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CARDINAL009
Recommend Ralph Sawyer's latest book on strategy (Tao of Deception: A History of Unorthodox Warfare in China) for the budding (and advanced) pragmatic strategist.

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Book Description

This is the definitive book on ancient military principles that is strikingly relevant to the War on Terror, the war in Iraq, and the rise of China as a geopolitical power.

The history of China is a history of warfare. Wars have caused dynasties to collapse, fractured the thin facade of national unity, and brought decades of alien occupation. But throughout Chinese history, its warfare has been guided by principles different from those that governed Europe. Chinese strategists followed the concept, first articulated by Sun-tzu in The Art of War, of qi (ch'i), or unorthodox, warfare. The concept of qi involves creating tactical imbalances in order to achieve victory against even vastly superior forces.

Ralph D. Sawyer, translator of The Art of War and one of America's preeminent experts on Chinese military tactics, here offers a comprehensive guide to the ancient practice of unorthodox warfare. He describes, among many other tactics, how Chinese generals have used false rumors to exploit opposing generals' distrust of their subordinates; dressed thousands of women as soldiers to create the illusion of an elite attack force; and sent word of a false surrender to lure enemy troops away from a vital escape route.

The Tao of Deception is the book that military tacticians and military historians will turn to as the definitive guide to a new, yet ancient, way of thinking about strategy.


About the Author
Ralph D. Sawyer, one of America's leading scholars in Chinese warfare, has worked extensively with major intelligence and defense agencies, as well as the Pentagon. After studying at MIT, Harvard, and National Taiwan University, Sawyer has spent the last thirty years doing international consulting work throughout Asia.

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This book is now available in your local or favorite on-line bookstore

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CARDINAL009
Just started reading the book.

Great writing. A lot of x-references and notes. Will review it in depth at some point.

Thomas Chen
QUOTE(CARDINAL009 @ Mar 1 2007, 11:37 PM) [snapback]4878681[/snapback]
Just started reading the book.

Great writing. A lot of x-references and notes. Will review it in depth at some point.



Lookin forward to read your review...


Ralph Sawyer is coming up with another book:
History of Warfare in China: The Warring States Period (to be released July 30, 2007)

http://www.amazon.com/History-Warfare-Chin...3841&sr=8-2
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(Thomas Chen @ Mar 6 2007, 12:46 PM) [snapback]4879343[/snapback]
Lookin forward to read your review...


Ralph Sawyer is coming up with another book:
History of Warfare in China: The Warring States Period (to be released July 30, 2007)

http://www.amazon.com/History-Warfare-Chin...3841&sr=8-2


That is correct.

Believe that is the one book many of us are waiting for.

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Currently involved in a greater endeavor. Will review the book sometime late this summer or middle fall.

Have a good year.
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(Thomas Chen @ Mar 6 2007, 01:46 PM) [snapback]4879343[/snapback]
Lookin forward to read your review...


Finished reading the book the 1st time around. Will re-read it again one Sunday afternoon while watching a SF Giants or an Oakland A's baseball game.

My favorite chapters are chapter 6, chapter 12 and 13.

More to come.
dej2
One of the first examples of Deception Sawyer presents is "Ambushes and Feighed Retreats". He uses the Tso Chuan occurance dating to 714 BC.

"Jung mounted incursions into Cheng, the Duke of Cheng actively resited them. However, he was troubled by the Jung army. The Jung is composed of infantry whereas Cheng was on chariots. Duke of Cheng was afraid that the Jung will maneuver around behind us and launch a sudden attack."

Prince T'u suggested that Cheng use some courageous but irresolute men to provoke the invaders and then quickly flee. Meanwhile, establishing three ambushes to await them. The Jung act astily and are not well ordered, they are greedy and lack consern for their fellow soldiers. When those in the forefront see potential gain they invariably concentrate on advancing. When they advance and encounter our ambushes, they are sure to speedily run off. Since those in their rear will not rescue them, the conflict will not be sustained, resolving the conflict.

The duke heeded his advice. When the Jung advance forces encountered the ambushes and ran off, Chu Tan pursued and isolated them before mounting a swift strike both front and rear, utterly destroying them. The remaining barbarian contingents fled in great haste.

________________________

Sun Tzu,
feighed retreat--"Although cabable, display incapability. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity." or possibly
ambush--"Do not rely on their not coming, but depend upon having the means to await them."
Dameos
Is this the same as tao of spying?
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(dej2 @ Apr 5 2007, 09:18 PM) [snapback]4883082[/snapback]
One of the first examples of Deception Sawyer presents is "Ambushes and Feighed Retreats". He uses the Tso Chuan occurance dating to 714 BC.

"Jung mounted incursions into Cheng, the Duke of Cheng actively resited them. However, he was troubled by the Jung army. The Jung is composed of infantry whereas Cheng was on chariots. Duke of Cheng was afraid that the Jung will maneuver around behind us and launch a sudden attack."

Prince T'u suggested that Cheng use some courageous but irresolute men to provoke the invaders and then quickly flee. Meanwhile, establishing three ambushes to await them. The Jung act astily and are not well ordered, they are greedy and lack consern for their fellow soldiers. When those in the forefront see potential gain they invariably concentrate on advancing. When they advance and encounter our ambushes, they are sure to speedily run off. Since those in their rear will not rescue them, the conflict will not be sustained, resolving the conflict.

The duke heeded his advice. When the Jung advance forces encountered the ambushes and ran off, Chu Tan pursued and isolated them before mounting a swift strike both front and rear, utterly destroying them. The remaining barbarian contingents fled in great haste.

________________________

Sun Tzu,
feighed retreat--"Although capable, display incapability. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity." or possibly
ambush--"Do not rely on the opposition not coming, but depend upon having the means to await them."


To lure the wolf, always play the rabbit not another wolf.
Always be the prepared and first at the arena of competition (and/or confrontation).

Dej2! Good perspective.

Just completed the first 1/3 (third) of my review article. Still working on it during my free time. One sentence per day.

What Sawyer done very well is x-reference some of his material from his previous writings and some new research.
CARDINAL009
The review on Sawyer latest classic is interesting in terms of the writer do not possessed any idea of what a strategic mind set is about.

This Sawyer's book was not written for novices and wanna-bes.

Have already completed my preliminary review of Sawyer latest classic. Will submitted it at some point of time.


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Backwards and forward
CULTURE > Book Review
June 2007

The Dragon and the Foreign Devils: China and the World, 1100 BC to the Present by Harry G. Gelber; Bloomsbury; US$43
The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China by Ralph D. Sawyer; Basic Books; US$30

Generally acknowledged wisdom is that understanding the past is an invaluable asset when building a future. The idea, of course, is that events of the last couple of thousand years have set the foundation for the current state of the world.

Understanding history is particularly important to those who follow the constant give and take that shapes global relationships. Past events have shaped the attitudes that define how individual countries engage one another. The relatively short but brazen history of the US leads directly into that country's determined stance towards global affairs.

At the other end of the scale, the rather long but conflict-ridden history of west Africa goes some way toward helping us understand why that particular part of the world is still hit by trouble.

The history of China's own relationship with the outside world is longer and more complex than many others. It is a patchwork of curiosity, isolationism, intellectual creativity and almost unforgivable self-sufficiency. It is a 3,000-year story throughout which the only constant is conflict.
Tackling history

Harry Gelber, a Cambridge-trained historian with a number of books under his belt, attempts to lay out the long and twisted history of China's interactions with the outside world in his latest book The Dragon and the Foreign Devils.

Gelber starts his story way, way back, before the China we know today was even a concept. Throughout 442 pages of interesting and surprisingly light storytelling, he weaves a narrative that flows naturally into the emerging power status of the China we know today.

"In reality, then, China is a medium power, albeit one very likely to become a significant global actor eventually," Gelber writes. "For the time being, it would be a mistake to confuse the possibility of a great China tomorrow with the realities of China today. It has accepted the shift, in not much more than a century, from an empire at the core of its own world order to being, formally, a modern Western-style nation state."
Turbulent times

The one constant that emerges throughout Gelber's story is that China is a country that knows change more intimately than perhaps any other. Revolutions and takeovers, wars and coups, have been the order of the day since well before the Mongols ruled the country and created their own dynasty.

At the same time, the history of China's rulers has been one of immense variety.

There have been inspired emperors that lived up to the mandate of heaven and created a government infrastructure that, in some ways, survives to this day at a time when European city-states had no discernible political structure. Other emperors, however, took debauchery and indifference to unprecedented heights bankrupting a country that was the leading world power at several points in history.

Gelber takes history seriously but presents it rather lightly and makes it easy to read. As far as history books go - and this one often comes across as a textbook - The Dragon and the Foreign Devils is a nice read.

What Gelber does provide that other histories of China often do not, is a running reflection of the impact the country has had on the outside world and vice-versa.

Regardless of whether one or the other accepts it, China never quite succeeded in being the isolationist state it often sought to be. It is far, far too big for that and populated by a wide range of people.

Around AD1200, the Mongols took over running the government of China but even before that they had helped shape China's attitude towards foreigners. Mongol control of a wide swath of western Asia allowed for smoother trade and easier communication between east and west. At the same time, the threat of invasion that the Mongol hoard represented led to the construction of the most iconic and telling Chinese structure: The Great Wall.

Through its contacts with the outside world, Chinese emperors became so convinced of their own relative superiority that they later sought to limit contacts with the outside world. The outside world, on the other hand, never really agreed with this idea.

One expedition after another continued to influence China and its emperors and later, much more aggressive Western fleets with technology that had grown to surpass that of China, managed to dictate their own terms and take over entire cities. Qingdao, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Macau were all taken over by Europeans that themselves did not understand China or its people.

The 20th century was one of virtually constant turmoil leading up to and including the 1978 opening up to the outside world.

The next few decades are, hopefully, predictable. China's economic growth will continue and its political influence will continue to expand. The only constant will likely be change. That is not unique to China but it will permeate the world. The question is what kind of shape that change will take.

Gelber ends his book with a telling note: "... as the American writer Philip Roth says somewhere, history is really only the path by which the unexpected becomes the inevitable."
Unorthodox warfare

Another historic look at China's relationship with the outside world, and within itself, can be found in The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China by Ralph D. Sawyer.

The subject matter is different. Sawyer's book is a highly focused study of strategy and warfare but it is definitely not for the uninitiated. The writing is nowhere near as clear and smooth as in Gelber's book and the complex subject matter make this book a somewhat inaccessible read for those without some grounding.

The Tao of Deception does include some unique insights, as any book with this level of research should, but those insights are not easy to get at.

http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/cer/inf...nd_forward.html
BeeJay
Thanks for posting those reviews.

I know it's just the marketing guys talking, but why do these reviews always have to add statements like


"But throughout Chinese history, its warfare has been guided by principles different from those that governed Europe. Chinese strategists followed the concept [...] unorthodox, warfare."
(that was about Sawyer and a weird statement if you think about it ... if they all followed the concept of unorthodox warfare, than it's no unorthodox anymore!).

and

"The one constant that emerges throughout Gelber's story is that China is a country that knows change more intimately than perhaps any other. Revolutions and takeovers, wars and coups, have been the order of the day [...]"
(that was about Gelber, I doubt Gelber makes such a statement in his book)


Most of those reviewers are westerners (I suppose) ... instead of reading up on another culture's history, what they should do is read a book or two about their own culture, see that the difference they mention is non-existent (whether in Europe, Amercia, Africa or Asia), so they can finally stop writing all that nonsense.

Oh well, another pet peeve.

BJ
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(BeeJay @ Jun 19 2007, 08:40 PM) *
Thanks for posting those reviews.

I know it's just the marketing guys talking, but why do these reviews always have to add statements like

"But throughout Chinese history, its warfare has been guided by principles different from those that governed Europe. Chinese strategists followed the concept [...] unorthodox, warfare."
(that was about Sawyer and a weird statement if you think about it ... if they all followed the concept of unorthodox warfare, than it's no unorthodox anymore!).

and

"The one constant that emerges throughout Gelber's story is that China is a country that knows change more intimately than perhaps any other. Revolutions and takeovers, wars and coups, have been the order of the day [...]"
(that was about Gelber, I doubt Gelber makes such a statement in his book)


Most of those reviewers are westerners (I suppose) ... instead of reading up on another culture's history, what they should do is read a book or two about their own culture, see that the difference they mention is non-existent (whether in Europe, Amercia, Africa or Asia), so they can finally stop writing all that nonsense.

Oh well, another pet peeve.

BJ


"Can't please everyone. Got to please yourself. ... "
--- Garden Party 1970's Rick Nelson's song

This Cardinal would presume most of the reviewers are just wanna-be desktop generals who thinks they know the history of Chinese military warfare and Chinese strategy mindset by reading a few chapters of SunZi AoW.

@ this moment, the only thing counts now is who becomes #1 in the global economy.
BeeJay
I stand corrected ... unfortunatley Sawyer DOES share this opinion about a big difference. But he says the main difference was Chinese armies focussing on maneuvring, while Europeans just marched to meet to slug it out (p4 of his 100 unorthodox strategies). So he sees a different difference, but is wrong for the same reason. Hmm, he seems to only be a translator after all.

If there WAS any difference in real war / battle, then it seems that Chinese were re-active, and European more pro-active. That is, if you only compare by using Chinese theory oppposite European practice (the usual way) ... not right I feel and I doubt if Chinese warfare was as reactive as the books want us to believe.

BJ
Master Ghost Valley
QUOTE(CARDINAL009 @ Jun 22 2007, 07:39 PM) *
"Can't please everyone. Got to please yourself. ... "
--- Garden Party 1970's Rick Nelson's song

This Cardinal would presume most of the reviewers are just wanna-be desktop generals who thinks they know the history of Chinese military warfare and Chinese strategy mindset by reading a few chapters of SunZi AoW.

@ this moment, the only thing counts now is who becomes #1 in the global economy.


Hi CARDINAL009

Here is my take on the Tao of Deception:


"Not surprisingly," or "not unexpectedly" ( two of Sawyer”s favorite paragraph openers) TAO of DECEPTION has meet all of the expectations I have come to expect from the Sawyers.
It is unique in that there are not long complex titles or honorary names used for the characters, therefore the readers attention to the core substance is not interrupted. This writing is a serious work that requires careful reading; it is a distilled presentation of a tremendous amount of material, together with many penetrating thoughts. Rich food for intelligent pondering.

The major points necessary to illuminate the deceptive stances common to the historical periods and indeed also today are presented in logical succession. The thing works, it performs its intended purpose. And further, Mei-chun’s Sawyers documentation and back-up material are of extraordinary value to me in instances where more factual information is needed.

This is not just a translation or a simple listing of events but an intelligent concise comment on the issues relating to deception and other concepts.

For example he talks about the ” two chief components of Sun Tzu’s vision for the ruthless practice of efficient warfare(1) the strategic configuration of power and (2) vacuity and substance.” This is a but a small piece of intelligent commentary that clears up a myriad of issues for even seasoned followers.

I was impressed and gratified by his statement that “Kuei-Ku -Tzu, the Master of Ghost valley “ has now become the most widely portrayed of legendary strategist.” I say Gratified because ever since I was introduced to Master Ghost valley through the words of Dennis and Ching Ping Bloodworth in their book The Chinese Machiavelli I have been a rabid student of and ardent collector of the works of Master Ghost Valley and find it rewarding that both Cleary (Thunder in the Sky) and now Sawyer are among the foremost of the well know and respected authors to recognize Kuei-Ku- Tzu. I suspect it will be only a matter of time before there will be multiple translations on his work, as there are on the work of Sun Tzu. My point is, not only is this book fascinating reading, it is also the foresigns trends in the field. In many issues Sawyer has recognized present events that are happening and is in this book judging the impact of these events yet to come.

I am pleased with the book
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(Thomas Chen @ Mar 6 2007, 01:46 PM) *
Lookin forward to read your review...


Ralph Sawyer is coming up with another book:
History of Warfare in China: The Warring States Period (to be released July 30, 2007)

http://www.amazon.com/History-Warfare-Chin...3841&sr=8-2


Would not be surprised that this book might be running behind schedule.
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(Master Ghost Valley @ Jun 25 2007, 04:31 AM) *
Hi CARDINAL009

Here is my take on the Tao of Deception:


"Not surprisingly," or "not unexpectedly" ( two of Sawyer"s favorite paragraph openers) TAO of DECEPTION has meet all of the expectations I have come to expect from the Sawyers.
It is unique in that there are not long complex titles or honorary names used for the characters, therefore the readers attention to the core substance is not interrupted. This writing is a serious work that requires careful reading; it is a distilled presentation of a tremendous amount of material, together with many penetrating thoughts. Rich food for intelligent pondering.

The major points necessary to illuminate the deceptive stances common to the historical periods and indeed also today are presented in logical succession. The thing works, it performs its intended purpose. And further, Mei-chun's Sawyers documentation and back-up material are of extraordinary value to me in instances where more factual information is needed.

This is not just a translation or a simple listing of events but an intelligent concise comment on the issues relating to deception and other concepts.

For example he talks about the " two chief components of Sun Tzu's vision for the ruthless practice of efficient warfare(1) the strategic configuration of power and (2) vacuity and substance." This is a but a small piece of intelligent commentary that clears up a myriad of issues for even seasoned followers.

I was impressed and gratified by his statement that "Kuei-Ku -Tzu, the Master of Ghost valley " has now become the most widely portrayed of legendary strategist." I say Gratified because ever since I was introduced to Master Ghost valley through the words of Dennis and Ching Ping Bloodworth in their book The Chinese Machiavelli I have been a rabid student of and ardent collector of the works of Master Ghost Valley and find it rewarding that both Cleary (Thunder in the Sky) and now Sawyer are among the foremost of the well know and respected authors to recognize Kuei-Ku- Tzu. I suspect it will be only a matter of time before there will be multiple translations on his work, as there are on the work of Sun Tzu. My point is, not only is this book fascinating reading, it is also the foresigns trends in the field. In many issues Sawyer has recognized present events that are happening and is in this book judging the impact of these events yet to come.

I am pleased with the book


One way to learn the strategy classics is to read the eight classics, MGV's essay, 100 Unorthodox Strategies and Sawyer's latest book

Then practice what one has learned. (Chapter by Chapter).

CARDINAL009
QUOTE(Dameos @ Apr 9 2007, 08:31 AM) *
Is this the same as tao of spying?


Not even close! It is a comprehensive guide to the ancient practice of unorthodox warfare.
Master Ghost Valley
QUOTE(CARDINAL009 @ Jul 9 2007, 06:47 PM) *
One way to learn the strategy classics is to read the eight classics, MGV's essay, 100 Unorthodox Strategies and Sawyer's latest book

Then practice what one has learned. (Chapter by Chapter).


Greetings CARDINAL009

Quote "Then practice what one has learned. (Chapter by Chapter)." This is the hard part! But, this is also the most valuable part.
(at least that is my opinion).
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(Master Ghost Valley @ Jul 13 2007, 05:15 AM) *
Greetings CARDINAL009

Quote "Then practice what one has learned. (Chapter by Chapter)." This is the hard part! But, this is also the most valuable part. (at least that is my opinion).


This Cardinal found that task to be quite easy.
CARDINAL009
QUOTE(BeeJay @ Jun 23 2007, 09:41 PM) *
I stand corrected ... unfortunatley Sawyer DOES share this opinion about a big difference. But he says the main difference was Chinese armies focussing on maneuvring, while Europeans just marched to meet to slug it out (p4 of his 100 unorthodox strategies). So he sees a different difference, but is wrong for the same reason.
Hmm, he seems to only be a translator after all.
If there WAS any difference in real war / battle, then it seems that Chinese were re-active, and European more pro-active.

That is, if you only compare by using Chinese theory oppposite European practice (the usual way) ... not right I feel and I doubt if Chinese warfare was as reactive as the books want us to believe.BJ


You can take a chance of translating 100 Unorthodox Strategies yourself.


Got this item from an associate. He found it @ Financial Times Business Wire
QUOTE
### Economic implications of unorthodox warfare D.Murali Chennai, July. 23:
King Wu queried his preceptor, advisor, strategist, and confidant, the T’ai Kung: “I want to overthrow the Shang but have three doubts. I am afraid our strength will be inadequate to attack the strong, estrange the close supporters within the court, and disperse their people.

What should I do?”

The reply, as chronicled in ‘Six Secret Teachings’ (Liu-t’ao), was as follows: “In order to attack the strong you must nurture them to make them even stronger and increase them to make them even more extensive.

What is too strong will certainly break, what is too extended must have deficiencies. Attack the strong through their strength. Cause the estrangement of favoured officials by using favourites, disperse the people by means of people.”

On similar lines is a snatch from chapter 36 of the traditionally received Tao Te Ching: “If you want to reduce something, you must certainly stretch it. If you want to weaken something, you must certainly strengthen it. If you want to abolish something, you must certainly make it flourish,”

Although abstract, the embedded techniques are considered highly applicable in the context of Chinese-American power discrepancies, writes Ralph D. Sawyer in ‘The Tao of Deception’ (www.landmarkonthenet.com). “Exactly how this operational premise may be translated into active measures remains enigmatic,” he adds. “However, economic policies that temporarily cause the US (or Taiwan) to apparently flourish even while fiscally impoverishing it and creating massive manufacturing dependency presumably fall into this category.”

Another possibility, according to Sawyer, can be “political gestures such as repeatedly threatening Taiwan and military actions including the selective development and acquisition of newly menacing weapons that compel the US to augment and disperse its military power (much as the PRC – People’s Republic of China – perceives that the US deceptively manipulated the USSR into the arms race that ultimately exhausted it).”

Contemporary military weapons are epitome of complexity, and martial power is increasingly dependent on technology and communications, the author reminds. “In a Pacific conflict the logistical burden would be enormous and unwieldy, the supply lines severely extended and exposed, and power projection invariably spearheaded by increasingly vulnerable carrier groups.”

Frighteningly, there is then ‘great opportunity to exploit the instabilities inherent in such overextension’ and to target installations ‘in both normal and asymmetric fashion, particularly through the employment of unorthodox techniques.’ Such indirect techniques may include “the blinding of down-looking sensors, distorting the GPS signal or eliminating it altogether with attacks by micro-satellites employed as kinetic weapons…”

Sawyer mentions the findings of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ by Ch’iao Liang and Wang Hsiang-sui, originally published in Chinese by the PLA in 1999. “Destructive measures that target the financial sector, communications, and the core infrastructure components of electricity and transportation are postulated as certain to severely disrupt normal life, causing consternation and undermining any will to fight because Americans are perceived as lacking self-discipline, resilience, and the capacity to endure casualties.” Disturbing picture of the modern implications that ancient precepts may have. ** A fight with no rules “To suffer and learn a lesson, one pays a high price, but a fool can’t learn any other way,” reads a Chinese proverb, with which Matthew Polly begins ‘American Shaolin’ (www.crosswordbookstores.com).

The first lesson is a challenge match that the laowai (old outsider, a polite term for white foreigners) has to fight against Master Wu, a kungfu teacher from Tianjin. The venue is a tourism centre in Henan province. Bao (Polly) Mosi (Matthew) narrates the walk to the performance hall, along with his teacher Monk Deqing, who quotes his favourite martial arts maxim: “I do not fear the 10,000 kicks you have practised once; I fear the one kick you have practised 10,000 times.

The fight has no rules, Coach Yan tells Polly. “I want you to beat him to the ground. You hear me? To the ground.”
The combatants approach… stopping about five feet from each other. “Master Wu shifted into a cat stance, his weight largely on his right foot, his left foot resting lightly in front, a strong defensive position…I had sparred extensively since arriving at Shaolin, but this was the first real fight – street clothes, no rules…” No different from the biz world. ** From steel to steal, In ‘China Shakes the World’ (www.orionbooks.co.uk), James Kynge narrates the tale of how ‘a hungry nation’ has risen. The book opens ‘on the flat alluvium beds’ of the Yangtze River, where parts of a steel mill from the heart of Ruhr “had been reconstructed exactly – to the last screw – as they had been in Germany. Altogether 2,50,000 tonnes of equipment had been shipped, along with 40 tonnes of documents that explained the intricacies of the reassembly process.”

From that steel story, the author moves on to a steal-y one. “As Chinese demand drove up the price of scrap metal to record levels, thieves almost everywhere had the same idea,” he narrates. “During the several weeks from mid February 2004… slowly at first but with mounting velocity, manhole covers started to disappear from roads and pavements all over the world…

The first displacements were felt in Taiwan, the island just off China’s southeast coast. The next were in other neighbours, such as Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan… More than 150 covers disappeared during one month in Chicago. Scotland’s ‘great drain robbery’ saw more than a hundred vanish in a few days. In Montreal, Gloucester and Kuala Lumpur, unsuspecting pedestrians stumbled into holes.”

The manhole cover episode suggests that in many different ways the events reshaping China are no longer merely resonating on foreign shores but actually changing the way the world works, notes the author. “It is said that around 200 hundred years ago, Napoleon warned that people should: ‘Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.’”

Shen Wenrong of Shagang, the Chinese plant, explains to Kynge why he had bought the ThyssenKrupp steel plant: “I needed a horse that would run fast and not eat much hay.

When the next crash in world steel prices comes, and it will certainly come in the next few years, a lot of our competitors who have bought expensive new equipment from abroad will go bust or be so weighed down by debt that they will not be able to move. At that time you will see that this purchase was good.”

Kynge quotes from a poem by Shen, carved into granite, in the new steel town in China: “The bull will rush forward without whipping, once in flight it covers a thousand miles.” Instructive. **

Can’t move the snow to India?Wealth and power are shifting to the East, declares Clyde Prestowitz in ‘Three Billion New Capitalists’ (www.basicbooks.com). It is while skiing on Lake Tahoe in California, in the winter of 2003, that the author gets the first glimpse of the powerful forces being unleashed by the new capitalists and how they might interact with the old system and structures.

Chummy, the author’s oldest son, asks him if he would consider coinvesting in a local snow-removal company. Read on… “‘What do mean by snow removal?’ I asked, somewhat surprised because my son is a high-level software developer. ‘Well,’ he explained, ‘the company has contracts to plow the parking lots and access roads of the hotels and vacation condominiums around here whenever it snows, and that happens pretty frequently between November and May.’ ‘But what on earth are you doing,’ I exclaimed, ‘going into something as mundane as snow plowing?’ ‘Dad,’ he said, ‘they can’t move the snow to India.’

It took a minute for that to sink in. It had never occurred to me that my son had anything to fear from India or anywhere else in terms of his career path.” Spine chilling… or heart warming? ***

### http://BookPeek.blogspot.com http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200707231860.htm # # #
CARDINAL009
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