A quote from Warhead on another thread:


This is actually something that I have been thinking about recently. We see lots of Western lists of the 10 Most Decisive Battles in History, and usually there's not a single Chinese one. Eurocentrism and ignorance of Chinese history may have much to do with it, but we Chinese ourselves would be hard put to identify many decisive battles in our military history, as opposed to decisive campaigns, of which there are many.

There have been very dramatic battles in which one side was totally whacked, like Changping, Kunyang, Guandu, Chibi, the Fei River, Canhebei, and Geshu Han's defeat at the Tong Pass for example. But it is difficult to see them as decisive in the long run. If we are looking for the military unification of the whole empire, that still depended on one campaign after another. Or are we looking at the wrong objective? Should we be looking at short-term consequences instead?

Jeffery Barlow in this article: http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?showtopic=538 argues that the Battle of the Kunlun Pass between Di Qing and the Zhuang rebel Nong Zhigao was decisive because it kept Guangzhou and Guangxi as part of China. But I think he exaggerates - the long-term superiority of the Song was never really in doubt.

Let's try listing our choice of the most decisive battle or battles in each Chinese dynasty or historical period. It might prove to be a rewarding exercise, if only because it shows how subjective "decisiveness" can be.

I am gonna hate this - subjective is the right word.

For starters, I'll identify a few criteria which qualify the battle as decisive.
(1) The outcome must not be a forgone conclusion in advance.
(2) There is a lot at stake.
(3) If the outcome of the had been different, the course of history would probably be radically different too.


My choice for first two posting

(1) The Battle(s) at the Pearl River (First Opium War, AD 1839-1842). Despite the more advanced technology employed by the British, IMHO, it was possible for the Qing not to be defeated. But a combination of underestimating the opponents and lack of awareness of the opponents' capabilities cost them the battle, which encouraged the British, and eventually other colonial powers, to push their luck.

Had the Qing gave a better showing, the Qing, hopefully, would realise the need to modernise and open up, but could dictate it on their own terms rather than on the terms of the foreignors. Half a century later, it was too late to preserve the empire.

(2) Battle of YaLü River (though actually fought in the Korean Bay), AD 1894, as part of the First Sino-Japanese War. Poor management and leadership on the Qing's part eventually cost them the war.

The outcome was that not only had China lost its dominant position in the Far East due to the Western colonials in earlier conflicts, it also ceded its "big brother" position to Japan.

Thus began China's age as Sick Man of the East.

I think one of the earliest monumental battles was when Qin mobilized 600,000 men to conquer Chu... Clash of the Titans...

RE: China as the Sick Man of the East is history... It is fast becoming the Strong Man of the East...

One pretty good Western list of battles not in terms of how decisive the outcome was, but rather how great the impact on the course of history:
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/topten

The Huai-Hai Campaign of the Chinese Civil War is in there - that usually makes the list if there is any Chinese battle included.

A rather more Eurocentric (and dated - written in 1851) list and account of 15 most decisive battles:
http://www.standin.se/fifteen.htm

JFC Fuller's classic 1954 book "The Decisive Battles of the Western World" (which makes no secret of its Western orientation):
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Academy/6422/rev0319.html

An interesting Indian book about the 20 most decisive battles in Indian history:
http://www.hindunet.org/alt_hindu/1994/msg00674.html

A 2001 book on the 100 most decisive battles in history:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detai...118508?v=glance

It includes only four Chinese battles - Gaixia (where Liu Bang vanquished Xiang Yu), the Mongol siege of Xiangyang, the Manchu defeat of Li Zicheng at Shanhai Pass, and Huai-Hai in 1948. One more, the failed Mongol invasion of Japan at Hakata Bay, could arguably be included as a Chinese battle too.

Can you guys do better in the context of Chinese history?

Another reason may be the lesser interaction with foreign nations. Most of China's wars are internal. Europe, on the other hand, has always been a powder keg due to geography and parity.

I think the failed Yuan invasions of Japan made the biggest difference.

How about Zhèng Chénggōng's expedition to Taiwan? Having a lasting Dutch influence may have turned it into something more like a Caribbean or Latin American nation with mixed breeds who speak a European language.

It looks like that the idea of dicisive battle is related to military aventurism, if none of the side got superiority neverless they decided to take a chance, what else could we call it but aventurism.

I have a candidate, the battle of Fei Shui, Fu Jian's attempt to unify China which ended disastrously and lead the fall of Former Qin. Fu Jian's troops outnumbered East Jin by large, he had his elite cavalry. Although a little unstable in term of internal affairs, if Fu Jian could conquer East Jin, all the internal problems would be gone facing such a deed. Had Fu Jian won, the Xian Bei might never rise, there might never be a North Wei and there might never be a Tang dynasty. Fu Jian ventured and lost.

However, there are some who argue that Fu Jian's empire was already too unstable, and he could not have kept it together even if the Eastern Jin had surrendered. There are even scholars (following Michael Rogers) who claim that the battle never took place. See this thread for the Fei River battle: http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?showtopic=131

I can see why Gaixia would be pivotal - if Xiang Yu had won, China could have reverted to a feudal multi-state structure, rather than the centralised empire of the Qin. However, one could argue that the siege of Xiangyang and the Manchu victory at Shanhai Pass were foregone conclusions.

It seems that the Western standard for a decisive battle is often that it leads to the survival, emergence, rise or fall of an important state in history. In that case, how about these battles:

Changping - decline of Zhao and superiority of Qin

Gaixia - destruction of Xiang Yu and ascendancy of Liu Bang

Kunyang - survival of Liu Xiu and destruction of Wang Mang's army

Guandu - survival of Cao Cao and destruction of Yuan Shao

Fei River - survival of southern dynasties, fall of Former Qin, re-emergence of the Xianbei

Canhebei - ascendancy of Tuoba Xianbei over Murong Xianbei, and indirectly causes the death of Murong Chui

Very interesting thread....

One could argue....
Chang Pin: Although the battle itself was not a forgone conclusion, would a Zhao victory really have turned back the Qin dominace? considering that the Zhao strategy under Lian Po if it had worked would have simply starved out and force the Qin to conceed and retreat. And the Qin was certainly not immune to defeats before and even after Chang Pin, even against the Zhao.

GaiXia: I am a little fuzzy here, was Gaixia the draw that led to the treaty which Liu betrayed or was Gaixia the seige after Xian was cought off guard.

KunYang: Wang Mang was certianly doomed even if he had won here. even if he had won here he only took out a pocket of a much greater rebellion. Although it did have a future impact on who win the deer chase...

Guan Du: one could very seriously argue that the destruction of Yuan Shao was due far more to he's son's internal struggle afterwards instead of the battle itself

Gaixia was the siege in which Xiang Yu's army's morale collapsed after hearing the songs of Chu being sung all around them. Xiang Yu fled with just 800 cavalry, and was besieged again at Dongcheng. In the end he broke out with only 28 men and committed suicide on the banks of the Wujiang River.

Chenggao was the battle the year before, in which Xiang Yu and Liu Bang fought each other to a stalemate (although Xiang was badly weakened by the struggle), and agreed to fix their border at Honggou.

Perhaps if Xiang Yu had withdrawn to the south after Gaixia, there would have been one state in the north and one in the south? Or was Chu a totally spent force by then?

I believe it's just a matter of time. Han already had all the wealth, people, generals.... Chu would just have been overwhelmed. In any case, Xiang Yu is still a hero (not Liu Bang).

You got it. In comparison, the Chinese internal struggles pale as decisive battles; they don't fit this criteria from Snowybeagle:

"(3) If the outcome of the had been different, the course of history would probably be radically different too."

Though the dynasty names may have been shuffled, its unclear what lasting differences they would have made.

One could perhaps argue that the conquest of the Jin by the Mongols was crucial to their emergence as a formidable power, probably more so than the conquest of the Southern Song (by which time they were already at their peak). So how about the battle of Zhongdu in 1215 and the battle of the Three-peaked Hill (Sanfengshan 三峰山) in 1232, two decisive battles in the Mongol invasion of the Jin?

Zhongdu, 1215:

When the Mongols besieged Zhongdu (Beijing) in 1213, Li Ying 李英, Li Xiong 李雄 and a few other Jin generals assembled a militia of more than 10,000 men who inflicted several defeats on the Mongols. But when the Mongols withdrew in 1214 after being given a large tribute by the Jin, and Li Ying wanted to ambush them on the way with his forces (which had grown to several tens of thousands), the Jin emperor Aizong (Wanyan Shouxu 完颜守绪) was afraid of offending the Mongols again and stopped him. The emperor and Shuhu Gaoqi 术虎高琪 (who was the minister dominating the Jin court from 1213 to 1219) then decided to shift the capital south to Kaifeng, above the objections of many courtiers including Li Ying.

After the shift of the Jin capital to Kaifeng, Prime Minister Wanyan Chenghui 完颜承晖 and General Moran Jinzhong 抹然尽忠 were left to guard Zhongdu. At this point, one of the Jin armies defected to the Mongols and launched an attack on Zhongdu from the south, taking the Lugou Bridge 芦沟桥. Chinggis Khan then despatched his troops to attack Zhongdu again, led by the surrendered Khitan generals Shimo Ming'an 石抹明安, Yelu Ahai 耶律阿海, and the Tuhua 秃花 brothers. Moran Jingzhong's second-in-command, Pucha Qijin 蒲察七斤 surrendered to the Mongols with all the troops under him, throwing Zhongdu into a crisis. The Jin emperor then sent reinforcements north: Yongxi 永锡 leading the troops from Zhending 真定 and Zhongshan 中山 (numbers not given), and Wugulun Qingshou 乌古论庆寿 leading 18,000 Imperial Guards, 11,000 infantry and cavalry from the Southwestern Route 西南路, and 10,000 soldiers from Hebei, with Li Ying in charge of the supply train.

But at Whirlwind Fort (Xuanfengzhai 旋风寨), Yongxi's force encountered the Mongol troops and were soundly defeated (Mongol troop numbers are not given). Li Ying then gathered several tens and thousands of militia from the area and engaged the Mongols again at Bazhou 霸州, but they were defeated again, with Li Ying dying in battle. After this, because Shuhu Gaoqi (who controlled the imperial court) was enemies with Wanyan Chenghui, he refused to send any more reinforcements to Zhongdu. Wugulun Qingshou's demoralised army of 39,000 then scattered without putting up much of a fight.

Wanyan Chenghui had originally entrusted military affairs in Zhongdu to Moran Jinzhong, knowing him to be an experienced general, and had sworn a pact with Jinzhong to defend the city with their lives. But now he found out that Jinzhong had already made secret plans to flee. Thoroughly disappointed, he wrote a letter expressing his views on how to save the dynasty and attacking Shuhu Gaoqi for his selfishness and treachery. Then he took poison and died. That night, Moran Jinzhong fled back to Kaifeng, and Zhongdu fell to the Mongols.

Three-peaked Hill, 1232:
In 1223, the Mongol general Muhuali 木华黎 had struck into Shaanxi, attacking Chang'an. The garrison in Chang'an, 200,000 under Wanyan Heda 完颜合达, was too strong and Muhuali had to turn to besieging Fengxiang 凤翔 with 100,000 men. The siege dragged on for months and the Mongols were harassed by local militia, while Jin reinforcements were about to arrive. Muhuali then died of illness, and the Mongols retreated. [This was the siege in which the Xi Xia troops supporting the Mongols gave up and went home, incurring the wrath of Chinggis Khan]

In 1231, the Mongols attacked again and finally took Fengxiang. The Jin garrison in Chang'an panicked and abandoned the city, pulling back to Henan with all the city's population. One month later, the Mongols decided to use a three-pronged attack to converge on Kaifeng from north, east and west. The western force under Tolui 拖雷 would start from Fengxiang, enter the Tong Pass 潼关, and then pass through Song territory at the Han River (near Xiangyang) to reemerge south of Kaifeng to catch the Jin by surprise.

Wanyan Heda learned of this plan and led 200,000 men to intercept Tolui. At Dengzhou 邓州, he set an ambush in a valley with several tens of thousands of cavalry hidden behind the crest of either mountain, but Tolui's spies alerted him and he kept his main force with the supply train, sending only a smaller force of light cavalry to skirt around the valley and attack the Jin troops from behind. Wanyan Heda saw that his plan had been foiled and prepared his troops for a Mongol assault. At Mount Yu 禹山, southwest of Dengzhou, the two armies met in a pitched battle. The Jin army had an advantage in numbers, and fought fiercely. The Mongols then withdrew from Mount Yu by about 30 li, and Tolui changed his strategy. Leaving a part of his force to keep Wanyan Heda occupied, he sent most of his men to strike northwards at Kaifeng in several dispersed contingents to avoid alerting Heda.

On the way from Dengzhou to Kaifeng, the Mongols easily took county after county, and burned all the supplies they captured so as to cut off Wanyan Heda's supply lines. Heda was forced to withdraw, and ran into the Mongols at Three-peaked Hill 三峰山 in Junzhou 均州. At this point, the Jin troops on the Yellow River were also diverted southwards to meet Tolui's attack, and the Mongol northern force under Khan Ogodei 窝阔台 seized this opportunity to cross the forzen river and join up with Tolui - even at this point, their combined strength was only about 50,000!

Wanyan Heda's Jin army still had more than 100,000 men after the battle at Mount Yu, and the Mongols adopted a strategy of exhausting the enemy. The Jin troops had had little rest all the way from Dengzhou, and had not eaten for three days because of the severing of their supply lines. Their morale was plummetting and their commanders were losing confidence. When they reached Three-peaked Hill, a snowstorm suddenly broke out, and it was so cold that the faces of the Jin troops went as white as corpses, and they could hardly march. Rather than attack them when they were desperate with their backs to the wall, the Mongols left them an escape route and then ambushed them when they let down their guard during the retreat. The Jin army collapsed without a fight, and the Mongols pursued the fleeing Jin troops relentlessly. Wanyan Heda was killed, and most of his commanders also lost their lives. After the Battle of Three-peaked Hill, Kaifeng was doomed and the Jin emperor soon abandoned the city and entered Hebei in a vain attempt to reestablish himself there. He was driven south again, and by this time Kaifeng had been taken by the Mongols so he established his new capital at Caizhou 蔡州 (Runan, in Henan). After half a year (in early 1234), the Song and Mongol allied forces besieged Caizhou, Wanyan Shouxu committed suicide, and the Jin dynasty was finally destroyed.

Well there's also a lack of good military writers AND historian that could make a reasonable account of battles. I read a book of David Graff that you well know and he complains about the nature of the report of the battles that are never very detailed and look biased. Of course in the western worlds there was no less biased and indeterminate account but we are saved because these battles were particularly investigated by modern historian like Delbruck, Oman, Fuller etc... For example Herodotus information that more than two millions of Persians invaded greece in 480 is now unanimously rejected: long time ago military writers worked on his account and estabilished that persian army was about 50000 men at his full strenght. I think that a serious critic has still to be done on the Chinese sources. I see that is still accepted as totally true the account of Chengpin where we see in action armies of 400000 or more men concentrated in a single point. Clearly these numbers are too big and the kind of battle should indicate that army involved were of small size. But how much smaller? Graff sometimes indicates that armies of 50000-100000 men should be accettable but this seem to be a rough esteem of what a chinese army could look like. We need more studies translated in western language.

On the other hand, Chinese history were ususally compilled after the fall of that particular dynasty, so on this part it could be less biased than something like Herotodes who is not only a greek but wrote he's account only several decades after the battle.

Espically so that the details of battles such as Chang Pin probably came from multiple sources as there were many kingdoms at that time, while Shi Ma Chian was certainly quiet neutural on a matter so long ago and not concerned with the current dynasty. he was also away from political influence by the time he wrote that........

However the fact that there was a mass destruction of written sources during the Qin could put some douts on he's creditbility that is true.

You could go for translation error, I'm told that Army historically means about 100,000 people, same as Western army. But in the old PVA during the Korean War, equivalent of western army was an Army Group.

It seems that the Roman Legions were replete with artillery.

Onagers = 10 per Legion (55kg projectile avg. 440 meters range)

Balliste = 60 per Legion (Range about 300 meters)


Some of these Balliste were mounted on carts.

That why Roman Legion dont rely on bow/crossbows, because they had enough fire power to break any enemy formation.

I think, recent history, it would have to be 淮海/ 徐蚌...

That battle determined the result of the KMT CCP conflict.

what about the battle of Shanyuan (1004)? Led to the Treaty of Shanyuan, which stabilised relations between Song and Liao on a peer-to-peer basis - unprecedented in Chinese history

otherwise I don't know much about it, maybe someone who does can enlighten us

I think Ma Ling is the single most important battle of the warring states period, far more so than Chang Ping, since Ma Ling virtually took Wei out of the Great Power struggle,(without Ma Ling, Qin might never have rose so fast, the Wei was strong enough to keep it in check, if Zhao Wu Ling Wang came to the scene when Wei is still strong, Qin would have 3 strong kingdoms(the wei, Chu, and Zhao) as its neibour and would probably never succeed in unifying China, while ChangPing only increased the speed of whats already the trend of Qin dominance.

Then warhead, which battle would you consider as a turning point for the downfall of Qi? I personally felt that it was more like a series of battles.

Qi? Thats easy, it was the single battle of the allied troops led by Yan.

That defeat cost Qi its dominance, prior to this, Qi is just as strong of a state as Qin.

How about these two-

Battle of Chibi- Decided the fate of the three kingdoms. If Cao Cao's forces had won, the three kingdoms would probably have not came into being.

Battle of Talas- This battle eventually decided the outcome of the Tang dynasty which in the end the Tang forces lost to the Muslims and the dynasty collapsed there after several more events that had taken place in Tang China.

We've already went over why Talas isn't a desisive battle in any sense of the word here:
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?showtopic=725

In a way I guess you could say it isn't, Tang was already falling apart before the Battle of Talas. The taxation and the citizens starving was enough to shake up the dynasty for an open rebellion. Battle of Talas was just a final step before the fall of the Tang dynasty.

Not even, the tien Bao wars were far more devastating and comes much later.

Neither was Chibi. If we look at how Jin rose, it seems to have very little to do with how much land was under Wei's control as opposed to the political infighting. The situation is unlikely to have been different even if Wei conqoured all of China.

The scale of Talas is no larger than a medium sized Turkish raid. Mocho kaghan's raid in 705 A.D. on NingXia was in fact a larger scale battle than Talas.

Mine telling me about the Tien Bao wars or a link if possible? I heard about those wars once, but probably have forgotten with my poor memories. Thanks.



Well it differs a little that the 3 kingdoms could have been been prevented, the course of history might have been a little different. But it is possible that Wei would have face the same downfall as the Jin did, a short lived dynasty fallen to barbarian invasions.

"Mine telling me about the Tien Bao wars or a link if possible"

http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php...720&hl=nan+zhao

Ma Ling and Chiba

For western culture, there have been pivotal battles about its very existence like Marathon, Salamis, Tours, Vienna, earlier Sieges of Constantinople. Islamic would also have things like their first few battles where they established Islam and allowed it to spread such as Yarmuk and Al Quidisa but did the Chinese culture have any sort of battle that would have totally changed the nature of China had it gone the other way?

Merged with an older thread that could do with some reviving.

cailst introduces a new element to this topic: was the 'Chinese' culture (by which I assume you mean the culture of the north China plain, i.e. Zhongguo 中國) ever in danger of being replaced by another as a result of a single battle or campaign?

I can think of one instance when such a perception seemed to exist. In the Analects, Confucius (551 BC-479 BC) is said to have told his disciples that if not for the career of Guan Zhong (?-645 BC) as prime minister of the Qi state, "we would now be wearing our hair loose and folding our robes on the left side!" Confucius was referring to Guan Zhong's policies which led Duke Huan of Qi (Jiang Xiaobai) to repel Di 狄 and Mountain Rong 山戎 attacks on some of the Zhongguo states, specifically Yan 燕, Xing 邢, and Wey 衛, in 664-659 BC. Wearing one's hair loose and folding one's robes on the left side were customs associated with 'barbarians' like the Di and Mountain Rong. However, it is unclear whether Confucius' assessment of the Di and Mountain Rong threat to Zhou civilization actually reflects perceptions during Guan Zhong's own time (which was a century before Confucius' birth).

No one mentioned Peng Cheng.


Who would thought Xiang Yu would win? I mean, everyone were following Liu Bang's momentum it seems it almost unstoppable.
And then...it splatter itself on Xiang Yu.

For a few moments, Xiang Yu turn back the tide.

That is precisely the problem. Pengcheng was a suprising result and a humiliation for Liu Bang, but it was not decisive. Xiang Yu still lost ultimately. The battle would only have been decisive if Xiang Yu went on to win the war.

I believe thats no more of a change than the Manchu conquest of China, the hairstyle and clothing changed, but the core of the civilization did not.

I don't think the battle of Gai Xia is really that decisive. Xiang Yu had little chance of winning in the first place. It was 300,000 against 90,000.

To me a battle of decisiveness is one which turns over the tide of the whole setting. In this case, battles such as Guan Du between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao, Si Shui between Li Shi Min and Dou Jian De, could be considered very decisive battles. They decided the fate of these respective warlords.

Confucius probably did not think such a thing was possible. After all, he already thought that civilization was endangered because the Lu aristocrats did not observe the rites and the ethic of obedience and reverence to their lord. I'm guessing he would have committed suicide if the Di conquered Lu and made everyone stop tying his hair up.

Even 2,000 or so years later, there was no shortage of former Ming subjects who did not believe civilization could survive the change of hairstyle ordered by the Manchus, and paid for it with their heads. One wonders whether, if the Manchus had not imposed their hairstyle, the Communists would have been the first 'Chinese' to start cutting their hair.

Confucius thought that Qi's victories over the Di and Mountain Rong were decisive in preserving civilization, and for more than 2,000 years, Confucians thought the same way out of reverence for the Sage. But we, looking back from the early 21st century with nicely cut hair and shirts that button on the left, have no reason to agree with him. By his standards, we are already barbarians.

If Xiang Yu losing the war get rid of its Decisive Battle, then under that opinion, only Decisive Battles ever fought would be fought by the winner of each dynastic struggle.


Guan Du wouldn't be Decisive, because Cao Cao never reunite China. Well, it was Decisive in Regional status.

Or, Decisive Battle could meant that certain track of History has been moved. [Given it could move. Which itself is a ridiculous comment, since History itself is not a probability, thus comments I just made are plain silly. ] Xiang Yu was definite on the losing side. His main force tied down, his homeland invaded, his capital captured. AND with the victory in Peng Cheng, he manage to swing the state of war back to a stalemate.

Unlike GaiXia, which, was a lost cause.

I am not sure if a victory that merely delays one's imminent defeat can be considered decisive. Perhaps others on this thread can comment?



As Warhead has mentioned, victory at Guandu made it possible for Cao Cao to later defeat Yuan Shao's sons and reunify north China under a Han court controlled by him. If Cao Cao had been defeated, however, it could have meant the end of his career as a warlord and the Han court would be controlled by someone else (possibly Yuan Shao). On that level it is decisive.

But if victory at Guandu had not prevented Cao Cao from ultimately being destroyed by Yuan Shao, its decisiveness would be gone. So we could even say that the decisiveness of Guandu depended as much on the Yuan family's subsequent failures as on Cao Cao's success.

Ah. I understand now.

Thanks.

So in a sense, a Decisive Battle isn't just about the battle itself, but also the ripple it cause. Thus, a Decisive Battle really isn't only dependent on the victor's greatness but also on the enemies inability to recover.


Which leads me to think, everything I wrote are just plain worthless

Just on a small count. I was thinking more of winning an impossible battle, which mostly are Guan Du etc etc.

Though Chi Bi and Chang Pin are pretty self determined. Unless the other side screwed up big time, its quite impossible to win.

But Peng Cheng, in a sense, really dependent on Liu Bang screw up, though Shi Ji never really tell how he did.

What about the battle of Wannan? Despite the Nationalist victory, ironically it gave the majority of the benefit to the Communists as the population saw the act as treason for the Nationalists, at a time when the two parties should be working together to repel the Japanese during WW2. Looking back, if Chiang wasn't so anti-Communist, maybe he could have won against them. Oh, the irony.

I don't think the Communists gave Chiang any choices in that matter. You can't really dig up someone's roots and then hope to peacefully coexist.

Besides which, how in the name of God would anyone see any act from the Government against rebel party as "treason." You have to realize, that KMT is not only the party, but also the nation. '三民主义，吾党所宗，以建民国，以进大同‘ So really, they aren't treasonous in any way, shape, or form.

Besides which, I always thought that 1947-1949 period were pretty one sided. I cannot imagine the KMT could win after it been bleed out by WWII.

Well, it's not so much "how" they could see their act as treason, but that the population "did" see the act as treason. When it comes to how you probably should be asking them instead, people have different attitudes toward everything. The Communists and the Nationalists signed treaties to have a cease fire during WW2(not that Chiang had a choice), but with the ensuing ambush the Nationalists lost a lot of legitimacy. Whether they are "treasonous" or not is a matter of opinion, but the fact I want to make clear is that the battle made them seem that way for the Chinese population in general.