorry I took you on a huge tangent. Answer is, certainly, there would be no obligation to believe what is not justified. Is it wrong to believe it, then? That's a judgement call.

[somechineseperson]

According to your terminology of "belief", "firm belief," I essentially have no disagreement. I personally find it extraneous to include "belief" in "knowledge." In any case, Christianity demands people to what you call "firmly believe."
This is where it gets ambiguous. I first heard the phrase "leave room for doubt," actually, from a Catholic Dominican novice (who is now, I think, a priest. A novice is somebody studying to become a monk or a friar. Dominican here refers to the religious order, not the country.) In any case, however, it is still necessary for Christians to make that act of belief despite of doubt. Belief in Christianity is not simply an intellectual recognition, but an act of choice.
I'm sorry I took you on a huge tangent. Answer is, certainly, there would be no obligation to believe what is not justified. Is it wrong to believe it, then? That's a judgement call.

I personally find it extraneous to include "belief" in "knowledge."

Perhaps, but I hope you realise that this is not my idea, it's the standard definition of knowledge in epistemology.

In any case, however, it is still necessary for Christians to make that act of belief despite of doubt. Belief in Christianity is not simply an intellectual recognition, but an act of choice.

Right. Christian belief can be justified (I think), so that warrants belief in Christianity, but it still leaves plenty of room for doubt. Justification can only take one this far. The rest is a matter of faith. Perhaps some people with their faith remove all doubts and thus "firmly believes" in Christianity, (and then naturally becomes a Christian) while others make a choice to become a Christian despite their doubts. Once they become Christians fully, of course, doubts will gradually disappear so in the end they also end up in the "firmly believes" category.

Dominican here refers to the religious order, not the country.

I know. I maybe ignorant, but I'm not that ignorant.

I'm sorry I took you on a huge tangent. Answer is, certainly, there would be no obligation to believe what is not justified. Is it wrong to believe it, then? That's a judgement call.

That's ok. Actually according to the Classical Picture there is a moral obligation to not believe anything that cannot be justified. The idea is that 1. Our reasoning powers come from God, so to believe in unjustified things is being irresponsible to our own reasoning powers, which is a gift from God and thus immoral. 2. Reason is what seperates man from animals, so to believe in unjustified things is to abandon this distinct human trait and behave like an animal, and thus it is immoral.