[bnovak]

Can someone shed some light on this topic for me, it is for a essay, and I need it by tomorrow. I am getting the gist of it, but can not formulate an essay for it. What roles did each play?

[naruwan]

bnovak, on Oct 12 2005, 06:51 PM, said:

Can someone shed some light on this topic for me, it is for a essay, and I need it by tomorrow. I am getting the gist of it, but can not formulate an essay for it. What roles did each play?

There are a lot of information on the web on this topic.

There are many dimentions when analysing struggles of KMT and CCP. Pick one, and focus on that.

[Chen3141]

naruwan, on Oct 13 2005, 02:58 AM, said:

There are a lot of information on the web on this topic.

There are many dimentions when analysing struggles of KMT and CCP. Pick one, and focus on that.

If you want some good information try to focus on one large part. Such as the leaders or the fighters. You can't be so general.

[ahxiang]

You may want to tackle this KMT-CCP issue by going to the core of the debates directly


Mr Xin Haonian has a website entitled Huaanghuagang.org

On the website, someone called Li Wangshu rebutted Li Zongren Mmeoirs, as exhibited at http://www.huanghuag...e11/big5/05.htm

Mr Xin Haonian himself was currently under communist attacks for his book Which Is The New China
http://www.huanghuag...ianyu/index.htm

I had read through related records and gave the following notes at
http://www.uglychine...ren-debates.htm


-----------------

Mr Xin Haonian's huanghuagang.org had carried an article rebutting Li Zongren's criticisms of Chiang Kai-shek the self-likened Chinese Bismark. Though we live in 21st century now, historical events that had occurred in China during the first half of 20th century were still in debates. Thanks to Chi-com's imprisoning thousands of high-level KMT officials and officers instead of butchering them as was the fate of millions of KMT 'bandits', we could manage to read through the self-criticism format memoirs to derive some coherent historical accounts and restore the truth of history. Recent declassification of Russian and Chinese communist archives as well as the revelation of American VENONA wiretap transcripts had shed new light on i) Russian/Comintern conspiracies against China, and ii) American manipulations of Chinese politics, e.g., Stilwell's instigating General Bai Chongxi, Stuart's instigating Li Zongren, and McArthurs's instigating General Sun Liren.

The loss of China could not simply be explained by the faults of Chiang Kai-shek alone. However, this webmaster would add some notes to the "criticisms of Li Zongren's criticisms of Chiang Kai-shek" below for sake of historical clarification.


Li Zongren's oral history recitals, not published before either his death or Chiang Kai-shek's death, had been written by Tang Degang at the request of Columbia University. Similar to Wellington Koo's memoirs or Chen Jieru's memoirs, the Chinese communists and their leftist fellows in HK had published or translated the scripts without obtaining the copyright of either the owner or his/her descendant or the Columbia University. There was no pre-meditated motive in all cases other than the expression and opinions of the hero or heroine involved.

What Li Wangshu criticised as to Li Zongren's claim about Chiang Kai-shek conferral of provincial governorship was out-of-context since Li Zongren was talking about the communist insurgency prior to the Wars of the Central Plains of 1930 and/or prior to the ruption of the 1937-1945 resistance war.

The number of 7000 communist prisoners of war was related to the battle against the Xiao Ke's herald troops in Sept-Oct 1934, not the 80,000 Central Red Army. Communist General Xiao Ke led the herald 10,000 column into Guangxi Province. Bai Chongxi counter-charged against the Red Army, inflicted a casualty of 10000 on Red Army led by General Xiao Ke, and captured 7000 prisoners of war. Xiao Ke managed to bring about 1000 remnant soldiers of Red Army 2nd Corps-Conglomerate to a union with Heh Long in western Hunan Province after incurring defeats in Guangxi Province.

Li Zongren, like the rest of military contenders [Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan], had their rights to maintaining their influence and domain after the unification of China by objecting to drastic demilitarization. Chiang Kai-shek, though self-likening himself to China's Bismark, did not actually enjoy any more reputation and feats than the contenders. The first shot from the Wuhan Incident might not have anything to do with Li Zongren who was the only group army commander staying on in Nanking the capital in lieu of returning to his power base as Yan and Feng did. There was nothing particularly wrong about Chiang Kai-shek's aspiration for centralization of politics, economy and military other than Chiang Kai-shek's innate disadvantages in comparison with predecessor Yuan Shi-kai or successor Mao Tse-tung. Incidentally, the combined headcouts of four group armies at the time of Chinese reunification in 1928 was not too much out-of-par should we look around to see how big Japan's standing army was percentage-wise against the population. The direct consequence of Chiang Kai-shek's selfishness and intolerance would be: i) Communist disturbances in multiple provinces; ii) Japanese invasion of Manchuria on Sept 18th 1931.

Chiang Kai-shek's agents from both military statistics & investigation and central statistics & investigation bureaus did resort to assassinations and political assassinations against the communists, political enemies and Japananese collaborators. Li Zongren was wrong in pointing fingers at Chiang Kai-shek for the deaths of former warlords like Sun Chuanfang & Zhang Zongchang, but was not too much off in counting the deaths of Li Gongpu & Wen Yiduo since the boss must bear responsibility for the faults of the subordinates any way. Li Zongren might not have full knowledge of Tang Shaoyi's collusion with Japanese, while Chiang Kai-shek's agents had indeed taken out potential collaborators as a premptive strike. Looking in hindsight, it was already agreed-upon by many scholars, including elements from KMT "central statistics & investigation bureau" that "bodily extinction" policy against the communists did not route out the communist base in Shanghai in early 1930s but the new policy of converting Chinese communists, yielding to the fact that almost majority of KMT agents in central statistics & investigation bureau had been "communist converts". The April 12th 1927 Purge of communists in Shanghai was drastic, dramatic, harsh and bloody in the opinion of this webmaster.

Li Zongren's "collusion" with Japanese prior to 1937 resistance war should be looked upon in a similar perspective to Dr Sun Yat-sen's collusion with Japanese governor in Taiwan during the 1900 boxer turmoils. The proof of Li Zongren's loyalty to China could lie in the repeated attempts by communist-infiltrated Weng Zhaoyuan's 61st Division in provoking a Sino-Japanese War: On Aug 22nd 1936, Bai Chongxi & Li Zongren declared that KMT 19th Route was restored by assigning a division to Division Chief Weng Zhaoyuan; Weng Zhaoyuan's 61st Division was dispatched to Beihai city [near southern Guangdong Prov] where they murdered a Japanese-born merchant [zhongye shunsan] who was long suspected of being a Japanese spy. (Xie Hegeng memoirs stated that a communist member named Zhang Meisheng was the secretary to division chief Weng Zhaoyuan and that this execution on Sept 3rd 1936 was approved by Cai Tingcai.)

Chiang Kai-shek indeed went into every bits and pieces in his habit of command, often giving handwritten notes as authoritative decree and making phonecalls to as low as the regiment command centers. Numerous memoirs ponted out that Chiang Kai-shek devoted his time around-the-clock, sleepless, during the 1937-1945 resistance war time period. This, however, was Chiang Kai-shek's personal weakness since he dared not to delegate authorities and command to non-Whampoa and non-Zhejiang-nativity officers and officials. American manipulations of Chinese politics had stemmed from the very recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's personal weakness, e.g., Stilwell's instigating General Bai Chongxi, Stuart/Marshal/Truman's instigating Li Zongren, and McArthurs's instigating General Sun Liren.

Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi, possibly knowing that Liu Zhongrong & [Liu Zhonghua were communists, nevertheless had naivety as to the cruelty of politics. What Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi or Chiang Kai-shek did not understand was that Chinese communists, after numerous rounds of political purge, had become a clique which operates mechanically and mercilessly in lieu of tolerating enemies on basis of acquaintanceship. Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi certainly would not know that Guo Rugui & Liu Fei were undercover communists, and they would not know of Wei Lihuang's collusion with communists certainly unless communists disclosed it on their own accord throughout the cultural revolution of 1960s. Understandably so in light of the fact that communists had converted sons and daughters of numerous KMT officers and officials. The scale of international communism, as exhibited by tens of thousands of volunteer fighters mustered by Comintern against Franco in Spain, portended the torrents that could sweep through the world of the time. Alternative memoirs and explorations had proven that Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi, though gloating at Chiang Kai-shek's downfall from fall, would never submit themselves to the communists. Whatever strategy and tactics Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi had adopted in dealing with Chinese communists in 1948/1949 should be construed as a 'delay play' to ward off the Chinese communists. Mao Tse-tung outsmarted them all, and insisted in crossing the Yangtze. Mao certainly outwitted Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi in fetching Li Jishen to Peking from HK one step ahead, shattering their dream of creating a coalition government.

Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi, like Chiang Kai-shek, were absolutely wrong in assuming that American aid would come to China once Chiang Kai-shek was to resign his presidency. They never knew that Comintern agents, like Currie, Acheson or closet communists like Marshall, had played the game to make sure that Chinese nationalist regime capsize in the interests of the Russians and the Chinese communists. Prevalent writings by Chinese communists and their leftist HK proxies had flooded the market with books about the American involvement in Chinese civil wars, i) fabricating the theory of American support of Chiang Kai-shek's war against the communists, and ii) exaggerating the non-existent American military supplies. (A simple way to filter through communist junk books published in HK [and in Taipei] would be to look for a common style, i.e., scripting of paragraphs and pages of dialogues between the political figures.)

Li ZOngren Memoirs devoted less than 20% to the civil wars in content coverage. This shows that Li Zongren had really nothing to write about his role during the collapse of the Nationalist Regime n 1948-1950. Chiang Kai-shek, with control of Tang Enbo's army group, had full responsibility for not assisting Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi in defending the Yangtze River, not to mention the transport of China's only gold and foreign exchange at a time of final duel against a powerful and ferocious enemy who dared to challenge the colonialist warships like those of Britain. Further, Chiang Kai-shek was responsible for the demise of Guangdong-Guangxi defence line by relocating Whampoa lineage troops to the Hainan Island before the loss of Hunan Province.

Li Zongren & Bai Chongxi's debacle in native Guangxi Province could be attributable to one important factor: the so-called iron army of 7th Corps had dissipated once they returned to hometown, similar to the dissipation of Bai Lang [white wolf] banditry once they returned to native Henan province from Shenxi-Gansu provinces in early republican years.

Li Zongren certainly fell into American trap while visiting in US by going to a meeting with Truman. Before that, Li ZOngren, without understanding the motive of American manipulations of Chinese politics as well as Comintern/Russian takeover of the US government, had written a letter of criticism against Chiang Kai-shek, which was incorporated into Acheson's White Paper as 'evidence'. After United States, controlled by Republican Eisenhower, re-instated the policy of support for Chiang Kai-shek in 1952, Li Zongren had colluded with Mao Bangchu in avenging on Chiang Kai-shek by continuing to claim his "official presidency" of the Republic of China while not recognizing that the United States government was purely pragmatic in discerning the utility of leaders of foreign countries, not excluding the case of Saddam Hussein. The flipover in the instigations and betrayal of Wu Guozhen and Sun Liren should serve as a caution to any future Chinese statesmen. All in all, nobody could escape from the spider-web knit by the powerful hands.