I am working on a paper on why (Han ethnic) Chinese empires never seems to actively attack the northern nomads (Xiong nu, Kitan, Mongol, Jurchen...etc). Every time there is a war between the Chinese and the barbarians, it seems to be a defensive measure in responds to a barbarian raid or invasion. There are of course campaigns launched by emperors such as Han Wu Di, or Ming Emperor Yongle, but such cases are exception rather than the norm.

Now Chinese is definatly not a absolute peace loving country as demonstrated by various wars amongst themselves and occasional invasion of neighbours such as Korea (Sui, Tang) or Vietnam (Ming).
What I am wondering is why are the Chinese so reluctant to attack the north but willing to attack Korea and the south, and what caused emperors like Wu Di and Yongle to act against the norm.

I have done some research and the most common reasons that may be applicable are the heavy burden on the economy because of Chinese large army, and the Confucius emphasizes on "wen" (scholarly?) rather than wu (martial).
English sources are limited and although I can read Chinese, primary sources are fairly hard to obtain as well, so if anyone can give me some ideas and sources would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks.

Because the North is worthless desert and semi-arid grasslands.
Wars are extension of the tripartite amalgam of social, political and economic issues.

In any case, you missed out:
1. The Wei (Cao) campaign against Wuhuan
2. The Wei (Tuoba) campaign against the Rouran
3. The Sui (Yang) campaign against the Tujue (Turkuts)
4. The Tang campaign against the Tujue (Turkuts)
And then we had a break until the Ming dynasty, and so on so forth.
But saying that the attacking the north is an exception and not the norm is not a realistic approach. The north has always been a problem, and the Song and Ming dynasties were the 2 that completely foundered in it. The final solution came around by the Qing dynasty, which really took care of a great deal of the nomad problems (not to mention that the horse archer had became useless).

IT is GUNs and CANNONs

Yes, apart from that spam - CANNONS, not CANONS.

The Sui and Tang campaigns against Korea took place after the North was generally more peaceful.
Its not an issue of preferring to attack Korea. Most of the time Korea submitted willingly. They resumed their tributary status shortly after the Ming dynasty, remember, and continued to regard China as the "ancestral leader". I think there were far more campaigns against the nomads than the Koreans.

Actually, you could probably make a point that, whereas most of these invasions became rare after the Han, during the Springs and Autumns, the Warring States and the beginning of the Western Han, they might have been more common. You can start with this thread (post 11 and after), where it is even suggested that the northern wall of Zhao was probably built as much to mark the territory conquered over the northern people than to defend against their incursion.

http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php...t&p=4872269

Another place to look is the westwards expeditions of Qin, during the Springs and Autumns against the Rong. The fifth chapter of the Shiji (look in the Shiji subforum) has several passages about them.

Yet another point is linked to historiography. All the sources we have for these expeditions are seen from the chinese side, and there is a strong tendency for historians, then and now, to describe any war or conquest as a defensive measure.

Francois

If Chinese army was there to conquer, it must be the arabland indicing them. What do u think fighting in desert for? Show of the military muscle? There were some nuts emperors exciting for it, but not common case. To subdue the northern nomads was always a priority of Chinese strategists for 1) eliminating the nomads were in most time mission impossible or required great resources that might cause unrest internally that did no good to the regime. What's more concerned issue is 2, as the vast northern wasterland could be either emigranted or transformed into farmlands, the elimination of Nomads would do no good but leave valcume for more aggreesive tribles to fill in who could hardly be talked with. If subduing failed, the next choice was distracting nomads and playing proxy conflicts between them. But this is not easy anyway, keeping balance and watch out not pushing the running dog to the other side is by all means a tough job. So many times we see failures in operatings. The last choice, which in the cases that the empire was on decline, was posing itself a totally defensive position and waiting for another chance to uprise or the collapse of enemy themselves.

This is mainly a logistical question. Without cities in the north, you can't resupply your army through capturing enemy supplies. This means your own country have to cough up every single bit of the grain, weapons, clothing and all other logistics. Which means it is extremely wasteful to invade the northern frontier, around 7-10 times the amount of food is needed during war than just feeding the army during peace. This straining of the resources will certainly put the people on edge. Throw in a disaster or two and without the emergency supplies needed to relieve the region, you will be having a rebellion on your hands.

Unless you have a serious axe to grind, just hold on to the defensive position until your enemy's own supplies run out.

to Sephodwyrm,
wow yes I totally missed all those, thanks for pointing them out! Would you happen to know what were the consequences of those campaign in terms of political and economical? Also some sources would be great. Not that I don't trust you : ) just that I want to see what the sources say and as a academic paper I need to reference it.

to fcharton,
The Zhao wall certainly seems interesing. I wonder whats the reason for invasion becoming more rare after Han...
I recall reading that court historian can be fairly bias, but it never occur to me that they may have describe a war of conquest as a defensive measure. This would make a very good arguing point.

to bayonet,
I don't think going to war just to show military muscle is a completely illegitimated reason. Although it may put strain on the economy of the empire, a successful campaign against a barbarian group brings many benefits. Instead of conquering the land (which by itself may offer little benefits as you pointed out), successful raid or skirmishes may be enough to acquire livestocks, horses, and money. A show of the empire's military might also act to deter other barbarians from allaying with hostile barbarians, as well as from invading China themselves.
The Chinese seems to have taken no interest in raiding and seeks tributary relations instead. What kept the Chinese from trying a different approach to the nomad who refuse to pay tributes like the Koreans?

To Wujiang,
I noticed this is one of the strongest argument I have came across from my research and I would really like to expand on this in my paper. Would you have any sources that I can refer to regarding the cost and consequences of financing an invasion?
Regarding holding a defensive stance until enemy supplies runs out... this doesn't really seems viable as any nomads thats was large enough to be a threat such as Xiongnu, Khitan, Mongols, and Jurchen.... all have a large power base up north and would be unrealistic to try to wear opponents down like that. This is demonstrated as all of these barbarins (except Xiongnu) were able to conquer parts or all of China eventually.

Thank you all for the great replies!

On the logistics issue, its more than just a lack of cities in Mongolia, ect. its a lack of anything. I dont see how a large, non native army could live of the land in those areas. There is also nothing of value to capture, leaving little motivation for the common soldier.

Are you looking for general info on the cost of finiancing wars? or sepecific info on a chinese campaing against nomads?

SunTzu's art of War says, only make war to make money(actually, that's not what he literally said, but close enough). Prolonged campaigns drain money, so that's bad. Making war against the nomads would be a prolonged campaign, and even if you win, you get no extra cities and few population boosts for new taxes. At the height of a dynasty most would just try to make the nomads fight themselves. Whenever there's a hint of the nomads uniting, the troops would go in and mess things up(so I would say attacking, but not conquering, the nomads would actually be a norm). When a dynasty weakens the country typically goes on the defensive.

Although there might not be necessary materistics things to capture that can't be acquired at home, I think the thought of eliminating further threats or possibily revenge for kins can be motivating for the common soliders.

Specific info regarding Chinese campaigns would be great, but i guess general info would work too just as a comparision.



I don't understand how the nomads are able to afford a prolong campaign and eventually win out where the Chinese cannot when theoretically the Chinese should be "richer"?
Did the nomads not expect China to retaliate (thus turning into a prolonged campaign) or do they have some superior ways to finance their army?

During the Mongolian invasion, the Jin was much like the Persian empire when being attacked by Alexander. It was already crumbling from within. By the time the Song was targeted the Mongolian nomads weren't really "nomadic", since the Yuan by then contained both the Jin and some Muslim countries. I would say it's semi-nomadic. As for the Ming, it was attacked from both within and without. Internal rebellions within and Qing forces(the Qing weren't completely nomadic either) beyond the great wall. By the time the Qing held the great wall it's a three way battle. The newly risen Shun dynasty, the Ming remnants, and the Qing dynasty.

No, it is just the other way around. The nomads did not face logistic problem, they had no logistic at all
Like a Han general camplained to his majesty after a skirmesh '' the Xiongnu hordes beat the hearts of beasts in the chests and run the blood of eagle in the veins. It is almost impossible to capture and annihilate them.''

The nomads were on move and never got settled down. Every adult men were herdmen at peacetime while turns out to be tough warriors immediately when called on to wars. They were fed by sheepmeat, slaked by milk and warmed by furs which were all from livestocks along with them. Thus, they had no rear, no fixed and stuborned logistic lines left being attacked by Chinese.

The Chinese, on the contrary, had to maintain logistics to support the military machine work. The infantry based army were slow to response and vulnerble to cavalries assaultion. Even later switched to a more cavalry based army, the Chinese were still far away from their northern counterparst for they had no livestocks along with them and still heavily relied on the logistics which were all the way from within great wall. As a agriculture country, this means the labours were out of farming, so the production decreased which might cause unrest in local. To launch a war against nomads, the country had to prepare and mobilize for months to ensure the impact on commonfolks was minimun. Even arranged everything well, chances were that the army gained nothing after strolling months in the deserts.

Two of the major problems, as mentioned above, were logistics and mobility. The steppes nomads would eat off the saddle and essentially live off the land. They were also elite horsemen and were a much more mobile force than the larger, more sedentary Chinese armies. Because of this mobile superiority, the nomads could choose to engage the and harass Chinese at will. The Chinese on the other hand, could chase the nomads with little effect while consuming their costly food supplies. A stalemate was a Chinese loss, and, thus, continuing the campaign was fatalistic. Essentially 90% of the food would be consumed during the transportation (I forgot where I read that, so don’t quote me). Regardless, the following excerpts provide similar problems…

Mark Elvin’s The Pattern of the Chinese Past has some information you may find useful and even attributes China’s size, in part, to the logistics of troop maintenance along the “barbarian” frontier:



Here’s a tidbit concerning Emperor Taizong’s strain on resources during the Turk and Korean military campaigns:



Elvin also links logistics to the decline of the divisional militia:



In the book Warlords of China: 700 BC to AD 1662, Chris Peer wrote a chapter titled Strategy and Logistics in Central that may also interest you. Here’s an excerpt:



Logistical problems are also described in other books, such as David Graff’s Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300 – 900. These books should be available at a university library.

If I think of more, I’ll let you know.

Nomads were however vulnerable during the early spring after the long harsh northern winters the herds would be greatly weakened. This would allow a small raiding force to weaken the nomads. However this would almost gurantee counter-raid during the harvest season on the sedientary border Chinese populations (and subsequently another spring raid by the Chinese). Obviously this results in a lose-lose situation for both sides.

In the Retreat of the Elephants, Mark Elvin attributes nomad invasions into China to their need for more more pastures and food during cold periods. He adversely attributes Chinese prosperity to warm periods where crops would be more bountiful and larger armies/distant could be more readily sustained.

Thanks for everyone's input! Those sources were great : )
After pulling an all-nighter, I finally managed to finish my paper this morning one hour before its due