You know, I wonder why this never occurred to me but I think I have an answer to something that has always had me wondering.

Although the Sunzi Bingfa is commonly believed as the greatest military treaties written in China, this is often something made up by pop culture. Comparing it with other military treaties at the time, Sunzi Bingfa is extremely vague and gloss over important details within little to no elaboration. Even with just 6 of the 48 chapters of Wu Qi's book, we can see the Wu's has much more details than Sun. Where other manuals talks specifically about the implimentation of a certain idea, Sun Wu just mentions the ideas.

So why did Sun Wu do that ? Well the way I see it, it depends on when you believe this book was actually written. Some say it was written as a self-recommendation for the king of Wu, others believe that it was finalized after he retired. Based on how vague and borderline useless it is, it makes perfect sense to believe in the former.

Sun Wu's treaty being a self-recommendation to the king means he must show he is an extremely well learnt and capable person. Yet at the same time, he mustn't give him too much as to give away 'trade secrets'. If he told the king everything he knew, then why exactly would he needs Sun Wu anymore ?

So essentially, the book was saying 'see, I know so much, and if you want me to show you something, you better dang well hire me and pay me an arm and a leg'

Hi Wujiang,

Some modern scholars, like Guo Huaruo, one of the experts on Sunzi Bingfa, consider that the Art of War, like many other classics, was compiled in its present form over a relatively long period of time, from texts by Sun Wu or his disciples. It is also known that other military treatises (of a more practical nature) were written in the same period.

As such, it seems likely that the Sunzi as we know it was compiled as a short theoretical work, summarising the main principles of Sun Wu's school. It was probably was meant to be completed by commentaries/additional treatises of a more practical nature (eg the Sun Bin Bingfa). This would explain its relative imprecision.

Francois

To be a good strategy consultant, one discusses with the client "the big picture", the situations connected to it and the generalities of solving the situation. The advantage is the detailed approach of solving it. Some thinks they know. A rare few understands.

Sorry, I am completely missing your point here. What does this have to do with Sun Wu's intentional glossing over important details and being overly general in his book ?

When you read it you're left wondering 'So what?'.

Like you say, nothing but very general statements. And they're not even presented or ordered in an intelligent manner, just thrown together it seems.
Anyone with an ounce of common sense can think up similar statements. It reads like a book written by several someones with boring jobs and too much spare time, who spend their Sundays sitting in some Starbucks sipping their Lattes and 'theorizing' (fantasizing) about the things they 'really wanted' to do, without having even the faintest idea what they are talking about.

Militarily it has no use, unless the reader is a complete and utter military virgin. And the only thing that person will get from it is a headache for trying to memorize all those unprioritized generalities. Even after participating in a single of their hunts, you know more and are better prepared.

So it seems it truly was written to awe someone even less knowledgeable. Or maybe it was just part of a recipe book for fortune cookies, the part with all the wisecracks.
The reason it is so popular nowadays, is that it is so general, you can use it for anything, just cross index your keyword with a suitable 'military translation' of it and presto: fitting statement.

Anyway, that's just my thoughts.

BJ

You guys are commiting the fallacy of the "I-knew-it-all-along" syndrome. Just like how the invention of the wheel seemed simple, and how people think they themselves could have thought it up if born in a pre-wheel era, this is obviously not so. Besides, the big picture of SunZi's Art of War is that war surrounds $, something leaders both past and present don't seem to grasp. Don't look at the puzzles seperately, one has to piece everything together. Yes, SunBin's popularity is due to its generality, considering anything more specific would likely become useless over time due to changing technology and whatnot. However, to think the generality is common sense? What's that Chinese saying again? "Shi Hou Zhuge Liang", translated "becoming Zhuge Liang after the thing happened". Some(probably most) things seem obvious after you witness it. Of course, when the first plane hit the World Trade Center only an idiot would not know it came from terroists, or only idiots would not realize that Hitler's rise is an ominous sign, and only an idiot would think that Mao's economic communism would work. I must remind you that people both intelligent and educated(and probably much more capable than us) did not see any of this coming until after the thing happened. For my first advice, read SunTzu with the right attitude. Second, read it looking for strategy, not tactics(the latter would be much more specific simply due to its definition). Third, read it like working on a puzzle. For the most part, you'll come to realize that much of what he says revolve around a nation's economy. In short, when you wage war, it better be over money.

That's not he point of this discussion.
Rather, it is the motive in which Sun Wu was under when writing his book. That being, not to be informative or educate, but to give someone a taste of something vague and general enough for them to be intrigued but not compotent.

Meaning, rather than actually writting a military manual and recording down his ideas, it is nothing but an act of self-interest

It must have been an act of self-interest then. And I doubt if he himself (or they themselves) had the answer for the riddles.

A real expert or teacher will give you a top down list (top 10, pyramid, whatever) of the major elements: cut down to the bare essentials. His / their text just goes on and on, without a specific order or anything. It's the same kind of vagueness you see in those guys that have their heads crammed full with facts, to be able to be cool at parties, without really understanding a thing of what they are saying ... when you continue to ask, they quickly walk away.

Strategy, operations, tactics, etc. It's all thrown together here. That has nothing to do with some kind of syndrome some posters might have: just as today, back then people were intelligent enough to think straight and write coherently, this work is neither. When you sit down to write a book like this, just basic common sense will make your write down something, that actually is usefull. No hindsight needed to see that (that's why I included the hunting example). Besides, back then and way earlier people knew how to wage war, just as good as they know now, with all its political and economical implications etc etc.

All of this doesn't take away from the value of the work as a piece of historical literature of course. That remains. But the content itself has no practical value beyond what has been suggested so far (advertising, PR, fortune cookies )

BJ

Sigh, obviously I didn't explain the hindsight bias well enough, it seems, and I doubt what I say will change any opinions, set as it is.



Actually, I see SunZi's work as something to advise a king, not a general. Much of the sayings have to do with the actions of the king in a military perspective, not the general. Thus the focus on economics. On the other hand readers looking for the layout of different formations,rlogistics management, training, etc... would be sorely dissapointed, but unfortunately that is what most readers read for.

Do not know what you do professionally. This is what most good consultants do. They tell the client the big picture and what to do, but they will barely tell them how to do it until you hire them.

Some consultants are good. Some just sucks.

In a subtle way, Sun Zi was a consultant-contractor. So was Jiang Tai Gong, Zhang Liang etc. They join an organization that enables them to achieve great things.

In this global economy, some of us are independent contractors. In most cases, ppl. either join the highest bidder or someone who gives them a good comfort and challenging level.

The real money for strategy consultants is in advising the king (or the CEO).
How does one do that? He/she sells the big picture to them.
He/she is only hired if there is a giant problem.

q: How does one learn about the big picture?
a: Read the first two chapters of Jiang Tai Gong.

q: How does one achieve the big picture?
a: Study the Eight Classics. Learn from some world class professionals who have pragmatic experience.

That is my free strategy advice for the day.

[quote name='Anthrophobia' date='Jun 3 2007, 01:46 PM' post='4890927']
Sigh, obviously I didn't explain the hindsight bias well enough, it seems, and I doubt what I say will change any opinions, set as it is.
Actually, I see SunZi's work as something to advise a king, not a general. Much of the sayings have to do with the actions of the king in a military perspective, not the general. Thus the focus on economics. On the other hand readers looking for the layout of different formations,rlogistics management, training, etc...
Greetings Anthrophobia

Allow me to compliment you on your very keen obsrvation. Sun Tzu"s position as an advisor is obvious it seems ,to but a very few, but in any case, it is nice to find another with the same view.

And as long as I am applauding and in no special order, it is interesting to see the individual positions displayed by the postings of CARDINAL009, Anthrophobia, BeeJay, Wujiang, fcharton. and I suppose myself included. I wonder what a great thesis the analysis of the shape of the minds here exposed by we posters would make for some Phd. canidate ?

Sunzi's work was never meant to be a tactical manual, rather it was a political strategy. Politics here means the social-economic conditions that are essential to war and war is only an instrument to the political goal. He was the first person that we know of who advocated total war in a written treatise.

Machiavelli's Art of War provides little details on how to conduct a battle, but can we accuse him of glossing over details? No, because the discussion is not about conducting battle but about war itself.

These treatises may look vague and common sense, but to borrow a saying in quantum physic "if you think you understand quantum physics, you don't understand quantum physics at all". They only look vague because of the following reasons: 1. the scope of the subject matter is too huge to go into details, 2. readers' mistaken said treatises for manuals, 3. readers' inexperience in the subject matter.

If you look at other important military treatises, such as On War, they never tell you how and where to place a cannon or when to charge with your cavalry, but they will tell you what the hell is war.

So now the Art of War is already linked to quantum physics: vagueness conveying a deeper meaning ... wow ... didn't see that one coming

I do not agree with either of the three points btw.
1) That only applies to micro-managers (btw, AoW seems to be written by such a person as it contains a lot of irrelevant details)
2) If it's a treatise then why all the 'You have to do this or that's? It's not a tactical manual? It sure tries to be one in several chapters. In other chapters it tries to be a manual for the other scopes (operational, strategical). It's certainly not a treatise, because a treatise is supposed to delve into something systematically ... and that last important bit is missing from AoW.
3) That's a non-issue ... especially on an anonymous forum. Let's not go that way please.

Again, to me AoW looks vague ... because it is. It's a vast collection of poorly sorted statements, gathered I presume by the writer(s) over god knows how many years of talking, hearing and evesdropping. It goes around in circles, without prioritizing. It gets lost in too many detials. Sometimes it seems to want to cover every eventuality, and in doing so defeats the purpose that we think it had (we thereby no doubt overrate AoW and the author(s) and underrate the leaders and people of that era).
When reading it, I often get the feeling the writer doesn't really know what he's talking about, sort of like a priest giving sex advice.

AoW is a great work because it is so old. Not because of its content.

BJ

If you read the art of war thinking its content is useless, than it is indeed useless. If you read the art of war trying to learn something from it, you will learn something from it. The same goes for just about any major work, especially one that generals are required to study. It's called attitude.

Reading AoW is not useless. But reading into it what so many people want to, that is.

Because yes, if you read any book thinking it's useless, than a closed mind will conlcude it is. And likewise, if you read any book thinking it is The Source of Ancient Wisdom, than similarly a closed mind will conclude it is that.

BJ

^ Much like how Sun Tzu's Art of war is strategically nonsense because it is vague, unlike a good teacher that gets down to its bare essentials, yet somehow it gets lost in too many details.

As I have said before attitude. Machiavelli's/Clautzwiz's art of war on most instances say exactly the same thing as SunZi's art of War word for word(well, not exactly word for word since they spoke different languages). The only difference between them is that the former goes into details on how long a company formation should be, or how many rows of crossbowman a formation should have, etc... But as I have stated, that is tactics, and Sunzi contains little to nothing when it comes to tactics, but much when it comes to strategy. In the entire Art of War, only two chapters have a headline on tactics, yet one of them talks of strategy, despite the headline, and the other goes either way, depending on how you define strategy and tactics to the specifics. Quote one sentence on Sunzi that speaks of tactics and I'll give you 10 sentences that speak of strategy.

So AoW is mostly about strategy ... though I don't see what that has to do with AoW being vague. And let's not confuse 'having details' with 'not being vague'.

It must be attittude then, because I don't see AoW saying exactly the same as the others. Of course they touch upon the same concepts, but that is hardly surprising.

BJ

Because strategy itself is very vague. Tactics, which is the "winning of the battle" must be explained to the minimal detail. In strategy it is not so, which is why Sun Tzu's Art of War lasted with greater popularity than other Chinese works. Strategy survives the passage of time better than tactics. No matter how many goose formations complete with halberds and crossbowmen you throw at me, one line of tanks will mow it all over. Of course, that is not to say strategy isn't completely affected. SunTzu's says that country nearest to yours would be more of a threat to you than countries that don't even share a border, even if the former is weaker. Not true today, due to transportation technology. Of course, it could be applied to in a business sense, in that a shoemaker's biggest threat is another shoemaker, not the neighboring electrical engineer, yadda yadda yadda



I said exactly the same "on most instances". As stated bf, the others focused more on tactics than SunTzu. However, when it comes to strategy, you get picking higher ground, moral of the troops, birds in sudden flight signifying hidden ambushes, etc... pretty much all leaning the same way.

Here are some examples from SunTzu and Machiavelli's book 1 from a quick skim of the two.

Sun Tzu: Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements;
Machiavelli: To honor and reward virtue, not to have contempt for poverty

Machiavelli: Do you not have a proverb which strengthens my argument, which says: War makes robbers, and peace hangs them? For those who do not know how to live by another practice, and not finding any one who will support them in that, and not having so much virtu that they know how to come and live together honorably, are forced by necessity to roam the streets, and justice is forced to extinguish them.
Sun Tzu: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State.

Machiavelli: they should come, drawn by the regard they have for the Prince, where they are more afraid of of his anger then the immediate punishment
Sun Tzu: If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless.

Well, that is something where we really have a different opinion then. To me it can be as clear as tactics or operations.

Like I said, anybody writing about 'doing war' is bound to talk about the same concepts. So of course AoW tackles many things that are also mentioned by other books on war. Although I am sure we can find much better examples than the three mentioned: the last one indeed does show a similarity, but the other two have nothing in common (btw, I did not check their sources).

One other thing, I just skimmed thru it again and actually, AoW is mostly about tactics, not strategy. True, many concepts from one have their equivalents in the others, but the focus is not on strategy, but on operations and battlefields.

5/13 = Tactics: chapter 5, 6 and 12 plus half each of 7, 9, 10 and 11.
4/13 = Operational: chapter 3 and 8 plus half each 9, 10, 11, 13.
3.5/13 = General: chapter 1, 2, 4 plus half of 7.
0.5/13 = Strategy: half of 13.

Maybe we have different views on what exactly tac, ops and strat are? Actually, to me the 1st is tac, 2nd ops, 3rd tac. Although you can convince me that the 2nd (also) belongs to strat. And of course, higher ground is also important in operations and strategy. But only because they are vital for tactics.

BJ

I never gave this much thought to this but I find your explanation plausible to say the least.

Beejay, if you feel that SunZi is mostly about tactics, you are always welcome to accept my challenge. As I said, you give me one sentence on tactics, and I'll give you ten in strategy. Btw, if you think the last two examples "have nothing in common", than please explain your translations/views of the passage, instead of just saying "they have nothing in common", else we'll just boil down to a "yes uh, no uhmm" fling which is pretty repetitive.

Anthrophobia, if you feel that SunZi is mostly about strategy, why don't you act on your own challenge. Give me one on strategy and I'll give you 10 on tactics ... no wait, that's too much work ... I'll give you 2 on tactics, which must be very according to you. Btw, this is getting more and more off thread, but OK.

Possibly we first have to discuss whether or not the quote is strat. One thing we might then discover is that maybe people think operational and strategical are the same level. They are not, but it would clear up the misunderstanding (or maybe we just should have translated it to ops, not strat).

I thought the differences between those quotes were obvious, anyway:

To me the first one has AoW talking about focussing on the now, not the past: a plan might have been OK, but the situation has changed, so adapt. Mach is talking about looking at people's performance, not their pedigree. That is, taken from the short quotes you present, so maybe they have been taken out of context.
The second one has Mach talking about the disadvantages of having a professional army (especially mercenaries), while AoW explains about the nightmare of operational logistics.
The third touches on something similar, but in essence they are different. Mach talks about leadership, AoW about discipline.

Btw, good consultancy is about good salesmanship: before you can give any consult, you have first to make the sale. So if AoW was anything like PR, it was not a salespitch (too long), but more like one of those 1001 books that are being published nowadays by every consultant that feels (s)he is good. And at every presentation and pitch, they will mention it: "As I have described in detail in my "Ten Ways To Success", or "Twelve Steps to the Top" or whatever. AoW could be something like "137 Observations on War" (granted, I didn't count them, probably more).

But it reminds me even stronger of those weather almanacks that were (and still are) so popular.
Let's then redefine AoW as the War Almanack (TM-ed by me, now and here )

BJ

You're looking at the last sentence, but the similarity is in the first, "Bestow rewards without regard to rule" definitely does mean judging soldiers without regard to rank.



"War makes robbers" means war hurts the economy. Same with the AoW.



Both talks of the importance of the soldier's attachment with the leader. Obviously any sentence would have double meanings, but if that's negatively vague, than no double-judging.

btw, war strategy is very similar to business strategy in many ways.

And as for your challenge... Yep, the below are pretty much the entire first section of AoW, with some things left up due to repeats or whatnot. As you can see, each one relates with strategy, since it is about everything occuring before and after the battle.

The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete
accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him
regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,
times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small;
danger and security; open ground and narrow passes;
the chances of life and death.

The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,
sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.

By method and discipline are to be understood
the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,
the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the
control of military expenditure.

These five heads should be familiar to every general:
he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them
not will fail.

Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking
to determine the military conditions, let them be made
the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued
with the Moral law?
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven
and Earth?
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
(5) Which army is stronger?
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy
both in reward and punishment?

While heading the profit of my counsel,
avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
over and beyond the ordinary rules.

According as circumstances are favorable,
one should modify one's plans.

All warfare is based on deception.

Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,
and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.
If he is in superior strength, evade him.

If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
If his forces are united, separate them.

Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
you are not expected.

These military devices, leading to victory,
must not be divulged beforehand.

Now the general who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
The general who loses a battle makes but few
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations
lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:
how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention
to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.


----------------------------

It'll be pretty hard to find 36 parts on tactics, I assume, but anything's possible.

When judging the quotes, I try to look at what the author (probably) meant, not what we can read into it.

For example, "War makes robbers" taken out of context can of course be understood as an example of the effects of war on an economy (be they bad or good btw, just look at Pizarro ... pretty good for Spain), but that is not how the author meant it. He was talking about the dangers of having a professional army.


Well, that is not one sentence, but many. However, that first chapter I put in the 'General' category (see earlier reply), because some parts are none of strat-ops-tac, while most others can be interpreted as either. That is why this chapter doesn't do well as example for either strat or tac.

Examples:

"Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons."
This is general, because it tells us nothing about s-o-t (unless you're an alien maybe).

"Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."
This is general, because it can be all three: s-o-t.

That last one btw is a nice example of the obviousness of AoW (i.e. repeating common sense) to any leader living in that era: it's what you do when out hunting.

BJ

Obviously just saying that wouldn't be very convincing. If you think it's tactical, please explain why. As I've stated, each of the quotes I've listed has to do with warfare before and after battles, which is the definition of strategy.

Btw, nitpicking on certain "obvious" passages in AoW as obvious is double-standard. Not only does it display hindsight bias, as explained earlier, but any other work also has just as many, especially when you are nitpicking at a sentence that isn't supposed to be a stand-alone but a stem to describe a previous sentence. I might as well accuse Mach when he siad "opinions are different" and ignore the rest, and toss his works in the trash. If you think you are not showing the hindsight bias, than that would logically mean you can right the a work much like the AoW without any prior reading. Obviously others don't think so considering Mao was heavily influenced by it, Vietcongs actually bothers to memorize the whole d**** thing, and the US department emphasized on the importance of the reading. Considering that the Vietcong achieved their desired result while losing every single battle in the Vietnam War, I'd say they probably got strategy, not tactics(or maybe just technological inferiority).

Here's some of the obvious quotes of Mach,



Wow, it sounds pretty obvious, I bet The Prince is a complete waste of time!

Tactical = battle, operational = campaign, strategical = war.

Chapter 1 only has a few statements that we can categorize as being either of s-o-t. Some of them explained tactically, as you asked:

"Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him."
Feigned charges, weakened centers, defending strongpoints that are actually valueless.

"If he is in superior strength, evade him."
The bread and butter of light troops.

"If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant."
A repetition of the feint charge technique. Also a favorite of medieval European infantry armies.

"If he is taking his ease, give him no rest."
Enaging units to fix them (so they cannot be used as reserves, for example).
And the opposite, rotating units to have them rest.

"If his forces are united, separate them."
That's called a breakthrough. What knights want, what Alexander's Companions want. It's what cavalry on the flanks try to do to each other. More modern: strike at the borders between command zones. 1918 German assault techniques (and the later Blitzkrieg based on that).

"Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."
Flank attacks, flank marches, ambushes, light troops screening heavies until just before their charge, combined arms (you know: cav forcing the other to square, then arty or inf to shoot them up).


Again, as I said before, I'm not talking from hindsight. The hunt example is something from his own era. It was an important tool for any army training, like the Mongol's.

Btw, you provided that passage. Of course other works have obvious passages ... I never said otherwise. But works like Mach at least try to put their 'lessons' in perspective, they order it intelligently, explain the why and how. They do not just bundle all their one-liners together rather chaotically, as AoW does. That was my point.

BJ

Actually, you said it was both vague and "gets lost in the details", so obviously I missed your point. This only goes to the point of an opinion. In my opinion Mach is more chaotic and harder to read/understand, but I do not dismiss his work, b/c my reading skills has nothing to do with the message, I can only blame him(or the translator) for bad language skills, but his message is something else I can learn from. As for the why and the how, that would depend on what part of the AoW you are talking of. But to compare Mach and Sun on superiority is needless. It's like saying what is better, a baseball cap or planet Jupiter. Mach and Sun lived during different times and focused on different aspects of war and battles. They lived under different geographical conditions with a different population size, a different culture, and a different technological setting. Thus, some would emphasize things that the other wouldn't bother. For example, Mach warned of the reliance on mercenaries, drawing on Rome as an example. During Sun's time and place pretty much everyone was a conscript, so saying that wouldn't do much for the king, since the king already have a conscript centered army. Sun is more popular at present, that is undeniable, but that is b/c as I stated b/f, strategem survives better over time than tactics, the latter more affected by changes in technology(personally Sun is also easier to read, which probably also contributed to the popularity, but that is my opinion, maybe others find Mach easier to read).



campaigns are a part of strategy. It is the operations before/after the battle that goes in line with strategy. Although I don't see your point by pointing this out, so far we are of the same line here.



This I must quote from yourself: "when judging the quotes, I try to look at what the author (probably) meant, not what we can read into it. "

All your quotes goes before the most important one, "all warfare is based on deception, hence..." Not battles, warfare.

It's the vagueness of a collection of one-liners. Lost in details because there is no order.

We can of course say "tactics are a part of operations are a part of strategies, so all are strategies", but that's too easy. The three are seen as separate, that's not something I made up.

To use your own words: "all warfare is based on deception, hence..." Not strategies: warfare ... that means all three.
A very generalistic statement by him/them btw. Deception plays its part no doubt, but I would say that all warfare is based on force. You can multiply your force by clever deceipt, but you still need that force. Unless maybe he means 'based' in the sense of 'starts at', but then we would do better to translate 'deception' as 'diplomacy'.

When reading AoW I feel that the author was talking about the tactical and operational level. I do not know who ever linked it with our definition of strategy, but if the author meant it to be about strategy, then it has too much about the levels below that and not enough about strategy and the level above.

For example, there are dozens of statements that you can relate directly to the battlefield (no matter if you can also interpret them at some higher level): you can list dozens of examples that you can translate 1-on-1 to an actual execution of that statement during a battle (many battles actually). No vague interpretations needed.
On the other hand, there are only very few statements about the strategical playing field, with few that you can translate 1-on-1 to an actual execution.
And where the tactical listings are quite extensive and cover many of the issues seen as important in tactics in general, on a strategical level there is a lot missing, it is very much incomplete.

I.e. it is the tactical completeness versus the strategical incompleteness of the lists that cause me to believe the author(s) had tactics and operations in mind when writing them.

BJ

Because it pays for the road less travel ...




A good doctor rids off the root of illness ...
A good investigator read subtle clues ...
A good stock trader surfs the market ...
A good designer ... is to integrate.

... well a good consultant, he just press the button, at the right time, in the right place.
... for there are bunch of bright people to do the rest.



Real life speaks ...



I take this as good tips, my history consultant ...

Now all of that roots from personal opinion. There is nothing wrong with strategy, and the superiority of either strategy or tactics depends on country size and population, there is no "better" case. Now I have accepted your challenge, and you have yet to either continue it or accept mine. I know what you think, you told me repeatedly, but that's just an opinion.

The definition of warfare is war, or at most the waging of war, and in your words "strategy = war". That's all I can say.

Let's boil this down the the minimum. You say Sun Tzu's AoW are useless one-liners, but you also say that it teaches mostly about tactics which outnumbers anything on strategy. Then yes, if you are looking at tactics, the AoW is indeed horrible. This is why we call it the Art of "War" not the Art of battle(although in Chinese it more correctly means "way of the soldier"). This is like accusing a Biology book for not having any Physics. Heck, even Sun Tzu's introduction say that "the art of War is of vital importance to the state". There are no descriptions of formations, combined weaponry, etc.... Thus, by saying that Sun Tzu is mostly about tactics, one would naturally look for things that aren't there, and naturally conclude that it is useless.

I am at the ropes end. If you not only stick to the idea that Sun Tzu talks mostly on tactics instead of strategy, but also stick to the idea that Sun Tzu's AoW is useless b/c it's not detailed on any part that you think mentions of tactics, than I don't know what to say. It's illogical. The logical thing to do is read it for something else.

Note that Sun Tzu wrote this for his king to read, not for another field general.

Its the most obvious that is the hardest to grasp. Sun Tzu's book provides a constant reminder of the seemingly obvious. After all, IMHO, 90% of military blunders are not due to the opponent's brilliance, but due to the opponent's stupidity and ignoring the obvious. Sun Tzu wrote "The way to avoid what is strong is to strike what is weak." Hitler turns around and attacked the Soviet Union head on. Same with Japan:

"Lets Bomb Pearl harbor!"

"Rightey-o old chum! Thats a brilliant idea there. Lets annoy the most powerful industry in the world, and bring them into the war!" (Doesn't take hindsight to see this. WWI already proved US industrial might.)

Cornwallis:

"I like my back to the water, therefore, I'm gonna back myself up in a peninsula, with no sea or land escape route, cause thats just a fine idea old chum!"



Machiavelli was also seeking employment when he wrote one of his two books (Can't remember which one), but he seemed to be quite detailed. This may have to do with Sun Tzu's fascination with The Way, and probably his belief that specifics should be left out because, "道可道非常道."

That's true indeed: yours, mine, his, hers, etc.

Strategical level = a war, like Manchu-Ming; operational level = a campaign, like the invasion of Liaoning; tactical = a battle, like the first one at Shenyang.

Of course there is nothing wrong with strategy, or with the other two. And neither strategical, operational nor tactical statements / concepts are superior to the other, because each is meant for a different level. AoW's focus clearly is not on strategy.

AoW is very much more detailed about tactical situations than about strategical situations, as I explained before. However, because it doesn't do much explaining, it is in effect useless: it tells you what (not) to do, but not really why, let alone the how. Instead, it presents more and more and more of those "a wise man does this" statements.
Sure, it doesn't need to go into the 'how' (like how to deploy from line to whatever), because that could be done in another book (it would have been nice though if he/they had combined them), so that is not a shortcoming perse. But without the 'why', it turns into the long list of one-liners it is, like a War Almanack.

All of this does not mean AoW is less important: it has historical significance. But its content is not the deep pool of holy knowlegde that people nowadays take it for.

And about that challenge: I gave 6 tactical examples (from part 1), so if you still want to, you can post those 60 strategical counter examples. But for me we don't need to go there.

BJ

Nope, I used quite a bit of facts. Look back, from who's meant to read the AoW to the American Military, Mao, Vietcong,... placing it in high importance. Facts like the former backs up my statement that the AoW is on a strategic level rather than on the tactical, while facts on the latter backs up the fact that it's certainly helpful when used wisely. So far all I am recieving is opinions on that it is a "one-liner", which is an opinion unless SunTzu comes back from the grave(along with whoever else contributed to it) and said that it was indeed one-liners. That is something I don't see happening anytime soon.



In which I disagreed with pretty much all of them. Besides, you are the one that made me accept the challenge of having one strategy to 2 tactics. I accepted. I gave you 13 strategic versions, so I was expecting 36, not 6. It was you who proposed this challenge instead of the original one, as I recall. Especially when those 6 talked of strategy, not tactics, and more especially that all of them are the ones I showed you. I have explained why it is strategy, and you have yet to counter. I have countered every of your explanations, and I await for a reply. As I quoted from you yourself "read what the author probably meant" and SunTzu clearly summarized what he said as a part of "warfare", which is strategic, all the more so when it's translated, yes?

As for campaign, Bulow's quote says that strategy is "the science of military movements outside the range of the view of the enemy" which clearly contains the definition of a campaign. Strategy, according to the dictionary, is "the science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and operations. " which also contains the definition of a campaign.

As I have stated, if you stick to the idea that the Art of War is mostly tactical rather than strategic, as well as the idea that the Art of War lacks tactical explanations, than you put yourself in a pretty hypocritcal state. One can't have both.

Facts? Your opinion is that AoW is strategic, because ... the people you mention have read it ... as they have no doubt read many, many other books relating to military matters. So? If your friend tells you "Hot Fuzz is a great movie" and you ask "Why", would you be satisfied with "Because famous people have watched it", or would you like to hear your firend's reasons that relate to the content of the movie, preferably with some examples. Maybe you are OK with the first answer, I'd like to get the second one.

About "The Challenge": what I tried to do is show why the examples you quoted as strategical are actually tactical (possibly operational). Clearly you disagree, but you have not explained why ... why do you think those examples are strategical? And why do you think they are not tactical? After that I'll give you more examples.


I said its a collection of (mostly) tactical one-liners. How does that put me in a hypocritical state? (Besides, what can accusing me of being insincere add to this discussion? For the record: I'm not. And let's not get personal.)

Quoting Bulov does not change the fact that the military recognize a strategical, operational and tactical level. Why does that need to be questioned ... it's common knowlegde. But if one disagrees with that accepted partition, by only allowing for two levels - strategical and tactical - than that forces both levels to encompass elements that are normally attributed to the operational level. That drags the discussion even further away ... but even then AoW is mostly tactical.

BJ

Obviously you are reading it wrong. Let me quote myself: "Nope, I used quite a bit of facts. Look back, from who's meant to read the AoW to the American Military, Mao, Vietcong,... placing it in high importance. Facts like the former backs up my statement that the AoW is on a strategic level rather than on the tactical while facts on the latter backs up the fact that it's certainly helpful when used wisely" Maybe I wasn't clear, but I DID say that SunTzu was meant to have the AoW to be "read by a king, not a another field general". A Wu king has no hand in tactical battles, but much when it comes to starting wars. This is a fact, and backs up my argument that the AoW is written with a more strategic rather than tactical focus. The others, as I've stated, are facts that "it's certainly helpful while used wisely".

I think it's pretty obvious that Mao, the VietCong, and the US military are not my "friends", and given who they are, their voice in matters of warfare means much more weight than normal "friends" who never had any military experience.



I have already did. I'll quote myself again, if you want me to:

The first time I explained:

and again:

And again:


As you see, I have explained at least three times. I say that's more than enough.



Obviously that does not change anything. The military recognizing a operational level does not mean campaigns are not a part of strategy. Clausewitz himself says the planning of an entire campaign fits in with strategy. Either way that was not even my point to begin with. My point was that AoW is mostly strategy instead of tactics, I don't know how we got to talking about this, for I did not even mention it.

And as I repeat myself : if you stick to the idea that the Art of War is mostly tactical rather than strategic, as well as the idea that the Art of War lacks tactical explanations, than you put yourself in a pretty hypocritcal state. One can't have both.

The two arguments can't logically coexist.

Maybe I am reading you wrong. Then we probably are talking at different wave lengths here. It seems you refer to 'strategies' in the most general sense, like used in 'business strategies'. That use encompasses every action that has a plan behind it. I am talking about the levels as used by the professional military, and there strategy is war-scale.
Written for a king may indicate to us a strategical focus (in the miltary sense), but the text does not fit that: too much about tactics, too little about strategies. That is my point

Thanks for your defenitions. What I asked was if you can explain why those 6 statements from AoW (that I showed to be tactical) are strategical according to you. I thought that was your challenge: coming up with statements from the text that are either tac or strat. For example, one of those six repeated:

"Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him."
This is typically tactical. So I mentioned examples of that: feigned charges, weakened centers, defending strongpoints that are actually valueless. All are an actual 1-on-1 translation from statement to tactics, all fit the pace and time scale implied by the statement, none needs circumventious explanations.

And what I asked is if you (or anyone else) can explain those statements in such a direct matter as being strategical, with examples.


Well, first of all, if it would be illogical, that doesn't automatically make it hypocritcal. Even so, my statements are neither.
Second, as I said before: tactical statements form the majority of Aow. At the same time, they are just that: statements. There is no 'why' to all the do's and don'ts: they lack explanation.
Third: so you see, being one thing but lacking explanation about that thing is not contradictory at all.

BJ

We are going in circles. I say that your point is an opinion, you say mine is an opinion, I say mine is backed up due to the purpose of the AoW, and you say your point again, and then it just goes on and on.



Ah, than I misread you as well. Well for starters, "Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him" can do very well in Sun Bin's war with PangJuan, in which SunBin made purposely made less and less campfires in his camp for each day. The pursuing PangJuan took this as a sign that SunBin's army is starting to have many drop-outs, and thus acted in haste by using his cavalry to hunt down SunBin's retreating army and leaving the infantry behind, which followed to PangJuan's defeat as he fell into a trap. To make a long story short, PangJuan became a porcupine with all those crossbow bolts sticking out of him.

"If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant"

Many a time in sieges. No one likes the idea of climbing a wall just so you get thumped down by thrown projectiles, and when you finally do make it up that high, you'll just find a bunch of soldiers trying to kill you. The defender has the tactical advantage in a siege. Thus, sometimes(as in the case of ZhuGeLiang and SiMaYi) the attacking general would hurl insults. The defending general gets pissed and comes outside of the city to attack. Thus the attacking general gets to chose his battleground, instead of the defending general.

"If he is in superior strength, evade him."

I REALLY don't need to explain that one. When the death star comes, run away, run far far away. There's so many retreats in history I don't know which one to pick. But oh, what the heck, since I already got started. The Long March is a very unoriginal example. But then again most retreats which aren't feigned are unoriginal. It may be useful, but not fun to talk about.

"If he is taking his ease, give him no rest"

Here's another chance for SunBin to be in the spotlight. "Attack wei to rescue Zhao" would be his example. PangJuan, as a general of Wei, was attacking Zhao and winning pretty badly. SunBin, instead of sending his troops to Zhao, sends it to Wei. PangJuan would naturally rush back to defend his homeland. His tired-out soldiers were no match for SunBin's soldiers who were taking their time and waiting for them.

"Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected"

Same as the above. Lucky SunBin.

"If his forces are united, separate them"

Nurachi battled a Ming army of 200,000 with an army of 60,000(I'm not sure I remembered the numbers correctly). B/c of the big size, the Ming decided to seperate it into 5 armies marching seperate roads and combine them once again when facing Nurachi. Before they were able to combine their forces, Nurachi attacked and defeated each smaller army one by one. Except one of them which retreated without even fighting. This is very like Napoleon's strategy right before Waterloo. Unfortunately for him, his army either didn't intercept fast enough or Wellington's army/allies arrived with spectacular speed.



I really don't get it. How can someone write about something when his work doesn't mention it? However, it explains very well strategically at certain passages, as I've stated. If this is the case, SunTzu would be pretty crappy at writing military manuels, but a genius at doing the impossible.

But whatever, obviously this discussion is starting to go in circles. You're obviously going to stick with your opinion, and me mine. I'm going to agree to disagree.

Indeed it seems we are getting dizzy, but that happens when we both strongly believe in our point of view. So agreed to disagree. Nevertheless a reply.
The examples are mostly operational or tactical (siege). But let's not go into what is and is not operational. What is more important to me is that one has to look hard to find such suitable 'strategical' examples, while one can find several in practically every battle.

There are more reasons, besides the easy 1-on-1 translation of statements to battlefields, to think AoW is tactical, not strategical. The wording of the statements for example tends to convey actions and passage of time that much better fit a battlefield than a total war. Just some examples of that, plus why they are tactical:

From chapter 5 (actually most of that chapter is telling us nothing):

"Therefore, the force of those skilled in warfare is overwhelming, and their timing precise."
(and to illustrate: "Their force is like a drawn crossbow and their timing is like the release of the trigger.")
Tactical because: Timing is vital. As is skill. Drilled troops, that charge at the right moment. That hold their fire until a devastating close range volley. Etc.

"They offer bait that which the enemy must take, manipulating the enemy to move while they wait in ambush."
A repetition of what he mentions twice in chapter one. Feigned charges, etc: already mentioned.

More examples from chapter 6, a lot of which can be explained as operational, and with that being a disputed distinction, I only look at the ones that are clearly tactical:

"To achieve an advance that cannot be hampered, rush to his weak points."
Tactical: charge a break in the line, an open flank, your spears against his horse, your horse against his open troops.

"To achieve a withdrawal that cannot be pursued, depart with superior speed."
A bit of an open door. The advantage of cavalry over infantry, lights over heavies: their battlefield roles.

"If he prepares to defend the back, the front will be weak."
"If he prepares to defend the left, the right will be weak."
"If he prepares to defend the right, the left will be weak."
"If he prepares to defend everywhere, everywhere will be weak."
All about creating and committing reserves. Commanders are always looking for such signs. Many battles see the commanders trying to force or fool the other into such a move. These three usually are the main activities of a commander during a battle.

None of these can be explained as strategic: timing like the release of a trigger, laying an ambush, a rush, to depart a place … those events imply a quick action, not something on a strategic scale, it would be very odd to use those in that connection.
To compare: trigger release in strategy is opening the lock of a dam; an ambush in strategy is luring the opponent into a narrow peninsula, a rush is an invasion not slowed down by baggage, departing is shifting to another area or region.
All are the same principles as tactical, but slower processes with more force / momentum.


As I said before, AoW lacks completeness, thoroughness. It has a lot of Donts and a lot of 'Ways of the Winner'. What is missing however, is the ways to counter the 'Ways of the Winner'. It seems to assume that opponents don't follow the general principles that AoW lists. A bit strange, as it states that deception is important, but always assumes enemy signs to be real (enemy prepares to defend left, thus his right must be weak). That one-way thinking makes it incomplete.
Another example of its incompleteness: AoW only caters for multiple-choice leaders: 'these are the 5 ways of', 'those are the 4 methods to', etc. Because there is no 'why' (or even an 'otherwise'), the student will not know what to do in a situation that is not covered by the lists.

The lack of completeness is true about the tactical statements, but much more so about the strategical ones. The total scope, the big picture being drawn so to speak, fits tactics in the center with some attention to the things surrounding it (higher and lower levels). It does not fit strategy in a similar way: under-represented in AoW are (non-combat) strategical statements plus some of the level above that, like burning fields, poisoning wells, detouring rivers, forbidding trade, etc. In other words, statements that clearly set the text in a strategical frame. On the other hand, from a tactical point of view, there are plenty of such statements, to both the levels above and below.

And for all those reasons, I think that:
1) AoW has its focus on the tactical level, not the strategical.
2) AoW is over-rated for the non-historic meaning of its content.
Nevertheless, the work is old and as such of course does have historical significance.

That's about it from my side, I guess.

BJ

>Because it pays for the road less travel ...
So you say.

>... well a good consultant, he just press the button, at the right time, in the right place.
>... for there are bunch of bright people to do the rest.

If it was only so easy.


>Real life speaks ...
Depends on who?


>I take this as good tips, my history consultant ...
Not a history consultant.

Since my college days, have always read the strategy classics from a consultant viewpoint not from a "warrior or a pseudo general" perspective.

The "warrior mindset" reader are those usually thinks strategy in terms of conflicts and confrontations. The funny thing is most of them rarely ever fought a battle except in a X-box game.

As a consultant, this Cardinal views strategic and tactical events in terms of tangibility and positive outcome.

###

There are so many different pov(s) on what strategy is.

The only thing that counts are:
* Can you use it successfully in your settings and beyond!?
* Can you generate mucho profit from it?

The real strategic thinkers-implementers are those who can and the wanna-be(s) are those who just talk about it!?
Less talk. More actions.

Dun worry, no one ever say it is easy.
That won cost u a dime ...





typical traits of a consultant ...

From before my college days, I have always read the strategy classics from a military viewpoint, never from a "consultant or his maiden's child" perspective.

The "maiden's child mindset" reader is one that usually thinks about strategy (or anything else for that matter) in terms of anything but what it was written for. The funny thing is you can always over-generalize anything to mean anything, and if you step back far enough, every big picture looks like every other ... generalities (not generals) rule in the land of the unknowing.

As a an ex-military and consultant, this Poster doesn't like to speak in the third person about himself, nevertheless he views strategic and tactical events in terms of ... events at different levels.

###

There are - unfortunatley - too many different pov(s) on what strategy actually is, most of them wrong.

The only thing that counts is:
Commons sense outperforms the layman's advice every single time.

Strategic thinkers without a tactical base or tactcial experience to build on keep repeating the same meaningless mantras for situations so far distant from the actual situation at hand, that they are seldom practicable (they are great entertainment at cocktail parties though).
True consultants listen to their client, chart the problem at hand and find the solution that fits the client's wishes and capabilities. They get to the point.Their added value is their independence and their background in a specific industry.

No matter what, in the end it boils down to:

Learn to think for yourself, because otherwise There's Never Enough Time to Do All the Nothing You Want, to quote another great source for baseless strategy thinking: Bill Watterson's prophet Calvin, from his Fourth Great Guide "Weirdos From Another Planet".

BJ

You are completely right of course. On the other hand, we can make an educated guess of the value of its content at the time of writing, because people back then were just as intelligent as nowadays. Thus so were the different ways in general to successfully perform conflict. But yes, what we can only speculate about is the real reason why it was written.

BJ

I think you miss the entire point:the point is that generally speaking theme concerning military confrontations has an innate appeal to most of the male population....... What's the kind of video games that sells the best? From my experience as computer-related retail industry anything involving wars and battles~~~
Speaking of your latter comment,irony is that many in the arms service hasnt fought in an actual battle(maybe with the exception of US Army),like what Basil Liddell Hart had written in his book,"Strategy":
"Unlike those who follow other professions, the 'regular' soldier cannot regularly practise his profession. Indeed, it might even be argued that in a literal sense the profession of arms is not a profession at all, but merely 'casual employment'- and, paradoxically, that it ceased to be a profession when mercenary troops who were employed and paid for the purpose of a war were replaced by standing armies which continued to be paid when there was no war."
What you call "warrior or a pseudo general" is actually more well-known as "armchair general",met several of them in internet forum......to sum up they are military history enthusiast(though tactical and technical aspect are often more appealing) so I see nothing wrong or silly with it(though some of the enthusiasts really serve in the military and some of them are even war veterans). Something more in line like discussing the performance of sports cars even though having no experience of driving one.
Of course some of these "armchair generals" really know their stuff and ascend to fame through such niche interest,one of the most well-known example is Tom Clancy, whose classic piece "Red Storm Rising" has been studied by military academies, and Jim Dunnigan,who accurately predicted the maneuver used by the coalition forces just before the commencement of the 1st Gulf War.

Communications is the instrument of the consultant.
Rule #1 of communication: If spelling is difficult, learn how to use a spell checker.




Pls enlighten me on the "Dao of the Consultant"?

Being a former member of the military and a "real" consultant, you must be the best in your niche.

Wish you well in your endeavor and your strategic approach.

The bottom line is: use what you learn. Implement what you can. Always focus on successfully completing your goal.

Regardless of one's belief in the strategy classics and profession, the standard for succeeding in the global marketplace lies in the # of 0's in one's bank account.

A note to add to those previous entries where there were those who believe tactics is everything and those who believe that strategy is everything.

Each move that a tactician makes serves one tactical purpose. It is usually based on reaction. Therefore he is barely catching up with the curve.

Each move a good strategist makes usually serve multipurposes. It comes from understanding the big picture and prepared anticipation. He/she saves time and resources. Therefore he is ahead of the curve.

The consummate strategist focuses on creating order than controlling chaos.

There is no right or wrong. Depends on the opposition and key influences.

Some might ask whether the end justifies the means and vice-versa?
It's all up to the playcaller. :|

This is the Dao of Strategist. This viewpoint works regardless of the arena.

Hmm. As tactcial and strategic terminology and thinkign hark back to the military, it's interesting to see that most big picture thinking in that department is based on small picture thinking. Most tactics can be scaled up to become strategies.

A re-active tactician is just as dependent as a re-active strategist.
A pro-active tactician is just as 'ahead of the curve' a pro-active strategist.

Tactics and strategies together form a pyramid, with strategies the top. Without solid tactics, the whole crumbles; without solid strategies, you still can have a strong foundation to build on.

A strategist is no good when you need tactics and vice versa. However, a good tactician is more important than a good strategist. Because without surviving tomorrow, there is no use thinking about next year. While if we survive tomorrow in a successfull way (instead of barely hanging on), we have all that extra time - compared to our competitors - to work out next year (... and that succesfull tactician merely needs to scale up (lose detail in) his plans).
This is not just my philosophy: there are countless examples where a single tactical instance changed the strategic landscape, but few if any the other way around.

We need order. But we cannot defeat entropy: all order wants to degrade to chaos. Good tacticians and strategists realize this and seek the most efficient and effective ways to postpone that moment for themselves, while speeding it up for the competitor.

BJ

Hi Everyone,

I am new to the Chinese History Forum, and I have to say what a nice place it is! Well done guys.

Well, as for the Art of War, I found it to be just right in terms of details (or rather the lack of details) in tactics. I think the main emphasis of the book is about whether and when to wage war, when to stop, and what are the most important factors a leader (whether millitary or political) must look after. One can win every single battle but still lose the war. I think the book is there to help remind one the important factors to win a war, but not how to win an individule battle. Notice I used the word "remind" here, as any clear minded leader should be able to figure out these factors them-selfs anyway.

As on the tactical side, I think Sun Zi is correct to point out that there is NO perfect recipe. The generals are encouraged to be creative, rather than to follow a set of rules. Thus the reason for the book's success over other millitary manuals is exactly due to the fact that it contains no details. If it was to contain tactical details, it will inevidably fall out of fashing due to the technological advances or the creation of counter-tactics. In my view Sun zi's book summarised most of the important points in a human conflict, whether it is on the battlefield, political arena or comercial markets.

Other millitary strategy works contained more tactical details precisely because Sun Zi's work included almost all "common sense" strategies one may think of, and hence only way to contribute more is to include practical details on tactics, as leasons of experiences for commanders to learn.