98 replies to this topic

[MengTzu]

Nope, because even numbers are observed. The length itself is an observable fact.

Numbers are not observed. We assign numerical value to things we observe. The numerical value itself is apriori.

What you are arguing is really irrelevant to this topic. SCP said logic proves everything and rules all, while at the same time deny the possible existence of other realities. I merely refuted that statement and said logic without observation is just nonsense in his theory of one reality.

But the very statement "logic without observation is nonsense" is an apriori statement. Prior to applying empirical principles to observation, one must first have these principles of empiricism, yet these principles are themselves apriori. To say that anything can be derived from observation, one must first believe that it is possible to derive truth from observation. But this belief is apriori to observation itself, hence there was a point in the empirical methology when logic is without observation, yet this logical premise without observation still holds for the empiricist as it is an indispensable premise.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

Numbers are not observed. We assign numerical value to things we observe. The numerical value itself is apriori.

Nope, numbers are observed just the same, or you wouldn't know they exist. You are showed since childhood how to count. If no one showed you anything, you wouldn't know that something exist besides nothing. Only negative numbers are not observable, but even they depend on the concept of observation, nothing that has contributed to progress can be completely free from observation. Or it would be just as mentioned before, useless.

But the very statement "logic without observation is nonsense" is an apriori statement. Prior to applying empirical principles to observation, one must first have these principles of empiricism, yet these principles are themselves apriori. To say that anything can be derived from observation, one must first believe that it is possible to derive truth from observation. But this belief is apriori to observation itself, hence there was a point in the empirical methology when logic is without observation, yet this logical premise without observation still holds for the empiricist as it is an indispensable premise.

I beg to differ. All of what you mentioned ultimately originates in observable facts. Metaphysical speculation is not.

[MengTzu]

Nope, numbers are observed just the same, or you wouldn't know they exist. You are showed since childhood how to count. If no one showed you anything, you wouldn't know that something exist besides nothing. Only negative numbers are not observable, but even they depend on the concept of observation, nothing that has contributed to progress can be completely free from observation. Or it would be just as mentioned before, useless.

Of course you're just repeating yourself without addressing my point. We can assign numerical value to things. We can count things. Insofar as there are 5 apples, and we can count 5 apples, there is indeed a real numerical value that can be "derived" from nature (if you insist on classical realism.) However, numbers themselves are not learned from observation. If we do not have the concept of numbers, we'd be looking at a bunch of apples and not be able to figure out how many there are. The ability to count exists prior to the actual action of counting itself. Numbers are apriori to observation.

I beg to differ. All of what you mentioned ultimately originates in observable facts. Metaphysical speculation is not.

This is clearly untrue. In order to be empirical, we must first decide that things are actually observable, that qualities of things are not assigned to them categorically (or to consider the even more extreme, that they are not illusions.) That decision is apriori, and not a fact derived from observation (for to say that I derive the principle "things are observable" from observation, I'd be using a circular logic.) Hence apriori to observation, an empiricist must first believe that things are observable. Such a belief is apriori, and is itself pure logic apart from observation.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

Of course you're just repeating yourself without addressing my point. We can assign numerical value to things. We can count things. Insofar as there are 5 apples, and we can count 5 apples, there is indeed a real numerical value that can be "derived" from nature (if you insist on classical realism.) However, numbers themselves are not learned from observation. If we do not have the concept of numbers, we'd be looking at a bunch of apples and not be able to figure out how many there are. The ability to count exists prior to the actual action of counting itself. Numbers are apriori to observation.

I think you are misinterpreting my "logic without observation is nonsense", I wasn't critisizing logic itself, but the whole theory which the logic is based on. Numbers still needs to be assigned to observable factors. You cannot have any progress by applying logic to something thar is not of this worldly. Its as simple as that.

This is clearly untrue. In order to be empirical, we must first decide that things are actually observable, that qualities of things are not assigned to them categorically (or to consider the even more extreme, that they are not illusions.) That decision is apriori, and not a fact derived from observation (for to say that I derive the principle "things are observable" from observation, I'd be using a circular logic.) Hence apriori to observation, an empiricist must first believe that things are observable. Such a belief is apriori, and is itself pure logic apart from observation.

No, you can go into this like the Chicken and the egg, because even consciousness itself is part of observation, knowing is observing. "I think, therefore I am," is itself an observation. But the fact remains, no observation = empty theory. Socrate's mind-body dichotomy is an example of that.

[MengTzu]

I think you are misinterpreting my "logic without observation is nonsense", I wasn't critisizing logic itself, but the whole theory which the logic is based on. Numbers still needs to be assigned to observable factors. You cannot have any progress by applying logic to something thar is not of this worldly. Its as simple as that.

I agree that certain theories must depend on both logic and observation. As long as you do not deny the fact that even empiricism at its very base is pure logic (for prior to observation, it must make the unobservable, logical assumption that things are observable,) we do not disagree here.

No, you can go into this like the Chicken and the egg, because even consciousness itself is part of observation, knowing is observing. "I think, therefore I am," is itself an observation. But the fact remains, no observation = empty theory. Socrate's mind-body dichotomy is an example of that.

You still fail to address my question. Whether or not one has consciousness or has observed prior to deciding "things are observable" isn't the issue. The issue is that the decision that "things are observable" is itself a premise that is not observable, and purely logical.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

I agree that certain theories must depend on both logic and observation. As long as you do not deny the fact that even empiricism at its very base is pure logic (for prior to observation, it must make the unobservable, logical assumption that things are observable,) we do not disagree here.

Yes we do indeed disagree, because I do deny your claim that empiricism at its very base is purely logic. I consider logic in its pure form, observable.

You still fail to address my question. Whether or not one has consciousness or has observed prior to deciding "things are observable" isn't the issue. The issue is that the decision that "things are observable" is itself a premise that is not observable, and purely logical.

I don't think I failed to address it at all. You need consciousness to even make the decision that things are observable, and that consciousness itself comes from observation.

[MengTzu]

Yes we do indeed disagree, because I do deny your claim that empiricism at its very base is purely logic. I consider logic in its pure form, observable.

It is impossible that the premise "it is possible to derive any principle from observation" is itself observable. To derive some principle from observation, one must first assume that it is possible to do so. Yet if one were to say that "I derive the principle that 'it is possible to derive a priniciple from observation' from observation," one is operating with a circular logic, presuming one's conclusion as premise, or assume what one sets out to prove. For what such a person concludes here is that it is possible to observe and derive truth from observation -- his conclusion is his premise. Circular reasoning.

(By the way, I believe you misphrased what you intended to say. If you "consider logic in its pure form, observable", then you're not really explaining why you deny "that empiricism at its very base is purely logic", because if, as you said, "pure logic" is observable, then you wouldn't object to saying that empiricism at its base is purely logic. I think some editing of your statement is in order here -- if you don't see the problem, read it over carefully. It looks like a careless mistake, though it's more than a typo.)

I don't think I failed to address it at all. You need consciousness to even make the decision that things are observable, and that consciousness itself comes from observation.

Already went through this. Your argument that one has observed prior to forming any logical premise is irrelevant to whether observation is used to form a particular logical premise; Since your argument is irrelevant, you failed to address the issue. Your argument is irrelevant because, as said above, it is circular logic to say that one derives the principle 'it is possible to derive any principle from observation' from observation. Hence the act of observation itself does not contribute to the logical foundation of empiricism.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

It is impossible that the premise "it is possible to derive any principle from observation" is itself observable. To derive some principle from observation, one must first assume that it is possible to do so. Yet if one were to say that "I derive the principle that 'it is possible to derive a priniciple from observation' from observation," one is operating with a circular logic, presuming one's conclusion as premise, or assume what one sets out to prove. For what such a person concludes here is that it is possible to observe and derive truth from observation -- his conclusion is his premise. Circular reasoning.

Empiricism is based on the study of natural occurences and patterns, which is ultimately observed. A human that never had any contact with senses cannot conduct empirical reasoning for the simple fact that logic revolves around the process of this world. Awareness itself is observation. As long as you "know", you are observing.

(By the way, I believe you misphrased what you intended to say. If you "consider logic in its pure form, observable", then you're not really explaining why you deny "that empiricism at its very base is purely logic", because if, as you said, "pure logic" is observable, then you wouldn't object to saying that empiricism at its base is purely logic. I think some editing of your statement is in order here -- if you don't see the problem, read it over carefully. It looks like a careless mistake, though it's more than a typo.)

I didn't disagree, what I did oppose is this statement: "for prior to observation, it must make the unobservable, logical assumption that things are observable"
Logic doesn't decide what is observable, you simply know what is observable. And to know that you know itself is an observation.

[mariusj]

Yes, but would you not agree, that empirical data needs to be valorized over others?
All of my beliefs are based on the weight of probability.

and I am a mathematician focused in Probability.

And.... I think your probability isn't my probility....

my knowledge on this is really limited to the lectures I had from a Prof. B three years ago. She said a statment that I was really confused on, (on Daoism of course) and I hope you guys can help me with.

She said this, Dao De jing said "道可道，非常道，可道非道也"
and I believe it meant something like if Dao can be described, -------- (I forgot what she said about the second part.). If Dao can be spoken then it isn't Dao.

So if Dao can't be described, speaking of, explain to, then how can one ever be sure that Dao is Dao?

Then again, I hate philosophy....

[MengTzu]

Empiricism is based on the study of natural occurences and patterns, which is ultimately observed. A human that never had any contact with senses cannot conduct empirical reasoning for the simple fact that logic revolves around the process of this world. Awareness itself is observation. As long as you "know", you are observing.

Once again, the idea that there actually are patterns in nature, and that these patterns are not categorically imposed subjectively and read "into" nature, is a logical premise, a premise that itself isn't observable, but is constructed philosophically. The very idea that patterns and forms really exist in nature -- the realist position -- is a philosophical standpoint, a standpoint you can't prove by observation.

To illustrate: let's say a realist is to show a nominalist (one who believes that patterns and forms are imposed by the mind and read "into" reality) that there really is pattern in nature. The realist cannot point to him the various patterns of nature, because the nominalist believes that these patterns are inside the mind, not objective. The decision of "whether there is actual form and pattern in nature" is apriori -- apriori means "before observation."

The circular reasoning here is obvious:

A: How do you know that you can observe patterns in nature?

B: Because I can observe.

"Because I can observe, therefore I can observe" is circular reasoning.

I didn't disagree, what I did oppose is this statement: "for prior to observation, it must make the unobservable, logical assumption that things are observable"
Logic doesn't decide what is observable, you simply know what is observable. And to know that you know itself is an observation.

Well, you're essentially justifying the circular reasoning with "I just know." That's not really an answer to anything. Imagine asking someone to prove his point, and he says, "I just know I'm right." That's not really a debate, isn't it?

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

Once again, the idea that there actually are patterns in nature, and that these patterns are not categorically imposed subjectively and read "into" nature, is a logical premise, a premise that itself isn't observable, but is constructed philosophically. The very idea that patterns and forms really exist in nature -- the realist position -- is a philosophical standpoint, a standpoint you can't prove by observation.

Even the patterns in nature are observed first for the logicians to propose such a logic. If nothing has patterns, such logic would not exist. Hence it is observed first, then analyzed.

To illustrate: let's say a realist is to show a nominalist (one who believes that patterns and forms are imposed by the mind and read "into" reality) that there really is pattern in nature. The realist cannot point to him the various patterns of nature, because the nominalist believes that these patterns are inside the mind, not objective. The decision of "whether there is actual form and pattern in nature" is apriori -- apriori means "before observation."

Even the nominalist's believe is first based on observation! If he saw nothing, he wouldn't even know something called pattern.

The circular reasoning here is obvious:

A: How do you know that you can observe patterns in nature?

B: Because I can observe.

"Because I can observe, therefore I can observe" is circular reasoning.

I see what you mean, however, to even propose question A requires observation first. You don't need to use logic to do that, a baby can observe and use his instinct to react. Logic builts upon observable facts, not the other way around.

Well, you're essentially justifying the circular reasoning with "I just know." That's not really an answer to anything. Imagine asking someone to prove his point, and he says, "I just know I'm right." That's not really a debate, isn't it?

Opposed to the argument "I just know because I used logic"? I don't think that makes any sense, you don't need logic to have awareness. You have awareness before you use logic. And observation is an inherant part of that awareness.

[Bao Pu]

You have awareness before you use logic. And observation is an inherant part of that awareness.

Hi Warhead

I can barely follow any of your discussion with Meng Tzu, but your last words are right on the mark, imo.

[MengTzu]

Even the patterns in nature are observed first for the logicians to propose such a logic. If nothing has patterns, such logic would not exist. Hence it is observed first, then analyzed.

Preliminary note: What you're suggesting is somewhat akin to the classical realist position of Aristotle, that the mind is a blank slate, and that everything in it is derived from something observed. I'm not sure if Aristotle would go as far to say that logic itself is first observed.

Logic can at most be argued to be something learned, like language. But, again, patterns are evident in nature insofar as we are able to recognize them. But are there really patterns in nature, or are these patterns our categorical constructs? You can ultimately not prove that it is one and not the other.

If you incline to ask me how I prove the other position, I'll tell you: I insist on neither position. I only questioned why you insist on one over the other, when ultimately neither is really provable. In other words, these positions are epistemological positions, premises that are not at all self-evident. All this, however, is not exactly what I'm talking about. My point is much more subtle:

My point here is not to insist on either position, so you're quite missing my point. My point is that an empiricist must not insist that his first premise is observed, because his first premise is that "reality is observable." It is like a man saying, "I think only according to my master's teaching," yet if someone asks him, "why do you follow your master's teaching?", he cannot say, "because my master says so." That would be circular reasoning. A premise cannot be its own premise. Each and every theory can be studied as many links of premise - conclusion, and ultimately it rests upon a first premise that is self-evident and relies on no other preise.. As pointed out above, "nature is observable" is not a self-evident premise.

Again, if you want to counter this argument with, "well, logical constructs aren't self-evident either," you missed my point. I'm insisting on neither observation or logical constructs as self-evident. To insist that logic itself is a guide to the truth, we must also assume on something else.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

Preliminary note: What you're suggesting is somewhat akin to the classical realist position of Aristotle, that the mind is a blank slate, and that everything in it is derived from something observed. I'm not sure if Aristotle would go as far to say that logic itself is first observed.

Logic can at most be argued to be something learned, like language. But, again, patterns are evident in nature insofar as we are able to recognize them. But are there really patterns in nature, or are these patterns our categorical constructs? You can ultimately not prove that it is one and not the other.

If you incline to ask me how I prove the other position, I'll tell you: I insist on neither position. I only questioned why you insist on one over the other, when ultimately neither is really provable. In other words, these positions are epistemological positions, premises that are not at all self-evident. All this, however, is not exactly what I'm talking about. My point is much more subtle:

I wouldn't call the natural pattern in the head logic, since it is simply an inborn trait of human. Logic require analysis, and that is more than just natural patterns in human mind. However, this doesn't change the fact that all science require observation first, without that, the application of logic is useless.

My point here is not to insist on either position, so you're quite missing my point. My point is that an empiricist must not insist that his first premise is observed, because his first premise is that "reality is observable." It is like a man saying, "I think only according to my master's teaching," yet if someone asks him, "why do you follow your master's teaching?", he cannot say, "because my master says so." That would be circular reasoning. A premise cannot be its own premise. Each and every theory can be studied as many links of premise - conclusion, and ultimately it rests upon a first premise that is self-evident and relies on no other preise.. As pointed out above, "nature is observable" is not a self-evident premise.

Again, if you want to counter this argument with, "well, logical constructs aren't self-evident either," you missed my point. I'm insisting on neither observation or logical constructs as self-evident. To insist that logic itself is a guide to the truth, we must also assume on something else.

Then I think you are missing my point, I never said observation is self evident either. But it does not rely on logic, but awareness, of which logic derive from as well. The whole point is, logic without a premise based on observation cannot be applied to anything useful.

[MengTzu]

Then I think you are missing my point, I never said observation is self evident either. But it does not rely on logic, but awareness, of which logic derive from as well. The whole point is, logic without a premise based on observation cannot be applied to anything useful.

Let me ask you this, then: Do you still insist that this principle, "things are observable," an observable fact?