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I'm not sure if hes a general, but that stragegist from han who defeated this 1 million men strong navy during three kingdom
You're probably referring to Zhuge Liang and the battle of Chibi in 208 AD. However, it's a myth that Zhuge Liang was the one responsible for the victory at Chibi. The real commander was Zhou Yu. Also, Cao Cao's navy was not one million strong. Read about issues regarding the battle of Chibi on this thread:
http://s7.invisionfree.com/China_History_F...p?showtopic=404QUOTE
My favourite general is Zhu Yuanzhang (Hongwu, first Ming emperor )
why?
By (for example) his victory in the Poyang lake (1363).
"A Ming army of 100,000 sailed to raise the siege, defeating the Han in a decisive battle on the lake by the use of firsehips and superior mobility"
"Medieval Chinese Armies 1260-1520". Osprey Military.
The Han army: 600,000 mens. Lider: Chen Yuliang.
Zhu Yuanzhang's great victory at Lake Poyang was extremely hard-fought, extremely close and almost a stroke of luck. The extent to which he was outnumbered has been exaggerated - Chen Youliang's 600,000 men was a wildly inflated figure, while Zhu Yuanzhang had about 200,000 men. Zhu lost 36 of his generals in the battle (some by his own hand!) and suffered heavy losses in men and ships, and at one point his ship was beached in the shallows and he was almost captured. The fateful decision to use fire-ships was made by Zhu only on the suggestion of a subordinate, and was made much easier by the fact that Chen Youliang had foolishly chained his ships together, just like Cao Cao at Chibi. And Chen would still have lived to fight another day if a stray arrow had not struck him in the head when he tried to escape from the lake with his remaining forces.
From Ralph Sawyer's "Fire and Water" (pp. 220-221):
Seriously outnumbered, Zhu divided his naval forces into eleven operational groups and had them fully provided with various incendiary devices and bows and crossbows with the intent that they should first use their incendiary weapons (catapults or cannon) and then their missile weapons before finally closing for close combat. However, since his vessels were smaller and lighter, they suffered the disadvantages of being outgunned and forced to fire upward at an enemy that overlooked them. Zhu was therefore forced to rely on quickness and maneuverability.
On the very first day, the 21st [of the 7th lunar month], Zhu Yuanzhang resorted o incendiary warfare to destroy twenty of Chen's vessels in their initial encounter, after which the fighting intensified. Both sides suffered significant losses, but the battle descriptions indicate that Zhu's forces must have been on the defensive despite having a more valiant spirit, and Zhu himself narrowly escaped death [when his ship was beached]. The second day, the 22nd, unfolded similarly with the Ming forces sustaining such heavy losses that Zhu rashly had his group captains executed for leadership failure, hardly an act to recommend him to history but certainly symptomatic of his ruthlessness.
However, a subordinate belatedly reprimanded him with the observation that it wasn't the commanders' fault, but the size disadvantage that allowed Chen to generally prevail. Since Chen's vessels were not only large and unwieldy, but also chained together (presumably to frustrate penetrating attacks by the smaller vessels), an incendiary attack was obviously indicated. Adopting his suggestion, Zhu had seven incendiary boats prepared and then positioned straw dummies in them fitted out with real armour to preclude suspicion. Taking advantage of a favourable wind, he launched them against the enemy on the third day, the 23rd, quickl incinerating several hundred boats and inflicting such horrendous casualties [including two of Chen's brothers] that Chen lost half the original force which had initially outnumbered Zhu ten to one [
wrong - more like three to one].
However, the fighting continued until dusk and on the fourth day, the 24th, Chen still came forth, deliberately targeting what he believed to be Zhu's distinctive white boat. Because Zhu's informants had alerted him to the danger, all the Ming boats had been painted white overnight, frustrating the assassination attempt. Chen's forces had by then become dispirited, accounting for the ease with which Zhu's operational groups penetrated their lines to inflict substantial additional casualties without being seriously challenged.
Viewing the situation as untenable, Chen sought various escape routes and temporary shoreside havens only to find them and the sole exit out onto the Yangzi River all blocked. At the end of the fourth day, although still in close proximity, both sides initially stood down, but Zhu moved his navy out through the lake's narrow upper channel into the Yangzi under cover of nightfall and then proceeded to deploy his troops on both banks, establish defensive barriers, and prepare additional incendiary boats to quash break-out attempts. After some thirty days of indecision marked by increasing disaffection and desertion among his generals, several insulting provocations by Zhu, and severe provision shortages because the Gan River supply route from Nanchang had essentially been cut off, Chen finally burst through with his remaining 80 to 100 large ships. Suffering a savage attack at the lake's mouth and then on the Yangzi River mounted by fire boats as they tried to proceed upstream and escape, Chen perished [when hit by a stray arrow] and his remaining 50,000 leaderless troops surrendered, further adding to Zhu's inland navy.