57 replies to this topic

[Centaur]

Dear Le Khac Minh Giao, I agree with you that Li Shimin's hands were forced and XuanWumen was a necessary evil.

Your question regarding if Li Jian Cheng had won the fight, what would the situation, is a pertinent one. Similarly I too, have also a question, what if Li Shimin had not been the Tang Taizong that he was, but instead was a wastrel and despotic, would we be so kind in our appraisal of Li Shimin's action at XuanWumen?

Edited by Centaur, 07 September 2006 - 07:47 PM.

[Sephodwyrm]

He would be Yang Guang # 2.

But I don't think he's that stupid to repeat mistakes.

[Rong Qin Wang]

Dear Le Khac Minh Giao, I agree with you that Li Shimin's hands were forced and XuanWumen was a necessary evil.

Your question regarding if Li Jian Cheng had won the fight, what would the situation, is a pertinent one. Similarly I too, have also a question, what if Li Shimin had not been the Tang Taizong that he was, but instead was a wastrel and despotic, would we be so kind in our appraisal of Li Shimin's action at XuanWumen?

Zunjing de Centaur,

I think that you have asked a very good question, and Sephodwyrm really brought up a good point about Tang Taizong being the second Sui Yangdi if he was not a great Emperor.

Of course, if Tang Taizong was a horrible ruler, then we would have to analyze the XuanWu gate incident in a different light. I do believe that we can evaluate someone through their actions. If Tang Taizong was a tyrant, then we would have to consider the possibility that his brothers might have made the first move under his manipulation. Maybe he somehow forced his brothers to instigate the XuanWu gate incident, so that he would have a legitimate reason to kill them. As he was the second son, he would have had to fight for the throne either way. But since Tang Taizong was a benevolent ruler, we would think that he would at least try to be nice to his brothers. We are willing to give him the benefit of the doubt that he did not stir up the XuanWu gate incident.

About Sui Yangdi, there were suspicions that he killed his father and usurped the throne. Maybe he really did not commit such a crime, but since he was such a ruthless Emperor, people assume that he was very capable of pulling off something like that.

Similarly, people suspect that Wu Zetian murdered her baby princess just to blame it on Empress Wang, when there is really no solid proof on this issue. If Wu Zetian was a submissive wife, a loving mother, and a virtuous woman, then nobody would think that she could have done such a thing. The fact that she exiled or killed her sons showed that it would be no surprise that she was willing to sacrifice her daughter as well.

Back to Tang Taizong, I personally think that if he was a despot, then people would have focused more on how bad he was to the people, and be less concerned with the XuanWu gate incident. Also, I think people bring up the XuanWu gate incident just to prove that even a great Emperor like Tang Taizong had flaws. It is still sad to think that you had to kill your brothers in order to become a great Emperor.

Well, that is just my personal opinion, so any questions and comments are greatly appreciated!

Xie Xie,

[galvatron prime]

I voted yes because LI shi Min do it for the sake of Tang Dynastly ,his 2 brothers are bad guy i personal think ,have he not kill his brother the Tang empire will not last long ,particular Tang will conquer by Tujue as well ,with LI jing around , LI shimin do the right thing .

[Yun]

Andrew Eisenburg of Northeastern Illinois University ( http://www.neiu.edu/~history/eisen.htm ) wrote an article in 1994 ("Kingship, Power, and the Hsuan-wu Men Incident of the Tang", in T'oung Pao LXXX) arguing that the Xuanwu Gate Coup was instigated by Li Yuan himself to ensure that the strongest and most ruthless contender for the position of heir apparent would get it.

His conclusion: "Tang Gaozu purposely arranged for his three eldest sons to compete with each other, and ultimately, to endeavor to kill each other in a bid for the position of heir apparent. Li Shimin (later known as Tang Taizong) emerged the winner. In order to ensure political stabiliy and continuity in imperial policy and personnel, Gaozu 'retired' in the eighth month of 626 and remained at the palace center for another three years, before relocating to the suburban Taian Palace."

Eisenburg has three starting points:
1. He accepts the revisionist approach that Li Yuan, and not Li Shimin, was the key decision-maker from the time of the rebellion against the Sui government until his 'retirement'. He was not pushed into rebellion by Li Shimin, and was a forceful leader himself. So Eisenburg finds it unlikely that Li Yuan was passive in the face of the factional fighting between his three sons, placidly accepted Li Shimin's act of fratricide at the Xuanwu Gate, and then allowed himself to be forced into retirement by Li Shimin.

2. In North Asian (i.e. steppe) regimes, violent free-for-all civil wars to determine the most competent successor to the rulership were common. Eisenburg accepts the argument by Thomas Barfield and the late Joseph Fletcher (scholars studying the relations between nomad societies and China) that the Xuanwu Gate Coup reflected the influence of Xianbei or Turk political culture on the Tang dynasty. He argues that Li Yuan avoided a large-scale conflict between his sons by carefully overseeing the contest and setting the parameters such that in the end, only one or two of the sons would die instead of having massive bloodshed between armies led by them.

3. In the Northern Wei and Northern Qi dynasties of the Age of Fragmentation, two relatively young emperors had 'retired' (i.e. taken the position of Taishanghuang) and handed their thrones over to heirs still under ten years of age. This was done, Eisenburg argued in another article in 1991, so that the 'retired emperors' could oversee a stable succession, allowing the new child-emperor to acquire legitimacy and experience before his father died and left him to fend for himself. The idea is that father-to-son succession was not well-established in Xianbei politics, and that challenges to the heir could be expected from other members of the imperial clan unless the father was around to protect him.

Eisenburg's further argument is that in the Tang, there was a slightly different approach to retiring emperors in that the heirs whose fathers retired were all mature adults. Li Yuan's motivation for handing the throne to Li Shimin was to develop a system of 'power-sharing' between a senior emperor and junior emperor, so that the junior emperor had time to gain the loyalty of the senior emperor's 'old guard' of officials and generals. After his retirement, Li Yuan actually remained active in court affairs until 629 when he moved to the Taian Palace in the suburbs of Chang'an. This ensured a smooth and stable transition of power between father and son.

Do you find this theory convincing?

[snowybeagle]

I always wondered about the emperors handing the thrones to young sons when they were still well in health etc.

But there's a few doubts about Eisenburg's theory.

First, why appoint a Crown Prince?

Second, there were more than sufficient precedents during AoF of rivalries between brothers fracturing the kingdoms. Eisenburg suggested Li Yuan was controlling the situation to prevent it from reaching that point, but given that the Tang regime was newly established with various regions still not quite fully subdued, was the risk worth it?

[Yun]

Some further quotes from Eisenburg addressing your two questions:

1. "Immediately after Gaozu ascended the throne, Jiancheng was designated as the heir apparent. From the ritual perspective, this was the correct thing to do. However, with three adult sons present, all of whom could claim to have made significant contributions to the establishment of the Tang, all of whom were intensely jealous of each other, and all of whom had their own staffs and followers, ritual legitimacy was insufficient. Gaozu was confronted by a very delicate situation."

2. "The approach of Gaozu was very risky, but under conditions where there were a limited number of relatively legitimate competitors for the throne, the encouragement of a limited free-for-all ensured that the survivor would be the most competent and ruthless political manipulator and thus eminently qualified to become emperor."

[lifezard]

hi Yun,

it seems that Eisenburg has a very interesting theory here... i would like to pose a few questions..

Some further quotes from Eisenburg addressing your two questions:

1. "Immediately after Gaozu ascended the throne, Jiancheng was designated as the heir apparent. From the ritual perspective, this was the correct thing to do. However, with three adult sons present, all of whom could claim to have made significant contributions to the establishment of the Tang, all of whom were intensely jealous of each other, and all of whom had their own staffs and followers, ritual legitimacy was insufficient. Gaozu was confronted by a very delicate situation."

2. "The approach of Gaozu was very risky, but under conditions where there were a limited number of relatively legitimate competitors for the throne, the encouragement of a limited free-for-all ensured that the survivor would be the most competent and ruthless political manipulator and thus eminently qualified to become emperor."

1. if it was Li Yuan s idea to put forward the struggle between Li Shimin and his brothers, dun you think no matter what conventional history has to say of him, he definitely got the situation out of control and backfired on himself... he played almost no further part in political history and was regarded by posterity as a mediocre ruler... no matter what he planned, i find it hard to believe that the endding was what he intended

2. when you mentioned about the fierce kin struggle for succession in various steppe cultures, i could n't help but looked back at the various xianbei and xiongnu regimes in the AoF era.. of which Tang emerged as the last and most successful of them.... if my memory do not fail me, while indeed there are plenty of such srtruggles, i do not remember any that took place under a watchful eye of the incumbent ruler... indeed, if such types of struggle occurs, usually the incumbent is eliminated as well, not just designated successors and likely competitors... seen in this light, li shimin s allowing of his father to 'retire' seemed pretty benevolent...
3. without 3rd party primary sources how much li shimin 'appropriated' history wrt to his father and the xuanwumen affair is still pretty hard to speculate

4. one struggle vaguely similar to this and haoppening just a few decades later : the 乙巳の変 Itsushi Affair) seemed the closest i can relate to xuanwumen

Edited by lifezard, 07 December 2006 - 06:12 AM.

[huey]

Some further quotes from Eisenburg addressing your two questions:

1. "Immediately after Gaozu ascended the throne, Jiancheng was designated as the heir apparent. From the ritual perspective, this was the correct thing to do. However, with three adult sons present, all of whom could claim to have made significant contributions to the establishment of the Tang, all of whom were intensely jealous of each other, and all of whom had their own staffs and followers, ritual legitimacy was insufficient. Gaozu was confronted by a very delicate situation."

2. "The approach of Gaozu was very risky, but under conditions where there were a limited number of relatively legitimate competitors for the throne, the encouragement of a limited free-for-all ensured that the survivor would be the most competent and ruthless political manipulator and thus eminently qualified to become emperor."

Interesting points.

1. It's hard to choose among the three. If Li Yuan made the competition for his 2 sons, wouldn't he decide not to designate Li Jiancheng to be crown prince?

2. Just popped out from simple mind. If Li Shimin found out this plot, wouldn't he kill his father after he became emperor?

Similar approach (competition) was used in this modern era, i.e. when selecting the next CEO of GE, to choose the best among 3 candidates to be successor of Jack Welch, the legendary CEO of GE.

[snowybeagle]

2. Just popped out from simple mind. If Li Shimin found out this plot, wouldn't he kill his father after he became emperor?

There wouldn't have been any point for him to do so.

If Li Shimin was anointed as Crown Prince instead, the contest for succession would still be there, and something still has to be done about Li Jiancheng and Li Yuanji.

How likely was it for Li Shimin to convince his brothers that he would make a better emperor than either of them, persuade them to support him and pledge their loyal dedicated service to the empire instead?

[Rong Qin Wang]

Andrew Eisenburg of Northeastern Illinois University ( http://www.neiu.edu/~history/eisen.htm ) wrote an article in 1994 ("Kingship, Power, and the Hsuan-wu Men Incident of the Tang", in T'oung Pao LXXX) arguing that the Xuanwu Gate Coup was instigated by Li Yuan himself to ensure that the strongest and most ruthless contender for the position of heir apparent would get it.

His conclusion: "Tang Gaozu purposely arranged for his three eldest sons to compete with each other, and ultimately, to endeavor to kill each other in a bid for the position of heir apparent. Li Shimin (later known as Tang Taizong) emerged the winner. In order to ensure political stabiliy and continuity in imperial policy and personnel, Gaozu 'retired' in the eighth month of 626 and remained at the palace center for another three years, before relocating to the suburban Taian Palace."

Eisenburg has three starting points:
1. He accepts the revisionist approach that Li Yuan, and not Li Shimin, was the key decision-maker from the time of the rebellion against the Sui government until his 'retirement'. He was not pushed into rebellion by Li Shimin, and was a forceful leader himself. So Eisenburg finds it unlikely that Li Yuan was passive in the face of the factional fighting between his three sons, placidly accepted Li Shimin's act of fratricide at the Xuanwu Gate, and then allowed himself to be forced into retirement by Li Shimin.

2. In North Asian (i.e. steppe) regimes, violent free-for-all civil wars to determine the most competent successor to the rulership were common. Eisenburg accepts the argument by Thomas Barfield and the late Joseph Fletcher (scholars studying the relations between nomad societies and China) that the Xuanwu Gate Coup reflected the influence of Xianbei or Turk political culture on the Tang dynasty. He argues that Li Yuan avoided a large-scale conflict between his sons by carefully overseeing the contest and setting the parameters such that in the end, only one or two of the sons would die instead of having massive bloodshed between armies led by them.

3. In the Northern Wei and Northern Qi dynasties of the Age of Fragmentation, two relatively young emperors had 'retired' (i.e. taken the position of Taishanghuang) and handed their thrones over to heirs still under ten years of age. This was done, Eisenburg argued in another article in 1991, so that the 'retired emperors' could oversee a stable succession, allowing the new child-emperor to acquire legitimacy and experience before his father died and left him to fend for himself. The idea is that father-to-son succession was not well-established in Xianbei politics, and that challenges to the heir could be expected from other members of the imperial clan unless the father was around to protect him.

Eisenburg's further argument is that in the Tang, there was a slightly different approach to retiring emperors in that the heirs whose fathers retired were all mature adults. Li Yuan's motivation for handing the throne to Li Shimin was to develop a system of 'power-sharing' between a senior emperor and junior emperor, so that the junior emperor had time to gain the loyalty of the senior emperor's 'old guard' of officials and generals. After his retirement, Li Yuan actually remained active in court affairs until 629 when he moved to the Taian Palace in the suburbs of Chang'an. This ensured a smooth and stable transition of power between father and son.

Do you find this theory convincing?

Zunjing de Yun the Sage-King,

Hmm, it is certainly an interesting topic worthy of more discussions if a new theory had emerged! I must admit this new theory was so different than the other two speculations.

Some people believe Li JianCheng’s accomplishments were seriously undermined by historians with the insistence of Tang Taizong since Tang Taizong was the only Emperor who requested to see the historical records himself and his wish was granted. However, we really don’t have any proofs regarding any aspects of this sibling rivalry being altered by later historians. Nevertheless, it is always a great idea to question everything you read, and never completely trust any sources.

Others put most of the blame on Tang Gaozu since he was so indecisive and was giving out mixed signals. The worst part was that he practically did nothing to prevent the factional fighting among his sons. Before establishing the Tang Dynasty, Tang Gaozu had promised the throne to his second son because he had made the most contributions. However, after ascending to the throne, Tang Gaozu conveniently forgot his promise because he did not wish to go against traditions and create a second son the Crown Prince. After creating Li JianCheng as the Crown Prince, Tang Gaozu continuously entrusted Li Shimin with many major court affairs and fighting a lot of crucial battles. These actions undermined Li JianCheng’s position as the heir apparent, thus, intensifying the jealousy and rivalries among his sons.

Eisenburg has a very interesting theory here; therefore, I would like to pose some questions and make a few analyses.

I agree Tang Gaozu was placed in a very delicate situation; however, it was really no different than the problems also encountered by other dynastic founders.

1.] The traditional view was that Li Shimin initially insisted on starting a rebellion himself and replaced the Sui Dynasty. However, Li Shimin was far too young to win respect of other followers. Hence, he forced his father into the rebellion by tricking him into sleeping with two of Sui Yangdi’s concubines.

I have never read any revisionist versions regarding Li Yuan as a forceful leader himself and rebelled partly because he also had ambitions of becoming the next Emperor. If this was the case, then he would have been a shrewd politician; therefore, it was rather unlikely for him to not be so active in his sons’ battles for the throne. It would be even harder to believe that he would have abdicated in favor of his son so easily. However, can we really trust this revisionist version?

2.] Yes, primogeniture was practically a Han Chinese custom. Tribes living in nomadic societies did not really follow the same practice. Nomads were a lot more democratic in choosing the next leader. The next leader usually had to work really hard to obtain his position and then do the same thing to maintain it. There were far less rigid rules in nomadic societies. That is why Tang Gaozu had promised to make his second son the Crown Prince as an incentive for making the most contributions as it was not such a radical idea. Well, the Xuan Wu gate incident did result in only the deaths of Li JianCheng, Li Yuanji, and their followers rather than a large scale conflict with massive bloodshed between armies. This consequence was very fortunate for the Tang Dynasty. However, this was not due to Tang Gaozu’s careful intentions, but because Li Shimin was far more talented than his brothers; hence, he was able to organize his army more efficiently and had better strategies. Honestly, his brothers stood no chance against him since this was a head to head battle, so it was impossible for them to use dirty tricks.

3.] Hmm, I believe the idea that an Emperor should retire early is a wonderful one! I mean even Emperors cannot fight old age, which is one of the saddest things! When you are old, you are more likely to make silly/stupid mistakes that you would not normally do. If an old Emperor retired early, then he can ensure that he won’t be making unintentional errors due to old age, and live peacefully for the remainder of his life. If Tang MingHuang had retired a little earlier, then the prosperity of the Tang Dynasty might have lasted even longer.

It is also a really thoughtful idea to have an Emperor abdicate in favor of his immature son. Since young Emperors occupying the throne were one of the reasons for usurpations by other family members or major officials, it is really wise for a young Emperor to give the throne to his young son while he was still alive. This way, the Grand Emperor can protect his young son and cement his position in the political court.

However, that was not the case for the Tang Dynasty. Some sources stated that Li Shimin forced his father into an early retirement. I highly doubt that was the issue since all the contenders for the throne were already eliminated. Besides, people would have probably been more than frightened by Li Shimin’s fratricide; hence, his position was already stable. IMO, Tang Gaozu’s abdication was due to his grief over losing his two sons and his incapability in preventing this whole thing from happening.

There had been more than an adequate amount of examples in showing the disputes over the throne among the princes would more often than not result in a rapid decline for the empire as several factions were formed. Of course, competitions can bring out the best of everyone; however, it was way too risky to purposefully set up conflicts for the throne just to select the most suitable successor as it would most likely result in bloodshed, especially since the Tang Dynasty was not fully established with a secured position. Also, I really don’t think Tang Gaozu was astute enough to have this plan in mind.

Lifezard had brought up a really good point when stating that when struggles occurred, the Emperor was likely to be killed along with the heir apparent. Hey, if the heir apparent survived, then he might have started plotting against his father, so that he could quickly ascend to the throne and secured his footing.

Xie Xie,

[Rong Qin Wang]

There wouldn't have been any point for him to do so.

If Li Shimin was anointed as Crown Prince instead, the contest for succession would still be there, and something still has to be done about Li Jiancheng and Li Yuanji.

How likely was it for Li Shimin to convince his brothers that he would make a better emperor than either of them, persuade them to support him and pledge their loyal dedicated service to the empire instead?

Zunjing de Snowybeagle Xian Sheng,

Hmm, do you really think that even if Li Shimin was appointed as the heir apparent instead, there would still be the contest for succession since Li JianCheng and Li YuanJi would have never settled for peace?

Well, I have posted a similar question in the other thread; however, I have received no responses. Hence, I will repost my question in here for you again.

What if Tang Gaozu were to create Li Shimin as the crown prince right at the beginning? Would this have ceased the Xuanwu Gate incident from occurring, or would it only cause the killing of brothers to start sooner?

Xie Xie,

[Ashura]

Zunjing de Snowybeagle Xian Sheng,

Hmm, do you really think that even if Li Shimin was appointed as the heir apparent instead, there would still be the contest for succession since Li JianCheng and Li YuanJi would have never settled for peace?

Well, I have posted a similar question in the other thread; however, I have received no responses. Hence, I will repost my question in here for you again.

What if Tang Gaozu were to create Li Shimin as the crown prince right at the beginning? Would this have ceased the Xuanwu Gate incident from occurring, or would it only cause the killing of brothers to start sooner?

Xie Xie,

Mind you there was no way that Li Shi Min would be appointed as heir in the beginning. Such move would be illegitimate and would result in bigger conflict.

The whole conflict arose when the three princes had they own systems and power bases and Li Yuan could not resolve that. Making the situtation worse, Li Shi Min contributed the most to the empire which made the position of Li Jian Cheng uneasy as Li Shi Min was the conquerer and conquerer had a lot of legitimacy.

[Rong Qin Wang]

Mind you there was no way that Li Shi Min would be appointed as heir in the beginning. Such move would be illegitimate and would result in bigger conflict.

The whole conflict arose when the three princes had they own systems and power bases and Li Yuan could not resolve that. Making the situtation worse, Li Shi Min contributed the most to the empire which made the position of Li Jian Cheng uneasy as Li Shi Min was the conquerer and conquerer had a lot of legitimacy.

Zunjing de Ashura My Liege ,

Hmm, are you sure that it would be considered illegitimate to initially make Li Shimin the Crown Prince? I recall from a reading that Tang Gaozu did not officially proclaim who would be the Crown Prince until a month after his ascension to the throne. This delay was due to the fact that he was contemplating over whether or not to create Li Shimin as the Crown Prince. He eventually decided against that idea. However, the fact that he would consider making his second son the heir proved that some officials would support this decision as the legitimate one. Of course, according to the law of primogeniture, Li JianCheng was automatically the heir. With this in mind, I wonder what Li Yuan was thinking when he promised the throne to Li Shimin in the first place. Li Yuan was certainly sending mixed signals to his sons.

Xie Xie,

[esse]

The charge that Li Jiancheng poisoned Li Shimin is non-conclusive, at best biased, and at worse fabricated. Shimin didn't die, decribed to have had the physical symptom that could have been caused by typical food poisoning amongst other things.

Neither is the claim that Li Jiancheng and Li Yuanji "initiated" the conflict conclusive. Prior to Xuanwu incident, the only official event that set light on the rivalry was ... Li Shimin being reprimanded by Li Yuan for vying for the throne.

The theory that Li Yuan was a strong emperor in control is also questionable. During this internal conflict, the emperor's court was irrelevant compared to the rivalling partisants. Once Shimin prevailed, Li Yuan became, for lack of better word, a puppet, whose fate rested entirely in his son's hand.