[General_Zhaoyun]

I've always wondered why Kuomingtang lost to the Communist during the civil war from 1945-1949.

Alright, the communist had won the hearts of the people, Kuomingtang was pretty corrupted..

I mean, the chinese communist were more poorly equipped as compared to the Kuomingtang. They must have better strategy, better generals than the Kuomingtang.

But what accounts for the chinese communist victory? Was Mao a better military leader compared to Chiang Kai Shek? Was the PLO a more efficient and powerful fighting force than the nationalist?

[yehzhaofeng]

Determined Generals. Guerilla Tactics, Mao systemactically used the SUn Tze Art of War. CHase when they retreat, retreat when they fight, stay away when they are larger, pursue them when they are weaker..blah blah.

General_Zhaoyun, on Oct 6 2004, 03:42 AM, said:

I've always wondered why  Kuomingtang lost to the Communist during the civil war from 1945-1949.

Alright, the communist had won the hearts of the people, Kuomingtang was pretty corrupted..

I mean, the chinese communist were more poorly equipped as compared to the Kuomingtang. They must have better strategy, better generals than the Kuomingtang.

But what accounts for the chinese communist victory? Was Mao a better military leader compared to Chiang Kai Shek? Was the PLO a more efficient and powerful fighting force than the nationalist?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

[IronMouse]

Sounds like guerilla warfare to me.

I think Liu Bang VS Xian Yu. During the 4-year skirmishes and wars Liu Bang waged with Xian Yu, Xian Yu pretty much won most of them. But winning the battles isn't as important was winning the war. Liu Bang had the support of the people, while Xian Yu's reputation just got progressively worse. His well-trained elite troops continually trounced Liu Bang's mostly peasant army, but over time, Liu Bang's army gained experience and continued to grow, while Xian Yu's army shrank in numbers and could gain no new recruits.

Generally speaking, Mao dragged the warfare on, and he could afford to unlike Chiang Kai Shek, whose Kuomintang made a mess of the economy anyway through rampant corruption.

[RollingWave]

I'm taking a class on that subject....

The communist were inferior in weaponary but not exactly by a landslide, after securing machuria they had a lot of the Japanese arms and some Soviet onces too... the comparason is that 1 KMT army division was about somewhere like 20% stronger.

I think the biggest overall problem was the horrible strategy and even worse cordination amoung the KMT armies, the KMT still had a lot of that old warlord S*** going and the command system was quiet complicated, making cordination espically on a larger scale very problematic, the Communist also won the spy war later on as several top KMT generals in central command were acturally Communist spies.... making the situation even worse.

One example we just did was the first major battle in Shang Dong province, The Communist stationed 7 divison in southern Shang Dong's Yi Ling with 2 more division spread out across the north, the KMT tried to annhiliated this force by sending 8 division from the south and 3 1/2 division from the north (i'm not quiet sure the correct term to translate here on the measurement of army... the communist were called cross division I think the KMT was called 整編師)

The demostration of the horrible cordination, the 8 division from the south alone was stronger than the 7 Cross division in Yi Ling but advanced slowly while staying closely pacted fearing being seperated and ambushed by the Communist. but the North divisions advanced at a very rapid pace southward. (and was also split up more... but they were also farther away from Yi Ling )

From all strategy point of view this was a horrible mistake, The northern troops were not only weaker than the communist divisions but also cutting off it's vital retreat and were facing otehr communist reinforcements near by while having little KMT reinforcement close, where as the Southern division was not only stronger than the Communist but also have massive back up if things go wrong, yet the north advanced recklessly while the South moved very conservatively.

Mao decided to abandon Yi Lnig leaving 2 Cross divisions to fake diversions and stall the slowly advancing southern front, while the other 5 division raced north with another division comming in from the east to reinforce them to take out the north front.

The South front collasped pretty quickly as 2 Cross divisions abandoned Yi Ling for the near by hills, but instead of realizing that the main forces had raced north, the Southern front stopped and proclaimed victory. only realizing a few days later that their comrades in the north were in serious trouble.

The North division were now hit by 7 divisions (one of the 2 division left in Yi Ling also later went north to join) and fell into a ambush while attempting to retreat, all 3 1/2 division was lost (that's 50000 men) while the Communist suffered low casualty, essentially the Communist traded a empty city annhilating 50000 enemy troops AND escaping a KMT trap.

This is a perfect example. the KMT came in with vastly superior number and power AND position but managed to acturally suffer a major defeat.

It doesn't take a strategy expert to see that either the South front should have been way more agressive or the north front should have moved in much slower, you don't pull a trap by sending ur weakside in first while ur strong side close in very slowly. that's like sending ur light calvary charging head on into enemy spear wall while ur infantry stand behind them. total tactical and stratigical failure.

[yehzhaofeng]

And besides, Mao's deception tactics, as you have given an example, worked GREAT, however, not now, and that is also one of the clls for war against Taiwan, to test out Chinese Modern Strategy, and I am against who said this since fighting your brother to test your strength and wit is all right stupid.

Chiang Kai Shek's most awful move was the Nanjing one. The Chinese forces there were actually pretty large and well equiped, but he chose to abandon it. This whole army and refugees stampeded out of the city just to get stuck at a bottle exit. It took some time for them to leave and many had to stay simply because the fact there were not enough boats. So the ones left joined the commander, I believe General Lee of something in defense of the city, his prmary plan was to defend the outer wall and inner, until a retreat was needed.

He managed to defend Nanjing for a week until Chiang ordered him out to assist him somewhere else. The whole squeese out of the bottle neck thing happened again, only this time, soldiers were left behind because the order was not heard, so hundreds left behind simply thinking their goal was still to defend nanjign while others were pulling out. What was ironic is, the numbers in nanjign still was fairly large, approx 20,000, 200,000 at the start of the defense.all the soldiers were later massacred by the Japanese.

I really want to know about what the strategies in Nanjing were.


Mao on the other hand was using SUn Tzu's Art of war as his bible, which proved to work. Nowadays, it wont work as well. His tactics in the North against the Japanese were working so well, the Japanese were ordered to surrender to the KMT or risk their lives, which didn't prove much since most Japanese captured by Mao were either killed or re-educated.

[Tyler]

Interesting that people still use Sun Tzu's strategy. The Art of War itself is an easy concept though based on opposets.

[RollingWave]

NanJing was debatable.... in fact quiet a few ppl here i've seen question the fact that CKS keep falling back while holding a big army... but most of them also won't deny that this very large army was no match for the much better armed and organized Japanese forces....

I think overall the fall back strategy was the right move for Chang... although there were some execution errors in several cases... it was undeniable that if Chang threw everything he got at the Japanese at the first couple years of the war China would be all of Japans quiet fast and there would be little chance for gurreillas too when they hold everything.

Mao did score some victories however he was fighting in the north.. where the Japanese troop concintration was much much thinner, and there was little attempt made against him offensively... where as Chang face the other way around, the bulk of the Japanese offensive was thrown at him and the South was heavily concintrated (I belive I read that that difference number of troops stationed for North and SOuth was somewhere around 1:7... and remeber that Japan's holding in the north was acturally much bigger)

Chang wasn't a brilliant strategiest that much is true, the KMT did have some great generals but the messed up command system got most of them killed for stupid cordinations.....

One have to remember that Chang was able to held back the Japanese for 8 years in the south... while the Japanese's original analysis thought they could take China in 3 month.... and he did manage to at least make the warlord divide situation a bit better through the north March..... he still deserve some credits for his acomplishments... non of those was possible if he really was a complete idiot.

[SY Xiao]

Not a lot of time to comment, but here goes...

1) The KMT did not have the support of the peasants (or anyone else, for that matter) because everybody knew the put up a half-A** effort against the Japanese.

2) The KMT allowed the Communist Red Army to grow endlessly with their war effort against Japan. By the time 1945 rolled around, the Red Army already had the same number as the KMT army.

3) Poor strategy. KMT held onto the cities, which were easily enclosed by villages controlled by the Communists.

4) Incompetent generals vs. competent generals. Deng Xiao Ping, Zhu De, and the other Communist generals were all excellent strategists.

5) Mao vs. Jiang. Need I say more?

6) Morale. Communist troops fought because they had an ideal and were intrinsically motivated to win, while KMT troops were there for the money. When the pay/food got bad, many deserted.

[RollingWave]

That's a rather biased view Xiao....
1.KMT bore the blunt of the Japanese forces in ww2 is totally undeniable fact... the communist faced a much smaller force taht was more spread out and couldn't really go after them... allowing them to hit and run all they like.... the KMT however faced a major spearhead with a much inferior oragnized/armed/trained army..... If you consider the army they faced off against... who really gave a half A** effort? cause the troop concintration/number they faced was definately not 50/50... more like 80/20 with 80 going after the KMT. while the 20 were just there to try to hold the vast north.

2.The Communist did grow considerablly during ww2, but it was after they took machuria that they really grew to rival the KMT.

3.That's probably the biggest reason for the loss... not exactly holding on to the city part but rather not willing to let it go when it was wiser to retreat ....

4.Yes and no, KMT had quiet a few good generals too... but their command systems were often seperated... which caused many good strategys to fail horriblly due to retarded execution and cordination.

5.Winner writes the history..... consider what happened in China compare to Taiwan from 49-76 I would seriously question how much smarter/better Mao really was to run a vast nation that fully supports them into the ground like that and destroy an entier generation's education/lifehood....

6.that's kinda true... but that doesn't mean that the communist troop would hang around if they weren't fed.... but their support in the farmlands certainly gave them a huge edge here

In the end I still think the single biggest reason the KMT lose was the organization mess.... it's like they were playing a chess game where their side have like 6 players all making their moves and have no idea what the other people are trying to pull...

[astralis]

would like to just look at 6, rolling wave,

i think long march and campaigns of the 1930s would disprove that.

biggest reasons why KMT lost, corruption and incompetence.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

"2.The Communist did grow considerablly during ww2, but it was after they took machuria that they really grew to rival the KMT."

Even at this time the nationalist still outnumber the communist well over 5 to 1




".Yes and no, KMT had quiet a few good generals too... but their command systems were often seperated... which caused many good strategys to fail horriblly due to retarded execution and cordination."


Guo Ming army simply proved incompetent in dealing with the PLA, their army despite been far superior in number, equipment and training are overly arrogant and their best army the 74th route armed with complete modern U.S. equippment brazenly lured by the PLA into the mountains and annilated, this is pathetic display considering the vast technological difference, its automatic assault rifle and tanks vs. rifles and bird rifles and some even with no guns. The nationalist army just couldn't utilize their superior army well, and their strategic strategy was poor.



"5.Winner writes the history..... consider what happened in China compare to Taiwan from 49-76 I would seriously question how much smarter/better Mao really was to run a vast nation that fully supports them into the ground like that and destroy an entier generation's education/lifehood...."

We're talking about military genius, not administration and its an undenyable fact that Mao is far superior, if 30,000 poorly equippted and trained PLA defeating 200,000 nationalist couldn't convince you, I don't know what can.

"6.that's kinda true... but that doesn't mean that the communist troop would hang around if they weren't fed.... but their support in the farmlands certainly gave them a huge edge here"

The PLA did not pillage and that was the major difference, they won the populace support and that was crucial.

[SY Xiao]

RollingWave, on Oct 25 2004, 08:01 AM, said:

That's a rather biased view Xiao....
  1.KMT bore the blunt of the Japanese forces in ww2 is totally undeniable fact... the communist faced a much smaller force taht was more spread out and couldn't really go after them... allowing them to hit and run all they like.... the KMT however faced a major spearhead with a much inferior oragnized/armed/trained army.....  If you consider the army they faced off against... who really gave a half A** effort? cause the troop concintration/number they faced was definately not 50/50... more like 80/20 with 80 going after the KMT. while the 20 were just there to try to hold the vast north.

  2.The Communist did grow considerablly during ww2, but it was after they took machuria that they really grew to rival the KMT.

  3.That's probably the biggest reason for the loss... not exactly holding on to the city part but rather not willing to let it go when it was wiser to retreat ....

  4.Yes and no, KMT had quiet a few good generals too... but their command systems were often seperated... which caused many good strategys to fail horriblly due to retarded execution and cordination.

  5.Winner writes the history.....  consider what happened in China compare to Taiwan from 49-76 I would seriously question how much smarter/better Mao really was to run a vast nation that fully supports them into the ground like that and destroy an entier generation's education/lifehood....

  6.that's kinda true... but that doesn't mean that the communist troop would hang around if they weren't fed.... but their support in the farmlands certainly gave them a huge edge here

  In the end  I still think the single biggest reason the KMT lose was the organization mess....  it's like they were playing a chess game where their side have like 6 players all making their moves and have no idea what the other people are trying to pull...

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

It might be true that the KMT army was bigger and took the hit quite often, but it's undeniable that they didn't put in any effort to win. Jiang even said to his generals that his intentions were to let the Communists and the Japanese battle each other, tire each other out, and then he will unleash his best troops to take care of whoever wins. This strategy didn't work, because he lost the support of the vast majority of Chinese.

And it is not sufficient to say that because the KMT army was larger, it took the hit more. It was obvious to anyone that the Communists, although few in number, took a much more active role in fighting back against the Japanese rather than just "taking the hit". This was a significant morale booster and was immensely popular with Chinese citizens.

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

its true that the nationalist army had a bigger role in battle against the japanese, but proportionally the communist was far more active, during the later part of the war, it was the communist that did the major fighting and the nationalists just sat back guarding their headquarters.

[RollingWave]

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And it is not sufficient to say that because the KMT army was larger, it took the hit more. It was obvious to anyone that the Communists, although few in number, took a much more active role in fighting back against the Japanese rather than just "taking the hit". This was a significant morale booster and was immensely popular with Chinese citizens.

If you are taking more hits... you are obviously less able to take action... the communist did not have the responsibilities to guard cities... and the Japanese made little to no attempt to dislodge them, where as it was completely opposite for the KMT, they can't just abandon a city on a whime and if u need all ur troops just to defend against the Japanese advances... how are you going to counter attack?

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Jiang even said to his generals that his intentions were to let the Communists and the Japanese battle each other, tire each other out, and then he will unleash his best troops to take care of whoever wins

Mao also said that the Communist 七分發展三分抗日 (spend 70% of their effort strengthing themself and spend 30% of the their effort fighting the Japanese)

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if 30,000 poorly equippted and trained PLA defeating 200,000 nationalist

what number are you quoting from here? from what i'm reading by the fall of 48 the Communist in Manchuria alone was close to a million while the KMT have around 300 -500 thousand left of which over 300 thousand is isolated in 2 cities . While in the otehr battle sector they did not have the lead in terms of number... they where no where as lopsided as the KMT situation in Manchuria.....

Another easy example will here centers on Manchuria... by the fall of 48 it was obvious that Manchuria was lost... but the KMT still had almost half a million men in 3 cities (長春, 瀋陽, 錦州) out of which 瀋陽 and 長春 had over 300 thousand men but was isolated , while 錦州 was the bottle neck from manchuria into northern China.....

From a military strategic point of view... it was obvious that Manchuria was already lost (u have less than half the troop they do AND most of those troops are surronded)... 長春's 100thousand men was isolated beyond hope of reinforcement or break through... (and they eventrually defected) but 瀋陽 had 200 thousand and could have easily broke out to 錦州 until after mid September... with 錦州 as a big bottleneck and have good accessability of railroad and port... it was a good possibility that they could prevent the Communist bulk from Manchuria to enter into reinforce the other communist sectors (which were almost all inferior in number to KMT troops)

But instead the local commander incharge of Machuria stubbornly refuse to retreat (seem like the main reason for fear of loss of his job) from 瀋陽 and the 300,000 troop trapped in the 2 city were soon all annihilated or defected... the communist also managed to overwhlem 錦州 soon after and stormed into northern China.... over the next couple of year over 2 million communist troops came down on the KMT through Manchuria....

The KMT army's equipment varies greatly from each armies... the example of good american equpiment only holds true for some of the central army... most of the armies that belonged to local warlord origins had arms that were far less adequet.... and even then... you might overstate how high tech the American arms was... remember this was right after ww2... where the german army's main rifle was still single shot !!! while the Communist took over quiet a large stock of japanese arms because they entered Manchuria first (thx to russian help again)

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We're talking about military genius, not administration and its an undenyable fact that Mao is far superior, if 30,000 poorly equippted and trained PLA defeating 200,000 nationalist couldn't convince you, I don't know what can.

yes but since most of the reasons citied so far are more political than military.... and like Sun Tzu said you really can't seperate the two (top strategiest defaet oppenents through diplomacies and politics)

Anyway... my point is that the KMT government were much more restricted by politics (since they were the ruling government) while their military command system was still very messed up causing what was suppose to be decent strategies to fail miserablly (like my previous example in Shang Dong..... what was suppose to be a good trapping turned into a disastor due to horrible cordination)

[Borjigin Ayurbarwada]

"what number are you quoting from here? from what i'm reading by the fall of 48 the Communist in Manchuria alone was close to a million while the KMT have around 300 -500 thousand left of which over 300 thousand is isolated in 2 cities . While in the otehr battle sector they did not have the lead in terms of number... they where no where as lopsided as the KMT situation in Manchuria..... "

I'm not talking about post ww2, I'm talking about the second battle of communist with the nationalist before the long march.