Understanding Clausewitz & Sun Tzu: Center of Gravity and Psychological Apprehension Variable Fact Sheet
By Terrance Jones ARNG/U.S. Navy
Over the last 2 decades especially, the U.S. military has
struggled both to understand the CoG concept as developed
by Clausewitz, and to find practical ways to apply it. In the
process, however, it has drifted away from Clausewitz’s
original idea. For example, each of the services—shaped by
different roles, histories, and traditions—tended to view the
CoG concept in their respective images.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
Historically, many military theorists have been of the opinion that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu operated from divergent spectrums of strategic thought concerning the center of gravity issues of Clausewitz and the psychological apprehension concept of Sun Tzu. My intentions are to show how past and modern history thoroughly refutes this assertion. I will address each assertion made by Clausewitz with an assertion made by Sun Tzu. I will also decipher the coded language of Tzu, as that has been a major reason that students of war have not noticed the striking similarities that are shared by both strategists.
A closer look at the German text shows that Clausewitz
never used the term “source” (Quelle). Moreover, the
concept remains valid only where the enemy possesses
sufficient “unity” or “interdependence” (Zusammenhang) to
act as a single body. Before applying the concept in war
planning, therefore, we must ask ourselves whether we can
consider the enemy to act as a single entity. If so, we should
look for connections among the various parts of an
adversary, or adversaries, in order to determine what holds
them together. This is the CoG.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
Today, we face several enemies under the rapidly increasing parameters of multi regional threat variances. However, these threats can be pared down to two lethal and imposing doctrines:
Example
Communist Expansion
China is the preeminent communist nation in the world today. Their expansionist agenda has seen them become a globally viable economic and military power capable of affecting theatre occurrences in several regions at once due to their strategic alliances with North Korea, Russia and Iran.
Fundamentalist Islamic Expansion
Iran is the most dangerous Islamic nation in the world due to their natural resources along with their fundamentalist agenda and the terrorist nation states and organizations they fund and support within and outside of the Middle East. These threat variabls are compounded by the missile and nuclear weapons technology that has Iran close to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. It is also important to note that Iran has played a major role in instituting and supporting multi sect cooperation concerning both terrorist attacks (regional, global), singular nation insurgency operations (Iraq) and nation state ascension strategies (Palestine, Iraq) that are geared towards
manipulating the democratic process to establish a multi sect caliphate system by Majlis/committee.
“Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting. The highest form of warfare is to attack strategy itself; the next, to attack alliances; the next to attack armies; the lowest form of war is to attack cities. Siege warfare is a last resort. “
Sun Tzu Art of War (Strategic Offensive Section)
Center of Gravity Correlation
China has executed its communist expansion agenda in a strategic and holistic manner that has not required any significant use of troops, materials or equipment. This has allowed China to expand at a dramatically accelerated rate abroad. These factors prove that the concept of psychological apprehension is the primary driver for strategy which is the primary driver for all military planning initiatives. It is imperative that America force China into transparency concerning their operations in divergent regions of the world in order to prevent the risk of a potential future conflict, as a failure to do so will increase the chances of the same end result at a time and place of China’s choosing.
Communist China exercises proxy oversight duties over the strategic initiatives of communist and fundamentalist Islamic initiatives through their strategic relationships with North Korea and Iran. Russia augments China’s leadership role through their strategic alliance with China. Therefore, the COG of China can be assessed as a strategic threat triumvirate with regard to North Korea, Iran and China acting as a single body in a strategic sense. Removing one or more of these threats will significantly weaken and or defeat the cumulative threat.
Furthermore, Clausewitz’s CoG focuses on achieving a
specific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is an
effects-based approach, rather than a capabilities-based
one and it resembles an emerging concept called
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) more than it does the
capabilities-based notion that underpins today’s doctrine.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
In the vein of Clausewitz, effects based operations are but extensions of psychological apprehension by physical means. The art of war is
based on strategy that stems from psychological innovation and disciplined execution of military plans based on the same. Knowing this, one must come to the conclusion that center of gravity issues as a whole are predicated on effects based operations that are affected and directed by psychological and physical factors. However, it is important to note that the mental aspect will always be the driving force that will decide the success or failure of a strategic initiative geared towards exploiting the enemy’s center of gravity at a singular point or at multiple points when several forces are acting in unison towards a single military objective. At this point, the physical aspect of warfighting dictates the intensity and variances of armed conflict:
“In the dynamics of war, there are but these two- indirect and direct-and yet their permutations are inexhaustible. They give rise to each other in a never-ending inexhaustible circle.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Potential Energy Section)
Here we have irrefutable proof of the cyclical evolution and variations of war that emanate from only two distinct tactical approaches to warfighting. Initial mission offensive strategies (IMOS) can facilitate a broad spectrum of effects based operations by simply and clearly determining the time, place and length of indirect and direct action initiatives. These initiatives must take note of the societal issues that must be addressed in order to prevent the rise of counter productive variables such as insurgency revolts and violent protests that threaten the success of regime change and or nation building efforts, as these initiatives are very much a part of desired effects based operations.
Another important point is that Clausewitz did not
distinguish between tactical, operational, or strategic CoGs.
The CoG is defined by the entire system (or structure) of the
enemy, not by a level of war. In addition, Clausewitz
emphasized that we should look for CoGs only in wars
designed to defeat the enemy completely. Only the vast
amount of energy and other resources that go into wars
aimed at achieving decisive victory can cause CoGs and
their areas of influence to emerge.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
Modern and current history thoroughly refutes the following assertion of Clausewitz:
“In addition, Clausewitz
emphasized that we should look for CoGs only in wars
designed to defeat the enemy completely.”
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
The rapidly rising phenomenon of “psychological apprehension” has made it necessary to find and defeat, neutralize or deter center of gravity factors because of the potential threats that can arise due to the holistic yet lethal nature of psychological apprehension in many cases:
Region Specific Conflicts: Psychological Apprehension based Escalation Parameters
I have often noted how lethal multi regional threat variances can be when executed by tangible and highly credible alliances. The current China/Russia/Iran alliance is one that has several regions in danger of
being destabilized due to the holistic yet lethal threat of psychological apprehension that has unified the strategic goals of these nations in
addition to augmenting their cumulative strength through technology sharing without the impending threat of armed conflict in the process. These initiatives must be met with a deterrent strategy of diplomacy and or military engagements in order to stop the accelerated pace at which psychological apprehension initiatives can overwhelm nations and forces in divergent regions of the world. There is a historical precedence for this type of response as psychological apprehension often facilitates escalation scenarios that make flashpoint intervention by a given nation a probable strategic option. However, because of the perception that America is unwilling to risk significant casualties, nations like China, Russia, Iran and even North Korea have attempted to accelerate their versions of psychological apprehension in order to expand their combined doctrines and strategic interests. This aggression is also due in large part to America’s commitments to fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Note:
It is important that America use foreknowledge and precision in their efforts to deter and neutralize the ground that has been gained by the China/Russia/Iran alliance, as this alliance could force America into making unwise decisions that will prove to be highly exertive on the their military forces in addition to America’s configurative posture. Note the following:
“The warrior skilled at stirring the enemy provides a visible form, and the enemy is sure to come. He proffers the bait, and the enemy is sure to take it. He causes the enemy to make a mover and awaits him with full force.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Potential Energy Section)
This state of affairs is rather ironic since Clausewitz originally borrowed the idea of the CoG from the sciences, from mechanical science—or physics—to be exact. Why the great military theorist chose to apply an essentially scientific concept to warfare, which he considered neither an art nor a science, lies beyond the scope of this monograph.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
“Relying on the energy, he sends his men into battle like a man rolling logs or boulders by their nature, on level ground logs and boulders stay still; on steep ground they move; square they halt; round, they roll. Skillfully deployed soldiers are like round boulders rolling down a mighty mountainside. These are all matters of potential energy.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Potential Energy Section)
Jones
Clearly, Clausewitz understood that physics plays a major role in all aspects of warfighting, whether it is containment by vector space control methods or fusion like contact that allows a given force to make contact and permeate the lines of the enemy. These factors are even more important in issues pertaining to center of gravity exploitation. There is also a direct correlation between teaching doctrines and recruit based fusion that leads to exponential increases in a military contingent’s capabilities and successful graduates of a given course of instruction. This is due to the effects of psychological and physical contact, fusion and expansion factors that are similar to the E = mc² formula in every sense of the word.
Some maneuver theorists, for instance, saw the CoG as a “critical vulnerability” that, if neutralized, would paralyze the
enemy and achieve a quick decision, á la blitzkrieg.5
Striving for this goal distinguished maneuver warfare from
its less attractive counterpart, brute-force attrition-style
warfare.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
Center of gravity based “Critical vulnerability” has both physical and psychological traits that can be exploited and or manipulated to facilitate a decisive end to a military engagement. It is preferable and desirable that the psychological options are pursued first in order to retain considerable physical advantages and options. Note the following:
Example
“The wise leader in his deliberations always blends consideration of gain and harm. By tempering thoughts of gain, he can accomplish his goal; by tempering thoughts of harm, he can extricate himself from calamity.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Potential Energy Section)
The psychological method in which an initial mission offensive strategy (IMOS) is executed can facilitate predictive action factors concerning when, where, how and why the enemy responds. This type of initiative exemplifies psychological apprehension in its purest form. In this type of scenario, the following psychological and physical factors are at work in strategic initiatives that are geared towards exploiting the enemy’s weakness or weaknesses at one or more center of gravity positions:
Invasion
Psychological Operations (Societal Compliance Facilitation)
Regime Change
Configurative Posture of Interior Defense
And, finally, the U.S. Marine Corps
(USMC), with the difficult mission of conducting
amphibious forcible entry operations, preferred for a time to
think of the CoG as a key weakness, or critical vulnerability,
the exploitation of which would give it a decisive
advantage.
CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY:
CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE—AGAIN!
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Jones Note
The U.S. Marine Corps quite obviously are of the opinion that by facilitating crucible realities for the enemy at their strongest point at a time and place of their choosing, they can exploit the enemy’s center of gravity as a weakness. This is sound strategy that has a historical precedence in the following coded language of Sun Tzu:
Example
“Assessment of the enemy and mastery of victory; calculating the difficulty, the danger, and the distance of the terrain; these constitute the way of the superior general.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (forms of terrain section)
As you can see, the enemy’s center of gravity can be manipulated, neutralized or soundly defeated by the skilled commander. However, the commander must understand that in this scenario, the center of gravity of his own troops is controlled by psychological apprehension
that is the primary driver for his strategic and tactical decisions. Once this is recognized, all is relative concerning the facultative elements of war and all is possible in regards to the commander’s strategic initiatives. Should these factors escape the commanders understanding the following scenario has a highly probable chance of occurring:
Example
“When a general misjudges his enemy and sends a lesser force against a larger one, a weaker contingent against a stronger one; when he fails to pick a good vanguard, the outcome is rout.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (forms of terrain section)
Note:
It is important to note that Tzu does not suggest that a lesser force is numerical, as the lesser force can often be the force that is inferior in regards to training due to a failure of the commander’s aforementioned cognizance of the enemy’s COG and the COG of his own forces as well. A weaker contingent can most certainly be considered one that lacks in diversity. This point validates America’s increased use of joint forces in tasks previously given to special forces groups, however, Tzu’s mention of the vanguard troops clearly establishes the point that special forces must have an integral part in diverse joint force missions.
References
Echevarria Antulio J., 2002., Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing our Warfighting Doctrine- Again!, [Online]
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.com
Jones, Terrance L. 2006, “Generalship” (unpublished)