閻 錫 山, the Shanxi warlord, was very anti-communist but also pro-Japanese.

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, he requested that the Japanese army in Shanxi surrender their equipment and men to him. About 2,000 Japanese soldiers volunteered to serve in his mercenary army.

Post-war Japanese leaders who were working under the jurisdiction of General MacArthur opposed the usage of volunteer troops in Shanxi by Yan because this was a violation of the surrender treaty requiring all Japanese troops to lay down their arms. So what these remaining troops did was formally discharge from the army, and then offered their service to Yan. They refused to return to Japan.

The Nationalists also opposed Yan's usage of Japanese troops.

The odd thing was that this Japanese volunteer army were very loyal to Yan and even fought alongside his warlord troops and KMT soldiers against the Communists in the Battle of Taiyuan in 1949.

Fighting alongside a former enemy that killed millions of Chinese during WWII will be hard to imagine, but Yan saw no problem with it because he was fiercely anti-communist. He probably shared Chiang's philosophy that "the Japanese were a disease of the skin, but the Communists were a disease of the heart".

One thing that I wonder is there any instance when CHinese soldiers do revenge killings against the surrendered Japanese troops? I mean surely the average Chinese of the time with a least bit of patriotism would hate the Japanese, let alone a Chinese soldier. Were the Japanese troops generally well treated when they were interned? It would seem strange that they willing to fight alongside with each other after 8 years of war and invasion.

It seems that Chiang and Mao were actually quite nice to surrendered Japanese troops (correct me if I'm wrong) and repatriated them back to Japan. The Soviets in comparison treated surrendered Japanese soldiers harshly and made them do forced labor. Considering what Japanese troops did in China during the 8-year war, Chiang and Mao's leniency does strike as strange.

It is pretty sure that CCP really benefit a lot from the surrendered Japanese soldiers,many of them served in the army of CCP for training the CCP soilders,there was a say that the earliest CCP airforce was brought up by Japanse ...

How many Japanese stayed in China? Did they adopt Chinese names?

Probably. Even during the war itself there were occasions of Japanese committing treason to the Imperial Japanese Army and surrendering to the Communists. There were a some significant rebel elements within the Japanese army that were against the war.

Here is the source where I got the information.

http://www.marshallfoundation.org/pdf/20Yu...ese%20views.pdf

"...While Shanxi province was theoretically under the Nationalist government, it was actually ruled almost independently of Chiang Kai-shek by Governor Yan Xishan, who was pro-Japanese. The Japanese staff officers, therefore, expected that Yan would allow the Japanese Army to stay in Shanxi because he needed its help for his battle against the Communists.

Yan Xishan actually tried to utilize the Japanese forces, weapons, and materials. Just after the war’s end, Yan asked General Sumita to transfer Japanese equipment to him and that Japanese troops remain in Shanxi under his command. Sumita initially refused, saying that it was senseless for the Army to engage in hostilities without the Japanese government’s order. Yan pressed Sumita strongly, however, and the general finally agreed, provided that Japanese soldiers were first discharged from military service and then volunteered to serve under Yan. [18] About two thousand Japanese soldiers took part in this program when it was established in the spring of 1946; the last unit fought against the Communists in Shanxi until April 1949. By the spring of 1949, the number of Japanese soldiers had decreased to one hundred, and many of them lost their lives in the final battle. [19]

Although the original idea had been that the Japanese volunteer force in Shanxi would assist Japan’s reconstruction, it was destined to be a deserted force. Neither the Japanese government nor the senior officials of the former Japanese First Army would accept the volunteer activities in Shanxi, because it was a violation of the Potsdam Declaration.

One junior officer who refused to participate in the new army recalled that the staff recruited soldiers systematically, giving enlisted men an exaggerated picture of the misery that awaited them if they returned to Japan. They even created a false pamphlet saying that if the soldiers returned to Japan, they would be sent to a prison in New Guinea as war criminals. [20]

The Japanese government knew of the activity in Shanxi and opposed the volunteer army plan. The First Ministry of Repatriation (formerly the Army Ministry) several times ordered the activities in Shanxi halted and sent an officer, Shun’ichi Miyazaki, to investigate the situation. Miyazaki reported in April 1946 that Yan Xishan was aiming at establishing his own independent kingdom with the help of his Japanese volunteer army. Miyazaki opposed this use of Japanese forces and recommended that the staff officers who insisted on remaining in Shanxi should be transferred elsewhere and that repatriation of Japanese soldiers in Shanxi begin as soon as possible, with the cooperation of U.S. troops. [21] Even Yasuji Okamura, the former commander of the China Expeditionary Army, who advocated cooperation with the GMD army after the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, objected to the Shanxi project.

United States leaders were also aware, to some extent, of the events in Shanxi province, and regarded it as injurious to the American program in China and to the Marshall Mission. Governor Yan was an obstacle to U.S. policy in China, in part because he did not obey the ceasefire that Marshall had helped to negotiate and continued to battle against the Communists, and in part because he was violating the Allied Powers’ order for disarming Japanese troops. When General Marshall visited Taiyuan 3–4 March 1946, he and the other members of the Committee of Three met some generals in Yan’s army and demanded the disarmament of the Japanese troops. Yan needed the Japanese forces, however, so he and his Japanese officers ignored Marshall’s request. The Japanese troops were camouflaged by officially disbanding them and hiding them in mountainous areas and retaining their organization. [23]

The Nationalist government not only did not support Yan Xishan, it strongly opposed his use of Japanese troops. When Shun’ichi Miyazaki, the Japanese officer investigating the Shanxi issue, met Yan, he found that Yan had refused to implement the directives from Chinese Army Headquarters ordering the disarmament of his Japanese troops. [24] Colonel Ulmont W. Holly, American member of Field Team 3, reported that Yan “repeats the orders received from [Marshall Mission] Executive Headquarters to his Field Commanders, but does not issue directives of his own to see that they are carried out.” [25] This was not the first time that Yan had ignored orders from the national government or Executive Headquarters. The national government had a long history of trouble in dealing with him. Yan, while anti-Communist, was an old-style warlord and not a man who understood the local situation in terms of U.S.-Soviet international rivalry; he merely wished to secure Shanxi.

Yan’s ambitions might fit the old-fashioned Japanese view of “weak and divided China,” but the Imperial Japan that had invaded China with this view no longer existed, and the postwar Japanese government could not recognize his Japanese troop project, making it an abandoned army. Possibly the Japanese officers who advocated this project could have exploited the U.S.-Soviet conflict, but they had no long-range vision of the Cold War and their plan was thus destined to failure. Moreover, the whole concept of the force preserved for Japanese reconstruction was vague and unjustifiable, ignoring as it did Japanese responsibility for the Asian war.

As it became clear to Yan’s Japanese mercenaries that their idea of assisting Japan’s
reconstruction was irrelevant, the officers sought to redefine their role. Hiroshi Jono, the troops’ political adviser, sought to revive the empty argument of an Asian anti-Western coalition. In his memoir, Jono wrote that the Japanese in Shanxi should help to strengthen Yan’s regime first, then let Yan persuade the Nationalists to cooperate with Japan, and subsequently Japan and China could form an anti-Western third-force coalition to exploit the Soviet-American conflict.[26] A reflection of obsolete anti-Western sentiments, his plan was doomed to failure. Philosophically the Japanese effort in Shanxi was a backward-looking amalgam of obsolete views."

Very interesting.

japanese and Koreans post-WWII

Yan Xishan, when recieiving delegations of reporters, disclosed that communst army had captured and retained Japanese as well. Communist acknowledged retention of Japanese since communists did not participate in the expatriation program, a program that cost China enormous money as well as the remnant from US LEnd-Lease program.

The communists claims the Battle of Shangdang as the first shot. The first shot was directed against Fu Zuoyi per Li Zongren. Communist records talked extensively the battle against Gao Shuxun's armies, but they refused to call it FIRST SHOT. Why? They knew that they did fire the first shot, not the KMT. Battle of Shandang was a mess, and blame could be on the opposite side.

In Manchuria, communists forces retained at least TWO Korean-ethnic divisions of Kwantung Army. Not to mention hordes of Japanese who trained communists with cannons. If you read Sun Liren's books, you would know how he defeated communist campaigns 4-5 times till his reccall from Manchuria. Sun fought the Koreans and Japanese in Manchuria. Don't forget Sun's herald troops also killed stranded Russians who were busy rampaging than catch up with retreating Russian army.

Sun Liren's fate is like that of Yuan Chonghuan of Ming Dynasty, by the way. Both KMT and CCP, due to ideology, would not straignten up history. It is then our task to do it.

The Koreans did not die away. They were sorted out in 1949 for Korean War. Those who foght in Korea comprised the bulk of Korean troops under Japanese Kwantung Army, not the Koreans who fought the guerrilla war against Japanese under CCP.

What's the base on Yan Shi Shang being pro japanese other than accepting Japanese troops AFTER the war?

Something that as already pointed out, the communist did extensively too, infact in memoiers of CCP soliders fighting in Machuria duing the civil war, was noted that the CCP threated the Japanese BETTER than their own solider, because they were crucial in techinical training, know hows etc.........espically since the CPP at that time were pretty much using whatever weapon they were getting their hands on, (which included a vast array of russian and japanese weapons ) they certainly need their help.

This is the proof.

The two dudes at the right were Japanese soldiers defected to CCP.

THis is Awesome. I've been trying to find information about this for a long time.

As for the Motivations of the Japanese Soldiers, after reading No Surrender and Japan at war as well as Storm of Steel and others it bacame obvious to me that many soldiers BECOME war. They no longer know how to function outside of a war environment.

Call me old style... But if I was an Imperial Soldier during 1949... and my country just lost a war against the West. I would bid my arm in the service to another Asian Power to continue my fight against western attempt to recolonize Asia.

Had Japan and China formed an alliance in pre-18th century, the world would of been a different place. But the west succeeded in dividing Asia, thus leading to a bitter war which would spark, hatred between China and Japan. In some sense the West have succeeded in keeping Japan and China from becoming friends.

I don't quite agree....though this may be a little bit generalising, the Japanese people in Japan itself, have always seen themselves as different or better people than chinese and koreans and prefer to associate themselves as equals to the european. Of course not all of them are like this but I do experience this attitude from their people while I was in Japan.

So I don't think the Japanese goverment would want to work with the Chinese in anyway possible. The mutual hatred is more of a product of both Japanese and Chinese people in my opinnion, nothing to do with the west.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but during the treaty after the first Sino Japanese War... wasn't it a Japanese Diplomat that suggested that China Modernize in order to face the west?
But then again as Sun Yat San has already stated

It was up to Japan to either be the tower of strength for the Orients or the Hawk of the rule of Might.

Yes but in the end they still invade China and try to subjugate its people. I agree with you on the last part.

JB had a siginificant leap in trying to undertstand and explain China's history in the big environment of world powers.

True Britain had a 300-year endeavor at making European continent divided. Same could be said of Japan, i.e., making Asian (Chinese) continent divided. To understand Japan's continental policy, you would go back to the books published in early 20th century for the military and political contracts and collaboration between Japan and Britain, and between Japan and America. There was such a book which a Japanese acquaintance had discussed with me about at one time. Japan's rise to power was not an isolated incident but the result of a nurturing process. -Same was with Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 after you figured out that majority of Soviet central committee commissars were [Jewish] returnees from the U.S.A. [just like today's Iraqi regime was controlled by returnees from Iran].

China, after losing the 1894-5 war, had indeed harbored not much hostility towards Japan, as reflected in the enhanced exchange between China and Japan in the ensuing 10-20 years. Almost all China's modern vocabulary was imports from Japan. And the leaders of ROC, both civil and military, had been graduates of some colleges and universities in Japan. Sun Yat-sen and founders of Japanese Black Dragon Society had common ground and synchronized military operations. You had examples of Japanese smuggling weapons to China from Taiwan and died in the rebellions against Manchu. Certainly, there were always different birds in the same forest: some Japanese might have harbored the view of making China divided, and hence promoting Sun's rebellion against Manchu rule would be one approach; but some Japanese indeed shared the thought of DOUBUN, i.e., same race and same language as Chinese, and obligated themselves to the Chinese revolution as a common cause against European colonialism. Sino-Japanese began to worsen in 1908-9 around when they signed secret treaties with Russians over Mongolia and Manchuria; relations further went sour when Japan raised 21 Demands in WWI; and after Bolshevik Revolution, Japan's relations with China was centered on the balance of power over Manchuria. When Soviet Unions repeatedly provided arms to China in the attempt of communizing China, Japan was cornered. Under the encouragement of Britain and America, it was natural to see Japan got a free hand to invade Manchuria in 1931. Ultimately things spiraled out of control and led to WWII.