As many of us are aware, Europeans made contact with China's Ming dynasty by the early 16th century, and had actually engaged in combat with the Chinese on a few occasions. I'm certain that their must be some extant accounts of European observers. What were their opinions on the early 16th century Ming army? Or the later Ming military in decline? How about some accounts of the Kangxi Qing army?

Much appreciated.

Up to Qianlong's time, China was viewed as equal or superior to Europeans. It not until the Opium wars that Europe began to look down on China. Before, a popular debate topic was who was more advanced, China or Europe.

The economy of China was superior to Europe until the 19th century. But I was hoping for European accounts of Chinese armies in terms of skill, tactics etc. I'd specifically like to see how they viewed Chinese military might in two very different periods--The weakness of the late Ming, and great strength of the early Qing.

That depends on whether you count it as size just by itself or by proportion.

Something I found interesting--the Spanish believed that they could conquer China with 5000 men and Japan too. A little far-fetched, I would say.

In 1635, Manuel Tavres Bocarro claimed that the Ming Chinese had no skill in the handling of artillery, "wherefore they rely on the Portuguese in this respect." This was partly justified by the fact that the Ming court had recognized the superiority of the Hongyi Pao (Portuguese cannon) from the Macau foundries, and hired 200 Macau cannoniers as mercenaries in 1630. These 200 were to be stationed at Dengzhou, where the Christian minister Sun Yuanhua (who had studied European mathematics and technology under Xu Guangqi) was Governor and had set up a facility to train Ming troops in the use of Portuguese cannons. Most of the Portuguese were detained at Nanchang on their way to Dengzhou and eventually sent back to Macau, because of opposition from anti-Christian and anti-foreign ministers at court who argued that the Portuguese could not be trusted. But the Jesuit Joao Rodrigues and the Portuguese commander Goncalves Texeira Correa continued on to Dengzhou with about 31 Portuguese artillerymen, where they taught Sun's men how to cast and use the Hongyi Pao.

In 1632, Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, two generals under Sun Yuanhua, rebelled and seized Dengzhou (they later sailed to Liaodong and defected to the Manchus). Texeira Correa and 12 of his men were killed, and another 15 were heavily injured. Joao Rodrigues escorted the survivors back to Macau, but was asked to select several dozen more Portuguese cannoniers to go to Beijing and teach the Ming forces how to operate cannon. This initiative, however, stalled when Sun Yuanhua was executed as a scapegoat for the Dengzhou rebellion, and Xu Guangqi also died soon after. The Christian faction lost its influence at the Ming court. This disruption gave the Manchus the chance to pull way ahead of the Ming in the use of Hongyi Pao, using the expertise of captured Ming artillerymen and defected Ming commanders like Tong Yangxing, Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming.

Very interesting Yun!

I'm curious, do you know what the European's general opinion was of Chinese armies through Ming/Qing periods? I ask this because of e.g the claim of a certain Spanish missionary that late Ming China would have been easy to conquer. (though he only visited a single coastal province, and made similar claims about south-east Asia)

European accounts of Ming China are uniformly unflattering where military affairs are concerned. Though recall that by the period in question (mid-15thC onwards) standards of equipment/training varied greatly across China; e.g. one observer describes Ming artillery as greatly inferior to that of Europe, while another describes it as superior. Also by this time the 'military revolution' was well under way in Europe, so European observers would have been much more critical than they would have been a century or two earlier.

One Spanish soldier whose name I can't recall gives a scathing description of Ming drill - the soldiers caper around like monkeys, shout brave slogans and then run away. If the infantry drills in Chinese TV serials like RTK are accurate, I can see how he got that impression.

The episode concerning the Portuguese in Dengzhou is fictionalised in the novel Manchu by Robert Elegant (a Chinese verison of Clavell's Shogun). It includes Rodriguez, Correa and the Christian mandarin Sun Yuanhua (along with Li Zicheng, Wu Sangui, Dorgon etc) although needless to say the hero is an Englishman.

1/ Before 1793

As mentioned earlier on this thread until, say, the beginning of the 19th century, European had China in great esteem. To make it short, the promoters of Chinese greatness were the Jesuits.
Westerner’s opinion was based on serious considerations such as good governance, fairer social organisation (there was a great admiration for the Chinese exam system), practical achievements vastly superior to Western Europe’s own performances (agriculture, the post, transportation, etc.) and of course, the arts and philosophy.
For Europeans eyes, military matters were of no great importance during the Ming dynasty (明朝) since the possibility of armed conflicts was remote, due to distances. Nonetheless, in 1662 Coxinga (鄭成功) expelled the Dutch from Taiwan (台灣) by force.
It should also be noted that at that time, France tried to warn the Qing (清朝) court of the rising British threat (d’Entrecasteaux – 1787).

2/ The 19th century

The turning point might be the 1793 British embassy to the court of Qianlong (乾隆). Here, we see a Western power determined to open China to British trade at all cost, eventually by using force.
Lord Macartney’s expedition included an artillery officer and topograph, Lieutenant Henry-William Parish, tasked with observing Chinese defences (including the Great Wall/萬哩城). Parish concluded that Chinese coastal defences could easily be overcome by a modern task force. This was put in practice fifty years later during the opium wars.

During the 1860 Franco-British expedition, made famous by the looting of the Summer Palace (圓明園), the combined armies met a strong Chinese resistance at Palikao (八哩橋). The “Tartar” cavalry, some of them still using bows, was repelled, but its courage and contempt of death was very much admired by the French who, more than once, were grateful to the British for their support and their Amstrong guns.

Judging Chinese subsequent self-strengthening efforts, a Western military Attaché concluded that Chinese are not really interested in military matters, although they pretend to be: “Les Chinois jouent au soldat » (Chinese play soldiers); in other words, Chinese like the show, not the real action.

3/ The 20th century

I am amazed how Chinese themselves downplay their own capacities. Judging from what I often read in this forum and hear with my own ears, Chinese still resent the Japanese 1936-1945 invasion as a defeat and seem to forget that, not only they resisted, sometimes brilliantly like Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石) in Shanghai (上海), but bogged down the Japanese armies and finally ended by Japan being utterly crushed.

Last week in Guangzhou(廣州), I almost had to argue with Chinese academics to make them realise that they beat the Japanese, and should be proud of it. There is definitely a Chinese self-denigrating attitude that has to be changed.

The fact remains that Chinese faced almost fifty years of uninterrupted wars, died by millions, and eventually survived, stronger and hopefully wiser.

4/ Recent experiences

I don’t know much about modern PRC (中華人民共和國) armed forces (who does?), but I know ROC (中華民國) well, and I believe that one can form an opinion on PRC’s by observing ROC armed forces, which are more open to modern warfare, better trained and still probably better equipped than their opposite numbers in Mainland (大陸).
ROC forces spring from the same Chinese armies who resisted and (I insist) beat the Japanese; they still keep a Political Warfare branch as a distant reminder of the Kommintern original influence, their old generals were formed in the same remarkable Whampoa military academy (黃埔軍校) as the PRC’s generals. These veterans had considerable experience of harsh fighting in appalling conditions. They communicated to ROC young officers a common culture which is still there, a patriotism which is still there, pro-Independance Taiwanese like it or not.

I shall say nothing of my personal experience but quote instead qualified US observers:

· Talking of F16 fighters’ too frequent pilots turn-over: “We can’t keep them in cockpit” (while common Western fighter pilots would use all their energy to keep flying, even when detrimental to their career, it looks as if their Chinese counterparts couldn’t wait to be grounded).

· Talking of ROC’s forces overall performance: “When I arrived in Taiwan, I thought I would find Israel; instead, I realised I was in Panama”. This cruel remark that made headlines in Taiwan at the time (around 2000) makes sense for those who are accustomed to ROC impeccable parades, pretty cadets’ uniforms and riffle juggling (a combination of poor US “plastic” taste and Chinese natural tendancy, in 2005 as in 1860, “to play soldiers”).

5/ Conclusions – Future developments

From what has been said, one might conclude that, seen from Western eyes, Chinese:
· are not really interested in fighting, or in training for fighting,
· give more importance to military appearances than depth,
· are brave and can face death like no one, which after all, is the ultimately dignified form of courage.

What remains to be seen is how China will deal with the next type of warfare, based no longer on the physical engagement they despise so much (too barbarian?), but on computers and intelligence where they excel.
Then, Napoleon’s famous prediction : “Quand la Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera” (When China wakes, the world will shake) might very well become reality.

江阿伯

I don't see how you can argue that China managed to kill Japan during the 2SJW. It managed to end up being a huge black hole, locking down a huge proportion of the IJA, but it's unlikely the Chinese armies could have defeated the Japanese by themselves.

For 4, you are describing ROC forces, not the PLA, which is today of greater interest. The ROC forces are held in contempt by many observers, especially since it is a conscript army.

We are talking of world wars that no one can win on his own. The huge black hole that locked down a huge proportion of the IJA made the difference.
In a way, Chinese resistance is not unsimilar to the Russians' who suffered enormous losses in 1941 and 1942, but eventually steamrolled the German back home. They could not have done it on their own if the US had not been behind with their lend/lease support programme. Would you say that USSR lost WWII because they suffered the most?
The same applies to the French/UK in 1918 who were in great danger until the US relief and new weaponry arrived to finish up the job (Clémenceau : "j'attends les chars et les Américains" - I wait for the tanks and the Americans).

I find the contempt for ROC forces misplaced. If a war broke out (much less likely today than thirty years ago), the one who would do the fight are not the conscripts but the professional, especially the ROCAF which is a modern, well trained and perfectly decent air force. Btw, ROC intends to go fully professional.

Although the PLA is supposed to be improving, it is not China's priority....for the moment. Its main strength might well be its secrecy.

You just mentioned anecdotes describing the lack of fighting spirit among the ROCAF, "which is a modern, well trained and perfectly decent air force."

I don't see how you could compare the early stages of the 2SJW a World War, and I find your comparison to the USSR misplaced.

The Japanese had almost the entire industrial capacity of China within their control, whereas the Soviets still had factories in the back producing tanks and munitions.

Actually, the "Military Revolution" was already in gear by the 16th century, and, as someone else noted on this thread, European opinions on Ming warcraft were mixed at best. It appears that the Spanish had a higher regard for Japanese ability, FWIW.

Take, for example, this excerpt of a letter from Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa, dated 1582:

"The Japanese are the most warlike people in this part of the world. They have artillery and many arquebuses and lances. They use defensive armor for the body, made of iron, which they have owing to the subtlety of the Portuguese, who have displayed that trait to the injury of their own souls."

Not suprising, by the late Ming the dynasty was on the edge of collapse due to corruption and internal+external strife. However, the Qing military was much, much stronger.

Then again, it also depends on which Spaniards are doing the commentating.

Here's an excerpt of a letter from Francisco de Sande, Governor of the Philippines in the 1570s:

"We need some weapons and armor—some corselets, such as are used in Nueva España, and five hundred lances, which should be brought from Nueva España. Those that we had here were used up, through carelessness and in the encounter with the corsair. Until now it was not understood that pikes were necessary, because the natives are wont to flee. But now it has been seen that the Chinese attack other men with these weapons, for fear of their commander. Now as there are so few of us, and the country breathes nothing but war, we have not ventured into the forests to see if there is good wood for these lances. For the lack of these lances here, we have no lance-practice, nor is there a squadron to train the soldiers; although, because of the great need, I have contrived to make some lances from poles and bamboo, with iron and steel from China. I have made one hundred iron points."

What de Sande is saying is that it was not initially thought that "lances" (infantry pikes, actually) were necessary in the Philippines, but the skilled use of spears by the Chinese prompted the Spanish to change their ideas on this.

Really quite interesting.

Well--as another member has pointed out, the quality of late Ming armies varied greatly. As did the opinions of Europeans on the quality of Asian armies, for instance, one Spaniard named Gesio believed Japan would be easy to subdue. Others thought it to be impossible.

I always had to laugh at the Spanish who claimed they could conquer all Asia. The folks who made such suggestions must have been half-crazy Hidalgos who just believed that God was on their side.

Folks with more intelligence knew better. Heck, Alessandro Farnese, the Duke of Parma (Commander-In-Chief of the Spanish Army of Flanders) tried telling Philip II that the Armada scheme wouldn't work--and that was an operation on the local European Front.

I'm not sure, but I think that the Spainish basis for this belief was because of the ease of conquest of the New World, correct?

As noted earlier on this thread, at least on Spaniard claimed that China could be conquered with 5000 men and the rest of Asia with 2000.

Yeah.

But Spaniards with combat experience in the Philippines (against Chinese, Japanese, and Moro pirates) certainly knew better. Gonzola Ronquillo de Penalosa noted:

"This land suffers from a constant and pressing need of reinforcements, on account not only of its unhealthful climate, but of the many emergencies which continually arise when I must send aid. These occasions now are not so much a matter of jest as they have been hitherto; for the Chinese and Japanese are not Indians, but people as valiant as many of the inhabitants of Berberia [Barbary], and even more so. I entreat your Majesty to give careful attention to this, and to order that in all vessels as many men as possible be sent; for it is the key to what is necessary for the preservation of this camp."


So, there you have a Spaniard who claimed that both the Chinese and the Japanese were more "valiant" than even the dreaded Barbary Corsairs. That's strong praise for the enemy.

Of course, the Spanish in the philippines were describing Chinese pirates rather than Ming government troops.
That bandits/rebels (e.g. Wokou) were often more effective than the regular army says much about the mid-late Ming regime . In 1574 the Cantonese pirate Lin Feng nearly captured Manila fort in a surprise attack, using ships so well-armed with cannon that they were mistaken for Portuguese (Peers MA307).

Similarly while the Ottoman navy stagnated, the Barbary corsairs adopted the frigate from the Europeans and remained a credible threat. The trend suggests that centralised, autocratic regimes are not good at maintaining efficiency or responding to change. Not a revolutionary idea, really...

Indeed, Lin Feng (aka Lim-Ah-Hong) and his Japanese partner Sioco attacked Manilla with 62 armed junks and 4,000 men. They were ultimately defeated by a combined force of Spanish regulars and Pampangan mercs, under the command of the great Juan de Salcedo, the so-called "Cortez of the Philippines".



The frigate? What century are we talking about?

But remember, a large percentage of these pirates were former military men. The same was the case with the Wokou.

Correct me if I'm wrong....
I saw an account which said the Chinese helmet is strikingly fierce although it is made of paste-board...
This account is actually refering to Qing soldier during 19th century...
Btw ...what is a paste-board?...
Another one which said about the Manchu's weapon of choice which is the bow...It is said that the bow is a weapon of the savages

In response to initial post

Try looking up European history books

I must have expressed myself badly if I gave the impression there is a lack of fighting spirit. The ROCAF is indeed an excellent air-force who, moreover, always managed to get the upper hand in every encounter. It seems however that they don't enjoy fastidious drills like their European colleagues who, especially in Western air forces, never seem to have enough. Same remark applies to the ROC Navy.
The reason I gave to myself is: you cannot make a Chinese soldier perform something he finds stupid. This "clever" attitude has good and bad points. Discipline, not intelligence, is the first quality you ask from a soldier.
Everything you say about China resisting Japan alone at first is true; however, a fact remains: they suffered terrible losses, never gave up and could never be conquered, like the Russians. I find it truly remarkable and justice should be rendered to those who lost their life before Japan final collapse, not knowing they had won the war.

so how did the spanish defeat the pirates with that siazeable force of junks

Larger ships with better armament and leadership.

Partly also because they trapped Lin Feng's fleet in a bay. Still, Lin Feng was able to break out at last with part of his fleet. Sioco, though, was apparently killed in the attack on Manila.

Matteo Ricci seemed to have varied opinions of the Ming military. He commented on martial abilities and discipline of some armies, and the poor state of others.

The best Ming armies are the frontier garrisons especially those in Hebei. The coastal armies and provincial ones are really decadent.

Matteo Ricci seemed to have been impressed by the armies he witnessed at Tianjin.

During the 16th century, European vessels were not always larger than Asian ships, but they were usually more heavily built and better armed.

The first spanish reports about China say that could be conquer with 5000 men. The last (by 1585), that was needed more than 20.000 men. That is, when the spanish knew better to the chinese they saw the necessity of more men for the army.
Well they had not very wrong information because they knew that the poor soldiers of the coastal province was only garrison and that a huge army with brave men was fighting in "Tartaria", far in the north. The hope of the spanish was conquer a southern province, get the favour of the local chinese (because they hate to the goverment by his fiscal policy, this thought the spanish) and resist the attack of the northern armies.
Impossible of course.

1581: following 15 years of open rebellion, the poor United Provinces officially (and successfully) reject the Spanish rule .
1588 : the Spanish Invicible Armada appears to be not as invicible as one thought .
How the Mighty fall because of preposterous assumptions.....

How frequent was the fighting in the north was it constant skirmishing with mongols or long periods of peace

Ok, here's some more information.

The Portuguese arrived to China in 1513 and after noticing its immense wealth tried to establish official commercial relationships with China. Yet, due to cultural misunderstandings between Chinese and Portuguese, relationships end up souring and Portuguese were attacked and expelled from China. Some were caught and put in prison in Canton. A couple of them, Cristóvão Vieira and Vasco Calvo, wrote letters in 1524 with lots of information about China including a plan to conquer Canton (and release them).

No such plan was ever attempted, with the Portuguese doing instead their best to establish official commercial relationships with China, something that they eventually achieved in 1554.

Nevertheless, I think it is interesting to take a look at the main points of the plan:

The attacking force should be constituted by 3000 Portuguese soldiers and some thousands of Indian mercenaries. The Chinese permanent garrison in Canton was of 3000 soldiers with the total number of soldiers in other places of the province about 14000. Chinese soldiers were not considered good fighters: bad archers and bad hand-to-hand fighters. Indian soldiers were considered much better. Actually, for those two Portuguese, Chinese speciality was instead using tricks. Chinese were also accused of being too much arrogant and self-confident, something that could be used against them. Some interesting examples: calling "barbarians" to the Portuguese; calling "kingdom of God" to China; calling "Son of God" to the emperor.

As for the common people, they didn't fight at all, since they were only allowed to have a knife, and all they did in case of war was hiding inside the houses. Actually, according to the Portuguese prisoners, the mandarins abused of their powers in order to enrich as fast as possible, being hated for that by the Chinese population, something that could be used by the Portuguese to their advantage by assuming the role of "liberators".

There was a large number of wooden houses in the outskirts of Canton, including along the river. These should be burned in order to crate clean fields of fire against the city and also to avoid that the Chinese soldiers could hide there and shot arrows against the Portuguese.

The main landing area should be the mandarin’s palace, which was in the southern area of the outskirts near the river. This area should be fortified and heavy artillery should be placed there to blow the (two) city gates in that area as well as to control the access to the city by sea. Once inside the city the Portuguese force should divide itself in 3 groups: one should head to the treasurer’s house and guard all the money that was there. Another should head for the rice warehouses and guard them. The purpose of controlling these warehouses was to force the population to submit through threat of hunger. The third should head for a small hill to the north of the city where there were some temples and fortify it with canons in order to have a better control over it, since the terrain of Canton was mostly flat, as well as to control the accesses to the city from north, east and west.

Once the city under control, either by force or hunger, the stone of the roads, which was abundant and squared, should be used to build more permanent fortresses in the above mentioned fortified areas. Another fort should also be built in the middle of a river where there was a temple (which would be adapted to fort), to have a better control of the river. In order to obtain the collaboration of Chinese workers it was suggested that they received more 50% of the ordinary rice ration. All the doors should be walled and only the twin southern doors should remain open, due to their access to the sea.

Once in control of the city the lighter Chinese ships in the port should be grabbed and artillery should be placed inside them. The purpose was to use them going up river attacking all the ships and inhabited places they found. This was a scorched earth policy with the purpose of denying local support for the mandarins living beyond Canton that could attempt to expel the Portuguese from the city, while at the same time creating conditions for bands of robbers to roam though the countryside creating even more misery. The same tactic was also to be used against other Chinese coastal areas. This situation would eventually force the Chinese to ask for peace and to pay a tribute of silver in order to dissuade the Portuguese to attack them again as well as to "protect" them from robbers. As for Canton, it would remain in Portuguese hands, who would have in this way a direct access to China's commercial activity.

according to CJ peers, the portugese regarded (Late Ming Dynasty) Chinese archers to be of extremely high quality but was not impressed with much else

the artillery was most likely not on par with europe at the time but apparently it was good enough to fend off Nurhaci's armies

the quality of the Ming Dynasty military seems to be inconsistent both chronologically (early strong, late weak) and from region to region. but even that is an oversimplication since the troops stationed on the northern border remained relatively battle hardened on through the late Ming and the coastal armies were able to fight off the pirates (also late in the dynasty). not to mention the Imjin war was late in the dynasty's history

we can infer that the units that the portugese saw were coastal armies since they came by ship. the army stationed on the coast would obviously function differently both in tactic and quality from troops stationed else where

can anyone here give an accurate (as in the exact years not generalized blocks of time) of the European accounts(of Chinese military quality) and compare them to what was going on in contemporary Ming military affairs

An even more popular debate raged on the topic whether contemporary Europe or the Classical Greeks and Romans were more advanced. As late as the second half of the 18th century, Frederik the Great thought the ancients to be superior.

In hindsight however, he was probably only correct about certain aspects of the Roman infrastructure, notably the road system, the sewers and the water supply, in most other respects Europeans had surpassed the ancients since the High Middle Ages, for a long time though without realizing it.

In the three above respects the Roman infrastructure was btw superior even to the majority of nowadays states.

A useful reference is The Military Revolution by Geoffrey Parker. It concentrates on Europe but has a comparative chapter on India/China/Japan.

Parker argues that East Asia was the one area of the world (apart from geographically or biologically inaccesible regions) in which the 16thC 'military revolution' did not give Europeans clear superiority. That had to wait for the industrial revolution (he cites the example of the steam-powered HMS Nemesis in the first Opium War).

Not really. After the arrival of Europeans to Asia in 1498, their main objective for some centuries was not to conquer vast territories, but instead control as much as possible Asia's commercial network. That was done through:

1- Control of the navigation, something achieved in 1509 when the Portuguese defeated the Muslims (who until them controlled the waters of the Indian Ocean) in the battle of Diu;

2- Control of strategic ports in Asia's commercial network, such as Hormuz, Melaka, etc.

Speaking of which, what intrested me the most is that some Europeons had plan of an attack on China in such an early stage. yet, how long does it take the Chinese to releaze that? XD

True. But his point is that before the 19thC the Europenas lacked the capacity to impose their will on East Asian societies they way they did in SE Asia, the Americas etc. The defeated Portuguese attempt against Guangzhou has already been mentioned. Parker also points to the Shogunate's treatment of foreigners in Japan. the fact that the wetserners had to settle for Nagasaki and Macau shows the relations of power at the time.

Well, the Tokugawa government was actually pretty disturbed by constant English ear whispering that the Spaniards of Manila would plan an invasion, something which led them to remove the Spanish missionaries from court and country out of fear for a fifth column in case of attack. The subsequent two hundred year long Japanese self-isolation then is history.

A government truly sure of itself, its people and its power would certainly have acted quite differently.

Why would they act differently?

Slaughtering the own population, that is the Christian Japanese, throwing out the most useful European Jesuits and merchants, and cutting off communications with the rest of the world for over 200 years might be called by some a slight overreaction. Do you think that was beneficial to Japan?

To Japan itself, very debatable. But for the Tokugawa (who instituted the Sakoku policy in the 1630s, after the Christian rebellion of Shimabara) it closed off the country and 'secured' themselves against outside influences. Even Rangaku (Dutch Learning) was seen as a threat. IMO it's not hard to see parallels between Tokugawa Japan and Kim Jong-Il's PRK

What CaoCao74 said. The anti-Christian purge was an internal political decision, not a reaction to a perceived external threat. Would the Tokugawa have followed up with a ban on firearms and decastellation if they really feared an invasion by gunpowder-armed Europeans?

Was the ban on firearms before, during or after the Naban period? It seems to me rather late.

And domestic decastellation was also fully underway in early French absolutism, at the same time the king pursued an aggressive foreign policy with almost continuous warfare, so it could have been as well an internal political decision in Japan.

As for the European factors, they certainly played a role, you dont close your country almost hermetically just for the fun of it.

Hideyoshi's reaction to Christianity proved stronger when a shipwrecked Spanish galleon brought Franciscans to Japan in 1597. Twenty-six Christians (6 Franciscans, 17 of their Japanese neophytes, and 3 Japanese Jesuit lay brothers - included by mistake-) were crucified in Nagasaki on February 5, 1597. It seems Hideyoshi's decision was taken following encouragements by the Jesuit to eliminate the rival order, the Spanish's bragging that military conquest usually followed Catholic proselytism, and by his own desire to take over the cargoe of the ship. Although close to a hundred churches were destroyed, most of the Jesuits remained in Japan.

The funny thing is that I was long under the impression that East Asian communities withstood Christianism because their own indigenous religious and philosophical systems were already spiritually sophisticated enough.

But the more I read about the history of Christianity in east Asia the more it becomes obvious just how much East Asian rulers had to 'convince' by the sword and other 'active' measures to keep their own populace from converting...