[asiaconqueror]

It seems that the more I read about Ming dynasty's navy, including the armada by Zheng Chengong (Koxinga), the Ming navy was really strong.

Why didn't China expand overseas? Was Ming's navy really that strong and effective?

[Book of Faith]

Well, under Zheng He, they did have much exploration and trade, but once the isolation policy came into effect, they doomed China to remain a low-tech country for hundreds of years.

[General_Zhaoyun]

The naval expedition was too costly. After much military campaign against the mongols, the imperial coffer was much expended and after Emperor Yongle died, the court could no longer afford to fun the expedition. Nevertheless the 7 naval expeditions led by Zheng He did left a mark in chinese history.

Zhen He is considered one of the earliest naval explorer in world history. China did became a naval power during Ming dynasty.

[barbarian]

asiaconqueror, on May 26 2004, 03:53 PM, said:

It seems that the more I read about Ming dynasty's navy, including the armada by Zheng Chengong (Koxinga), the Ming navy was really strong.

Why didn't China expand overseas? Was Ming's navy really that strong and effective?

No doubt, Chinese navy was the strongest in the world during Ming dynasty. But the chinese armada was only interested in exacting tributes from South-East asia as well as established trade with foreign kingdoms. The chinese had never really been interested in expanding navally through conquest. Not only would it be too costly, strategically, it wouldn't do China any good.

[chinesewarrior]

I read that even the chinese made a pact with some of the civilizations in the south-east asia to fight against pirates. In fact, there were some campaigns in which Zheng helped the other civs captured the chief of the pirates.

[General_Zhaoyun]

Zheng He (1371-1435), or Cheng Ho, is arguably China's most famous navigator. Starting from the beginning of the 15th Century, he traveled to the West seven times. For 28 years, he traveled more than 50,000km and visited over 30 countries, including Singapore. Zheng He died in the tenth year of the reign of the Ming emperor Xuande (1435) and was buried in the southern outskirts of Bull's Head Hill (Niushou) in Nanjing.

In 1985, during the 580th anniversary of Zheng He's voyage, his tomb was restored. The new tomb was built on the site of the original tomb in Nanjing and reconstructed according to the customs of Islamic teachings, as Zheng He was a Muslim.

At the entrance to the tomb is a Ming-style structure, which houses the memorial hall. Inside are paintings of the man himself and his navigation maps. To get to the tomb, there are newly laid stone platforms and steps. The stairway consists of 28 stone steps divided into four sections with each section having seven steps. This represents Zheng He's seven journeys to the West. The Arabic words "Allah (God) is great" are inscribed on top of the tomb.

Zhenghe constructed many wooden ships, some of which are the largest in the history, in Nanjing. Three of the shipyards still exist today.

Here's a picture of the ship he sailed:



Here's a picture of the route he sailed:

[General_Zhaoyun]

For more about Cheng Ho, there is a full-length book by Louise Levathes, "When China Ruled the Seas", reprinted by Oxford Univ. Pr, 1996, ISBN 0-195-112075

[Yun]

I recently wrote an essay arguing that the Zheng He voyages should be seen mainly not as naval or exploratory expeditions, but as trade missions to revive a maritime trade route between the Middle East, India and China. This trade route flourished in the Song and Yuan dynasties, because of trade by Arab and Persian middlemen and Chinese private merchants. But during the fall of the Yuan, the Arabs and Persians in China were killed, driven off or forced out of commerce. The Ming distrusted merchants and foreigners, and monopolised overseas trade for itself. So the Zheng He fleets became a necessary expense. After they could no longer be sustained, the trade route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea essentially died out. When most Chinese look at the Zheng He fleets, they see something magnificent, but I see instead a lousy economic policy.

My essay will probably be available online in a few months' time, in the National University of Singapore's History Journal. I'll keep you guys informed.

[Jiang Qin]

Theres also a great book which just came out recently by Gavin Menzies. Can't remember properly 1421: The Year China Discovered The World. A good book overall. Try to take a look.

[Lord Anatolius]

Quote

Theres also a great book which just came out recently by Gavin Menzies. Can't remember properly 1421: The Year China Discovered The World. A good book overall. Try to take a look.

I've read it! I even made a thread about it in Heavengames history forum.

1421 The year China Discovered the World

All the basic info is more or less there. What I want to ask of the Chinese forumers - what do you think of this theory (the book was a very convincing read)? And what would the world have looked like if Zhu Di had not discontinued his exploratory activities in 1423 because of the lighting bolt that hit the Forbidden Palace, convincing him the gods were displeased at that and combined with worsening state of Ming economy made a huge navy an unbearable burden to support.

[Yun]

I've read Menzies' book, and was impressed at least at the amount of time he spent on the research. But I don't think he has proven his case adequately, until he analyses those shipwrecks in the Caribbean Sea to see if they are Chinese. Most historians ridicule his claims and his methods, including my Australian lecturer at NUS. But in my view, the jury is still out, and Menzies should be given the chance to continue gathering his evidence. In my personal view, however, I am more inclined to see the Zheng He fleets as being interested in the Indian Ocean trade than as world explorers.

[wuTao]

chinesewarrior, on May 29 2004, 07:36 AM, said:

I read that even the chinese made a pact with some of the civilizations in the south-east asia to fight against pirates. In fact, there were some campaigns in which Zheng helped the other civs captured the chief of the pirates.

Yeah, according to Levathes' book "When China Ruled the Seas", China did flex it's naval power. Zheng He overthrew a Javanese king named Sekander for apparently usurping the legitimate king (but more likely just to help China's trade ally Malacca), overthrew a king of Ceylon named Alakeswara (but maybe a rival king, depending on which version of the story you believe) for attacking Zheng He's fleet and refusing to turn over a relic of the Buddha, shelled the walls of Mogadishu until the ruler of the city allowed the Chinese to enter and trade, and captured a feared pirate leader of Southeast Asia (forgot his name). So Zheng He was never afraid to flex the power of his navy when situations called for it.

[Yun]

Apparently, Levathes doesn't think much of Menzies' book either ;)

Here's an extract from my university lecture notes for a course on China-Southeast Asia relations, which presents quite an unconventional view of Zheng He's missions. I myself think that my Australian lecturer Dr Wade may have overstated his case about "proto-colonialism", but then again I'm probably biased because I have my own theory about the economic motives of the missions.

The Voyages by Zheng He and Other Eunuchs

• The despatch of various eunuch-led maritime missions to the “Western Ocean” (maritime Southeast Asia west of Borneo and the Indian Ocean), as well as other lesser-known missions to the Eastern Ocean (today’s Philippines, Borneo and Eastern Indonesia) was the third of the three prongs of southern expansion pursued by the Yong-le Emperor . The most widely-known of these envoys was Zheng He, otherwise known as “San-bao”, or “Three Treasures”, and it is around this eunuch that many of the legends current today are centred. Others included Wang Gui-tong and Hou Xian. Zhang Qian and other eunuchs were those responsible for the polities in the Eastern Ocean and brought envoys and rulers to China from there —Bo-ni, Pangasinan, Sulu and Luzon.

• The aims of the eunuch-led missions, were, like Yong-le’s expansions into Yun-nan and occupation of Đại Việt, 1) to create legitimacy for the usurping emperor, 2) display the might of the Ming, 3) bring known polities to demonstrated submission to the Ming and 4) collect treasures for the Court.

• To achieve these aims, the maritime forces needed to be both huge and powerful. Ship-building began almost as soon as the Yong-le emperor assumed power. In 1405, just after Zheng He departed on his first expedition, Zhe-jiang and other regional military commissions were ordered to build 1,180 ocean-going ships. By 1408, the task was assigned to a central ministry and the Ministry of Works was ordered to build 48 “treasure-ships” (寳船).

• The size and number of ships which accompanied the eunuch commanders on the 7 or 8 voyages to Southeast Asia and beyond has long been an issue of debate. However, it seems likely that some of the ships were more than 250 feet long. The ships were capable of carrying cavalry and some served as water tankers. Fleets ranged from 50 to more than 100 ships and remained away for up to two years. A sixteenth-century Chinese account suggests that 27,500 persons accompanied the largest missions to the Western Ocean.

• To enable these great fleets to sail through the Indian Ocean to Africa, it was necessary to create staging posts in what is today Southeast Asia. These were established at Malacca and at the northern end of the Straits of Malacca on an island near Samudera.

• The Straits of Malacca were probably more vital in the 15th century, when international linkages were entirely dependent on shipping, than they are today, and controlling this waterway was an essential first step in controlling the region. It was also thus that the Ming assisted the growth of the new polity of Malacca, so that its own base could be protected. The links between Malacca and the Ming thereby remained intimate for much of the 15th century. The degree to which the development of the port city of Malacca, and the northern port-polities of Sumatra was a product of Ming policies in Southeast Asia in the early 15th century, might be further discussed.

• The military aspect of these voyages needs underlining, in part because of the stress placed on these missions in current scholarship as “voyages of friendship”. A large proportion of the members of the missions were military personnel, and it is obvious that such a force would have played a major threatening role, useful in encouraging foreign rulers to come to the Ming court. However, there were other times when more than a military presence was required and the history of the Zheng He voyages is replete with violence as the eunuch commanders tried to implement the Ming emperor’s demands. Major military actions include:

i) Attack on the Old Port Pacification Superintendency (1407)

Old Port (or 舊港) near Palembang in Sumatra, had apparently long been home to a large number of Chinese persons by the early 15th century. After it came to Ming notice in 1405, the local leader Liang Dao-ming travelled to China. In 1407, Zheng He returned from his first major mission abroad, bringing with him a “pirate” Chen Zu-yi captured at Old Port, for reportedly having “feigned surrender but secretly plotted to attack the Imperial army.” The Ming fleet reported 5,000 persons killed, with 10 ships burnt and 7 captured. Later in the same year, the Ming recognised the polity of Old port. However, because of the large numbers of Chinese, both ex-military personnel and civilians, from Guang-dong and Fu-jian who lived there, it was deemed not to be a country. Rather, it was recognised as a “pacification superintendency”, a term which was commonly used to refer to polities ruled by non-Chinese on the Chinese borders. The person appointed as the Superintendent Shi Jin-qing, was more than likely someone appointed by Zheng He as the local ruler to represent the Ming state. Malacca subsequently sought the territory of Old Port, possibly because of the Malaccan ruler’s origins in Sumatra. References to this polity end in 1430, implying that its fortunes were tied to the continuance of the Ming presence in Southeast Asia, which further suggests that the rulers were indeed agents of the Ming state.

ii) Violence in Java (1407)

• In Java in the late 13th century, Majapahit had succeeded Singasari as the dominant power. Based in east Java, it continued the policies of Singasari of exerting greater power over areas beyond its heartland. The 14th century was a golden age of the Majapahit empire. Appears to have had a standing army and was possibly the largest empire to be created in Se Asia. It was the Ming’s greatest rival in the region, as its influence extended to the peninsula, to Brunei and to the southern Philippines.

In 1407, when Zheng He’s troops went ashore in Java, which was the Ming’s major competitor for regional hegemony in maritime Southeast Asia, some 170 of the Ming forces were killed. The Chinese records suggest that the Chinese troops “went ashore to trade”, “where the Eastern king had ruled”, which suggests Chinese involvement, intentional or otherwise, in a Javanese civil war. In response, the Ming dunned the Western king of Java for compensation. “Immediately pay 60,000 liang of gold in compensation for their lives and to atone for your crime…..Fail to comply and there will be no option but to despatch an army to punish your crime. What happened in Annam can serve as an example.” The reference is to the Ming invasion of Annam noted above. The methods of the later European colonial armies in Asia, demanding compensation following their own military adventures, might be seen as useful comparative examples of such imperial opportunism.

(iii) Threats to Burma (1409)

In the early years of his reign, while vying with Ava-Burma for influence in Yun-nan, Yong-le was particularly concerned about the polity of Mu-bang (Hsenwi). When the Mu-bang envoy came to the Ming court in 1409, reportedly complaining about Na-luo-ta, the Ava-Burma ruler, the response by Yong-le included the following: “Na-luo-ta, with his petty piece of land, is double-hearted and is acting wrongly. I have long known of this. The reason that I have not sent troops there is that I am concerned that good people will be hurt. I have already sent people with instructions requiring him to change his ways and start anew. If he does not reform, I will then order the generals to despatch the army. The troops will attack from the ocean route and you can arrange to have your native cavalry attack overland. The despicable fellow will not be equal to that.” This reference to a maritime army was to the Western Ocean ships of the eunuch commander, Zheng He, who together with Wang Jing-hong and Hou Xian, had been commanded to proceed on another mission to the Western Ocean. This threat by the Ming emperor underlines the militaristic and intimidating nature of the maritime voyages.

(iv) Attack on Sri Lanka (1411)

Perhaps the event most telling as to the nature of the eunuch-led maritime voyages was the military invasion of Sri Lanka, the capture of a ruler and his carrying back to the Ming court in modern Nan-jing in 1411. This occurred during the return voyage of a mission led by Zheng He which had taken the Ming forces to the west coast of the Indian subcontinent, including Quilon, Cochin and Calicut. According to the Ming texts, on the outward voyage, the Sri Lankan ruler Ya-lie-ku-nai-er (Alagakkonara) had been “insulting and disrespectful,” which meant obviously that he did not recognise the pre-eminence of the Ming and its envoys. He was also depicted as a local tyrant who “enticed” Zheng He back to the island, so that he could rob them. This, according to the official Ming history, is what gave rise to the hostilities by which Zheng He invaded the royal city, captured the king, destroyed his military and carried the king and his family members back to the court. As was the case in similar scenarios in Yun-nan, the Ming appointed a puppet ruler to replace the king, presumably to act in ways beneficial to the Ming. The Chinese troops who returned from the expedition to Sri Lanka were rewarded in the same manner and at similar levels to those forces which invaded Đại Việt in 1406, suggesting similar aims of the forces.

(v) Attack and capture of Su-gan-la of Samudera (1415)

A further example of the aims and methods of the maritime missions is seen in 1415, when Su-gan-la, the reported “leader of the Samuderan bandits” was taken to China from Sumatra by Zheng He. According to the Ming shi-lu, Su-gan-la (Iskander?) was plotting to kill the local ruler Zainuli Abidin and seize the throne, and was angered that the Chinese envoys did not recognise him as ruler and confer presents upon him. He thus led his forces against those of the Ming, but was defeated and fled to Lambri. He was there captured together with his wife and children, and shipped to China for punishment. While the events which did occur in 1414 and 1415 remain obscure, it is certain that Zheng He and his forces inserted themselves in a civil war in northern Sumatra, supported the side which was not hostile to the Ming and engaged in warfare against the other. Again, we see an instance of the maritime expedition acting mainly as a military force in an attempt to impose a pax Ming on what we now know as Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

• The examples above suggest that the maritime voyages sent abroad in the first third of the 15th century were intended to achieve the recognition of Ming pre-eminence among all the polities of the known maritime world. Those who would not recognise this supremacy of the Ming were subjected to military force. This is not to say that all polities needed military coercion. The economic benefits flowing from “tribute missions” suggests that some would have gladly sent tribute and personally travelled to the Ming court.

• However, the number of Southeast Asian rulers travelling to China with the Zheng He missions suggests that coercion must have been an important element. There are very few other examples of rulers visiting other polities within Southeast Asia in this period, suggesting that some great pressure must have been imposed on them to encourage them to journey to the Ming court, and thereby demonstrate their subordinate status before the Chinese emperor.

2.g Overall Assessment of Missions

• The examples above suggest that the maritime voyages sent abroad in the first third of the 15th century were intended to achieve the recognition of Ming pre-eminence among all the polities of the known maritime world. To achieve this they used force, or the threat therof.

• The number of Southeast Asian rulers travelling to China with the Zheng He missions suggests that coercion must have been an important element. In almost no other cases did Southeast Asia rulers travel to other polities for visits, as the loss of status within one’s own society must have been palpable. There are very few other examples of rulers visiting other polities within Southeast Asia in this period, suggesting that some great pressure must have been imposed on them to encourage them to journey to the Ming court, and thereby demonstrate their subordinate status before the Chinese emperor.

• “Gunboat diplomacy” is not a term which is usually applied to the voyages of Zheng He. However, they were nominally involved in diplomacy and it appears that the ships were indeed gunboats, with perhaps 26,000 out of 28,000 members of some missions being military men. They would also, like their counterparts involved in military missions in Vietnam and Yun-nan have been armed with the most advanced firearms in the world at that time.

• As such, they were missions intended to coerce and obtain control of ports and shipping lanes, precisely the same aims as the Portuguese who came after them. It was not control of territory, which came with later (‘New’) imperialism, but was control of space -- control of economic lifelines, nodal points and networks. In their methods, they were engaged in what might be called proto-colonialism, that is, the form of colonialism or perhaps, more properly, imperialism pursued by the Portuguese a century later, by which the dominant maritime power attacked or otherwise took control of the major port polities along the major East-West maritime trade network. Why is it that the Europeans who ventured abroad and employed gunboats to control trading centres and trading routes are known as colonialists, while the Chinese admirals who did the same thing are called “ambassadors of friendship”? I hope that I am not alone in seeing some incongruity in this.

• Another possible corollary, is to compare the Ming policies in the early 15th century with the recent actions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. They were both preeminent empires, anxious to shape the world in the image they saw for it, which involved bringing to submission by force those who opposed that vision. They were both armed with the ultimate weapons of the age, and both aimed to shock and awe parts of the world into submission. They left their shores, engaged in attacks on other polities and carried those they saw as enemies (pirates/terrorists) back to their own countries (or nearby in the case of Guantanamo Bay) for justice. The threats which the Ming emperor issued to Burma and Java are echoed in those issued by the Bush administration to Syria and Iran. This is the stuff of pre-eminent empires through much of history. George Bush as Yong-le? Not really, as historical analogy is, almost by definition, flawed. It just helps us to see things in our own time in a new light when we compare with other events in times gone by.

[General_Zhaoyun]

Why didn't Zhenghe or Ming emperor colonise or setup a trading posts en-route the voyage? It could establish a chinese maritime empire..

[deathdoom56]

The ming navy used to be the most powerful. The junks that they sailed on were 4 times the size of galleons used 2 centuries later.

Zheng He brought many things over to china from giraffes to entertain the emperour to a tribal chief who failed to realize the strength of the son of heaven.

However to save costs the navy was disbanded. A portion of the navy was revived to help the koreans during the Japanese invasion but even this tiny fragment was destroyed by the Japanese and the few that survived were disbanded soon after