26 replies to this topic

[hanibal]

Can someone suggest any good books about the Chinese 6th Army (Lt.-General Kan Li-chu) in Burma during 1941-42? I am particularly interested in the operations of the 93rd KTM Division (Lt.General Lu Kuo Ch’uan) in the Shan States against the Thais and the Toungoo area against the Japanese.

The Sixth Chinese Army (Lt.-General Kan Li-chu) was at the time composed of three divisions: 93rd, 55th and 49th. The 93rd KTM Division had three battalion size regiments: 277th, 278th and 279th Regiment.

URL: http://homepages.for...ineseXForce.htm

Anyone know more about this division? Have there been any regimental or divisional histories written about it???

[bayonet]

i know...a little.

i know some good detached Chinese books about the whole two expeditions of the KMT army during ww2. among them ,one is called <Chinese Expeditionary Force> which impressed me most. but sorry i m not sure u could read Chinese or not.

[hanibal]

i know...a little ... i know some good detached Chinese books about the whole two expeditions of the KMT army during ww2. among them ,one is called <Chinese Expeditionary Force> which impressed me most. but sorry i m not sure u could read Chinese or not.

Bayonet, do you have this book <Chinese Expeditionary Force>? Before going into any details can you please check if there is something about 93rd KTM Division in Shan States in spring 1942, where the Chinese KTM troops fought against Thai army? I am not looking for long essays, but rather hoping to get some questions answered to supplement the Thai article about this battle.

[ahxiang]

Can someone suggest any good books about the Chinese 6th Army (Lt.-General Kan Li-chu) in Burma during 1941-42? I am particularly interested in the operations of the 93rd KTM Division (Lt.General Lu Kuo Ch’uan) in the Shan States against the Thais and the Toungoo area against the Japanese.

The Sixth Chinese Army (Lt.-General Kan Li-chu) was at the time composed of three divisions: 93rd, 55th and 49th. The 93rd KTM Division had three battalion size regiments: 277th, 278th and 279th Regiment.

URL: http://homepages.for...ineseXForce.htm

Anyone know more about this division? Have there been any regimental or divisional histories written about it???

Limited info about the Burma Campaign, on the Chinese side, was the result of 1) KMT minimizing; 2) CCP maximizing; 3) Japanese hiding.

General Sun Liren's generals mostly spent 30-40 years in prisons on Taiwan Island. Gan Lichu, being a non-Whampoa lineage, had no coverage either. CCP definitely is not interested in KMT resistance war. From limited accounts, I had gathered the following:

1) Wang Chuying, i.e., Chinese representative to British 17th Division as well as organizer of Burmese Chinese Volunteer Fighters at Thai-Burmese border, at Lin Wei's instruction, had contacted the British for 268 trucks to pick up 200th Division from Chinese border overnight. Earlier, Wang Chuying's Burmese Chinese Volunteer Fighters defeated Japanese three times at the Thai border and killed a Japanese shosa [major equivalent].


2) Chinese side, with merely two divisions of 6th Corps inside of Burma, expected the 5th Corps and the rest of 6th Corps to take another 2-3 weeke to get deployed in Burma while Japanese could reinforce the 33rd & 55th Division-conglomerates for a possible attack prior to Japanese Army Day of March 10th.


3) Sun Liren learnt from a British captain that Japanese 56th had defeated Gan Lichu's 55th Division of 6th Corps at Loikaw on April 19th. To the right, Japanese 56th & 18th division-conglomerates took over Loikaw position from Gan Lichu's 55th Division of 6th Corps on April 21st. Japanese crossed the Salween River for a long trip to Lashio.


4) 200th Division Chief Dai Anlan, with about 6200 soldiers, arrived at Loilem on April 29th, but was ordered to retreat instead of fighting against the Japanese. Dai Anlan received conflicting orders from Du Yuming and Lin Wei, with Du Yuming asking him to go back to 6th Corps at Katha while Lin Wei directed him to Jingdong [Kengtung, i.e., later Golden Triangle] to be subordinate to Corps Chief Gan Lichu. Dai Anlan made a strategic mistake in crossing the forests to the north.


What could be concluded from above is that Chinese Volunteer Fighters had fought against Japanese under Wang Chuying at the Thai border. After the First Campaign, remnants of Gan Lichu's army relocated to eastern Burma, i.e., Jingdong [Kengtung, i.e., later Golden Triangle] that was ceded by PRC to Burma in 1950s for sake of evicting Li Mi's KMT army from Sino-Burmese border.

[naruwan]

Limited info about the Burma Campaign, on the Chinese side, was the result of 1) KMT minimizing; 2) CCP maximizing; 3) Japanese hiding.

General Sun Liren's generals mostly spent 30-40 years in prisons on Taiwan Island. Gan Lichu, being a non-Whampoa lineage, had no coverage either. CCP definitely is not interested in KMT resistance war. From limited accounts, I had gathered the following:

1) Wang Chuying, i.e., Chinese representative to British 17th Division as well as organizer of Burmese Chinese Volunteer Fighters at Thai-Burmese border, at Lin Wei's instruction, had contacted the British for 268 trucks to pick up 200th Division from Chinese border overnight. Earlier, Wang Chuying's Burmese Chinese Volunteer Fighters defeated Japanese three times at the Thai border and killed a Japanese shosa [major equivalent].
2) Chinese side, with merely two divisions of 6th Corps inside of Burma, expected the 5th Corps and the rest of 6th Corps to take another 2-3 weeke to get deployed in Burma while Japanese could reinforce the 33rd & 55th Division-conglomerates for a possible attack prior to Japanese Army Day of March 10th.
3) Sun Liren learnt from a British captain that Japanese 56th had defeated Gan Lichu's 55th Division of 6th Corps at Loikaw on April 19th. To the right, Japanese 56th & 18th division-conglomerates took over Loikaw position from Gan Lichu's 55th Division of 6th Corps on April 21st. Japanese crossed the Salween River for a long trip to Lashio.
4) 200th Division Chief Dai Anlan, with about 6200 soldiers, arrived at Loilem on April 29th, but was ordered to retreat instead of fighting against the Japanese. Dai Anlan received conflicting orders from Du Yuming and Lin Wei, with Du Yuming asking him to go back to 6th Corps at Katha while Lin Wei directed him to Jingdong [Kengtung, i.e., later Golden Triangle] to be subordinate to Corps Chief Gan Lichu. Dai Anlan made a strategic mistake in crossing the forests to the north.
What could be concluded from above is that Chinese Volunteer Fighters had fought against Japanese under Wang Chuying at the Thai border. After the First Campaign, remnants of Gan Lichu's army relocated to eastern Burma, i.e., Jingdong [Kengtung, i.e., later Golden Triangle] that was ceded by PRC to Burma in 1950s for sake of evicting Li Mi's KMT army from Sino-Burmese border.

Great information. Can I ask what is the source? I'd like to check it out.

By reading this, I still see no mention of the 93rd division led by 呂國銓 Lu GouQuan. If what is said here is true, that Wang led the Burmes Han immigrants volunteers in fighting against the Japanese, then why would the Thai remember the 93rd so well?

[hanibal]

By reading this, I still see no mention of the 93rd division led by 呂國銓 Lu GouQuan. If what is said here is true, that Wang led the Burmes Han immigrants volunteers in fighting against the Japanese, then why would the Thai remember the 93rd so well?

ahxiang & naruwan: Good point by naruwan. Goof info, but unfortunately nothing about 93rd KTM Division. Maybe I was confusing in my originally post, so I here post an article that deals with the war in the Shan States in May 1942. Maybe now it will be more clear why I am looking about Chinese 93rd KTM Division in Shan States in May 1942. OK, here I go....

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Forgotten Invasion: Thailand in Shan State, 1941-45

On December 8, 1941, Japanese troops invaded Thailand at nine separate points: by land, from Battambang in Cambodia, by air at Don Muang airfield, and by sea in seven amphibious landings between Hua Hin and Pattani on the gulf coast. Despite fierce fighting at points in the south, organised resistance lasted only a few hours. Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, then Thai ruler, ordered a cease-fire, his government having agreed that to fight the Japanese would be suicidal. At this point Britain and the United States regarded Thailand as an enemy-occupied country and the innocent victim of Japanese aggression.

Unknown to the allies - and to most of his own cabinet - Phibun had other ideas. Influenced, perhaps, by the sinking of Britain's two capital ships, Repulse and Prince of Wales, within sixty hours of the outbreak of war in the Far East, he determined to seek an alliance with Japan. On December 14 he signed a secret agreement with the Japanese committing Thai troops to participate in the invasion of Burma, One week later, on December 21, 1941, Phibun signed a formal treaty of alliance with Japan in front of the Emerald Buddha at Wat Phra Kaeo, considered the most sacred object in all Thailand.

Phibun's reward for entering into this alliance was a secret Japanese guarantee to return to Thailand the Malayan provinces ceded to the British in 1909, as well as - with no comparable historical justification - the "lost territories" of Burma's Shan State. In pursuit of these aims, because he believed the Allies beaten, and because it was an auspicious day, on January 25, 1942, Phibun declared war on Britain and the United States.

As is well known, Phibun's action was opposed by most Thais as well as by Thailand's ambassador to Washington, Seni Pramoj, who simply refused to deliver the declaration of war to the US Secretary of State. Phibun, however, was determined that Thailand should both be on the winning side, and that it should benefit from the spoils of victory. Thailand, he announced, was a nation of great warriors who had to learn to adapt and make sacrifices. Part of this process was to recognise who the country's true friends were. Britain could no longer be counted as such a friend, as it had long deprived Thailand of some of its territory. And so... let loose the dogs of war!

In addition to his territorial aspirations, it is probable that Phibun was worried about the morale of the Thai regular forces, now that they had been faced down by the Japanese and had no obvious role in defending the country. As a result, he conceived the idea of creating a new "Northern Army" which would invade Burma and seize control of Burmese territory east of the Salween River - a territory then known as the Eastern Shan States. Since Thailand had already been promised parts of Burma which were regarded as "lost territory" in the secret protocol, the Japanese did not object in principle, though they were not prepared to allow Thai claims on Burma's Karen State, insisting that Phibun limit his territorial ambitions to Shan State. The Japanese also seem to have realised, as apparently the vainglorious Phibun did not, that a campaign of conquest in north-eastern Burma would be no walkover.

Japan also had to take into consideration the feelings of its Burmese puppet-allies. Under a hastily drawn up constitution which incorporated both democratic and totalitarian elements, Burma was to be "a fully independent and sovereign nation" ruled over by the Naingandaw Adipadi, or Head of State. The man chosen for this position was the Burmese nationalist Ba Maw. When informed of the impending transfer of eastern Shan State to Thailand, Ba Maw was naturally less than happy. At a meeting with Tojo, the Japanese strongman, in Singapore, Ba Maw commented that "Neither the Burmese nor the Shans will be completely happy about the dismemberment of the Shan territory and its people". Tojo was apologetic, but explained that Japan had promised eastern Shan State to Thailand as the price for becoming an ally. "But we have come in with you too", said Ba Maw, "and we also have our claims".

Command of Thailand's Northern Army was given to Luang Seri Roengrit, well-known in Bangkok for his patronage of the Royal Turf Club, but who had also successfully organised the transport of military equipment to the Cambodian border during the conflict with French forces in Indochina in 1940-41. The logistical problems Luang Seri faced in Shan State were quite different, however. The Thai railway system only reached as far north as Chiangmai (as, indeed, it still does today), and from there the troops of the Northern Army, carrying thei supplies, had to slog their way along rocky mountain tracks to the Burmese frontier. Many of the soldiers involved came from the north-east, and were not equipped to cope with the climate in the northern mountains. They were inadequately armed, poorly motivated - and they had no real idea who they were meant to be fighting.

Shortly after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, Chiang Kai-shek cabled Roosevelt and Churchill offering China's full cooperation in the Southeast Asian theatre. In particular, he suggested that Chinese Nationalist (KMT) troops should move into northern Burma to help protect the vital supply routes between Rangoon and Chungking. This offer was accepted, and units of the 93rd Division of the KMT army based in Yunnan moved south down the Salween Valley. Early in 1942 these KMT troops arrived in Shan State where, facing no immediate prospect of a Japanese attack, they settled down to live off the land. This peaceful existence was shattered on May 3, when planes of the Thai airforce bombed Kengtung as a prelude to the arrival of the Northern Army several weeks later.(!!!!!!)

Half a century later a senior Shan monk still living in Kengtung recalls the occasion: "The Thais sent 27 aeroplanes and most of the bombs were dropped at the market where the Chinese troops stayed". The bombing caused the KMT soldiers to retreat from the centre of Kengtung. A few weeks later Thai infantry led by Field Marshal Pin Choonhavan reached Kengtung and raised the Thai flag there. General Chatichai Choonhavan, the former Thai prime minister and current head of the Chart Pattana Party, then a young man with the rank of second lieutenant, was amongst the victorious Thai forces.

Phibun Songkhram was predictably delighted. He announced that the victory of the Northern Army had vindicated the reputation of the Thai armed forces, and that the capital of the eastern Shan States had been liberated from "the enemy". He also announced that the new name of the eastern Shan States - that is, Shan State east of the Salween - would be "Original Thai State". Thailand's acquisition of these territories, together with the return of the northern Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Kedah which King Chulalongkorn had ceded to the British in 1909, was confirmed by treaty with Japan in August, 1943.

Meanwhile, in Shan State itself, the KMT soldiers withdrew to the hills and forests surrounding Kengtung, whilst the Thais set up a basic local administration in the city. Although the onset of the rainy season in mid-1942 brought a halt to the fighting in the area, it only increased the hardships the Thai troops had to suffer. They were seriously deficient in food and medical supplies, so deaths from malaria and dengue fever far exceeded those in battle. Phibun eventually turned his attention to the problem in January, 1943, when he ordered ten tons of quinine to be sent to the Northern Army.

When Phibun actually visited the north some weeks later, he sent orders flooding back to Bangkok for uniforms, staff officers, sugar, money, doctors and a hundred ox-carts of bananas to be sent to the troops in Shan State. With Japanese backing, he also ordered the construction of hundreds of kilometres of unsurfaced roads to link Chiangmai with Shan State - the present northern loop road from Chiangmai to Mae Hong Son through the settlement of Pai dates from this period.

By this time Phibun and his war cabinet were becoming distinctly uneasy, however. January, 1943 - the same month in which Phibun travelled north - brought news of shattering German defeats at Stalingrad and in North Africa. These were first clear signs that Phibun might have led Thailand into the war on the wrong side. He responded by banning all aliens from residing in Thailand's six northern provinces. Meanwhile the Northern Army continued to announce new victories - spurious claims, treated with scepticism by most Thais, who were well aware that the Japanese had already completed the conquest of Burma.

For the remainder of the war Shan State remained a largely forgotten backwater. Those Thai troops who fell ill and were returned to Bangkok for treatment were shocked that nobody seemed to know or care about the hardships the Northern Army was suffering. Meanwhile the surviving forces of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT 93rd Division hid out in the jungles, occasionally clashing with Japanese forces who had followed the Thais into Shan State and were now behaving with their usual bestiality, completely destroying, for example, the prosperous Chinese Muslim settlement at Panglong, butchering ethnic Chinese, and making it quite clear to the dispirited Thais just who the masters of "Original Thai State" really were.

Meanwhile, back in Bangkok, the Thai authorities were understandably anxious to placate the victorious Allies. Phibun had started out with the stated objective of ensuring that, whoever won the war, Thailand would be on the victorious side. In this, as in so much, he had miscalculated badly. Early in 1944 the British moved to the offensive on the Burma front. Thailand - and especially the Klong Toey docks at Bangkok - came under increasingly frequent bombing raids, supplies were short, the Japanese arrogant and increasingly harsh in their treatment of their Thai "allies".

At home, Phibun was increasingly disliked not just for involving Thailand in an unpopular war and for the rampant inflation, but also for his unpopular domestic policies - his attempts to simplify Thai spelling, to enforce unpopular dress codes, and to forcibly assimilate Thailand's various cultural minorities. On July 24, 1944, taking advantage of Tojo's fall from power a week earlier in Tokyo, an alarmed Thai legislature refused to pass two government bills, and Phibun - widely regarded as Tojo's protégé - was forced to resign.

His successors, under the nominal leadership of Khuang Aphaiwong but strongly influenced by the Free Thai movement of Pridi Phanomyong, were well informed about Allied wartime thinking on the desirability of punishing Thailand for its alliance with Japan. Britain, in particular, sought to impose retribution and controls on Thailand which would reduce the country to near-protectorate status.

In an attempt to forestall this eventuality, the post-Phibun Thai authorities discreetly contacted the Allies and let it be known that they were prepared to turn against their former Japanese partners whenever the Allies gave the word. They also made it quite clear to the British that they renounced all claim to Shan State and northern Malaya, and that they would return these territories to Britain immediately on the cessation of hostilities. Despite these gestures, the British were not disposed to treat the Thais leniently. They felt stabbed in the back by Japan's use of Thai territory to invade Burma and Malaya, and only strong American pressure prevented a vengeful Churchill from implementing punitive measures against the Thais.

Meanwhile, in distant Shan State, Thailand's Northern Army remained in occupation of Kengtung and the surrounding areas until Japan's unexpectedly swift surrender following the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945. Even before this time some Thai troops had been straggling back to northern Thailand. With the surrender and departure of their Japanese allies, most returned home, though some stayed on amongst their Shan fellows, married, and settled down in Kengtung. The descendants of some of these soldiers still live in Shan State today.

Interestingly, elements of the KMT 93rd Division also stayed on, allying themselves first with new Nationalist refugees from China following the communist seizure of power in 1949. After being driven out of Burma in 1956, some eventually settled in the 93rd Division's final base camp at Doi Mae Salong, in Chiangrai Province, where they and their descendants remain to this day.

Edited by hanibal, 09 February 2006 - 04:08 AM.

[Betong-Bojan]

Very interesting! Thank you!

[naruwan]

Interestingly, elements of the KMT 93rd Division also stayed on, allying themselves first with new Nationalist refugees from China following the communist seizure of power in 1949. After being driven out of Burma in 1956, some eventually settled in the 93rd Division's final base camp at Doi Mae Salong, in Chiangrai Province, where they and their descendants remain to this day.

Wonderful. Thank you for these information. I'll try to dig up Chinese side of this, though it would be most difficult.

However, the 93rd didn't stay in Thailand. I have to say some of the 93rd might and stayed or returned after the war. General Lu for example, is one of them.

[hanibal]

Wonderful. Thank you for these information. I'll try to dig up Chinese side of this, though it would be most difficult.

Please, please, please, please..... This would be really great. As I said for now I am only interested in the story of 93rd KTM Division in May-May 1942, when the Thais crossed the Thai-Burmanese border and occupied Shan State - Keng Tung, Mong Yawng, Mae Sai, Mong-Hsat and some other places. It was a brief campaign, but as you can see it is totally forgotten today.

However, the 93rd didn't stay in Thailand. I have to say some of the 93rd might and stayed or returned after the war. General Lu for example, is one of them.

The 93rd KMT Division never was in Thailand - sorry.... I thought you mean in 1942... Yes, after the war some men from 93rd KMT Division came from Burma to Thailand and settled there.

The 93rd KMT Division operated only in China (Yunnan Province) and Burma (Shan State). Shan State with its capital Keng- Tung is located in Eastern Burma at the fourpoint border with Thailand, Laos, Burma and China. North of Chiang Mai (Thailand) and east of Mandalay (Burma) to give you a rough place markation.

From what I could determine some elements of the 93rd KTM Division settled after the war in Burma or Thailand, while some went to Taiwan.

Betong-Bojan: You are welcome.

Edited by hanibal, 09 February 2006 - 05:00 AM.

[ahxiang]

Wonderful. Thank you for these information. I'll try to dig up Chinese side of this, though it would be most difficult.

However, the 93rd didn't stay in Thailand. I have to say some of the 93rd might and stayed or returned after the war. General Lu for example, is one of them.

It seems someone had written about the so-called "forgotten" war in Thailand during WWII. The talk as to Gan Lichu's army involvement at Thai border beyond the 1942 time period is hard to construe. The episode as to Dan Anlan's retreat pointed out that perhaps one division under Gan Lichu did stay on in eastern Burma after the debacle of First Burma Campaign of Apr-May 1942. (The debacle was due to Stilwell's stupidity and incompetence as well as Stilwell's appeasing his Anglo cousins, i.e., the British. - Note one Chinese division is about 8000-9000 men, but one Japanese division was 32,000 men. Three Chinese corps, spread across Burma, still managed to inflict heavy damages on Japanese, sustained two defence battles for dozen days each, recused thousands of British at one time, and provided the cover for British to flee to India.)

I had provided some circumvential descriptions about Chinese army in Jingdong after sorting through memoirs by Wang Chuying,by subordinates to Dan Anlan, and by subordinates of Sun Liren. Spy CHief Dai Li had been commented to have sent agents to Thailand. Thailand was relatively in low profile throughout the conflict. The KMT armies which retreated to Burma in 1950 were remnants of Yu Chengwan's army from Kunming and another KMT corps. In another word, those who later reported to Li Mi at Golden Triangle were armies of Henan Province nativity. Should you have read the book "Yi Yu", you would have the answer as to the provincial nature of KMT armies in Golden Triangle. It could be traced to Fan Zhongxiu's Henan Province Army which stationed inCanton and served under Sun Yat-sen & Chiang Kai-shek from 1925 to 1928.

Though, no doubt that individual Chinese soldiers had stayed on in Burma after evicting Japanese in 1945, and more stayed on after United Nations picked up Li Mi's bulk of the army.

Edited by ahxiang, 11 February 2006 - 08:44 PM.

[hanibal]

It seems someone had written about the so-called "forgotten" war in Thailand during WWII. The talk as to Gan Lichu's army involvement at Thai border beyond the 1942 time period is hard to construe. The episode as to Dan Anlan's retreat pointed out that perhaps one division under Gan Lichu did stay on in eastern Burma after the debacle of First Burma Campaign of Apr-May 1942. (The debacle was due to Stilwell's stupidity and incompetence as well as Stilwell's appeasing his Anglo cousins, i.e., the British. - Note one Chinese division is about 8000-9000 men, but one Japanese division was 32,000 men. Three Chinese corps, spread across Burma, still managed to inflict heavy damages on Japanese, sustained two defence battles for dozen days each, recused thousands of British at one time, and provided the cover for British to flee to India.)

I have taken some thought of what you have just written here, ahxiang and you could just be right here about the 6th Army not being the one that was responsible for the defence of the extreme eastern corner of the Shan States in April-May 1942. I have taken a liberty of checking the British Official Volume about the Burma Campaign 1942 and found some interesting details about the operations of the Chinese Armies in Burma. From what I could determine the force which retreated (and I presume also defended Keng-Tung and Mong-Hpayak was the 200th Chinese Division under Major-General Tai An Lan. Here I quote some passages from the British World War 2 Official History:

[...] On the 20th [April 1942] Stilwell had ordered 49th and 93rd Divisions to concentrate there [at Loilem, east of Taunggyi] at once. The leading regiment of the former division moving very fast, arrived just in time to offer some opposition to the Japanese west of Loilem, but was not strong enough to prevent them from entering the town. When next day the whole division was concentrated east of Loilem and poised for attack, General Kan Li-chu refused to allow the attack to take place and ordered the division to withdraw to Takaw [a small place on the Salween River, west of Keng-Tung]. The same day, the leading troops of 93rd Chinese Division were approaching Loilem from the east, but hearing that the town had fallen the whole division promptly withdrew to Takaw. Here both divisions concentrated and were joined by the survivors (some 1,000 men) from 55th Division who had come across country from Bawlake. The VI. Chinese Army then retreated through Puerh [could not locate this place] to China.

By the 22nd [April 1942], 200th Chinese Division had reached the western outskirts oif Taunggyi, where it was held up by the Japanese flank guard holding the village. The following day Stilwell visited the Chinese and, finding that little action had been taken, succeeded in persuading them to attack by offering 50,000 rupees if Taunggyi were secured that evening. The bribe proved effective and the village was recaptured before dark. Little further progress was, however, made and it was not until the 29th [April 1942] that the division reached Loilem. Finding the town burnt out and deserted, it then withdrew to China by way to Takaw and Kengtung. [...]


Now here is a brief summary of what the Thai Official Sources say about the Thai Invasion of Shan States in 1942:

- On 10th May 1942 the 2nd Thai Division began advance in the Shan States in two columns. The left column with two infantry regiments occupied without the opposition the towns of Mongmaeken, Monghang and Mongton and prepared for the attack on Mongsart. The right column comprised one infantry regiment which also arrived unopposed to the outskirts of Mongsart, the first vital objective of the Thai Campaign. The MONGSART had fallen to the advancing Thais on 23rd May 1942 from a retreating Chinese battalion.

- The mission of the Thai 4th Division was to capture the market town of Mongphyak. The division made their first moves across the border on 10th May 1942. Once the division reached the small town of Ban Ongluek, it was split into two columns, one moving northeast and the other northwest. The town of Mongphyak on 20 May 1942, but mopping-up operations of Chinese pockets of resistance continued until May 23.

- The Thai Cavalry Division, protecting the left flank, reported a small skirmish with the Chinese of unknown strength at Ban Piengluang near the Monghang Pass. After ca. two hours of fightings the Chinese pulled back.

- The 3rd Thai Division crossed into the Burmanese border town of Tachileik on May 10, 1942. From there on the division advanced along the Mongko-Monglen-Mongphyak route on the heels of the 4th Division before breaking off at the approach to Mongphyak, where it was divided into three columns. On 24th May, at Loimwe, a small hilly village just south of Keng-Tung, the Thais came first under Chinese small arms fire. With the help of artillery and Royal Thai Air Force the Thais overcome the Chinese resistance and on 27th May, after Chiang-Kai-Shek ordered the 93rd Chinese Division to withdraw from the Kengtung area to Puén [???], across the border in China towards the end of May 1942 because the Japanese were pressing from the west. Some 100 Chinese soldiers were captured in Keng-Tung.

- After the capture of Keng-Tung the Thais turned to northeast to take the second biggest city in the Shan States, the trading capital Mongyawng. The town was defended (so say the Thai sources) by a single battalion of the 93rd Chinese Division. The battle lasted from 19th to 20th May 1942, when the Thais entered the city.

- Meanwhile the 3rd Division renewed its advance. Capturing the village of Ban Taping on 10th June 1942, a Thai infantry battalion successfully forced a crossing at a point south of the Taping ford, but sustained heavy casualties due to the heavy Chinese resistance. The battalion ended up surrounded by superior Chinese forces some thirteen kilometres northeast of Ban Taping. Isolated, the force rapidly came under the attack and was annihilated. Battalion commander Major Yong was captured and later died in Chinese POW camp. The Thai attempts to save the encircled Thais proved unsuccessful.

- The attempt to capture town of Mongma was repulsed. The Chinese held on, while Thai rertreated back due to heavy casualtiues.

- The 4th Division advanced to take Mongyu on the southern banks of the Lwoi River and accomplished its task wit minimal resistance.

- The Thai army renewed its offensive in December 1942 and January 1943 and during this campaign, not without some fierce Chinese resistance, managed to capture Mongwa, Mongpan, Chieng Khang, Mongla and Lwuang.


As I said I would very much appreciate if someone could tell me the Chinese version of this story. Which battalion was defending Mongsart in May 1942? Which battalion of the 93rd Division was defending in Mongyawng? Which Chinese unit carried out the attack on the Thais at Ban Taiping area?

[naruwan]

Another great discovery. If that is indeed true, it may very well be why there is no mention of Lu's defense against Thai in Chinese sources.

The 200th division was very promenent even during 1943 when the Chinese expedition forces officially entered Burma.

[hanibal]

Another great discovery. If that is indeed true, it may very well be why there is no mention of Lu's defense against Thai in Chinese sources. The 200th division was very promenent even during 1943 when the Chinese expedition forces officially entered Burma.

It is more "confusing" than "great" discovery. The British official history clearly says that the 200th Chinese division retreated back to China via Keng-Tung. Since this retreat started in late April 1942 and the Thai army invaded the Shan States in early May 1942 one can assume that the Thai hit at some elements of the retreating 200th Chinese Division. But it is also interesting that all other Western and Thai sources mention that the defence of the Keng-Tung and other towns in this part of the Shan States was enthrusted to 93rd Chinese Division.

Is there any divisional history or detailed about 200th Chinese Division, where we could check whereabouts the division between 25th April - 1st June 1942? Surely some books have been published in China or Taiwan.

[hanibal]

Hey! Where has ahxiang's latest message gone???

[ahxiang]

It is more "confusing" than "great" discovery. The British official history clearly says that the 200th Chinese division retreated back to China via Keng-Tung. Since this retreat started in late April 1942 and the Thai army invaded the Shan States in early May 1942 one can assume that the Thai hit at some elements of the retreating 200th Chinese Division. But it is also interesting that all other Western and Thai sources mention that the defence of the Keng-Tung and other towns in this part of the Shan States was enthrusted to 93rd Chinese Division.

Is there any divisional history or detailed about 200th Chinese Division, where we could check whereabouts the division between 25th April - 1st June 1942? Surely some books have been published in China or Taiwan.

Since last post was gone during the migration, I will just paste some stuff I wrote on my website instead of sorting through the threads. Just to cap what you are interested in, Dai Anlan's 200th Division, i.e., the only Chinese mechanized division, could be said to be completely gone in Burma. Dai Anlan, who followed Du Yuming's order, declined Lin Wei's suggestion to go east for Jingdong. While crossing a highway, he was ambushed by Japanese. Dai Anlan, before the long trek from southern Burma to northern Burma, had transferred his equipment to Du Yuming midway, incidentally. The quipment was apparently lost by Du Yuming when he attempted to cross the primitive forests for China. Du Yuming did not go India because British did not approve the move. The only purpose of calling in Chinese by British would be to cover the butt of the British. Stilwell was to be blamed for his judgment errors about Mandalay duels. Japanese were smart enough to attack Lasio to the northeast to cut off Chinese supply and return route. Prevalent hsitory writings often cited Stilwell's claim of Chiang Kai-shek interference in command, e.g., watermelon story. Should you read Stilwell's diary, I could see two repeat words, CHEW and MOVIE. He is an idiot for sure. I had recently studies Stilwell's activities in Wuhan in 1938, and figured out that he might have joined the Reds right there, when those 'fighters' swamped over from Madrid for making Wuhan a Second Madrid.

More at


www.uglychinese.org/war.htm#BurmaCampaign


Burma Expedition

In early 1941, China formed a military alliance with Britain. Chiang Kai-shek dispatched "Shang Zhen military inspection delegation" to Rangoon for talks with British commander. Sheng Zhen visited Mao-tan-miao, Mandalay, Myitkyina & Lashio for two months. On July 24th 1941, Roosevelt ordered an economic embargo on Japan, and on Aug 1st, further ordered an oil embargo on Japan. On Nov 1st, Japan set Dec 1st as a deadline for diplomacy while secretly preparing attacks against Perl Harbour, Guam, and HK. On Dec 8th 1941 [Dec 7th Hawaii time], Japanese secretly raided Pearl Harbor of Hawaii, and launched simulatenous attacks at Hong Kong, the Philippines, Burma and Malaysia as well as Shanghai Bund and Tientsin Settlements. China declared war on Japan on Dec 9th 1941. On Jan 4th 1942, Aung Shan's Burmese Independence Army began to harass the Thai-Burmese border under Japanese auspice. Aung Shan, like Nehru and Ghandi of India, deeply resenting British historical conquests of Burma in 1824, 1852 and 1885, had sought for Japanese assistance by going to Hainan Island of China earlier.

Chiang Kai-shek departed on a secret visit to India via the Hump on Feb 4th 1942. Wang Chonghui, Zhang Daofan, Dong Xianguang, Shang Zhen, Pi Zonggan & Yu Guohua were among the entourage. The British, seeing that Japan had control over HK, Thailand and Malasia, intended to have Chinese president rally Indians out of the non-cooperation movement. On Feb 5th 1942, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Calcutta of India. Chiang antagonized Britain over British colonialism & Indian Independence by advocating for autonomy during Feb 10th talk with British governor in New Delhi. Chiang Kai-shek asked British Lord Lin-li-zi-ge whether he could make a promise to Indians that Britain would offer independence after the war, but received ambiguous reply. British were only interested in having Chiang pursuade Nehru out of the non-violent struggle against the British. Indians, after 160 years of colonial rule, were simmering with independence movements as well as sympathy for Japan's Pan-Asianism slogans. Among Indian's one million soldiers, only 150,000 were at home, including Sikh, Gurkha, Bengal and Muslims. British forces numbered around 57,000. Upon the news that Singapore fell on Feb 15th, Chiang Kai-shek commented that it was British lack of courage, not the bravery of Japanese, and expressed concern that Indian army could ever put up a fight against the Japanese. On Feb 15th, British gave Chiang Kai-shek a royal medal.

On Feb 20th, Japan invaded Burma under 15th Group Army commander Shofiro Iida, with 18th, 33rd, 55th, 56th division-conglomerates and special operation units. Japanese obtained the defection of Burmese military against the British. Rangoon was lost on March 6-7th. British retreated to Prome. Prior to the loss of Rangoon, China sold to Britain 70000 tons of merchandise in Rangoon warehouses after successfully shipping out 44000 tons. Americans hastily assembled 820 Ford trucks and 95 armoured vehicles for the Chinese.

Chiang held three talks with Nehru, one in New Delhi and two times in Calcutta. On Feb 27th, at a dinner in Calcutta, Chiang pointed out to Nehru that it was not easy to launch a revolution in India beacuse India possessed an advanced transportation system that could carry British troops to the hot spot instantly. Chiang, having expressed support for non-violence approach, told Nehru that China could play a role in helping Indians win independence after the war should Indians stand on the same side as Chinese and the anti-fascist union. Nehru countered Chiang by stating that Chinese might not have experienced the brutality of the British which was comparable to that of Japanese as Chinese had experienced, and mentioned the Indian bloodshed in 1857 & 1914, respectively. Nehru pointed out that Gandhi had abandoned the hope of cooperating with the British after the British army slaughtered 2000 National Congress Party meeting participants in Punjab in April 1914. Nehru told Chiang their success of non-cooperation by shutting all doors at the time British crown prince visited India. After receiving a letter from Mahatma Gandhi, Chiang Kai-shek was moved to tears and demanded a personal meeting with Mahatma Gandhi. Chiang Kai-shek's original request for meeting with Gandhi was declined by the British. At the insistence of Chiang Kai-shek, British agreed to a meeting between him and Mahatma Gandhi on 18th, which was faciliated by Nehru. Gandhi came to Calcutta from Bombay with a goat and a weaving machine, and stayed in the residence of a wealthy merchant. Gandhi countered Chiang Kai-shek by pointing out that how could China safeguard Indian independence after the war when China herself failed to get representation at the "joint chief-of-staff" meeting of the Allied countries? Gandhi offered the weaving machine to Mme Chiang Kai-shek as a gift. Chiang left India on Feb 22nd, at which time Indian radio station announced that China's president had paid a state visit to the country. Radio also caried the text of "Chiang Kai-shek Open Letter To Indians" which was recited by Mme Chiang in English. Chiang Kai-shek commented upon British colonialism as the fundamental reason that the Burmese collaborated with the Japanese and that Indians showed passivity in the war against Japan. In March, Japanese sacked Andaman Islands, and supported a radical Indian Bao-si [Subas Chandra Bose] as the leader of "interim Indian government". As pointed out by Donovan Webster in "The Burma Road" [Douglas & McIntyre Ltd, Canada, 2003 edition], the 40-45,000 Indian National Army under Bose was composed of captured British Indian soldiers in Malaya in late 1941 and early 1942. Later in Aug, British declared the emergency law in India and imprisoned Nehru & Gandhi. (Britain passed the Monbarten Act later in June 1946, and allowed the establishment of India & Pakistan in Aug 1947 after Indians launched an armed uprising in Feb of 1946.)

However, British delayed the approval to have Chinese enter Burma. A regiment of Chinese herald troops arrived in Rangoon around the turn of Jan and Feb even though Chiang Kai-shek agreed to British request for organizing expeditionary force on Dec 23rd 1941 and Chinese forces converged upon the border in Jan 1942. China's "Burma Expedition Forces" consisted of 5th, 6th & 66th Corps commanded by Du Yuming, Gan Lichu & Zhang Zhen respectively. To the east, Gan Lichu's 6th Corps was to face Japanese 18th Division-conglomerate; in the middle, Du Yuming's 5th Corps was to face Japanese 55th Division-conglomerate; and to the west, British 1st Division was to face Japanese 33d Division-conglomerate. Wang Chuying, i.e., Chinese representative to British 17th Division as well as organizer of Burmese Chinese Volunteer Fighters at Thai-Burmese border, at Lin Wei's instruction, had contacted the British for 268 trucks to pick up 200th Division from Chinese border overnight. Earlier, Wang Chuying's Burmese Chinese Volunteer Fighters defeated Japanese three times at the Thai border and killed a Japanese shosa [major equivalent]. Chiang Kai-shek met with both British and Chinese generals at Lashio on the same day. Chinese side, with merely two divisions of 6th Corps inside of Burma, expected the 5th Corps and the rest of 6th Corps to take another 2-3 weeke to get deployed in Burma while Japanese could reinforce the 33rd & 55th Division-conglomerates for a possible attack prior to Japanese Army Day of March 10th. Dai Anlan, pointing out that his division still lacked 1306 soldiers, requested for 90 machineguns, 18 heavy machineguns, 18 mortars, 8 cannons, and 300 submachineguns. On the night of March 3rd, Japanese crossed the Sittang River for Rangoon. On 4th, 200th Division departed for Toungoon.

British, totally defeated by Japanese, would yield the 1000 kilometer line from Toungoon to Kentung to Chinese army to be under the command of Stilwell. 66th Corps was dispatched to Mandalay & Lashio area of Burma after Chiang Kai-shek found out that 5th & 6th Corps were over-stretched in Burma for fulfilling Stilwell's Mandalay duel plan. Having never ever fired a shot in WWI, Stilwell, nicknamed Vinegur Joe, made a blunder in ordering a counter-attack at Japanese for recovering Rangoon. Japanese, possessing four division-conglomerates of 18th, 33rd, 55th & 56th, were equivalent to ten Chinese corps, not to count the Japanese airforce and navy powers in the area. At Toungoo, Japanese encountered 200th Division of Chinese 5th Corps and suffered fierce resistance not seen after entering Burma. Beginning on March 17th 1942, Japanese began to bomb Toungoon [Tonggu]. Chinese army took over the defense positions from the British, dug three defense lines, defeated 20 rounds of Japanese attacks, destroyed 20 tanks and armoured vehicles, killed about 4000 Japanese soldiers, and captured alive 400. On 18th, Japanese followed the retreating British 2nd Brigade to the city. After destroying dozens of Japanese on March 18th, three companies of soldiers ambushed about 600-700 Japanese and four tanks at railway and highway bridges on 19th, and inflicted a death toll of 200 onto Japanese. Deputy Cavalry Regiment Chief Huang Zunxian sacrificed his life during the battle. On 20th, another ambush killed about 200 Japanese from 2nd da dui 143rd lian dui. On 22nd, 2000 Japanese mounted an attack at Chinese positions for two days. Among the Japanese dead would be a Japanese Taisa [colonel equivalent] from 55th Cavalry lian dui and a Japanese shosa [major equivalent] from 2nd da dui of 112nd lian dui. Dai Anlan repeatedly beat back Japanese by means of 100 meter wrestling fightings. By March 26th, Japanese intruded into the city defence line. Japanese reinforcements arrived on 28th. Division Chief Dai Anlan, with 9000 soldiers against 20,000 Japanese, persisted at Toungoon from March 16th to 29th before retreating to Pyinmana. Du Yuming mounted an unsuccessful siege of Tongoo and had to evacuate from Tongoo on 30th. At Yedashe, a few miles to the north of Toungoon, Liao Yaoxiang's 22nd Division of 5th Corps persisted from March 30th to April 15th. Facing Chinese frontal resistance, Japan changed direction to attack British on the left side and to attack Chinese in Loikaw on the right side.

Sun Liren's troops did not cross the border till March 27th 1942. Sun Liren [Sun Li-jen] arrived in Lashio on April 2nd, and was subsequently sent to the defence of Mandalay on May 5th after leaving behind Peng Keli's battalion at Lashio. On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Maymyo, a city about 50 miles to the east of Mandalay. Two days later, on May 7th, Chiang Kai-shek announced to his generals that Stilwell was to become the commander-in-chief of the expedition force as well as conferred the post of garrison commander for Mandalay onto Sun Liren. In likening Mandalay to Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek instructed that Sun Liren defend Mandalay to the last. On April 11th, a plane came over with official stamped conferral for Sun Liren and a bag of Burmese currency valued at 20,000 units. After almost two years of strict training, by Nov of 1940, Sun Liren had restored the title of "Tax Police Army" for the eight regiments of troops he had trained under Kong Xiangxi's Finance Ministry. KMT spy chief Dail Li, however, intended to absorb Sun Liren's troops for deployment as guerrilla fighters under Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO). Only the Pacific War and the British-American intervention would allow Sun Liren to retain three regiments of 2nd, 3rd & 4th for a re-organization as New 38th under Zhang Zhen's 66th Corps. Each regiment trained by Sun Liren had about 1200-1300 soldiers. After promulgating a pacification order, Mandalay came back to life under Japanese bombardment,and refugees returned from forests and mountains.

To the west, Japanese marched along Irrawaddy River to attack British at Prome. British, at the sight of Japanese, collapsed. After vacating Prome on April 1st, British first fled to Allamyo. Yenangyaung oildfield was ordered to be sabotaged. After giving up Megwe on April 10th successively, British fled to Yenangyaung where Japanese 33rd Division-conglomerate caught up with and surrounded the British. Further, Japanese crossed the Pinchong River to drive away British at the crossing, hence cutting off the return path of the British in Yenangyaung. On the afternoon of April 15th, Sun Liren was ordered to send out Chen Mingren's 112nd Regiment & Liu Fangwu's 113rd Regiment to Natamauk and Kyaukpadaung. General Alexandre, with Stilwell, had requested with Chinese army for giviing relief to British encircled at Yenangyaung. On the night of April 16th, Sun Liren went to expeditionary army command center at Pyawbwe with a request to personally lead 113rd Regiment for rescuing the British in lieu of Deputy Division Qi Xueqi. Sun Liren explained that hsi remnant 114th Regiment, with one battalion left at Lashio airport, could not fend off coming Japanese attack unless he was to win some victory over Japanese on his initiative. By dusk of 17th, Qi Xueqi, with Liu Fangwu's regiment, closed in to 5 miles from the Pinchong River. By dawn of 18th, 3 battalions of Chinese army suddenly descended on the Japanese and pressured the Japanese to the river bank. Sun Liren arrived just in time to command his thirsty soldiers to charge at the Japanese, with a call for drinking water at the river ahead. By noon, Japanese to the north of the Pinchong River were eliminated. General Slim, still unconvinced that one Chinese regiment could do any good in rescuing 7000 British across the bank, was asked by Sun Liren to throw in cannons and chariots. Sun Liren promised to the encircled British a lift no later than dusk of the following day and demanded that the British persist for a third day. Sun Liren, having brought Slim along to the frontline, personally instructed as to how British cannons were to blast at the Japanese positions tier by tier while the chariots and Chinese army were to follow through. To the east, two battalions of soldiers were to cross the river circumventially to attack the 5000 Japanese from the hindside and east side. On April 19th, in the early morning, Sun Liren personally led the remaining battalion of 113th Regiment for a river crossing to charge at Japanese encirclement line at Yenangyaung [Ren-an-jiang]. Chinese forces circumvented to sack Japanese defense positions three times in a zigzag war. Battalion Chief Zhang Qi sacrificed his life in the bayonet fighting. After thirteen hours of fighting, Chinese forces defeated Japanese 33rd division-conglomerate, killed more than 1000 Japanese and captured 500 Japanese, recovered from Japanese hands about 500 British prisoners of war, priests and news reporters, and rescued 7000 British & Indian soldiers. (Luo Zhuoying's telegraph to Chiang Kai-shek on April 20th stated that Sun Liren's daring attack had inflicted a casualty of 500 onto Japanese. Sun Liren's memoirs stated that his regiment incurred a death toll of 204 soldiers while inflicting a casualty of 1000 onto Japanese during the three day around-the-clock campaign.)

On April 5th, Chiang Kai-shek met with Division Chief Dai Anlan at Maymyo in regards to Pyinmana Duel. British withdrawal from Allamyo led to Chinese abandonment of Pyinmana on April 18th as well as cancellation of Stilwell's Pyinmana Duel plan. Stilwell, however, made another blunder by stranding Chinese forces to the west for Mandalay Campaign. To appease British General Slim, Stilwell ordered Sun Liren on a chase of Japanese 33rd Division-conglomerate. Meanwhile, after Yenangyaung rescue, Sun Liren, intending to destroy Japanese 33rd Division-conglomerate, had called over 113rd & 114th regiments for encirclement of Japanese which was scheduled for the morning of 21st. General Luo Zhuoying had to dispatch 28th Division to the replacement of 38th Division at Mandalay, yielding to the Japanese a vaccum at Lashio to the east and north which was the lifeline for Chinese troops. Sun Liren was suddenly ordered to go back across the Irrawaddy River for Sagaing on the midnight of April 20th. Meantime, Sun Liren learnt from a British captain that Japanese 56th had defeated Gan Lichu's 55th Division of 6th Corps at Loikaw on April 19th.

To the right, Japanese 56th & 18th division-conglomerates took over Loikaw position from Gan Lichu's 55th Division of 6th Corps on April 21st. Japanese crossed the Salween River for a long trip to Lashio. 66th Corps Chief Zhang Zhen dispatched partial of 28th Division back to Lashio's defence in vain. Midway, Japanese 56th Division-conglomerate took over Taungyi & Loilem which were to the south of Lashio. After leaving about 400 soldiers, Japanese continued on towards Lashio. Dai Anlan's 200th Division, being ordered to recover Taungyi to the east, dispatched hearld troops of Cavalry Regiment and 598th Armoured Regiment. On 23rd, Dai Anlan and 600th Regiment arrived at the outskirts of Taungyi. Stilwell and Chinese corps chief came over on 24th. By dusk of 25th, Chinese troops took over Taungyi and destroyed 400 Japanese troops, including a Japanese shosa [major equivalent] from 3rd da dui of 113rd lian dui of 56th Division-conglomerate. Stilwell then ordered Chinese 200th Division to chase Japanese from Taungyi. Instead of sending Chinese armies back to the rescue of empty Lashio city, Stilwell ordered that main forces of Chinese 5th Corps return to Mandalay for his utopian duel, albeit allowing 200th Division to look for the northbound Japanese 56th mechanized division-conglomerate.

Chinese_Tank_Forces_and_Battles_before_1945_ed.htm stated that "in April 1942, after taking Rangoon, the Japanese encircled two British brigades and a tank battalion at the Yenangyaung oilfields in central Burma. The Allied forces in Burma, commanded by General Joseph (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell, rushed the [KMT] 200th Division [?????? Sun Liren's 38th Division]... the only Chinese mechanized formation, from Lashio to the rescue."

On April 25th, British General Alexander informed Stilwell of a "tactical retreat" to India. Du Yuming was fetched back from Taungyi for the meeting. Du Yuming and Dai Anlan parted right after the recovery of Taungyi. On the night of April 25th, Stilwell and Chinese commanders decided upon a retreat from Mandalay, with agreement that the British retreat to India and Chinese 38th Division of 66th Corps and 22nd & 96th Divisions of 5th Corps retreat to China via Myitkyina. 100,000 Chinese armies were left to their own fate by Stilwell. On the night of April 29th, British 17th Division and Liao Yaoxiang's 22nd Division crossed the Irrawaddy River via Mandalay Bridge. Bridge was destroyed thereafter. On April 29th, Japanese took over Lashio. Supplies bought using American Lend Lease Program was shipped out of Lashio [Liexu] during Mandalay confrontation. At Lashio [Liexu], Chinese had to destroy 10000 tons of supplies.

200th Division Chief Dai Anlan, with about 6200 soldiers, arrived at Loilem on April 29th, but was ordered to retreat instead of fighting against the Japanese. Dai Anlan received conflicting orders from Du Yuming and Lin Wei, with Du Yuming asking him to go back to 6th Corps at Katha while Lin Wei directed him to Jingdong [Kengtung, i.e., later Golden Triangle] to be subordinate to Corps Chief Gan Lichu. Dai Anlan made a strategic mistake in crossing the forests to the north. While crossing a highway near Bhamo on May 16th, 200th Division was surrounded by armoured Japanese. Two days later, on May 18th, Dai Anlan was wounded when he personally led 599th Regiment for a circumvential attack. Dozens of remnant soldiers rotated to carry Dai Anlan back to China on shoudlers. On May 26th, at Mengguan [Maobang], Dai Anlan passed away. The group, with Dai Anlan's corpse, broke through Japanese line on June 2nd and penetrated the wilderness to arive at Tengchong of China on June 27th.

On April 30th, 36 Japanese planed bombed Sun Liren's defense positions at Sagaing. On May 1st, news came that Luo Zhuoying's Myitkyina-bound train had collided with a southbound locomotive. Instead of re-organizing the dislodged allied armies for fortification in Myitkyina or Bhamo, Stilwell would trek his way through the jungles, acting as if the head of a company chief. On May 3rd, Stilwell himself, after sending off a plane which just arrived at Shwebo to pick him up [? page 39], walked across the mountains for India. After 3 weeks, Stilwell emerged in Ledo as a hero in the news media, not an idiot general. Zheng Langping commented that Stilwell could very well intend to limit his entourage for minimizing exposure to the Japanese army.

On the early morning of May 2nd, Battalion Chief Liang Dizhu of Sun Liren's 112nd Regiment covered the retreat of 96th Division by shelling mortars at plaincoated Japanese in the forests across the Irrawaddy to the southwest of Mandalay. Sun Liren, on the early morning of May 3rd, speedily crossed the precarious mountain road for the British camp at Yeu, but British General Alexander refused to assist him with cannons. Sun Liren left the British camp disappointed, with his jeep driving into a creek on his way to Wantho. Sun Liren was asked to send its bulk of forces to Wantho and to send his 113rd Regiment to Katha for guarding against Japanese from Bhamo direction to the east. Du Yuming declined to allocate trucks to Sun Liren. At a crossing near Katha, Sun Liren personally stopped the British from destruction of a bridge and waited for a company of 100 soldiers to evacuate from the defense position at a village across the river.

With Myitkyina and Bhamo taken by Japanese, Chinese commanders held a meeting at Indaw on May 8th. At the meeting, Luo Zhuoying claimed that his command center would go for Imphal of India and then left with Stilwell [? page 165 Shen Keqin's Biography of Sun Liren]. Deputy commander Du Yuming immediately ordered forces to retreat back to China by Kumon Mountain Range. Sun Liren objected by proposing a counter-attack to retake Myitkyina and Bhamo. When asked to provide cover for 5th & 6th Corps, Sun Liren, thinking that he might not even have tree leaves and skin to eat by following Du Yuming, suggested that he would like some leeway for a retreat to India after completion of mission. On May 8th, Sun Liren, leaving Chen Mingren's 112nd Regiment behind, would personally guard a crossing near Wathoat till the last ferry. On May 10th, Sun Liren's 38th Division command center arrived at Meza. Knowing that 113rd Regiment was still entangled with Japanese at Katha and 112nd Regiment was encircled by Japanese at Watho, Sun Liren, past midnight, suddenly rode on his horse to order his retreating soldiers at Meza Train Station to go back. At dawn, Sun Liren's troops set up a trap at a hilly area to the south of Watho train station, ambushed five Japanese tanks, and destroyed 800 Japanese soldiers in collaboration with the encircled 112nd Regiment. 112nd Regiment hence broke through the encirclement. On May 13th, Japanese cut off the path between Watho and Bhamo. Sun Liren retreated to the northwest of Watho, and ordered that 113rd Regiment detached from fightings with Japanese at Katha. After waiting for 113rd Rgiment for one day, Sun Liren led his troops into the mountains. With British and Burmese help, Sun Liren walked out of the mountains to arrive at Kaget on May 16th.

After failing to get response from 66th Corps Chief Zhang Zhen and Chiang Kai-shek's Chongqing military commission, Sun Liren contacted Stilwell [? Stilwell did not arrive in India till 19th]. Sun Liren's column picked up stranded soldiers, ethnic Chinese, British and Indians, including Prince of Sikhim [Yuksom]. By 6:00 pm on 18th, Sun Liren arrived at the bank of Chindwin River by penetrating the mountains and walking in the valley stream instead of following hundreds of thousands of refugees on the road from Siton to Tomu. With Japanese patrol boats in the river, Sun Liren faked a defense on the bank for divulging to Japanese via a county magistrate and other Burmese collaborators, and then crossed the river via rafts at night. While crossing the river, plaincoated Burmese suddenly changed to white-colored clothes and attacked the Chinese. The next day, Japanese army caught up with one battalion guarding the crossing. A Chinese engineering battalion retreated to the river to attack the Japanese from a different angle, and destroyed about 200 out of 800 Japanese after over one day long fighting. A few dozens of British and Chinese captives were rescued from the retreating Japanese. From Chindwin River to India, Sun Liren lent help to refugees along the road and distributed the remnant 3000 Burmese currency. Sun Liren's troops then crossed the mid-point of the Patkai-Chill-Aakan Ranges to arrive at a village near Imphal of India on May 27th. During the First Burma Campaign, Sun Liren's 38th Division lost 200 soldiers from 113rd Regiment at Yenangyaung, dozens from 112nd Regiment at Watho, and about 30 in crossing Chindwn River.

Chinese troops suffered heavy losses in crossing Ye-ren-shan [i.e., Wilderness Man] Mountain. Numerous Chinese soldiers died, including women soldiers, inside of Wild Man Mountain of Burma. Du Yuming's 22nd & 96th Divisions, about 10,000 soldiers, were lost in the mountains to the north of Magaung Valley, between Kumon Range and Patkai Range. Chiang Kai-shek dispatched Yu Feipeng to India for British assistance in locating Du Yuming. Sun Liren dispatched Zhou Youliang and a company of soldiers for searching the missing troops. By Aug 4th, Du Yuming, Luo Youlun and Liao Yaoxiang, and about 4300 remnant soldiers arrived at Ledo of India. While Du Yuming lost 7000 soldiers in the mountains, Regiment Chief Yang Lichu under 28th Division of 66th Corps, though having collected remnants to a total of 5000, would walk into the mountains against the advice of Sun Liren, with about 700 remnants by the time they walked to Gaoligong [Kumon] Mountain and 130 remnants by the time they walked to the Chinese border. Zhang Shuji claimed that his column had dwindled to 300 men from original 1000 after 3 months' trekking through the mountain with plantain as the sole food. Chinese_Tank_Forces_and_Battles_before_1945_ed.htm stated that "the Japanese entered Lashio and forced [Chinese into] a general withdraw. In the process, the [KMT] 200th division was destroyed with its command staff." Out of 100,000 Chinese expedition forces, possibly 60,000 were lost. Zhang Langping, however, stated that 80,000 out of 100,000 might have retreated to India or China, with majority deaths related to starvation, disease, and going astray.

Wu Xiangxiang mentioned that Americans shipped away its 10th Flight Group to North Africa on May 26th, and Ni Lexiong attributed the vaccum of air cover as the fundamental reason that First Burma Campaign failed. Stilwell himself, during the June visit to Chiang Kai-shek, shifted the blame to incompetency of Chinese generals and lack of air support. Zheng Langping, in "An Everlasting Glory", blamed Chinese casualties on Stilwell's multiple blunders, and further pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek should have demanded the dismissal of Stilwell right here in lieu of 2 years later. In Zheng Langping's opinion, the "Burma Counter-attack" would become an Anglo-American scheme to bog down China & Japan in a balanced way so that China would not emerge a victor to pose a threat to the Anglo-American interests in the Far East. Certainly, we did not have to remind the world that Russians, after signing a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13th 1941 [by betraying the 1937 non-aggression treaty between China and USSR], had sealed off China's continental exit to the north and northwest.

As to Burma Theater, Li Zongren memoirs stated that he was against it. Li Zongren advocated a concentrated fight against Japanese in Guangzhouwan Bay, hence securing a seaport for delivery of US supplies as well as cutting Japanese army in the waist. Li Zongren claimed thst should China have secured the southern coast, Japanese in Burma and Vietnam would automatically collapse. Moreover, China might be able to ship troops to Manchuria and Northern China in case of a sudden Japanese surrender. The end result of continuous Burma Expedition would be the entrenchment of 400,000-500,000 best trained troops in the mountains of Burma and Yunnan Province at the time of 1945 Japanese surrender. (In the spring of 1942, Li Zongren participated in a military district commander meeting in Chongqing for discussing the new situations of World War II. After that, he went to Guilin of Guangxi Province for visiting his mother, and spent one week in hometown Liangjiangxu. Seeing that his mother was ill, Li Zongren stayed on for some more days and saw his mother pass away at age 76 as a filial Confucian desciple. Then his one seat plane flew back to Chongqing, and en route, plane had a short stopover at quiet Zhijiang Airport of Hunan Province for refueling, barely passing three Japanese reconnaissance planes at an elapse of three minutes.)

Before Japanese continued on to Wanding of Yunnan Prov, another 40000 tons of supplies and 30000 tons of gas were deliberately destroyed. Japanese then sacked Longling & Tengchong. Japanese sudden attack of Huitong Bridge would force Chinese into blowing up the bridge, with 500 trucks stranded behind enemy line. Chinese and Japanese faced each other across the Nu-jiang River [i.e., the upper stream of the Salweeen River]. Burma-Chinese highway was hence cut off by Japanese.

Later, Song Ziwen and Chiang Kai-shek argued with Roosevelt & Churchill numerous times for re-launching Burma Theater campaign since Burma-China Highway was essential to China's war against Japan. Song Ziwen, in briefings with US, mentioned that the flight route over Tibet (i.e., Hump Course over the Ridge of the World) had barely brought over supplies for US "Flying Tiger" column, not to mention supplies for Chinese forces. Contrary to common misperception, Chiang Kai-shek never hesitated to reroute his troops for Burma campaign while US & Britain time and again avoided committing marines, navy, airforce and army to Burma as well as insisted on merely a Northern Burma Campaign. Over the Hump Course, more than 600 planes were lost from May 1942 to Sept 1945.