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[General_Zhaoyun]

Found this great site on buddhist philosophy (for beginners):

http://www.akshin.ne...ddhismindex.htm

http://www.akshin.ne...udphillogic.htm that gives beginner an intro to buddhist logic (a subject greatly dealt with in buddhist philosophy).

Buddhist Logic

Buddhism has from the beginning emphasized a logical structure. Examples of this can be found in the structure of the (midwifery) talks and discourses of the Buddha.

The basic structure can be found in the logical tetralemma:

* A is true
* A is not true
* A is both true and not true
* A is neither true nor not true


This formulation, which is very often found back in the oldest texts, provides the 'key' to most 'typical Buddhist problems' towards their 'understanding' or their 'inconceivability' (e.g. the anatta-doctrine, the conception of sunyata, or the teaching of Totality within the Avatamsaka-teachings ). What seems 'illogical' according to the binary logic (the so-called Aristotelian logic), becomes clear through the perspective of this tetralemma.

With its dissemination Buddhism unavoidably came into contact with other Indian spiritual currents. From this arose the necessity of having a set of polemic instruments at its disposal with which it could answer the argumentations of the formal-logically structured Hindu darsanas (especially Nyaya and Vaisesika).

In relation to this J. Takakusu says in his 'Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy': "Buddhist Logic is not a formal logic of thought, but is rather a logic of dispute or debate which lays stress on the investigation of cause, relations and possibility and is therefore an art of argumentation and refutation." We can see this need strongly represented in Nagarjuna, but even more decidedly with Vasubandhu, who by way of his view on the trayasatya (Three Truths) gave rise to the implementation of a clear Buddhist formal logic.

It is however Vasubandhu's disciple Dinnaga who is generally accepted as the factual founder of this logic. In his Nyaya-pravesa (also called Nyaya-mukha), 'Introduction to Logic', he explains the new lines of thought based on the 'knowledge of causality' (hetu-vidya). He supports his claims on the 'three forms of causality' (lingasya trini-rupani) by way of the 'nine necessitating causes' (hetu), in which he replaces the - until then - usual comparative method with a sharp method of deduction which expresses itself in new syllogistic formulations. His works are - except for the aforementioned Nyaya-pravesa and some Sanskrit fragments - mainly preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations.

A next important step in Buddhist Logic was taken by Dharmakirti (7th Century ?). Concerned about the decline of the Teaching in India, he searched for new structures of argumentation. In his works Pramana-varttika, Pramana-viniscaya, but especially in his Nyaya-bindu he points out that names and relations are only instituted by mind, whereas the sense-functions represent their objects of experience accurately, unless of course they are distorted and perverted.

Other important Buddhist logicians are Agotra, Dharmapala, Dharmottara, Silabhadra, Sthiramati…



Prelude

From http://www.akshin.ne...philprelude.htm

'Buddhist' = Peculiar to or originated from the Teaching of the Buddha, in the manifold forms it assumes, all however relating back to the same fundaments.

It will be more difficult to give a definition or even a description of the term 'Philosophy'. It is however very clear that 'philosophy' in its Western (viz. Greco-Christian) context shows a different 'content' than that in the East (predominantly Indian and/or Chinese). From almost every definition of philosophy it goes to show that Western philosophy centers around the question of 'being', the 'first (or last) cause' and the 'absolute'. It tries to find an explanation, analyzes the experiential data and attempts to develop a dialectic around it.

Western philosophy then will be mainly concerned with metaphysics, and especially with ontological questions.
Another facet of Western philosophy (and mysticism) is that it places itself outside the realm of religion, even in those cases where its use lies in giving a coherent structure to religion (viz. Scholasticism).

In the East, philosophy endeavors towards a coherent scheme around which multiple soteriological practices can be weighed, evaluated and structured. The search here is not the search for an explanation (the why-question) but for an efficiency (the how-question). It is not so much the 'absolute truth' that counts, but the effectiveness of a given system or practice.

It is therefore not the question of 'being' but the question of 'knowledge and knowing' (epistemology versus ontology) (viz. Wisdom) that will be the center of philosophical thought in the East. There is the search for understanding the connections and inter-relationships between phenomena and the ability to express them. It is an attempt to translate the non-conceptual (meditative or mystical) into concepts and words, with the clear purpose of describing the salvific process or way to liberation (Enlightenment or Nirvana,...), without however confusing the 'description' with the 'described'.
Emphasis therefore is put on psychology and epistemology as the basis for the development of a soteriology.

Thus, there is no search for the 'absolute' as there is in the West, but an uninterrupted input of relativism and self-critique. It is therefore the religious aspect that is dominant, integrating both philosophy and mysticism. A non-religious philosophy, while characteristic for the West, is conceived as an impossibility in the Eastern context. Even Confucianism, with its initial rejection of all things supernatural takes into account the concept of Heaven (T'ien) and its Virtue (working or effectiveness).
A Buddhist 'philosophy' will make no exception to this rule.

Fundaments of Buddhism

The basic principles of the Teaching of the Buddha are found within the Four Noble Truths :

1. The Universality of Suffering
2. The Cause of Suffering
3. The Cessation of Suffering
4. The Way that leads to the Cessation of Suffering


(1) and (2) are situated mainly on the psychological level of the world of experience. Both the 'inner' and 'outer' world are seen as nothing more than a representation of the mind. Our knowledge originates in the subject. Not the world is illusory, but the glasses through which I see the world makes that the world as it appears to me is an ego-illusion.
If one looks at the meaning of these Four Noble Truths, one comes to the conclusion that the first three Noble Truths point to a theoretical model in which (1) can be taken as consensual, generally acceptable and not necessarily Buddhist; while (2) and (3) are causal: (2) as the cause of suffering, and (3) as the cause of the cessation of suffering. Truth (4) on the contrary is typically Buddhist in its referral to a praxis.

The concept 'suffering' is usually misinterpreted, due to a Christian or materialistic point of view. The term 'duhkha', although mostly translated as 'suffering' reaches much further than our ordinary conception of the term suffering: it implies not just our bodily or social torments or vexations, but also - and primarily so - our mental torments. Therefore duhkha would be better described as 'universal unsatisfactoriness' or 'dissatisfaction with the existing situation'.
In a certain sense we can also consult philosophers from the West for possible 'better' translations of duhkha. John Locke 1 (1632-1704) speaks of 'uneasiness', thereby remarking that this is the basic feeling, the drive behind every thought or action of humanity. Also found are terms such as 'Unerfülltheit' etc. It is through the use of these, that the term 'suffering' can be taken out of its physical-material context.

In a certain sense we could look upon the Buddhist concept of 'suffering' as being the interval, the distance between the existentially experienced and our expectations, on the one hand 'desire' and 'attachment', on the other hand fear:


Suffering here, does not belong to the sphere of salvation or enlightenment - as is often the case in other religions -, but is a characteristic of the existential world in which existence unfolds. This 'suffering' stands loose from the sphere of nirvana : this becomes clear although paradoxically expressed in the 'Heart-Sutra' ("Here, there is no suffering, no cause of suffering, no cessation of suffering, no path that leads to the cessation of suffering.").
Duhkha indeed is one of the universal characteristics of that which exists, viz. the 'experienced'. As the locus typicus goes:

* All forms of existence are characterized by suffering;
* All forms of existence are characterized by impermanence;
* All elements of existence are characterized by non-self.

The distinction between 'forms of existence' and 'elements of existence' is of the utmost importance.

All 'things' or 'beings' are compound: these are the 'forms' that existence takes on. (samskara = compound).
This 'compound' is characterized by its composing elements or components (dharma = principle, basic principle, characteristic,...).
If one would use the example of computer science as a metaphor, one could picture a dharma as corresponding to a unit of communication (bit) or a unit of transmission (baud). Samskara than would correspond with a 'message' or 'data'.

Both samskara and dharma have in fact a multitude of meanings that are not always clearly distinguishable. The Monier-Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary for example gives the following lemma for 'samskara': "...the faculty of memory, mental impression or recollection, impression on the mind of acts done in a former state of existence. Buddh.: mental conformation or creation of the mind (such as that of the external world, regarded by it as real though actually non-existent...". In the Pali Text Society Dictionary on the other hand we read for the same lemma: "1. Aggregate of the conditions or essential properties of a given process or result e.g. the essentials or 'elements' of anything; - essential conditions, antecedents or synergy (co-ordinated activity), mental coefficients, requisite for act, speech, thought. 2. One of the five khandhas, or constitutional elements of physical life...".

'Suffering' is unavoidable since all 'things' are impermanent (not-remaining = Skt. anitya). This impermanence has given rise to a lot of esthetical expressions such as the inevitable withering of a flower, or morning dew, etc. Often this theme of impermanence is emotionally interpreted as the 'transitory nature of all things' through which a sense of doom is evoked, e.g. in poetry. Yet anitya should be understood as objectively neutral: if things where 'doomed' to perish or to disappear, than enlightenment would not be a possibility. Even impermanence can become a factor of enlightenment !
Besides this it is clear that every change in a 'subject' at the same time means a change in the experienced 'object'. In this way anitya in fact becomes a universal experience.

Things are impermanent because there can be no 'permanent' substance ('soul', 'atman', 'self', 'ego'). The 'elements of existence' (dharma) - and therefore also the 'forms of existence' which are composed by these elements - are 'self-less' (P. anatta). All that exists (the world of experience) is self-less, without self, without permanence, without absoluteness. This is the main criterion of the Teaching of the Buddha.


But : if there is no 'self', than who is it that suffers?

That which we call an 'individual', a 'personality', 'ego' or 'psyche', is in fact no more than a convergence of events, impulses, thought constructions, volitional actions, etc. In short, all that is conventionally understood under the term "mental activity". This collection (khandha, skandha) has no permanent substance or essence (atman). Just as no permanent 'house-entity' is found in a constructed house, in the same way no permanent 'entity' can be found within the different forms of existence including sentient beings. This compound nature of the forms of existence explains not only their impermanence but also their 'artificiality', their com-positeness (together + to put) (sam-skri), their polymer character.
The term 'samskara' has, as was mentioned before, a lot of meanings that can not be confused with one another. Each of these possible meanings however point to a compound nature, an aggregate; yet, the context in which the term is used can differ. Therefore it is necessary to make a clear distinction between its different uses: e.g. samskara is used to denote the fourth of the five skandha's (aggregates) in which case the connotations of 'karma' and 'will or volition' will be determining. When it is used as the second link of the pratitya samutpada (dependent co-origination), the emphasis will be put on the dynamic that runs from a (past) volitional action towards its (future) result, the fruit which conditions a future mental situation.

Every momentous 'being' is a compound of a series of ever-changing and impermanent aggregates called the 'five aggregates' (pañca-skandha).

* rupa: form, corporeality
* vedana: feeling, perception
* samjña: cognition, conception
* samskara: volition, karma-formations
* vijñana: consciousness, discrimination


How difficult it is to give a proper translation or even an approach of these terms becomes apparent from the multitude of (sometimes contradictory) translations.

These five skandha's are stages of perception, cognition and volition. They are NOT ontological elements. They give an approach of the mental process that is active in the 'psyche'. We thus can look upon them as psychological/epistemological elements.

It would therefore be wrong to consider each of these skandha's as an 'entity', a 'being'. Not only are they compound (ad infinitum), they also can not exist by themselves but only in relation to and in function of the other skandha's. They are therefore without substance and without autonomy, the two prerequisites for the so-called 'atman'. Thus there is no 'atman'. Or to state it more clearly: concentrating on or around the idea of an atman is (according to Buddhist thought) an inefficient thought-error. Buddhism in all its forms and aspects is an-atman (anatta): non-self.

This strict norm is the main criterion to separate things Buddhist from things non-Buddhist.
Further: the fivefold classification of the personality into skandha's and the twelve-fold classification of karmic existence (see later) are not a "scientific neurological or neuro-psychological" analysis and make no statements concerning an objective, anatomical reality. We are to look upon these classifications as empirical 'expedient means' (upaya) used to gain an insight into the process which leads from an 'existence characterized by suffering' (samsara) to a state of 'non-suffering' (nirvana). We are therefore clearly dealing with a soteriological methodology and not with mere psychological data or metaphysical statements.

The illusion to have or to be an atman - or even to take it into consideration - is the deep origin of suffering. Suffering comes to an end through the destruction of the atman-delusion (avidya = ignorance, mis-conception). This delusion leads to desire (trisna, P. tanha = thirst) and hatred (dosa = aversion), out of which the whole world of dissatisfaction or unsatisfactoriness, in short 'duhkha' comes into existence.
The term 'desire, thirst' should not be interpreted to narrow, in the sense of merely emotional or psychological. Desire encompasses 'all beings'. So for instance we could say that 'the heart desires to beat' seeing that this is the hearts necessary function. We can even speak of a certain 'cosmic' desire, e.g. as is seen in the mutual attraction of two masses (Newton's Law). Seen as such, desire is not only the motive or drive of the individual, it can also be transposed to a collectivity, yes even cosmically as the drive or the motive of the universe.

This all leads us to conclude that 'suffering' has its origin in 'desire', which in its turn has its source in 'ignorance'. To often however this is interpreted as "my suffering has its origin in my desire which in its turn finds its source in my ignorance". Such an expression leads to irrelevant questions concerning e.g. the suffering of innocent children. This mistaken shifting of emphasis is based on the input of the concept of 'mine' there where 'it' is meant. The reduction to individuality is in contradiction with the presupposition of anatman or 'no-self' and leads to a methodological incoherence. In our discussion of causality (next chapter) we should continuously take this into account with every step in our train of thought.

This makes that the Third and Fourth Noble Truths should consequently be interpreted in a purely soteriological and pragmatic (i.e. effective) way. A further consequence of the anatman-idea is than that all concepts, all ideas, all forms of thought are anatman, and therefore have no absolute or adequate sense, i.e. they can only be understood as being relative (i.e. in relation to). Further: anatman is also applied to anatman, meaning even anatman is relative: it is only a form of expression in which the content is relative, interchangeable, impermanent. From this the concept of 'emptiness' (sunyata) originated. However, also the concept of sunyata is a mere concept.....therefore.....

Buddhist philosophy than will primarily be an epistemology, a philosophy of knowing and Buddhist soteriology will be a wisdom of knowing: seeing things as they are in se, in their emptiness, and not as they appear to our existential consciousness.
In relation to this we could mutatis mutandis point to an analogy with "Gestalt Psychology", which has phenomenological data (Gegebenheiten) as its basis. "We do not perceive the world as it is, but as we are." The 'perceiver' organizes his/her own world of experience out of or around his/her own attitude.

To give a structure or a soteriological efficiency to such "emptiness-thinking", we can make use of several keys or paradigms with which we can solve the apparent unacceptability's or paradoxes. Most used in relation hereto are:


(1) the logical tetralemma, which forms the basis of the Buddhist fourfold logic :

a. A is
b. A is not
c. A is, and is not
d. A neither is, nor is not



In which the final and definitive emphasis is put on (d.). Where paradoxes occur (e.g. in the question of self/no-self) the thought process should - if possible - extend to the fourth lemma (d.) i.e. "neither self, nor no-self".


(2) the threefold level in relation to 'person', based on a centrifugal perspective:


a. personal
b. transpersonal
c. impersonal


See also:

Buddhist philosophy of causality
http://www.akshin.ne...ilcausality.htm

Buddhist philosophy of diversification
http://www.akshin.ne...rsification.htm

Buddhist Philosophy of Nirvana
http://www.akshin.ne...philnirvana.htm

Hinayana/Mahayana
http://www.akshin.ne...na-mahayana.htm

Madhyamaka and Nagarjuna
http://www.akshin.ne...ilnagarjuna.htm

Yogacara and Vasubandhu
http://www.akshin.ne...hilyogacara.htm

Avatamsaka - Hua-yen
http://www.akshin.ne...lavatamsaka.htm

Sukhavati: Pure Land Buddhism
http://www.akshin.ne...hilpureland.htm

Kyoto School of Philosophy
http://www.akshin.ne...udphilkyoto.htm

[General_Zhaoyun]

A good article on buddhism and its philosophy development in China

From http://www.akshin.ne...udphilchina.htm

Buddhism in China

Although Buddhism is already mentioned in China in the beginning of the 1st century, the beginning of any Chinese form of Buddhist philosophy can only be situated after the Han-Dynasty, i.e. during the period of division (the Three Kingdoms 220-265; the Six Dynasties 265-589; and the Northern Dynasties 385-581).

This period is characterized by the flourishing of Religious Taoism and so-called Neo-Taoism. It is especially within the circles of the latter that we can notice a remarkable likeness between on the one hand the teachings of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu and on the other hand Buddhism, with the main focal point being Prajñaparamita and Madhyamaka. Translations of Buddhist texts during this period are characterized by the frequent use of Taoist terminology.

In this way there arose a initial symbiosis - or at least a certain sympathy - between the Neo-Taoist thinkers and Buddhism. So, for example, we see:

* Sun-ch'o (301-380)
who in his Tao Hsien Lun (Treatise on Buddhist Monks and Taoist Sages) compares seven 4th century Buddhist monks with the famous Seven Sages of the Bamboo Forest (3rd century Taoists).

* Fan-yüeh (398-445)
who in his Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han Dynasty) writes: "when we carefully study the [Buddhist] teachings concerning the purification of mind and the liberation from the shackles [of existence], and thereby putting an emphasis on the setting aside both 'emptiness' and 'being', we [come to the conclusion that the Buddhist teachings] belong to the same current as those of the Taoist scriptures.

* Liu-ch'iu (438-495)
writes (quoted in Seng-yu's 'Extracts from the Tripitaka'): "East of the K'un-lun Mountains the term 'Great Unity' is used. Towards the west of Kashmir cheng-chüeh (sambodhi) is used. When one aspires for 'non-being' (wu) or attempts to 'emptiness' (k'ung), it is the same principle."

Newly imported terms such as sambodhi, sunyata, bhava/abhava are experienced as Taoist equivalents. This terminological equation (ko yi = method of analogy) combines the 'internal writings', i.e. the Buddhist sutras, with the 'external writings', namely Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu and even I-Ching.

Beginning of Chinese Buddhist philosophy


The beginning of Buddhist schools in China is shrouded in great obscurity. There is talk of the 'Six Houses and Seven Schools' (liu-chia ch'i-tsung), but original texts are very fragmentary and we have to refer to works of centuries later. Yet, it is clear that they were all strongly tinted by philosophy and that they based themselves on both Madhyamaka and Yogacara thought.

The first figure that stands out clearly and originally is Seng-chao (384-414). After his Taoist studies he became a disciple of the translator Kumarajiva, who introduced him to Madhyamaka-thought. Seng-chao however gave great importance to the Vimalakirti-nirdesa. His work was collected under the general title Chao-lun, yet its chapters are clearly conceived as separate entries. Seng-chao is regarded as the founder of the San-lun tsung (School of the Three Treatises, also the Madhyamaka-School), which bases itself on two works attributed to Nagarjuna: Madhyamika-sastra (MMK plus a commentary T 1564) and Dvadasadvara (the 'Twelve Gates', T 1568); and a work attributed to Nagarjuna's disciple Aryadeva: Sata-sastra ('Treatise in One Hundred Verses' T 1569).

Seng-chao's main interest focuses on the problems of time, space and movement. So, e.g., he states that dharmas are "neither in motion, nor in rest", but that their characteristic is pu-ch'ien, literally 'unchangeing': they have such a short momentary existence that they are more as static images following on each other in a tremendous speed.

The San-lun school mainly emphasizes three themes:



1. A polemic attitude towards all discursive claims and the refutation of all affirmative prepositions; absolute truth, which is the only ideal, is after all nisprapañca: 'inexpressible and unthinkable'.

2. A sharp distinction between relative truth and absolute truth: relative truth leads to 'knowing', absolute truth is wisdom. "Wisdom is no-knowledge" is by the way the title of Seng-chao's 3rd chapter.

3. The eightfold negation of Nagarjuna (introductory verses of MMK) which translated in Chinese state:


No Production
No Extinction
No Annihilation
No Permanence
No Unity
No Diversity
No Coming
No departure


Some quotations from Seng-chao:


"The true nature of dharmas is that they are neither in motion, nor at rest. Or, to state it differently: they are both in motion and in rest. To use the formulation of the Path of the Middle: by stating that there is both motion and rest, we fall into one of the two extremes. By stating that there is neither motion nor rest, we follow the Path of the Middle."

"All dharmas are truly non-existent in one sense and not non-existent in another sense. In the first point of view they are although apparently existing, de facto non-existing. In the second point of view they are although apparently non-existing, de facto not non-existing."

"That is why the Holy Man is as a hollow void. He cherishes no-knowledge. He remains in this world of impermanence and usefulness, however he abides in the realm of non-action (wu-wei). He is situated within the walls of what is expressible, and yet he lives in the open space that transcends all speach. He is silent and alone, empty and open; his form of existence cannot be covered in words. There remains nothing further to be said about him."


A second important figure is Tao-shêng (360-434), just as Seng-chao he is a disciple of Kumarajiva. Later he also becomes a follower of Hui-yüan (334-416, more about him later). Besides a profound knowledge of Madhyamaka, Tao-shêng also had a special interest in the Nirvana-sutra (Nieh-pan ching, T 374-7), especially concerning the problem of Buddha-nature and the icchantikas (Ch. [I-]ch'an-t'I, literally 'those who follow their own [desires and impulses]'), those beings who are without any merit and who, according to general tradition, cannot or don't wish to realize Enlightenment. According to the Nirvana-sutra also these beings will realize Enlightenment because of the presence of Buddha-nature in all beings, no matter who or what they are.

Tao-shêng, who was also familiar with Confucianist and Taoist teachings, is said to have provided a philosophical foundation to this vision of the sutra, making ample use of Chinese insights. Although only small fragments of his work remain by way of quotations, fact remains that he was discussed extensively by his contemporaries and even by the next generations.

Although Buddha-nature is present in all beings, it can not be expressed by words. Words are traps, 'bow-nets that are left behind once the fish is removed'. True insight is therefore without (beyond) words. Also in this sense Tao-shêng can be regarded as a precursor of the Chinese Ch'an School.

From this same vision on Buddha-nature, Tao-shêng concludes that Enlightenment is a 'sudden' event. As long as the mind remains captive in the chains of existence, no true, definitive Enlightenment is possible. The falling away of the last ties to existence (e.g. to the insight of 'being' and 'non-being') is a unique fact that has the duration of a single thought-moment (eka-ksana, Ch. I-nien), i.e. the limit value of the shortest possible time-experience. This notion of 'Sudden Enlightenment' stands against the notion of 'Gradual Enlightenment' in which enlightenment is seen as realizable by way of passing through a gradual series of levels or stages (bhumi). From Tao-shêng on forward this will become one of the most occurring themes of discussion within Mahayana Buddhism and a criterion for the (later) division into 'schools'.

Resistance against Buddhism

Right from its first introduction in China, Buddhism has met the resistance of Confucianist schools. It is after all clear that Buddhism stands in opposition to a great number of notions held by Confucianism, such as e.g. the 'celestial ruler', 'society', etc.

Thereby comes a growing Chinese nationalism during the 5th century as a reaction against the 'barbarian' rulers who conquered Northern China, and who generally where in favor of Buddhism. In these northern states there often developed a kind of cooperation between the Sangha, the Buddhist community, and the political powers, through which a great deal of corruption entered the monasteries and temples. To strengthen their influence, ambitious monks did not hesitate to attribute themselves with magical powers or perform impressive rituals.

Despite the initial sympathy from the Neo-Taoist thinkers, we can see a hostile reaction from the 'religious Taoists' around the beginning of the 5th century. To them, Buddhism was clearly the 'competition'.

In the also divided South of China the relations were different. Buddhist institutions and thinkers there profiled themselves as more independent in regards to the political powers and focused themselves more on meditation and study.

Ignited by the Confucianists and Taoists the first persecution of Buddhism in China took place during the Northern Wei (from 446 until 454), in which a great number of temples, statues and texts were destroyed.

But even after the persecution had lifted, the Confucianists kept an antagonistic attitude towards Buddhism. Most distinguished in this regard are especially Seng-yu (445-518) and Tao-hsüan (596-667). Fan-chen (450-515, also called Tzu-chen) attacked mostly the doctrine of karma and rebirth, which in the eyes of the Chinese was the most striking characteristic of Buddhism: ("the body is the soul and the soul perishes with the body" [sic]). It should be mentioned here that Hui-yüan, for the sake of propaganda, supplied a more simplistic, popular version of the karma and rebirth doctrine, in which he even introduced the non-Buddhist concept of a 'soul' (shen).

Besides this rejection of karma and rebirth, the attacks of Confucianism were mainly directed at:

at the unprovability and uncontrollability of the sutras, against the 'clear' objectively controllability of the Five Classics (Wu ching: namely 'Shu ching' (Canonical Book of Documents); Shih ching (Canonical Book of Songs); I ching (Canonical Book of Changes); Li Chi (Canon of Rites) and Ch'un-Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn Annals)); and the Four Books (Ssu Wu: Lun-yü (Analects of Confucius); Ta Hsüeh (The Great Learning); Chung Yung (The Teaching of the Middle); and Meng-tzu (the works of Mencius).

at the fact that Buddhism was insulting toward authority, in conflict with tradition and Chinese customs.

at the fact that Buddhism would disrupt the social system.

Also Taoism will gradually react more sharply against Buddhism, be it mainly through an attempt to imitate its outward appearance. From the 5th century onwards Taoism will try to structure itself by building monastic communities and hierarchies, by establishing a collection of scriptures (the Tao Tsang in 1120 volumes) and by taking into its pantheon popular bodhisattvas and Indian deities. It never made it into a firm and lasting organization though.

[urofpersia]

Sawa, since you are Theravada Buddhist it would be interesting if you can point out the differences in logic and philosophy with Mahayana Buddhism, that will make this topic more complete.

[LYY]

Buddhist philosophy than will primarily be an epistemology, a philosophy of knowing and Buddhist soteriology will be a wisdom of knowing: seeing things as they are in se, in their emptiness, and not as they appear to our existential consciousness.
In relation to this we could mutatis mutandis point to an analogy with "Gestalt Psychology", which has phenomenological data (Gegebenheiten) as its basis. "We do not perceive the world as it is, but as we are." The 'perceiver' organizes his/her own world of experience out of or around his/her own attitude.

To give a structure or a soteriological efficiency to such "emptiness-thinking", we can make use of several keys or paradigms with which we can solve the apparent unacceptability's or paradoxes. Most used in relation hereto are:


(1) the logical tetralemma, which forms the basis of the Buddhist fourfold logic :

a. A is
b. A is not
c. A is, and is not
d. A neither is, nor is not



In which the final and definitive emphasis is put on (d.). Where paradoxes occur (e.g. in the question of self/no-self) the thought process should - if possible - extend to the fourth lemma (d.) i.e. "neither self, nor no-self".

Any difference with the Logical Operator in VB?

(2) the threefold level in relation to 'person', based on a centrifugal perspective:


a. personal
b. transpersonal
c. impersonal

Analogy to the Triadic: Heaven(天)-Earth(地)-Man(人)?

Edited by LYY, 23 October 2005 - 09:09 PM.

[naruwan]

Actually Buddhist is not really trying to say something exist or not exist.

Instead the concept.

Such as if you see something you call a table, then you'd say it's a table.

But that is because you defined the object.

The object doesn't have to be used as a table. To others, it might be a chair, it might be a raft. Therefore what you think is a "table" doesn't exist. It exist only because you think it exist. You think it exist so strongly, because you also have this concept of self, much like how you have the concept of the table.

Therefore same applies to the suffering. And how to escape suffering.

Because Buddhism is a religion that want you to Escape Suffering and Find True Happiness.

Also the MOST important concept is reincarnation and the world as we, the unenlightened see it, is defined by Cause and Cessation.

To became a Buddha is to escape both, as both are the root cause of suffering.

Edited by naruwan, 23 October 2005 - 08:50 PM.

[LYY]

Every momentous 'being' is a compound of a series of ever-changing and impermanent aggregates called the 'five aggregates' (pañca-skandha).

* rupa: form, corporeality
* vedana: feeling, perception
* samjña: cognition, conception
* samskara: volition, karma-formations
* vijñana: consciousness, discrimination

Dichotomy of Body/Mind:

Body (Rupa) / Mind (Feeling, perception, volition and consciousness)

[LYY]

Suffering here, does not belong to the sphere of salvation or enlightenment - as is often the case in other religions -, but is a characteristic of the existential world in which existence unfolds. This 'suffering' stands loose from the sphere of nirvana : this becomes clear although paradoxically expressed in the 'Heart-Sutra' ("Here, there is no suffering, no cause of suffering, no cessation of suffering, no path that leads to the cessation of suffering.").
Duhkha indeed is one of the universal characteristics of that which exists, viz. the 'experienced'. As the locus typicus goes:

* All forms of existence are characterized by suffering;
* All forms of existence are characterized by impermanence;
* All elements of existence are characterized by non-self.

Non-self

In the Triadic - Heaven(天)-Man(人)-Earth(地), the MAN in the middle state is only an agent of mediation.
MAN cannot assert himself for a simple reason. MAN has no self. It is a transient mediation between Stimulus/Reality/Earth (Form/Rupa) and Heaven (Mind Aggregates). Soon the completion of mediation between Rupa and the Kandha, it gives way.

(This is the origin of the saying 不三不四).


Impermanence

Because the MAN (the agent of mediation) is only at transient state, it is never permanent.
The process of mediation consists of:
(i) Stimulus
(ii) Mediation
(iii) Response

Mediation must give way in order to allow for Response.

These are basic processes that dictate the everchanging ever-evolving Samsara.


Suffering

The everchanging ever-evolving change of phase (or Hexagrams in I Ching) involves accumulation and dispersal of entropies (karma/kamma) in parallel with the realm of Time and Place (Space) [ 時与位].

Suffering may come from the RUPA and/or Khandas as well.
It characterizes the accumulation/dispersal of karmic energies.

[LYY]

The distinction between 'forms of existence' and 'elements of existence' is of the utmost importance.

All 'things' or 'beings' are compound: these are the 'forms' that existence takes on. (samskara = compound).
This 'compound' is characterized by its composing elements or components (dharma = principle, basic principle, characteristic,...).
If one would use the example of computer science as a metaphor, one could picture a dharma as corresponding to a unit of communication (bit) or a unit of transmission (baud). Samskara than would correspond with a 'message' or 'data'.

From the Form(Rupa)/Mind(Khanda) dichotomy, we can further recurse the dichotomy:

Dichotomy of Form(Rupa):
---> Form(Rupa)
---> Temperature[冷熱] / Hardness[剛柔] = Earth Element (土)
---> Wood/ Fire / Metal / Water (木火金水)

(Note: The Earth element is a filterer, composing the right temperature and hardness to give Form to reality).


Dichotomy of Khanda(Mind):

I leave it to the experts here.

Edited by LYY, 23 October 2005 - 10:40 PM.

[LYY]

Every momentous 'being' is a compound of a series of ever-changing and impermanent aggregates called the 'five aggregates' (pañca-skandha).

* rupa: form, corporeality
* vedana: feeling, perception
* samjña: cognition, conception
* samskara: volition, karma-formations
* vijñana: consciousness, discrimination


How difficult it is to give a proper translation or even an approach of these terms becomes apparent from the multitude of (sometimes contradictory) translations.

These five skandha's are stages of perception, cognition and volition. They are NOT ontological elements. They give an approach of the mental process that is active in the 'psyche'. We thus can look upon them as psychological/epistemological elements.

Line 3: Man-Heaven => Feeling, perception
Line 4: Man-Earth => Cognition/Conception
Line 5: Heaven-Man => Volition
Line 6: Heaven-Heaven => Consciousness

Note that Line 4 (Man-Earth) is the only line free of Heaven.

Edited by LYY, 23 October 2005 - 11:21 PM.

[MengTzu]

From the articles GZ posted:

Even Confucianism, with its initial rejection of all things supernatural takes into account the concept of Heaven (T'ien) and its Virtue (working or effectiveness).

There so many exaggerating claims that Confucius was agnostic, or that Confucianism initially rejected all things supernatural. The usual quote that we hear in support is "I do not know life, how do I know death?", but this is one quote. As a professor of mine once said, there are so many Confucian classical texts that have such diversity that it's easy to prove anything from them. Fact of the matter is that Confucianism isn't always consistent with most things. To unify Confucian thought is like trying to draw a pattern to connect a bunch of scattered dots, but no pattern would ever connect all the dots. It's probably safe to say that Confucianism is the accumulated intellectual effort of many individuals schooled in generally the same subjects and texts.

Confucius was perhaps much more skeptical than prophets like Moses, Jesus, and Muhammed, but certainly not as skeptical as the atheist, or even agnostic, philosophers. One of his sayings, though still isolated and stands on its own, gives us very interesting insight into the extremely complex and nuanced religious view of Confucius: "Honor the ghosts and spirits and distant yourself from them." This distancing of oneself from the spiritual might be itself a form of respect (recognizing our unworthiness,) and yet it might also be a form of hesitation to rely too much on the supernatural. Yet honor for the spirits and not depending too much on them are the two concepts that are perfectly harmonious for Confucius. Another instance is recorded in Li Ji, where Confucius taught that treating the dead as alive might not be logical, but treating the dead as dead is certainly not affectionate. Confucius then suggested that one can perform rituals and pour out his heart, but does not have to have full belief about the after life, and he would still be living according to ritual propriety.

Furthermore, Confucius often spoke of Heaven not unlike how Christians speak of a personal, loving God. Confucius also said that someone who has committed serious wrongs cannot find sure help through prayers to Heaven. Confucius once also spoke of Heaven in very naturalistic terms, that Heaven does not speak, and all things in nature are in order.

In brief, it is probably best to categorize Confucius as being somewhere between religious and skeptical. I'm sorry if I drew a tangent. Please continue discussion about Buddhism.

[naruwan]

From the articles GZ posted:
There so many exaggerating claims that Confucius was agnostic, or that Confucianism initially rejected all things supernatural. The usual quote that we hear in support is "I do not know life, how do I know death?", but this is one quote. As a professor of mine once said, there are so many Confucian classical texts that have such diversity that it's easy to prove anything from them. Fact of the matter is that Confucianism isn't always consistent with most things. To unify Confucian thought is like trying to draw a pattern to connect a bunch of scattered dots, but no pattern would ever connect all the dots. It's probably safe to say that Confucianism is the accumulated intellectual effort of many individuals schooled in generally the same subjects and texts.

Confucius was perhaps much more skeptical than prophets like Moses, Jesus, and Muhammed, but certainly not as skeptical as the atheist, or even agnostic, philosophers. One of his sayings, though still isolated and stands on its own, gives us very interesting insight into the extremely complex and nuanced religious view of Confucius: "Honor the ghosts and spirits and distant yourself from them." This distancing of oneself from the spiritual might be itself a form of respect (recognizing our unworthiness,) and yet it might also be a form of hesitation to rely too much on the supernatural. Yet honor for the spirits and not depending too much on them are the two concepts that are perfectly harmonious for Confucius. Another instance is recorded in Li Ji, where Confucius taught that treating the dead as alive might not be logical, but treating the dead as dead is certainly not affectionate. Confucius then suggested that one can perform rituals and pour out his heart, but does not have to have full belief about the after life, and he would still be living according to ritual propriety.

Furthermore, Confucius often spoke of Heaven not unlike how Christians speak of a personal, loving God. Confucius also said that someone who has committed serious wrongs cannot find sure help through prayers to Heaven. Confucius once also spoke of Heaven in very naturalistic terms, that Heaven does not speak, and all things in nature are in order.

In brief, it is probably best to categorize Confucius as being somewhere between religious and skeptical. I'm sorry if I drew a tangent. Please continue discussion about Buddhism.

Confucious doesn't "reject" all things supernatural. It is in the tradition to worship and respect the spirits, so Confucious is all for that. What he doesn't do is "discuss" anything supernatural. To put it plainly, he rather believe and just have faith in the "traditional" views of death and spirits, instead of discuss it and devise new or accept new concepts of after life.

[MengTzu]

Confucious doesn't "reject" all things supernatural. It is in the tradition to worship and respect the spirits, so Confucious is all for that. What he doesn't do is "discuss" anything supernatural. To put it plainly, he rather believe and just have faith in the "traditional" views of death and spirits, instead of discuss it and devise new or accept new concepts of after life.

You're right to an extent, but not exactly. Confucius definitely philosophized about rituals (such as about honoring the deceased, as I pointed out already) and many other things (the popular idea that Confucius was purely a pragmatic thinker is also incorrect.)

[naruwan]

Well I'm not that Enlightened to make a real deep comparison. XD But here is my try:

The basics are the same in Theravada and Mahayana, however the approach or 'vision' towards the operation and use of the religion is different. As usual, Theravada is accuse of lacking in 'compassion.'

The link provided by GZ is worth a read: http://www.akshin.ne...na-mahayana.htm

When we speak about Mahayana and Theravada its the same Arahat vs Bodhisattvas discussion. In short that Mahayana aims for the mass to learn and be Enlightened through the Bodhisattvas, while the Arahat in Theravada is individually Enlightened.

Theravada focus on Enlightenment of the individual, which is true, for its doctrine focused only in practicing Buddhism and attaining Enlightenment, a practical approach. It is basically put that a tool is put infront, whether one use it or not is the matter of one's choice. In some cases or beliefs, whether the tool is put infront is also dependent on your own Karma.

The task of Enlightening the Mass is left out of the doctrine but is practiced through the religion's organization. Basically the Monastic organization will root itself into the culture and politics of a nation, then push the religion into practice. The Therevada order in Thailand, for example, is under one Patriach. Compassion is thus a big part of the relationship between the Monastery and the layman. It thus become a way of life.

Mahayana, IMO attempts to bring out Buddhism to the Mass through the doctrine it self. Mass Enlightenement is attempted by the Bodihisattvas who are already Enlightened but having compassion stayed. Basically the virtues of Buddhism is embodied in the Bodihisattvas which would allow a better access through the Mass, and thus from the Faith of the Mass, as in Pure Land, the Mass can attain a good positive step towards Buddhahood.

So whats the big difference? I think none, as both reaches for Enlightenment and the difference is only through the means of reaching out to the mass, which is something a Monk shouldn't even care, leaving Layman like us to argue.

In fact, the two doctrin first diverged after the first Buddhist summit right after Buddha died.

They allowed limited number of top followers into the cave to recall all Buddha's teachings.

However many people came to this event who didn't get to go into the cave stayed outside and they came up with their own.

The difference between the two is on the subject of Vajrayana. While Mahayana insisted that Vajrayana shouldn't be taught to those who are not monks, as it would confuse them. The Theravada believes that Buddhism should have strong knowledge bases in both the monks and the followers, therefore Vajrayana should be taught to those who are not monks but have achieved certain levels on the path to enlightenment.

That's how it all started.......