[General_Zhaoyun]

Part 2 - The Downfall of Southern Song

Taking advantage of the Mongols' temporary retreat, Jia seized court power, leading the dynasty further and further to its demise. In the spring of 1260, Kublai procalimed the title Great Khan. At that time, he was too busy cracking down the internal unrest to launch another southward invasion. So he sent envoy Hao Jingguo to inform the Southern Song of his succession.

To prevent his secret truce with the Mongols coming out into the open, Jia, acting like a hoodlum, detained the Mongol envoy inthe Song barracks. When the Mongols repeatedly sent their messengers to inquire the envoy's whereabouts, Jia denied knowing anything about it.

In the face of a powerful enemy, Jia did nothing to united his own front and continued to persecute generals who refused to attach themselves to him. As a result, he brought calamity to the Song and its people. The governor of Dongchuan region, General Liu Zheng, well-known for his fighting skills, could not get along with Jia's trusted men Yu Xing. For this reason, he suffered repeated persecutions and had nowhere to voice his complaint. Out of anger, he surrendered 15 prefectures of Sichuan to the Mongols.

Liu Zheng's surrender caused serious consequences. Song not only lost a brave general, but also had its secret information about its defense deployment and military strength leaked to the Mongols. Furthermore, Liu Zheng began to help the Mongols against the Song . He advised Kublai to attack Xiangyang first and then conquer the rest of the Song.

Kublai adopted his proposal. At Liu's further advice, he bribed the Song's chief commander Lu Wende with jade belts to allow the Mongols setting up a market outside Fancheng. Under the pretext of building the market, Kublai had a fort constructed and used it as a stronghold to stage attacks against Xiangyang.

In 1267, Kublai started his offensive against Xiangyang and Fancheng. The Song side fought bravely and held to two cities for 6 years.

Xiangyang was separated from Fancheng by the Han river. At first, the Southern Song could use the water route to continually supply provisions to the two cities to back their resistance against the Mongols. In addition, there was a chain bridge across the Han river connecting the two cities. This helped to constitute a strong defense system and made it possible for the two places to assist each other in the face of enemy attacks.

In February 1269, the Mongol troops built a fortress east of the Han River to block Song's water route. They ambushed and defeated Song's rescue force from both land and water. Fancheng was encircled . The year when Kublai founded the Yuan dynasty, the Mongol army (later known as the Yuan army) also laid siege to Xiangyang.

While Xiangyang and Fancheng was under prolonged siege, Jia blocked all information to Emperor Du Zong. The court put Li Tingzhi in charge of reinforcements to the two besieged cities. However, Jia weakened Li's authority by allowing another Song general to ignore Li's command. This caused difficulty for the reinforcement plan to succeed.

Shortages of salt and cloth in Xiangyang and Fancheng amde the defense difficult and people there longed for reinforcements. In 1272, General Li Tingzhi enlisted 3,000 anti-Yuan volunteers. When the Han River rose, they loaded their boats with firelocks, cannons, charcoals, axes and blows. Led by Zhang Shun and Zhang Gui, they set sail, cutting the iron chains that blocked their way and fighting successively along their 60-km-long journey. At last, they broke through Yuan's tight encirclement.

Zhang Shun led a heroic fight against the Yuan army. In the end, he lost his life in battle after being struck 4 time and pierced by 6 arrows. When his body floated on the water, he still wore his armor and held his bow, his eyes wide open in anger. It was indeed a touching sight. Finally, this brave reinforcement unit entered Xiangyang, which greatly boosted the morale of its defenders.

After his arrival in Xiangyang, Zhang Gui sent two of this brave men to swim under the water to Chengzhou, requesting the Song army there for reinforcement. Thw two sides decided to join forces at Longwei Rapids. Unfortunately, a Song deserter leaked this secret information to the Yuan troops. When Zhang Gui led his men to Longwei Rapids, the Yuan attackers intercepted them. They put up Song flags to mislead Zhang and his men and killed all of them in a surprise attack.

From then on, Xiangyang and Fancheng were totally isolated. In January 1273, the Yuan army cut off the chain bridge that connected the two cities. Having lost contact with each other, Xiangyang and Fancheng were each completely encircled. The Yuan troops used powerful trebuchets they had obtained from the western regions to attack Fancheng and sacked the city.

Both the army and the people in Fancheng fought heroically against the Yuan invaders until the fall of their city. Officer Niu Fu led his brave men in a street fight, killing many enemy soldiers. When fatally wounded, he burnt himself to death. Wang Fu, his subordinate, shouted, "My leader had died for his country. How can I live along and be a coward?" Theyn he threw himself to the fire. Commander Fan Wenshun also remained undaunted and died for his country.

Fancheng fell. Seeing no hope for reinforcements and frightened by the enemy's powerful trebuchets, Commander Lu Wenhuan of Xiangyang oepned the city gate and surrendered to the Yuan. The loss of Fancheng and Xiangyang deprived Hangzhou of its northern defense strongholds. After sacking the two cities, the Yuan army advanced eastward along the Yangzi River, marching victoriously to Hangzhou.

On hearing of the fall of Xiangyang and Fancheng, the court in Hangzhou was shocked. Jia put on a show of bravey, vowing to save the dangerous situation. When some court officials put forward proposals for defense, he refused to listen and drove them out of the court. In July 1274, Emperor Du Zong died and was succeeded by the 4-year-old Xian Zong. The Southern Song was on the verge of collapse.

In September, Prime Minister Boyan of Yuan marched the main Mongol force over both land and river to the Southern Song capital Hangzhou by 3 routes. Lu Wenhuan, a Song general who had surrendered to the Yuan, led the Mongol navy as a vanguard. They set off from Xiangyang and advanced forward along the Yangzi river.

Chengzhou was the first city along Yuan's march route. Commanded by Zhang Shijie, a famous anti-Yuan general, the Song force guarding Chengzhou repellled the attakcs by Boyan's main force. Unable to capture the town, the Yuan army had to make a detour and continued their south-ward march, sacking one town after another on their way.

At this critical situation, Jia had to lead a force of 130,000 to Wuhu in an attempt to resist the Yuan invaders. His force was soon routed in battle and with this defeat, the Southern Song lost all its elite army. Song court councilors and imperial scholars all demanded that Jia be put to death. Empress Dowager Xie, who was in charge of court affairs, merely exiled Jia as a punishment. Nevertheless, the escort officer murdered JIa out of moral indignation in a temple in Zhangzhou, Fujian province.

In July 1275, Emperor Kublai ordered Boyan to attack Hangzhou. The Yuan army met resistance only in Tanzhou, Yangzhou and hearing of Yuan's imminent arrival. Empress Dowager Xie sent envoys to ask for peace with the Yuan, but Boyan refused. The following January, the Southern Song court submitted its royal seal to Boyan and surrendered. Thus ended the Southern Song dynasty.

[General_Zhaoyun]

Part 3 - Wen Tianxiang and Lu Xiufu : Anti- Yuan Heros

On January 18, 1276, the Southern Song government submitted a letter of surrender to the Yuan army. The next day, Empress Dowager Xie sent Prime Minister Wen Tianxiang to the Yuan camp for surrender negotiations. Wen led some court officials to the Yuan camp, 15 km away from Hangzhou. On his arrival, he appeared dignified and fearless.

When Wen met Boyan, he did not mention anything about surrender. Instead, he asked, "Which do you really intend to do, make friends with Song or destroy it?" Boyan falsely replied, " Emperor Kublai does not have any intention to exterminate Southern Song." Wen then said, "if that is so, please withdraw and then we shall talk about peace." Boyan was speechless.

Looking ferocious, Boyan threatened, " the only thing you can do now is surrender. Don't talk about anything else, or none of you will be pardoned." Wen Tianxiang said calmly, " I am a Song scholar, ready to die for my country. When there is Song, there will be me. When there is no Song, there will be no me. I fear nothing in the service of Song."

Seeing Wen's indomitable spirit, Boyan had to end the negotiation hastily. He detained Wen, letting other Song officials return. Determined to give up resistance, Empress Dowager Xie sent another prime minister to offer surrender. This time, Boyan accepted Song's letter of surrender. Emperor Gong Di, Empress Dowager Xie and other Song officials including Wen Tianxiang were all taken prisoner and sent northward to the Yuan capital.

Wen Tianxiang (1236-1283), a native of Jiangxi, took the first place in the palace examination of 1256. He was both an oustanding scholar official of the Song and a national hero in the struggle against the Mongol invaders.

Born of a scholar family, Wen read extensively while still a child. On first entering school, he saw portraits of Ouyang Xiu, a renowned man of letter, and some anti-Jin heros in the worshipping room of the school. Greatly inspired by their achievements and patriotism, he swore, "I shall follow them as my example."

After becoming a court official, Wen found that Jia Shidao and some eunuches wer just a bunch of wicked people who would bring disaster to the country. He dared to oppose them. When Kublai laid siege to Erzhou, eunuch Dong Songchen proposed to move the capital to Ningbom urging Emperor Li Zong to flee. At this time, Wen came out boldly and submitted a memorandum, requesting the emperor to behead Dong. Because of this act, he lost his official post.

Soon, Wen was summoned back to the capital. He began to serve as a royal scholar,
drafting imperial edicts for the emperor. Once he argued against Jia Shidao and was dismissed and retired to Luling. Only at the critical momen of Song's imminent collapse that Wen Tianxiang was recalled and given the post of governor of Ganzhou in Jiangxi Province.

In 1274, Boyan marched a force of 200,000 to Hangzhou. The Southern Song government immediately issued an imperial edict, calling on local governments to recruit soldiers to defend the emperor in the capital. Among local administrators, Wen Tianxiang was the only one to give away his family property to raise an army of 30,000 men. He organised them into a sizeable defense force.

One of Wen's friend tried to dissuade him from doing this. He said, "the Yuan army is marching straight in, meeting little resistance. If you lead your new recruits to battle, it is like driving lambs towards tigers. Is it really worth the while?" Wen replied calmly, "Our country is now in a critical situation. I cannot sit back and watch without going to its rescue. I know that my power is limited, but I am willing to sacrifice my life for my country. It is my only wish that all loyal and upright people in the country can join me."

After Wen arrived with his men in Hangzhou, he was appointed governor of Shuzhou, a city at the forefront of the resistance against Yuan. He volunteered to send a reinforcement unit to join the defense of Changzhou. However, the decaying ruling clique of the Souther Song failed to provide reinforcements to strengthen the defense of Changzhou as it was bent on seeking peace. In the end, Changzhou was sacked and its people slaughtered by the Yuan invaders. Wen had to retreat to Hangzhou.

After the disgraceful surrender of the central court in Hangzhou, the Southern Song people, led by Wen Tianxiang, Zhang Shijie and Lu Xiufu, continued their resistance against the Yuan. On the way to the Yuan capital, Wen managed to escape by boat in Zhenjiang when the guard relaxed his vigilance.

The Yuan army occupied Hangzhou and took Emperor Gong Zong prisoner. The 9-year old prince Zhao Shi and the 6-year old prince Zhao Bing fled to Fuzhou under the escort of the Song royal clan. On May 1, Zhao Shi was enthroned and became Emperor Duan Zong . Chen Yizhong and Li Tingzhi were appointed prime ministers. Zhang Shijie was made vice director of the military council and Lu Xiufu a senior assistant of the council.

Wen Tianxiang escaped to Zhenzhou from Zhenjiang. As the Yuan army offered a reward to capture him, Wen went through much difficulties and hardship. With the help of local peasants, he got to Wenzhou by boat with 11 of his attendants. In late May, he arrived in Fuzhou and was appointed prime minister and senior advisor to the Military council. Wen proposed to recover Zhejiang, but his plan was abandoned b'cos of Chen Yizhong's opposition.

Wen left Fuzhou for Nanping where he set up a local government to organize armed resistance against the Yuan. In 1278, he marched his troops to the south of Jiangxi and won a big victory at the battle of Eryundu, recovering many counties. The victory greatly boosted the morale of the anti-Yuan fighters. A great number of volunteers in Hunan and Jiangxi joinged the anti-Yuan struggle.

At this time, another Yuan contingent marched in Fujian. Finding the situation hopeless, Chen Yizhong took a boat and fled to Vietnam by himself . Zhang Shijie and Lu Xiufu escorted Zhao Shi, the child emperor, to flee by sea. The 11-year old Zhao Shi was so frightened that he died of sickness shortly. Zhang and Lu made Zhao Bing the new emperor and moved their battleships to Yashan.

Seeing the rising tide of resistance against the Yuan in southern China, Emperor Kublai decided to send his crack force to crush the remnant Song force. A Yuan contingent, led by Li Heng, came fiercely to attack Wen's unity. Wen's wife and his advisors were captured in Yongfeng. Owing to the help of Zhao Shishang, a subordinate, who disguised himself as the prime minister, Wen managed to escape. Zhao Shishang lost his life.

Undaunted, Wen moved to Chaozhou, continuing the fight. Unfortunately, he was captured by the Yuan light cavalry in a sneak attack while having lunch in Wupoling. When the enemy asked him to kneel, Wen said fearlessly, "I can die, but I won't kneel." When ordered to write a letter to Zhang Shijie, inducing him to capitulate, he refused flatly, and wrote the following instead, "Death is something that no man can avoid. The great thing, however, is to leave a name recorded in history with honor."

On the sea below Yashan, Zhang Shijie and Lu Xiufu led the last anti-Yuan force in a desperate fight against the Yuan army. On March 19, 1279, two Yuan contingents joined forces and besieged the Song men from four sides. They rained numerous arrows on the Song position. With his soldiers unable to resist any further, Lu Xiufu, carrying Zhao Bing on his back, drowned himself in the sea, thus laying down his life for the country.

Wen Tianxiang was taken to the Yuan capital Beijing. For 3 years, he was kept in a damp earthen cell. In prison, he wrote the famous "Song of Justice" which expressed his strong will to die for his noble cause. Emperor Kublai tried to persuade Wen to surrender, promising to appoint him prime minister, but Wen refused and died a martyr on January 17, 1283.

This post has been edited by Yun: 13 April 2005 - 09:05 PM

[sima old bandit]

Amazing translation. I learnt alot here. It was really difficult to read though - every time the Song seem to show some promise our own leaders screw it up and rather be a vassal. -.-" They should have just surrendered already.

[Yun]

GZ, in your translation are you using Western calendar dates, or translating Chinese calendar dates as Western ones (i.e. fifth lunar month as May)? It's misleading to do the latter.

For more info and a map of the final battle at Yashan (not the 'Ya Hills' - Yashan was a place name on the coast; I have corrected the post), read http://www.chinahist...?showtopic=2563

[Goujian]

Do you guys think the selection of Kaifeng as Song's capital contributed to the downfall of Song? Kaifeng was known as Eatern Capital or 东京 and Luoyang was known as Western Capitol （西京）. Zhao Kuangyin wanted to move the capital to Luoyang or Chang'an like in Han and Tang Dynasty but the court officials rejected the idea. He once visted Luoyang and refused to move back to Kaifeng. Kaifeng is located on flat plain and so is very bad for defense. But Kaifeng is centrally located and has well-connected rivers. The court officials argued that for economic reason Kaifeng was ideal for the capital.

Unfortunately for Song, it emphasized too much on economics during those days when the whole world was not civilized.

[sima old bandit]

I was also puzzled by the choice of Kaifeng as capital. Retrospectively it seems defense was paramount but on the other hand since their policy was appeasement then the economy was paramount. How else would they pay the tributes!

[Yun]

We had a discussion on AE about Kaifeng last year. My argument was that by this time, the supply of rice from the south via the Grand Canal to feed the burgeoning northern population was essential, and Kaifeng being situated on the Canal had advantages that Chang'an and Luoyang could not equal. G. William Skinner, in his 1985 paper "The Structure of Chinese History". puts it this way:

Quote

Both Luoyang and Kaifeng had access to the Grand Canal, but Kaifeng's site, some 190km closer to the geographic centre of the North China plain, gave it a particular advantage in an era that saw a steady eastward shift of the region's population density.

In a footnote, he adds:

Quote

City building, too, was increasingly concentrated in the eastern and northeastern areas of North China throughout the centuries from Sui to Song. Kaifeng's early development as a commercial centre coincided with the late Tang relaxation of economic controls... which in fact favoured central places in accordance with their transport advantages regardless of administrative status.

[shawn]

Ho0w did Zhao Kuangyin defeat the southern dynasties?

[Yang Zongbao]

shawn, on Apr 6 2008, 08:08 PM, said:

Ho0w did Zhao Kuangyin defeat the southern dynasties?

http://www.chinahist...p...t&p=4341784

[Pyrrho22]

Gweilo, on Sep 26 2004, 09:31 AM, said:

Can anyone supply a detailed history of the Southern Song? Specifically, during the 13th Century CE, from the time the northern Song fell to when the Mongols finally conquered all of the southern Song territory. Thanks.

I know I'm very late to this topic, and we already got a very thorough history, but if you want more, especially about what daily life in Hangzhou looked like, look at daily life in china on the eve of the mongol invasion by Jacques Gernet, translated from French by H.M. Wright (available at Amazon.com, of course). A bit Eurocentric of a view, but very thorough accessible. It does not press a strong thesis, but if there is one, it seems to be that the Song dynasty did not fall to the Mongols for lack of societal adaptability.

[Yang Zongbao]

Pyrrho22, on Sep 5 2008, 11:53 PM, said:

I know I'm very late to this topic, and we already got a very thorough history, but if you want more, especially about what daily life in Hangzhou looked like, look at daily life in china on the eve of the mongol invasion by Jacques Gernet, translated from French by H.M. Wright (available at Amazon.com, of course). A bit Eurocentric of a view, but very thorough accessible. It does not press a strong thesis, but if there is one, it seems to be that the Song dynasty did not fall to the Mongols for lack of societal adaptability.

Holy c**p!

I just got this book from Amazon!

I must admit, the writing style and romanization are a bit quaint. I'll have more to say when I'm done reading. =)

[Terence1]

I can't help but feel that almost everytime a Chinese dynastys falls, all chinese historians do was to blame it all on coruption. But the problem mainly lies on poor leadership from incompetent emperors. Its just disturbing to know that dispite the fact that previous dynastys failed the same way (i.e corruption & one man "emperor" governing system"), there was no one who was able to revolutionize the system of governing a country like what happen in europe.

[shawn]

Would Song dynasty have lasted longer if military generals were trusted and not stripped of their powers right from the start of Zhao kuanyin's time? If reforms were being carried out from middle of the dynasty, would Song also have lasted longer? With these 2 factors and everything remained status quo on the "barbarians" side, would Song been able to unify the north? Also, were Song people considered Han people?

[brightness]

shawn, on Jun 15 2009, 09:00 AM, said:

Would Song dynasty have lasted longer if military generals were trusted and not stripped of their powers right from the start of Zhao kuanyin's time? If reforms were being carried out from middle of the dynasty, would Song also have lasted longer? With these 2 factors and everything remained status quo on the "barbarians" side, would Song been able to unify the north? Also, were Song people considered Han people?

If the Zhaos had not subordinated military commanders to the civilian administration, Song would most likely have become yet another footnote "dynasty" in "Six-Dynasties" instead of the historical "Five-Dynasties" because in all likelihood, some general would have usurped the throne just like Zhao Kuanyin did to his master, whose ancestor did the same thing to their master, etc. etc..

IMHO, Song military was not weak by the standards of the settled people. Its opponents just happened to be very strong, and for a good reason (see below). Song held up against the full strength of Mongol power longer than any other state/civilization anywhere else on the Eurasian cotinent.

The Songs were up against some serious logistic challenges: from the evidence we have today, the planet may well have been going through a cooling period. The same global cooling that gradually wiped out the Viking settlment in Greenland also transformed the northern China plains into something less suitable for settled farming and more suitable to pasturing/ranching that the nomadic "babarians" excelled at. Song was not unique in facing this problem: nomadic calvary pushed the line demarcating settled people vs. nomads from the "Great Wall" line south to the Huai River line every 800 years or so, both before Song (Nan-Bei Chao) and after Song (Qing/Manchu). When the climate is warm, farms are more productive, there is more surplus food to waste on supporting a centralized pyramidal bureacracy (with its attendant corruption) pushing all the way north to the GreatWall line. When the climate gets cold, farms are less productive, farms in the far north are abandoned to pasture; central government usually collapsed simply because there wasn't enough fat to support the wasteful multi-level bureacracy that had grown to excessive size in good times. Song actually held up remarkably well in Southern Song, buttressed by its navy and trade with the outside world along the sea coast; farmers did not have to carry the entire burden of both supporting the government corruption and the war effort against the nomads as the Southern Song court found revenue from taxing sea board trading. That enabled Southern Song to hold together and retain a semblence of stability, unlike the previous Nan-Bei Chao and 5-Dynasties/10-Kingdom. Compared to those dynasties under similar strategic logistic challenges, Southern Song did exceedingly well.

As for the official reforms during Song (Wan An Shi Reform), the effect was dubious at best. Wan An Shi's reforms actually introduced more government intervention, resulting in even more corruption; for example, one of the key reforms was government loans to farmers to buy seeds/seedlings . . . in theory that sounds great, what can be better than helping farmers turn seeds into harvest reaping 10x return in one year? Of course that assumed the government official knew where to plant and what the market interest rate should be, neither could be taken for granted; in practice, the policy became a loan sharking operation with the government being the leg breaker where officials were forcing/enticing farmers to take out loans at excessive interest rate to plant where it should not have been planted to begin with . . . just so that the officials could meet their loan origination quotas . . . sounds almost like our "subprime" loan debacle, and it indeed was because the Song officials were targetting loans at farmers who were not the best at their craft and could not get loans in the market place.

There was one thing that the Songs could have done that would have made life much easier for themselves: instead of allying with Jin/Manchu to eliminate the older enemy Khitan/Liao, then instead of allying with Mongols to eliminate the older enemy Jin/Manchu, the Songs should have kept their own end of the non-aggression bargains with Khitan and Jin/Manchu . . . in fact should have subsidized the older more sinicized "babarians" to fight off the far more dangerous and robust new batch of nomads flooding southward. The northern China plain and Youzhou were of very little economic value under the prevailing climate conditions; farmers were abandoning farm steads north, and the land was turnig pasture. The semi-sinicized "babarians" would have been far better at utilizing the pasture land after they were bought off, and could be used as a barrier against the more robust new group of "babarians." Song essentially made the same mistake that Yan made in the Warring State era: needling Han/Wei/Zhao to death, only to have the far more dangerous Qin showing up on its door steps.

Ultra-nationalism and revanchism among the chickenhawks in the Song central state university had a lot to do with the terrible strategic choice. The chickenhawks never had to worried about fighting and dying on the front line as foot soldiers themselves (being a foot soldier was beheath them: good iron is not to be used for nails); all they cared about was political grand-standing and drawing a government salary/stipend; never mind the impracticality of occupying lands that were no longer suitable for Han style farming under the particular climate condition of the time. They probably never worked a field themselves (also beneath them). What the Song should have done was packing up the students engaged in pro-war riots, send them to the front line, give each of them a crossbow, then tell them to fight the northern babarians as they wished; the rioters can even keep the land north if they can grab any.

[shawn]

In government reforms, what improvements could be done? Also, in military, nothing could be done? I mean, what could be done to beef up the military strength and intel? Also, how to deal with the northern "barbarians"?