Especially towards Japan. The government should really stop writing bs about Japan, true or no. The anti-Japanese sentiment is getting out of control.

Aye, but perhaps that should be in another thread. Back on topic guys.

TC,

Your lecture on Chinese swords sound great.
Q: Will you have your lec. material available for forum viewing?

/// Sorry to go off-topic.

[quote name='Wujiang' date='Dec 23 2005, 06:30 PM' post='4778574']
But won't you say that those times seem to go against Chinese military philosophy of mobility and speed ?

The Tao of warfare is to use light or heavy units where it counters.Dont you think warring states used heavy formations of heavily armoured men in tight formation?

China military history is hugely underated in the Western world. They keep showing how weak the Chinese military was. There was a documentary on Han dynasty showing that Han Wendi and Han jindi was forces to have their daughter marry to the xiongnu becuase of weak military. Also, the west focus too much on the success on colombus without giving any credit to Zheng He.

What they say is true. Early Han did pay tributes to the Hxiong Nu. However, more often then not, they never emphasize on Han's successful campaigns on the Hxiong Nu that split the Hxiong Nu empire in half. On Zheng He he is given much credit. Only in elementary schools do Columbus get more credit, but what do you expect? Do Chinese education give more credit to Columbus anywhere?

"But won't you say that those times seem to go against Chinese military philosophy of mobility and speed ?"


How is cavalry warfare against the philosophy of mobility? The fact is, the heavy cataphracts of the Northern dynasties in the 4th century is unmatched anywhere else, not in Persia, Not in the Eastern Roman Empire, not in India, and not even in much of the western steppe.

I understand what your saying, Jiangji you may find this article interesting if you have not read it yet:
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issue...ina_sawyer.html

Sawyer, does seem to blame a lot of China’s pacifism on menzi and Confucianism or post Confucianism ideals, he also blames leading writers, considered experts, on China. Fairbank & Kierman, I can confirm this having taken “Asian History” in college in the US. I believe Fairbanks and Kierman are indeed pacifists themselves and overly preoccupied with pacifist aspects of China’s history.

Another thing that Sawyer does not mention is that the Chinese people are culturally conditioned to underrate their own ability. (WHAT!) Yes… If have ever learned a kung fu style, most schools will tell you not to brag what you know. It will only lead towards bullies challenging you to fist fights, and you also loose the element of surprise when you do have to apply your martial art. If you have lots of money you never flaunt it never let people know how much money you have. When playing games or sports, when you are obviously superior and win the game, you still say “I was just lucky” or better yet, “you are far better than I, I was just lucky”.

Because the Chinese never outwardly brag… the western culture does not read between the lines and take what they say for face value… because in western cultures bragging is a big deal and often bite off more than they can chew. Chinese culture does not brag and you must be good at reading between the lines.

In the west you are raised in conditions were you have to write college essays and college applications that have to do with your achievements. If you don't brag, then chances are you won't have much of a bright future in terms of education. In China, your entire education depends on one huge test.

I'm curious as to what you think made them 'unmatched' (?sheer numbers?).

Assuming that 'heavy cataphracts' are men in full armour on fullt armoured horses. These are a rather specialised troop type developed independantly in several placea at different times. Most cultures only foud them useful in small numbers.

'cataphract' being a modern term used to represent cavalry described by Classical writers as cataphractoi (literaly 'decked' or 'covered', in land warfare it meant 'armoured').

Massive use of double metal stirrups which did introduce a size of use never seen before. It mae cavalry the DECISIVE weapon on the battle field.

No where else was there mention of the use of these stirrups until the 6th century, Persia probably got them from the Ephtalites, and Byzantine probably from the Avars. And the cavalrythey used at the time were small in number. The cavalries of the Northern dynasties were the first to employ such massive shock which puts the infantry as little more than a defensive base where the cavalry moves around and retreat to. Of course thats not the case in the South, where the infantry still remained the offensive, perhaps due to the lack of cavalry and introduction of new tactics.

Did they have light cavalry as well, say if there is a infantry formation in a defensive position with spears and crossbows
How does heavy cavalry succed in charging them?

Some would be suprised that I chose early Ming as one of the strongest periods of Chinese history. I'm preparing a thread on the early Ming army which I'll post in a few days....

I would choose the early Ming too but I heard many says the Tang has the strongest military compare to other dynasty. Hopefully, someone can give me insight on Tang military.

ok interesting,

Why would 'double metal stirrups' make cavalry 'DECISIVE' ??

What's double metal stirrups?

Early ming was good the mongols were weak when it took over,and the tumu fortress shows that it not that great,

It depend on leadership too. It you doesn't have a good leadership, no matter how powerful your army was, you still lose. For example, Battle of chibi during the Three kingdom era.

The Mongols weren't weak during the early Ming--on the contrary, the Oirats were very, very strong. As for Tumu, such a disaster would not have happened during the reign of Yongle or Hongwu.

When did ming military decline before or after tumu?

I would say around the time the death of Zhang Juzheng (1582) and General Qi Jiguang (1588). I would say General Qi Jiguang army is equal or even better than the earlier Ming army.

The Ming army began it's decline just before Tumu, was revived as a highly efficient fighting force during 1460's... again declined during the 1540's. But some exceptional military men -- Qi Jiguang for example, led armies of the same quality as those of the earlier Ming.

I already said, it "puts the infantry as little more than a defensive base where the cavalry moves around and retreat to." Cavalry became the major weapon of offense. For a brief time in the north at least but the norm for much of medieval Europe and large parts of the Islamic world.

"On a completely different note, probably because I hold everyone on the standard of Yue Fei, but the Bajiangzhuan seem to include alot of people who really don't deserve to be immortalized like that.

I mean, Li Guang never achieved anything extraordinary for the Empire. What he does seem to be really small compared to Han Xin, Zhou Yafu and Wei Qing. The later half of his life seem to be like a failure to me. Does he really deserve to be ranked with all those great jiangs ?"

I guess it is relative to how Western generals are ranked in order of their importance. Why do so many westerners think that Gustavus Adolphus was a great commander - he is killed before his impact can really be appreciated. Why do so many westerners think that Napoleon was a brilliant commander? He had so many talented subordinate commanders, Lannae, Davout, Murat, Ney, and the list goes on and on, who made him great.

One can never achieve greatness in warfare or empire building without talented subordinates.

I only have cursory knowledge of him, but a Tang poem refers to him. Of course, their education is also through these records

According to Ming shi, the decline of Ming military started in Yongle reign when he move his capital from south to north.

That not a decline in military, its because he removed many feudal lords south, that left the northern frontier largely empty.

And as I posted in another thread, Ming's military already started to decline before Tumu, but actually improved in efficiency(at least for the elite capital garrison) for a time afterwards.

I actually saying the sourthern army. Many soilders was used in transporting grain from the south to the north making them less effective and much less than a professional one.

I'm tired of people always blaming Confucius for China's military weakness. Confucius was not anti-war per se just anti-aggression. Confucius himself was a martial artist. (He was an expert swordsman) Confucianists (and Mohists also) believed in the idea of Just War. The ancestral hero of the ancient Chinese military tradition, General Jiang Ziya of the Western Zhou Dynasty, who aided King Wu of Zhou in overthrowing the Shang, believed in Just War also. So did Sunzi to some extent if you read his Art of War. The ancient Chinese culture did not believe in brutal ruthless violence, but martial strength and strategy guided by moral principles. Read Zhuge Liang's Art of War for a better understanding of Ancient Chinese military principles. Yue Fei himself was very much influenced by Confucian principles. Those corrupt self-serving officials in the Song court cannot represent true Confucianism.

But China was a civilian culture; the elites of the society strove to become administrators and artists, not soldiers.

That's only true from the Song Dynasty onwards, perhaps. (And even then it was certainly not completely the case for you have people like Yue Fei, who was not only a expert martial artist and a brilliant military strategist and tactician but also a good poet)

During the Zhou Dynasty for example nobles both studied the civil arts and philosophy as well as the martial arts. Confucius is an example. From the Han to the Tang Dynasties many great generals came from aristocratic and noble backgrounds.

However it is true perhaps that ancient Chinese culture always placed (in theory) moral principles above military strength, it has a dim opinion of those who use their strength to bully the weak. As Zhuge Liang, the great statesman and military commander from the Three Kingdoms Period stated, the ideal warrior "resists the strong and sustains the weak". He also said: "Culture comes first, the military comes after." The three "cardinal" Confucian virtues are "Ren, Zhi, Yong" (which may be translated as Love, Wisdom, Courage). Courage (in the martial sense) is important but comes after Love (in the moral sense) and Wisdom (in the intellectual sense).

The Just War theory was developed by ancient China earlier than it was in the West as far as I know. (The West did not have any theory of Just War until the arrival of Christianity) The philosopher Mozi, (4th century BC) who believed in universal love and the equality of all peoples under God, completely rejected any form of aggressive warfare. But he was not a complete pacifist either for he agreed with the use of defensive warfare. Mencius on the other hand did not completely reject the possibility of aggressive/offensive warfare, but he said that an offensive war is only just if the following two conditions are met:

1. The common people of the country that is being invaded actually welcomes the invasion force to overthrow their corrupt government. (E.g. one may argue that the US war in Iraq is just because the Iraqis wanted to have the US overthrow Saddam, I am not saying that is the case, I'm just using an example)

2. The person or group initiating the offensive war is actually in an appropriate position/status to do so. (E.g. one must not be a hypocrite, if one is a corrupt leader in one's own country, then one is not in a justifiable position to invade another country claiming that the objective is to remove that country's corrupt leadership. Again to use the US-Iraq war as an example, one might argue the US is not justified to attack Iraq and overthrow Saddam because even though Saddam is bad the US is no better)

How did you get that impression? Ban Chao once said "Throw down your writing brush and join the military!". The Tang dynasty ideal was a gentlemen equally capable in combat and in court.

Only from the Southern Song onwards. Northern Song was still plenty militaristic in terms of culture, if not governmental resource distribution

I would describe the early Ming and early Qing as militaristic.

I would says Ming always has been militaristic considering its enormous military expeditures and it also enjoying higher status compare to Song dynasty.

But note this article in the journal "War and Society", 2000:

David Graff
The Sword and the Brush: Military Specialisation and Career Patterns in Tang China, 618—907
It is often observed that in the early years of China's Tang dynasty military leadership was provided by an aristocratic elite capable of performing with equal aplomb in both civil and military positions, while in the middle and late Tang command came to be exercised by military specialists from heterogeneous and often humble origins. Though not entirely incorrect, this picture is a considerable oversimplification. Even in the early years of the dynasty civil and military career tracks were usually quite distinct, and in the second half of the Tang period parvenu specialists did not enjoy a monopoly over military command. Civilian scholar-officials responded to the increased autonomy of the soldiers by redefining military leadership as an intellectual exercise and asserting their own fitness for high-level command.



Even when those expenditures were made on building the Wall?

The rise of military expeditures in later Ming can also be attributed to many factors like the decline of military farming. Hong Wu "self-sufficient army" policy is no longer practical in the 16th century.

In the early Ming, the soilders pay consists only food and some winter clothing. Huang Ray points out that by around 1500, it had been a standard practices to fill vacancies in northern army commands with hired recruits. Then, the recruiting program expand to sourthern provinces. These new recruits are much more costly to maintain because the government had to paid them regularly with 5-6 taels of silver per years. The government also are responsible to provide them with a horse and clothing. By the end of century, many recruits receive 18 taels per years.

Another expansion of military budget were the wide use of firearms in later Ming. The production of firearms increase rapidly. For example, the wheeled vehicles with firearms mounted on them come into use in much larger scale. The ministry of works report that each vehicles costs 30 taels to produce.

The number of army posts northern frontier also rises significant overtime which further bring a burden to the government. There are only 7 commands before 1507 but 5 new posts was added in later Ming.

Other than military, the Ming provide little services to its people with most responsibility fall onto the provincial government. For example, the maintaining of Grand canal are the pronvincial government responsibility and they get very little financial help from central government.

from the Mid Tang or so onwards, the importance of Military arts among elites/aristocrats declined slowly eventually resulting in the complete centralization of Chinese political society and taking power away from the old aristocratic clans and replacing them with elite literati usually from humble backgrounds

Before that, military arts equaled or even surpassed in importance to civilian arts. Aristocrats were expected to lead the armies into battle and cavalry was largely taken from well to do families (since they were already familiar with riding and hunting)

Royal and aristocratic tombs from the early Imperial age are full of military themes especially hunting. Even tombs of females (like Princess Yi De of Tang dynasty) have military themes

even in the late Imperial era. archery remained an important part of the bureacratic exams

Q: What're the detailed standards (metrics) that validates a certain dynasty as the pinnacle of Chinese military strength?

I'd say

1. Containing and defeating nomadic armies both defensively and offensively
2. territorial expansion
3. tactical/technological innovations

however, maintaing internal order absolutely means nothing since the most militarily strong Chinese dynasties (Han, Tang, Qing) had all kinds of internal conflict, rebelliongs, uprisings while the arguably the most militarily weak (Song) had relative internal peace

makes you think, eh?

In display, Tang certainly come on top in the years of ZhengGuan.

Thks.

Good standards of excellence.

The amount of millitary stallion of each dynasty is usually an indicating factor of military ability from the Han til the Ming. At their height, the Han had 450,000 stallions, the Tang has 706,000 stallions, the Ming only have 154,000 stallions.

Why Ming had so few stallions

Chinese horse industry has been declining since the days of Song, but in reality, it was Yuan that the horse industry really went pell mell downwards.
The horse industry really only started to be important under the Qin which reached about 50,000 military stallions, during the Han, it reached a height when Han Wu Di started to gather all the horses across the empire against the Xiongnu up to 450,000 stallions total, but the campaigns of Huo Qu Bing and Wei Qing saw the loss of over 110,000 horses during the campaign, Han Wu Di started to imported horses from central Asia. During the Tang the horse industry reached its height of development, importation of horses from central Asia and abroad created great many breed of excellent quality horses, the amount of horses produced by Tang surpassed any other place on earth, or a combination of them.
But disasters and wars towards the end of Tang coupled by the 5 dynasties destroyed much of the grazing grounds that horses could feed.
During the end of Northern Song, there was a horse protecting law passed which decreased the number of imperial stallions. Following the Jin invasion, Southern Song again started an industry in Han Zhou, while the Jin had its own horse industry.
The devastations of Yuan era and the neglect of the horse industry is perhaps one of the reason why the Horse industry really started to decline during this period. The reason is still not clear, but perhaps horse is no longer the dominant arm it use to be during Tang, thanks to the Song, infantry is now very advanced in combat. Or perhaps the climate and devastation of grazing fields has something to do with it.

During the Ming, the horse industry is divided into 3 parts, the first is the imperial government, the second is provided by the officials, the last is by the commoners, but the horse devastation during the Yuan did not meet with the demand and the old trade of tea for horse continued.
The Ming started a program of letting the commoners take care of horses by starting the largest Horse bureucracy in Chinese history.
Including 养马、记丁养马、记亩养马制度。Yet despite the great quantity horses, the quality is extremely poor, so only a handful entered the imperial stallion, and that also has to do with heavy corruption in later time which reduced the Ming imperial stallion for a time to no more than 60,000 in size, but thanks to later reforms that number again increased back to over 100,000.
But thanks to the Qing, the Chinese horse industry saw a recovery but never as dvanced as the Tang or Han, the Qing made the strictest procedure in taking care of horses and control their numbers.

The banner in the capital has 11500 horses, while the rest in Jiang Ning, Jing Kou, Fu Zhou, Guan Zhou, Hajn Zhou Xi An, and Jing Zhou combined gives roughly 75304 stallions for the bannerman during Kang Xi, 95305 stallions during Yong Zheng but reduced to 79542 stallions during Guan Xu. Those of the Green Standard army has around 100,000-120,000 military stallion, so the total number during Qing by combining the capital stallion, the banner stallion and the Green standardard stallion is between 186500 to 226500 stallions.

　　　　

lack of access to horse breeding grounds and poor diplomatic relations to people IE nomads who could get them horses

the Han and Tang empires always maintained control of areas which could breed good horses combined with the ability to buy them from nomads. Its not as if Ming could not afford the horses but their overly proud attitude made trade relations difficult with Mongols

you can read more about Ming/Mongol relations regarding horse trade in

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/067401684...5Fencoding=UTF8

That's not really true at least for the early Ming. During Hong Wu reign, great effort was laid on breeding horses for military purposes. Special envoys were sent frequently to neighbouring countries to buy horses. Tributary states were encouraged to give horses rather than any presents. The government monopolized the export of tea in order to trade with border tribes for horses. Markets was set up lio-tung on Mongol borders, and in kansu, Shensi and Sichuan. Towards the end og Hong Wu reign, thirteen thousands five hundred horses was traded with tea. The government also set aside pasture for horse raising.

In 1412, Yongle order Board of War to seach out retired Mongol officials who would teach people how to breed good horses. In the same year an order was issued for inspection of soldiers in charge of horses. If they had bred horses to standard number, they will get reward from the government. By Xuande period, the number of horses in the empire was twice what it had been in Hong Wu period.

None of these are the major factors, Yuan and Qing had plenty access to every one of these places as well. The main reason is still unkown today, the decline might have more to do with strategic and demographic changes.

Actually, in 1423 the Ming had 1,585,322 horses (Source: Firearms: A Global History to 1700--Kenneth Chase)

"Actually, in 1423 the Ming had 1,585,322 horses (Source: Firearms: A Global History to 1700--Kenneth Chase)"

Whats his primary source?

The figure of mine is the total imperial stallions.