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Chinese Civil War 1945-1949


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#1 General_Zhaoyun

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Posted 01 February 2005 - 11:16 PM

I would like to know more about the military history of the chinese civil war 1945-1949 fought between the chinese communist and the nationalists.

What are the major battles fought? What were the units used? Who were the major generals? Why did the chinese communist win ultimately?
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#2 hansioux

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Posted 02 February 2005 - 02:33 PM

I would like to know more about the military history of the chinese civil war 1945-1949 fought between the chinese communist and the nationalists.

What are the major battles fought? What were the units used? Who were the major generals? Why did the chinese communist win ultimately?

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Ok, I'll get back to you on this one (cause i am at work). This is actually really interesting discussion. But generally, 2 major battles decided the outcome.

The Northeast battle 東北會戰, also know as the LiaoShen battle 遼瀋戰役.

Followed by the worst mistake of the Nationalist army at XuBang Battle 徐蚌會戰, also know as the HuaiHai battle 淮海戰役.

And the final blow to the Nationalist army at Pingjin battle 平津戰役 sealed the fate.
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#3 RollingWave

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Posted 03 February 2005 - 09:12 AM

The 東北會戰, is generally in Taiwan referred to as 錦州會戰 as the battle was fought there.

the first two was much more important than the 3rd... the 3rd is only there more due to the place where it was fought than the real effect it had on the whole war.

The single most important victory was probably 錦州會戰, as it destroyed the Nationalist presence in Machuria, causing one major war sector to be totally decisive while all the other sectors were still basically in stalemate situation... allowing the million strong (and more imporantly... much better armed ) PLA to sweep south. creating a domino effect.

錦州 is north west of 山海關, it is situated at the end of the bottle neck between 河北 and 東北. essentially, it is the key to Machuria.. it was also one of the 3 remaining strongholds of the Nationalist army by the fall of 48. with over 100 thousand man stationed there. with the 300 Thousand strong garrison in 瀋陽 to the north east and easy sea/land access to reinforement in the south, the KMT knew the stratigic importance of this position just as well as their enemy.

But the communist army under Lin Biao amassed over 3 times that number (need to fact check here.. i forgot the exact number ... and the organization number in those days were unreliable anyway as some army had 3 divisions while other had 1 and a half etc...) seiging the city while blocking reinfocements from the north west in the black mountain area and then send another group to block the reinforcement from the south.

The KMT's bad organization kicked in big time during the events that lead to the battle and the battle it self.... Chang Kei Sheik realized that the Communist was after Jin Zhou, and he also realized that Machuria was in effect lost. so he had ask the Machuria commander in Shin Yang to move all he's forces to Jin Zhou to creat a very strong barrier and hopefully bottle the communist's most powerful army out in the north east. but the commander Wei Li Huang for a variety of reasons refused to do so, giving Lin Biao all the time he needed to move he's troops southward.

As the battle started 100 thounsand strong reinforcement from Shin Yang under Liao Yao Xian set forth.... north westward to supposedly "cut off Lin Biao's life line"... then proceeded south... Jin Zhou was lost before they even reached the blockade Lin had set in anticipation of them. and then Liao hesitated ... Wei Li Huang had ordered him back to Shin Yang, Chang Kei Shiek ordered him otherwise, he hesitated on what to do... and end up losing the entire army to the PLA who's now pushing back towards Shin Yang, needless to say under this sitiuation Shin Yang it self wasn't able to put up much of a fight either.

The Southern reinforcement blockade faced a much harder battle as the KMT reinforcements stormed their position repeated and the commander in charge repeated ask Lin Biao for reinforcement or to retreat... but the battle in Jin Zhou ended much sooner than anticipated so they managed to held on just in time.
無盡黑夜無盡愁, 但盼黎明破曉時

#4 Koolasuchus

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Posted 03 February 2005 - 11:44 AM

The 東北會戰, is generally in Taiwan referred to as 錦州會戰 as the battle was fought there.
 
   the first two was much more important than the 3rd... the 3rd is only there more due to the place where it was fought than the real effect it had on the whole war.

   The single most important victory was probably 錦州會戰, as it destroyed the Nationalist presence in Machuria, causing one major war sector to be totally decisive while all the other sectors were still basically in stalemate situation... allowing the million strong (and more imporantly... much better armed ) PLA to sweep south. creating a domino effect.

    錦州 is north west of 山海關,  it is situated at the end of the bottle neck between 河北 and 東北. essentially, it is the key to Machuria.. it was also one of the 3 remaining strongholds of the Nationalist army by the fall of 48. with over 100 thousand man stationed there. with the 300 Thousand strong garrison in 瀋陽 to the north east and easy sea/land access to reinforement in the south,  the KMT knew the stratigic importance of this position just as well as their enemy.

    But the communist army under Lin Biao amassed over  3 times that number (need to fact check here.. i forgot the exact number ... and the organization number in those days were unreliable anyway as some army had 3 divisions while other had 1 and a half etc...) seiging the city while blocking reinfocements from the north west in the black mountain area and then send another group to block the reinforcement from the south.

    The KMT's bad organization kicked in big time during the events that lead to the battle and the battle it self.... Chang Kei Sheik realized that the Communist was after Jin Zhou, and he also realized that Machuria was in effect lost. so he had ask the Machuria commander in Shin Yang to move all he's forces to Jin Zhou to creat a very strong barrier and hopefully bottle the communist's most powerful army out in the north east. but the commander Wei Li Huang for a variety of reasons refused to do so, giving Lin Biao all the time he needed to move he's troops southward.

   As the battle started 100 thounsand strong reinforcement from Shin Yang under Liao Yao Xian set forth.... north westward to supposedly "cut off Lin Biao's life line"... then proceeded south...  Jin Zhou was lost before they even reached the blockade Lin had set in anticipation of them. and then Liao hesitated ... Wei Li Huang had ordered him back to Shin Yang, Chang Kei Shiek ordered him otherwise, he hesitated on what to do... and end up losing the entire army to the PLA who's now pushing back towards Shin Yang, needless to say under this sitiuation Shin Yang it self wasn't able to put up much of a fight either.

   The Southern reinforcement blockade faced a much harder battle as the KMT reinforcements stormed their position repeated and the commander in charge repeated ask Lin Biao for reinforcement or to retreat... but the battle in Jin Zhou ended much sooner than anticipated  so they managed to held on just in time.

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By much better armed, I suppose you meant that Lin Biao's 4th Field Army was much better armed after capturing KMT's elite troops' American equipment in the Liao-Shen campign than before? Because PLA generally were poorly equiped outside of the 4th Field Army even in 1949.

#5 RollingWave

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Posted 05 February 2005 - 01:44 AM

Correct, that and the fact that being in Machuria they were able to come across/obtain Japanese and Russian weapons through a variety of ways.

By the Time Lin Biao marched on Shin Yang he's army already had quiet a bit of tanks and more artilleries than the KMT, the infantry weapons were also almost on par with the KMT, the only real significant difference was that they didn't really have much of a airforce/navy.

On a account of PLA solider who fought in Machuria during this time "When we marched into Northern China after securing Machuria, we were stunned to find how poorly equipped our comards were, their whole 師 had only 3 light machine gun, when each of our 營 had more than 2 heavy machine gun (營 is made up of less men than 師) and also a variety of other weapons such as mortars."

The CCP don't only gain weapons through victory... they also gain men, most of the KMT army surrendered instead of died (normal in any war) and they were quickly converted to "liberated fighters" and joined the PLA, the PLA instantly gain a huge amount of already well trained and disciplined and mostly importantly... experienced army........
無盡黑夜無盡愁, 但盼黎明破曉時

#6 ahxiang

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Posted 24 July 2005 - 10:19 PM

    The CCP don't only gain weapons through victory... they also gain men, most of the KMT army surrendered instead of died (normal in any war)  and they were quickly converted to "liberated fighters" and joined the PLA, the PLA instantly gain a huge amount of already well trained and disciplined and mostly importantly... experienced army........

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See my post elsewhere for TWO whole Korean divisions under Japanese Kwnatung Army that were retained by communists, not to mention the stranded Kwantung army. Those Koreans were later sorted out for delivery to Kim Il-sun about 3-4 months before the Korean War outbreak.

I am still wrapping up on Huai-Hai and Ping-jing Campaign.

Huai-hai campaign is in deed "human wave tactics" that was first adopted by communists in Manchuria, i.e, plain-coated soldiers charging at KMT positions followed by PLA uniformed soldiers. Liu Bocheng's total "zong dui", i.e., corps, numbered at least 400,000. Su Yu's East China Field Army were probably double the size of Liu Bocheng. KMT troops had mostly fought communists troops with one battalion against a communist regiment or several regiments.

This is not propoganda. I read the memoirs line by line to figure it out.

In next post,I will post Ping-jing campaign

#7 ahxiang

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Posted 24 July 2005 - 10:23 PM

This is PART of my book. Mark the place of origin when quoting.

------------

Ping-Jin Campaign

Fu Zuoyi's KMT troops, totaling 520,000, originally had plans of either evacuating from coastal Tanggu or retreating to hometown Suiyuan Province in Inner Mongolia via Ping-Sui Railway. To prevent Fu Zuoyi from slipping away, Mao Te-tung deliberately adopted an early policy of either encircling the enemy cities only or segregating parts of the cities, with a specific order that communist forces could not take out all three key points to the west, i.e., Zhangjiakou, Nankou & Xinbao'an.. Mao Tse-tung was especially worried that Fu Zuoyi would succumb to Chiang Kai-shek's request for a relocation to southern China via sea, for which The final onslaught against besieged Du Yuming army group was delayed by two weeks.

In Beiping [i.e., Peking], Nie Rongzhen's city work department of Jinn-Cha-Ji CCP Central Bureau had been working on “peaceful pacification” of Fu Zuoyi's KMT troops since The spring of 1948. CCP underground activist Liu Ren first retrieved Nankai University student Zeng Changning for sake of manoeuvring her father Zeng Yanyi who was a classmate of Fu Zuoyi at Baoding Cadet. After failing to persuade Fu Zuoyi into a defection, Zeng Yanyi managed to have their common teacher Liu Houtong lobby with Fu Zuoyi. Before Liu Houtong acted on it, another communist contact Du Renzhi, with faciliation of student Yan Youwen acting as deputy office director inside of Fu Zuoyi's headquarter, had lobbied with Fu Zuoyi in vain. Du Renzhi then contacted Liu Houtong at the suggestion of brother Du Jingzhi who worked for Fu Zuoyi as a councillor. In September, Liu Ren dispatched messenger to Liu Houtong for asking Fu Zuoyi to follow the example of Wu Hualong's defection at the siege of Jinan. After communist victory in Jinzhou on Oct 15th, Du Renzhi disputed Liu Houtong's suggestion of selling a 'coalition government' to Fu Zuoyi. On Nov 2nd, Du Renzhi promised to Liu Houtong as to communist credibility. In early Nov 1948, Shen Diqing of CCP student work committee in Peking was called over to Bozheng town by Liu Ren for the task of accompanying Fu Dongju, i.e., Fu Zuoyi's daughter, to Peking.

3000 underground communists and 5000 communist sympathizers of third party nature, including Heh Siyuan [former Peking mayor] and Kang Tongbi [daughter of Kang Youwei], organized numerous parades and demonstrations for exerting pressure on Fu Zuoyi. On Nov 7th, Fu Zuoyi suggested to Heh Siyuan that he was in no hurry to make a decision since Americans might get involved in China's civil wars and Li Zongren might save the regime. Fu Zuoyi wavered till after several military defeats, i.e., 105th Corps being surrounded by The communist troops at Zhangjiakou, two divisions of 35th Corps surrounded at Xinbao'an and two divisions of 104th Corps destroyed at Henglingguan, Du Renzhi and communist underground leader Cui Yueli then pressured Du Renzhi with the prospect of Fu Zuoyi becoming a prisoner. Fu Zuoyi, still hoping to get a better term, dispatched representatives and telegraph set to communist camps to see Liu Yalou at Sanhexian county, still hoping that a trilateral talk, with Democratic League acting as a neutral, could yield a 'coalition government' in Northern China.

Chiang Kai-shek, to rein in Fu Zuoyi, dispatched Xu Shichang to Peking, but Fu Zuoyi declined the suggestion of a southern retreat either via Tanggu or going to Qingdao on the pretext that his troops at Zhangjiakou and Xinbao'an could not be saved. Zheng Jiemin, the under-secretary of the Defense Department, was sent to Peking next. Jiang Huiguo, i.e., Chiang Kai-shek's stepson, carried a letter to Peking, with Chiang Kai-shek's call for “the homecoming of Fu Zuoyi alone beating thousand soldiers”. American navy general also paid a visit to Fu Zuoyi as to US assistance in a coastal retreat. American ambassador Stuart and Dr Hu Shi paid a similar visit. Fu Zuoyi, over-saddened by the loss of 35th Corps at Xinbao'an on Dec 22nd, made a decision for conceding to communists on Dec 23rd. With communist final siege of Zhangjiakou going on on 23rd, Fu Zuoyi sent a letter to Mao Te-tung, with a call for a “public wire to terminate the civil war” but “advising against communist demand in disarming his troops during transition stage”. Communists answered with eliminating Fu Zuoyi's troops at Zhangjiakou, instead.

CCP Northeast China Field Army [NCFA], under Lin Biao, cut short re-organization for northern China campaigns. 800,000 troops entered the Great Wall via multiple passes, ranging from Shanhaiguan Pass to Gubeikou & Xifengkou passes. Li Tianyou's 1st "zong dui" of NCFA, after crossing Xifengkou, arrived Baodi county to cut off Beiping-Tianjin Railway on Dec 20th 1948. Five communist corps, with 22 divisions, in addition to cannons, tanks, garrison, and engineering columns, converged upon the city of Tianjin. One additional corps was deployed against KMT troops in coastal Tanggu.

On Jan 1st 1949, communists relayed a message to Fu Zuoyi for a delay in a public wire to call for termination of civil war on the pretext that Fu Zuoyi could maintain his legality, explained that communist side would still declare a list of war criminals including Fu Zuoyi, and suggested that Fu Zuoyi's immediate troops inside of Peking could be reorganized into one corps. On Jan 3rd, Fu Zuoyi dispatched officer Zhou Beifeng and Democratic League representative Zhang Dongsun to Jixian county for a new round of peace talks with communists. Nie Rongzhen, after discerning that Fu Zuoyi was willing to bargain on behalf of four cities of Peking, Tianjin, Tanggu & Suiyuan, proposed a talk the next day. On 4th, Luo Ronghuan stated that Fu Zuoyi's troops must be converted to People's Liberation Army, and all areas must be “liberated” whereas communists could release all officers captured in the siege of Zhangjiakou, Xinbao'an and Huailai. Two more talks were held on 7th & 8th, with signed stipulations good till midnight of Jan 14th 1949. Fu Zuoyi asked Zhou Beifeng relay a reply to communist side, stating that Jan 14th deadline was too close and suggested that he would dispatch to communist camp Deng Baoshan1 the deputy pacification commander for Northern China. Once Deng Baoshan flew into Peking, another sworn brother, i.e., Ma Zhanshan, fetched Deng Baoshan for exchanging opinions. The three made a decision, and then dispatched Deng Baoshan and Zhou Beifeng out of Deshengmen citygate by 1:00 pm. Nie Rongzhen, emphasizing that midnight was the deadline, cautioned Zhou Beifeng and Deng Baoshan that since the final attack at Tianjin city was already issued, peace talk would not cover Tianjin. To bargain for better terms, Fu Zuoyi ordered that chief of staff Li Shijie telegraph Chen Changjie with instructions that the longer Tianjin was retained the more likely some solution could be obtained.

Commander Liu Yalou devised a strategy of attacking the strip-shaped Tianjin from two directions of east and west, cutting the city in half at Jintangqiao, and then swallowing up southern segment before going after the northern part of the city. NCFA's 1st "zong dui" and 2nd "zong dui" were to attack Hepingmen citygate, while 7th "zong dui" and 8th "zong dui" were to attack Minquanmen citygate. At 10:00 am, on Jan 14th 1949, the general attack was launched with blanket shelling of the city for well over half an hour. Communist tank army rolled forward after taking out the long range cannon positions of the defenders. With citywall blast apart, Heh Dongsheng's division poured into the city via Hepingmen citygate. Jiang Yonghui's division breached the city defense as well. On the eastern side of Tianjin, another two communist corps also broke through the citywall; and on the southern end, one communist corps was charging at KMT position as well. At the citywall, KMT troops and communist troops mounted ferocious counterattacks. Communist troops eliminated KMT tanks with anti-tank artillery, and deployed "chemical mortar shells" against the defenders.2

Lane-to-lane fightings encused, with each building, each window, and each intersection wrestled after fierce struggles. Communist troops used dynamite satchel against walls and buildings for clearing the path. Division Chief Heh Dongsheng and deputy "zong dui" commander Cao Lihuai personally rode on a tank for blasting the KMT positions towards the city center of Jintangqiao. At this time, communist eastern route broke through Minquanmen citygate. KMT forces were cut into several segments and pockets. By 8:00 am of Jan 15th, communist troops sacked the citadel of Haiguangshi. Fierce fightings continued on inside of Tianjin Garrison Commander Chen Changjie's headquarter, with fightings in each corner, house, yard and floor of the building. Communist troops, after throwing grenades into the basement, intruded inside to have Chen Changjie caught alive. Tianjin, which was attacked by the communist troops 14 hours ahead of the midnight deadline, fell within 29 hours.

On Jan 16th, communists claimed to Fu Zuoyi's representatives that they would only cover the city of Peking for peace talks since Tianjin fell into communist hands, KMT troops at Tanggu already fled via sea, and Fu Zuoyi's troops in Suiyuan were far away. On Jan 17th, Deng Baoshan, together with communist tactics director Su Jing for Peking-Tientsin battlefield, entered Peking with signed preliminary agreement for peaceful liberation of Peking as well as an ultimatum from Lin Biao that was good from Jan 17th to Jan 21st. On the morning of 21st, before the communist noon deadline, Fu Zuoyi assembled all generals for a meeting, and declared that he had agreed to terminate war effective on Jan 22nd and relocate troops outside of the Peking city for reorganization in about one month timeframe3. Before delivering the city to communists, Fu Zuoyi made special arrangement for KMT agents from “military stats” and “central stats” bureaus to leave the city in exchange for releasing all communist captives and prisoners alive. On Jan 22nd, newspapers in Peking published the news. On Jan 31st, communist troops entered Peking.

-----------

Fu Zuoyi's army were never trusted. Several of his division generals were executed. Dong Qiwu's cavalry was disbanded instead of sending them to Korea. The "peace" terms did not get delivered since many of those subordinate generals failed to keep their jobs even though they were lucky not to be sorted out for class struggles. Chen Changjie spent dozens of years in prison, certainly.

#8 RollingWave

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Posted 25 July 2005 - 09:34 PM

Looking through all the battles, you can see that militarily, the KMT's biggest problem was simply the fact that their central command weren't unified, and when it was it wasn't being carried out on the ground. each general ended up fending themself, thus giving the CCP even easier time bringing 10 times or even more men on every single KMT army when in fact the two sides were realtively evenly matched in most battles.

If we look at Jin Zhou, the Shin Yang reinforcement were given order to head strait for Jin Zhou, but after delaying for several weeks, they headed north and "cut off" Lin Biao's reinforcements. and then slowly headed towards Jin Zhou.. only to find that it was already taken half way, and then the central government told them to proceed, but they wanted to retreat, and ended up going no where, getting surronded in the middle of no where. Many people also talked about pulling out of Shin Yang all together before the battle, but the head of Machuria Wei Li Huang refused.

During Huai Hai, Huang Bai Tao delayed he's retreat waiting for civilians and one of he's army, and ended up being surronded and defeated. Then Du Yu Ming's retreat also recieved back and forth orders from central command, ending up surronded as well.

During Ping Jin, Fu could have and should have pulled out and concintrated army, but instead he spread out he's line against a vastly numerically superior foe.........

But then ofcourse, we could never really overlook the political problems alone with the KMT's historical burdens. many of the back and forth decisions were struggles between military good sense and political stakes, (it's a good idea to pull out of Bei Jing.. but hey do we really want to give up our former capital?) the KMT's internal command confusion was also a result of all the warlord they brought in. but if they didn't bring them in... there probably won't even be much of a civil war as Japan probably took all of China with ease.
無盡黑夜無盡愁, 但盼黎明破曉時

#9 ahxiang

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Posted 25 July 2005 - 11:01 PM

  If we look at Jin Zhou, the Shin Yang reinforcement were given order to head strait for Jin Zhou, but after delaying for several weeks, they headed north and "cut off" Lin Biao's reinforcements. and then slowly headed towards Jin Zhou.. only to find that it was already taken half way, and then the central government told them to proceed, but they wanted to retreat, and ended up going no where, getting surronded in the middle of no where. Many people also talked about pulling out of Shin Yang all together before the battle, but the head of Machuria Wei Li Huang refused.

  During Huai Hai, Huang Bai Tao delayed he's retreat waiting for civilians and one of he's army, and ended up being surronded and defeated. Then Du Yu Ming's retreat also recieved back and forth orders from central command, ending up surronded as well.

  During Ping Jin, Fu could have and should have pulled out and concintrated army, but instead he spread out he's line against a vastly numerically superior foe.........


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Brother, we should not forget that communists know every single step the Nationalist army moved.

In Northeast China, the initial mistake was the recall of Sun Liren, and before that, the dismantling of the puppet troops. The final battles were the result of Wei Lihuang betrayal. Recent communist revelations proved that Wei Lihuang was a collabarator, but he was not fficially admitted to CCP. He did not surrender because Mme Chiang Kai-shek fetched his wife away from Shenyang without his knowledge. He built his friendship with communists in Mt Zhongtiaoshan and Shanxi Province. Wei, however, was smart enough to wait out 5 years in HK before going to Peking.

Jung Chang accused Hu Zongnan, Shao Lizi, Zhang Zhizhong and Wei Lihuang as undercover communists. In my opinion, both Zhang Zhizhong and Wei Lihuang were people sitting on fence, not real communists. Shao Lizi could be. Hu Zongnan definitely not.

Huai-hai Campaign: KMT forces were probably still too naive about their firepower. In deed, Huang Baitao and Qiu Qingquan chased communists throughout northern China from 1946 to 1948, and never encountered any significant defeat. Those KMT crack forces, on multiple occasions, had defeated communists forces, one regiment against one division. In contrast, communist forces had dispatched its core to Manchuria in 1945-1946. It took the communists two years to rebuild their army ranks. The spy was the final determinant. Du Yuming's last breakout was a deliberately hidden act by having communist agent relay the wrong info about the southwestern move. Two days later, Du Yuming received a revised order from Chiang Kai-shek and Guo Rugui, to go east to enter the bag set up by the communists. Those captured generals, throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, still hated the spies like Guo Rugui, and Liu Fei.

We don't have to emphasize the chilvary and bravery of army under Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan. Fu Zuoyi had beaten back Japanese for close to 10 years, and segregated the communists from Outer Mongolia.

As for Yan Xishan, the battle of Taiyuan was like 150,000 KMT deaths against 250,000-300,000 communist deaths. 500 KMT officers and soldiers committed suicide rather than surrender. Peng Dehuai and Xu Xiangqian exerted a total of 600,000 against Taiyuan. Should we look at history in ancient terms, then Taiyuan Siege could last 5 or 10 years like Mongol siee of Xiangyang. The difference is that communists had a determination to sack it at any cost, even if that means the death of all 600,000 troops.

There was and is no way out for the KMT. They were doomed because they faced an enemy that did not care about means.

Edited by ahxiang, 25 July 2005 - 11:07 PM.


#10 Grigori

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Posted 27 July 2005 - 12:36 AM

All's fair in love and war. The losers always complain the winners don't play fair. Let's not forget KMT had overwhelming advantage in weapons, material, manpower.

Jiang failed to use his available assets effectively. Which is same reason his forces underperformed in the war against Japan. One have to wonder how well he could run the country even if he had won and avoided Mao's mistakes. Had Mao and Jiang's positions been reversed in 1945, there would be no way Mao would lose.

History is full of such examples.

#11 ahxiang

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Posted 27 July 2005 - 10:42 PM

Let's not forget KMT had overwhelming advantage in weapons, material, manpower.

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Chiang Kai-shek's crack force army, as commonly known, were the remnants of Stilwell's X-force from India and Y-force from Yunnan-Guangxi provinces. Stilwell had tried to take over the Chinese force by implanting 200 American officers. Sun Liren declined it.

If you want to know how much US did for China, I would say that's basically all before Stilwell was recalled in Oct 1944. Stilwell had no interest in giving aid to China other than direct control over Chinese army. When China was attacked by Japan in No. 1 Campaign, Stilwell refused to direct the X-force against Japanese from south or allow the Y-force to back off from Burma border. Stilwell controlled the Lend-Lease program, and refused to even replenish Channault's Flying Tiger airforce, not to mention Chiang Kai-shek. Believe or not Stilwell was extermely interested in arming the Chinese communists and blamed the Xiang-Gui debacle on Chiang Kai-shek. Note that <b>Americans, other than the notorious Yalta Betrayal, had another equally dirty deal that deeply hurt China and benefited Japan, i.e., the Betrayal during the "San Francisco Peace Treaty".</b> Legally speaking, the hostility between China and Japan did not end with the "San Francisco Peace Treaty" since neither the KMT nor the CCP was invited to the conference by the allied powers. Though, Americans, who had authorized John Leighton Stuart in staying put during the communist takeover of Nanking the capital and further holding two talks with communist diplomat Huang Hua, suddenly decided to postpone the recognition of the emerging communist regime. Back in Aug 1949, 1000 page US White paper was published by D.G. Acheson, which was widely construed as the first step of US justification for recognizing the CCP. Hence, the United States government, while still maintaining diplomatic relations with the KMT government in Taiwan, had no reason to ward off Chinese from the "San Francisco Peace Treaty" other than the ulterior motive in hurting the cause of the Chinese and China in the same cloak of pre-war colonialists.

Wedemeyer had no time to implement the Lend-Lease program after succession. By Nov 1944, US decided to abandon the landing on Formosa and Chinese coast. Wedemeyer's contribution was in shipping Chinese army to Nanking, major cities in northern China and coastal Manchuria.

However, US, from 1946 to 1947, had a de facto arms embargo against China. Marshal strictly implemented the embargo policy to force Chiang Kai-shek into peace talks with communists. This is so-called "stick and carrot" policy.

Now you guys all know the myth of so-called American support for Chiang Kai-shek.

I will tell you guys NONE. After Korean War, US wanted Chiang Kai-shek to abandon Quemoy, Matsu, Dachengdao. Why? US wanted Chiang Kai-shek to declare independence from China. Mao and Zhou all praised Chiang as a true nationalist.

From 1911 onward, US had withdrawn from banker consortium for loaning China. China did not get a loan from US till after 1937. This is the result of British instigation. At http://www.larouchep...n_v_dr_sun.html, Mike Billington wrote for "Executive Intelligence Review" an article entitled "<i>How London, Wall Street Backed Japan's War Against China and Sun Yat Sen</i>", pointing out the behind-the-scene manipulations as to "SYNARCHISM AND WORLD WAR". As stated by Mike Billington, "<b>... British synarchist banking interests, centered around Bank of England head Montagu Norman, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank director Sir Charles Addis, and J.P. Morgan chief executive Thomas Lamont, deployed militarily and politically to destroy Sun Yat Sen and his influence. ... when their subversion and looting failed to crush Sun's republican movement, the British threw their weight behind the synarchist/fascist forces in Japan, financing the Japanese military occupation of the Chinese mainland... By 1931, J.P. Morgan had floated $263 million in loans for Japanese borrowers, including direct loans to the government in 1930</b>", with quite some of the funds going direct to the Southern Manchurian Railway under disguise to avert the world opinions.


The Aug 1949, 1000 page US White paper published by D.G. Acheson claimed that US had given to China US$2 billion from 1941 to 1949. Is that true? US aid was in the form of Lend-Lease. It was given to British for defending Burma; It was destroyed when Japanese closed in to Rangoon; It was used by Stilwell for equipping X-force and Y-force; It was MOSTLY used for paving the Ledo-Burma Highway that did not open till 1945; It was for funding the Hump Course airlift that went exclusively to Chennault's airforce but still failed to fuel the planes - because of Stilwell trickery against Chennault not because the American pilots' laziness; and it was finaly used for shipping 1-2 million Japanese home.

The remnant of Lend-Lease program was probably the only US flow to China after the outbreak of 1945-1949 civil war. Since Marshal and Truman imposed amrs embargo on China, only outdated ships etc were released. When KMT spy Gu Zhenglun fled Shanghai, he went to Huangpu River to intercept such an American ship.

Mme Song Mei-ling spent 1-2 years in US in vain. Why? The full US government was permeated with Comintern spies. US vice president, presidential assistant and candidate, and etc were all communists. Don't say I made it up. Majority of American academic don't believe it to be true till after the USSR archives were released. In another word, McCarthy was at least 95% correct about his roster of communist agents.

Now, was there 2 billion aid to China?

See for yourself.

http://64.233.161.10...hina wwii&hl=en

Magruder acquiesced, and eventually large amounts of lend-lease weapons and equipment, originally earmarked for Nationalist China, went to the British for use in the defense of Burma. With Rangoon threatened, Magruder ordered the destruction of all lend-lease stocks in an effort to deny them to the invading Japanese. As the Japanese approached, there had been frantic activity to move as much materiel as possible north to the Burma Road, but it was still necessary to destroy more than 900 trucks in various stages of assembly, 5,000 tires, 1,000 blankets and sheets, and more than a ton of miscellaneous items. Magruder transferred much materiel to the British forces, including 300 British-made Bren guns with 3 million rounds of ammunition, 1,000 machine guns with 180,000 rounds of ammunition, 260 jeeps, 683 trucks, and 100 field telephones. In spite of the destruction and transfer to the British,
however, over 19,000 tons of lend-lease materiel remained in Rangoon when it fell to the Japanese on 8 March.

----------

http://64.233.161.10...hina wwii&hl=en


Furthermore, the Lend-Lease program was used to obtain the aircraft required by the AVG."
-------------

http://64.233.167.10...lient=firefox-a


Eventually becomes $50 billion dollars in lend-lease during the war to many countries: 60% to UK, 20% USSR, 20% France, China, others. 30Nov40. Sat. United States lends [pre-lend-lease] $50 million to China for currency stabilization and grants an additional $50 million credit for purchase of supplies.


===========

Give me some good numbers to prove me wrong.

After 1951, US did give Chiang Kai-shek aid at about 0.1 billion per year. But US did the same Stilwell trick again, and that was the story of Sun Liren being put under house arrest for 20-30 years. I assure you guys Sun Liren was and is 100% patriot. He never thought about rebelling against Chiang Kai-shek. It was American rumor that tried to compel Sun Liren into an inevitable confrontation. (In China's military history, I only saw Li Zongren and Sun Liren as the most brilliant. They both won victory against larger number of enemy with small force.)

Edited by ahxiang, 27 July 2005 - 10:49 PM.


#12 Optimus

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Posted 28 July 2005 - 10:37 AM

read about how the US wanted Chiang Kai-Shek to delcare independence from China and Chiang just refused and insisted on hanging on to Kinmen and Matsu - the symbol link of his ROC to the mainland.

For whatever reason...at that period in 1950s...if Chiang wanted to declare a "second china" or "republic of taiwan" independent from PROC. I think the Communists who are isolated from the United Nations and in deep rebuilding of the country will accept that

was Chiang being selfish by not settling this problem ( Mainland and Taiwan Unification ) in his lifetime ? or was he giving the future generations of Taiwan a chance to decide themselves when the situation will be better as both sides have calmed down, developed and the bitter memories of the chinese civil war was long a chapter of history.

#13 T98G

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Posted 09 September 2007 - 11:23 AM

I haven't been here for a while because I found Wikipedia History of China quite informative and there hasn't been much historical articles since Yun left. Any way here is a article from the Chinese Civil war, how reliable is this ?

http://en.wikipedia....inese_Civil_War

Edited by T98G, 09 September 2007 - 11:24 AM.

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

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Against logic there is no armor like ignorance.

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#14 T98G

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Posted 10 September 2007 - 03:43 AM

I haven't been here for a while because I found Wikipedia History of China quite informative and there hasn't been much historical articles since Yun left. Any way here is a article from the Chinese Civil war, how reliable is this ?

http://en.wikipedia....inese_Civil_War



It looks like the CCP were better leaders in the civil war than the KMT, the CCP were able to used better resources and strategic and tactical plans not to mention a number of blunders committed by the KMT. I really don't think the KMT would had won this conflict unless there was foreign intervention.

Unless someone disagree with this.

The Chinese Civil War (Traditional Chinese: 國共内戰; Simplified Chinese: 国共内战; Pinyin: guógňng neězhŕn; literally "Nationalist-Communist Civil War"), which lasted from April 1927 to May 1950, was a civil war in China between the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It began in 1927, after the Northern Expedition, when the right-wing faction of the KMT, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, purged the Communists and KMT leftists from a KMT-CCP alliance. It went on intermittently until the looming Second Sino-Japanese War interrupted it. Full scale war resumed in 1946 and ended in 1950 with an unofficial cessation of major hostilities, with the Communists controlling mainland China (including Hainan Island) and the Nationalists restricted to their remaining territories of Taiwan, Pescadores, and the several outlying Fujianese islands. To this day, no official armistice has ever been signed, although the two sides have close economic ties.

To defeat the warlords who had seized control of much of Northern China since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Kuomintang leader Sun Yat-sen sought the help of foreign powers. His efforts to obtain aid from the Western democracies were ignored, however, and in 1921 he turned to the Soviet Union. For political expediency, the Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of support for both Sun and the newly established Communist Party of China. The Soviets hoped for Communist consolidation, but were prepared for either side to emerge victorious. Thus the struggle for power in China began between the Nationalists and the Communists.

In 1923, a joint statement by Sun and Soviet representative Adolph Joffe in Shanghai pledged Soviet assistance for China's national unification, and issued the Sun-Joffe Manifesto, calling for a unified and independent China, and arranged an alliance between the KMT and CCP. Soviet advisers, the most prominent of whom was an agent of the Comintern, Mikhail Borodin, began to arrive in China in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of the KMT along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CCP was under Comintern instructions to cooperate with the KMT, and its members were encouraged to join the KMT while maintaining their CCP party identities, forming the First United Front between the two parties.

The policy of working with the Kuomintang was also recommended by the Dutch Communist Henk Sneevliet, chosen in 1923 to be a Comintern representative in China due to his revolutionary experience in the Dutch Indies, where he had a major role in founding the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) - and who felt that the Chinese party was too small and weak to act on its own (see Henk Sneevliet#Working for the Comintern).

One major disadavantage that Sun Yat-sen suffered against the warlords was that he had no army, in an era when military power carried the most persuasion. In 1923, Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang Kai-shek, one of Sun's lieutenants from Tongmeng Hui days, for several months' military and political study in Moscow. After Chiang's return in late 1923, he participated in the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy outside Guangzhou, which was the seat of government under the KMT-CCP alliance. In 1924, Chiang became head of the academy and began the rise to prominence that would make him Sun's successor as head of the KMT. The Soviets provided much studying material, organization, and munitions for the academy. The Soviets also provided many techniques on mass mobilization. With this dedicated "army of the party," Sun Yat-sen hoped to defeat the warlords militarily. Chiang Kai-shek was a fervent instructor and at the academy he built up the personal allegiance and brotherhood with his students and officers who would eventually form the core of his central army. Communists were also present in the academy, and many of them, including Zhou Enlai, were political commissars who instilled the students with a sense of nationalist revolution.

Communist members were allowed to join the KMT on an individual basis. The CCP was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925. The KMT in 1922 already was 150,000 strong. However, the "party within party" situation and the Soviet meddling in Chinese political affairs irked Chiang, causing him to begin purging the communists and KMT leftists from the party ranks, leading to Civil War.

Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and KMT-CCP split

Just months after Sun Yat Sen's death in 1925, Chiang-Kai-Shek, as commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, set out on the long-delayed Northern Expedition against the northern warlords to unite China under KMT control. By 1926, however, the KMT had divided into left and right wing factions, and the Communist bloc within it was also growing. In the March 1926 Zhongshan Warship Incident, after thwarting an alleged kidnapping attempt against him, Chiang imposed restrictions on CCP members' participation in the top KMT leadership and emerged as the pre-eminent Kuomintang leader. The Soviet Union, still hoping to prevent a split between Chiang and the CCP, ordered Communist underground activities to facilitate the Northern Expedition, which was finally launched by Chiang from Guangzhou in July 1926.
Government troops rounding up prisoners.
Government troops rounding up prisoners.

In early 1927, the KMT-CCP rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the left wing of the KMT had decided to move the seat of the Nationalist government from Guangzhou to Wuhan, where Communist influence was strong. But Chiang and Li Zongren, whose armies defeated warlord Sun Chuanfang, moved eastward toward Jiangxi. Chiang wished to capture arsenals at Nanking and Shanghai, so he would not have to rely on the Hanyang Arsenal in leftist-controlled Wuhan. Chiang also demanded the capital be moved from Guangzhou to Nanchang, rather than to Wuhan. The leftists rejected Chiang's demand and Chiang denounced the leftists for betraying Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People by taking orders from the Soviet Union. On March 30, 1927, the left wing of the Kuomintang reorganized the party and attempted to strip Chiang Kai-shek of his power and spread anti-Chiang propaganda.

On April 7, Chiang and several other Kuomintang leaders held a meeting arguing that communist activities were socially and economically disruptive, and must be undone for the national revolution to proceed. As a result of this, on April 12, Chiang turned on communists and unionists in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Guangxi; the April 12 Incident purged the Kuomintang leftists by arresting and executing hundreds. The purge widened the rift between Chiang and Wang Jingwei's Wuhan government (a contest won by Chiang) and destroyed the urban base of the CCP. Chiang, expelled from the Wuhan Kuomintang for his actions, formed a rival government in Nanjing known as the Nanjing government. There now were three capitals in China: the internationally recognized warlord regime in Beijing; the Communist and left-wing civilian-military regime at Wuhan; and the right-wing Kuomintang regime at Nanjing, which would remain the Nationalist capital for the next decade.

The Comintern cause appeared bankrupt. On May 22, Josef Stalin cabled the Wuhan group and urged them to recruit reliable commanders and organize an efficient army to fight against Chiang, against the advice of Borodin and Vasily Blyukher. They feared that such open challenge would irreversibly split the United Front. A new policy was instituted calling on the CCP to foment armed insurrections in both urban and rural areas in preparation for an expected rising tide of revolution. Unsuccessful attempts were made by Communists to take cities such as Nanchang, Changsha, Shantou, and Guangzhou, and an armed rural insurrection, known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising, was staged by peasants in Hunan Province. The insurrection was led by communist leader Mao Zedong.

In June 1927, the Soviet advisers were recalled and the CCP was at a low ebb. The Communists had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing KMT allies, who in turn were toppled by Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang resumed the campaign against warlords and captured Beijing in June 1928, after which most of eastern China was under the Nanjing central government's control, and the Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The Nationalist government announced that in conformity with Sun Yat-sen's formula for the three stages of revolution: military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy. China had reached the end of the first phase and would embark on the second, which would be under Kuomintang direction.

[edit] Anti-Communist campaigns (1927–1937)

During the 1920s, Communist Party of China activists retreated underground or to the countryside where they fomented a military revolt, beginning the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927. They combined the force with remnants of peasant rebels, and established control over several areas in southern China. Attempts by the Nationalist armies to suppress the rebellion were unsuccessful but extremely damaging to the Communist forces. This marked the beginning of the ten year's struggle, known in mainland China as the "Ten Year's Civil War" (Simplified Chinese: 十年内战; Pinyin: Shínían Nčizhŕn). It lasted until the Xi'an Incident when Chiang Kai-shek was forced to form the Second United Front against the invading Japanese.
A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors.
A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors.

After Chiang Kai-shek had foiled the coup to oust him, launched by Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Wang Ching-wei (1929–30) in the Central Plains War, he immediately turned his attention on rooting out the remaining pockets of Communist activity. The first and second campaigns failed and the third was aborted due to the Mukden Incident. The fourth campaign (1932-1933) achieved some early successes, but Chiang’s armies were badly mauled when they tried to penetrate into the heart of Mao’s Soviet Chinese Republic. During these campaigns, the Nationalist columns struck swiftly into Communist areas, but were easily engulfed by the vast countryside and were not able to consolidate their foothold.

Finally, in late 1933, Chiang launched a fifth campaign that involved the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet region with fortified blockhouses. Unlike in previous campaigns in which they penetrated deeply in a single strike, this time the Nationalist troops patiently built blockhouses, each separated by five or so miles, to surround the Communist areas and cut off their supplies and food source. Villages in the region were organized into units known as baojia, as a security measure to prevent Communists from obtaining supplies and intelligence from the locals. Once the front line had been secured, a new ring of blockhouses were built to close in on the Communist base areas. This strategy was very successful, and by the fall of 1934, the Communists faced the possibility of total annihilation. It seemed that the time was now ripe to finish off the Communists, and then turn against the remaining warlords.

In October 1934, the Communists took advantage of gaps in the ring of blockhouses (manned by the troops of a warlord ally of Chiang Kai-shek's, rather than the Nationalists themselves) to escape Jiangxi. The warlord armies were reluctant to challenge Communist forces for fear of wasting their own men, and did not pursue the Communists with much fervor. In addition, the main Nationalist forces were preoccupied with annihilating Zhang Guotao's army, which was much larger than Mao's. The massive military retreat of Communist forces lasted a year and covered 6000 km, and was touted as the Long March, which ended when the Communists reached the interior of Shaanxi. Zhang Guotao's army, which took a different route through northwest China, was largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim ally, the Ma clique. Along the way, the Communist army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor, solidifying its appeal to the masses. Of the 80,000 people who began the Long March from the Soviet Chinese Republic, only around 7,000 made it to Shaanxi, and this included those who later joined the Red Army on the way. The remnants of Zhang's forces eventually joined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CCP, was never able to challenge Mao's authority. Essentially, the great retreat made Mao the undisputed leader of the Communist Party of China.

[edit] Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)

Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (pictured here in March 1945) was severely weakened in power by the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (pictured here in March 1945) was severely weakened in power by the Second Sino-Japanese War.

During the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek, who saw the Communists as a greater threat, refused to ally with the Communists to fight against the Japanese. On December 12, 1936, Kuomintang Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to a truce with the Communists. The incident became known as the Xi'an Incident. Both parties suspended fighting to form a Second United Front to focus their energies and fighting against the Japanese. In 1937, Japanese airplanes bombed Chinese cities and well-equipped troops overran north and coastal China.

The alliance that was created with the Communists was in name only and the Communists hardly ever engaged the Japanese in major battles but proved efficient in guerrilla warfare. The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CCP and KMT during World War II was minimal. In the midst of the Second United Front, the Communists and the Kuomintang were still vying for territorial advantage in "Free China" (i.e. those areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by Japanese puppet governments). The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when there were major clashes between the Communist and KMT forces. In December 1940, Chiang Kai-shek demanded that the CCP’s New Fourth Army evacuate Anhui and Jiangsu Provinces. Under intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders complied, but they were ambushed by Nationalist troops and soundly defeated in January 1941. This clash, which would be known as the New Fourth Army Incident, weakened the CCP position in Central China and effectively ended any substantive cooperation between the Nationalists and the Communists and both sides concentrated on jockeying for position in the inevitable civil war.

In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the Communists. Kuomintang's resistance to the Japanese proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek. The war against Japan greatly sapped the KMT's military resources, and Chiang's own central army was never to recover from the devastating losses it had sustained in the early stages of the war. In addition, in the last major Japanese offensive, Operation Ichigo of Fall 1944, the Japanese were able to manoeuver far inland and destroy much of what remained of Chiang's material strength. In contrast, thanks to the brutal mass retaliation policies of the Imperial Japanese Armies, huge numbers of dispossessed villagers were able to be recruited to the Communist ranks. Although the guerrilla operations conducted by the Communists inside occupied China were of limited military value, they greatly heightened popular perception that the Communists were at the vanguard of the fight against the Japanese. By the end of the war, large portions of the peasant masses of occupied China were politically mobilized in support of the Communists; however, the Communists had a severe shortage of war material, including small arms.

[edit] Immediate post-war clashes (1945–1946)
Chiang and Mao met during the peace negotiation held from Aug 28, 1945 to Oct 11, 1945 in the wartime capital of Chongqing, China to toast to the Chinese victory over Japan, but their shaky alliance was short-lived.
Chiang and Mao met during the peace negotiation held from Aug 28, 1945 to Oct 11, 1945 in the wartime capital of Chongqing, China to toast to the Chinese victory over Japan, but their shaky alliance was short-lived.

The dropping of the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender much more quickly than anyone in China had imagined. Under the terms of the Japanese unconditional surrender dictated by the United States, Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to Nationalist troops and not to the Communists present in some of the occupied areas, especially in Manchuria. However, as the Nationalists had no forces in Manchuria and very few or no forces in the most of the rest of the Japanese occupied area, while the communist guerrillas were the only Chinese force present in the area, the communists were able to takeover most of Manchuria before the Nationalists could send troops there. Even after sending sufficient forces, it would still take the Nationalists months of fighting to drive the communists out of major cities in Manchuria. As the communists were the only Chinese forces left in the region that had engaged the Japanese in guerrilla warfare, it was difficult for the Nationalists though to receive local popular support in Manchuria and other parts of China,because local Chinese residents blamed the Nationalists for allowing the Japanese invaders to conquer the local area, such as in the case of Manchuria 14 years previously.

Immediately after World War II, Chiang Kai-shek made a fatal mistake in trying to simultaneously solve the warlord problem and exterminate communism. Many of the warlords who sided with the Nationalists were only interested in keeping their own power, and defected to the Japanese side when the Japanese offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their cooperation. After World War II, these former Japanese puppet regimes once again joined the Nationalists.

Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good, as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined the Nationalists, because such a move would alienate other factions within the Nationalists; furthermore, these former warlords could still provide much-needed military assistance to the Nationalists.

As Chiang had neither sufficient force nor sufficient time to deploy his own troops in the former Japanese controlled regions, these warlords were given titles and ranks in the Nationalist forces and ordered to "keep order" in their areas of control by not surrendering to the communists, and by fighting off the communists if necessary. Chiang and his followers had hoped that these warlords would be able to resist the communists and hold on to the former Japanese-occupied regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops there. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still be of benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plaguing China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, the communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have an easier time taking control. The ensuing battles between the communists and these warlords resulted mostly in communist victories, exactly as Chiang and his followers had predicted, and their attempt to greatly reduce the problem of the warlords resulted in success.

However, this success came at a huge cost in the Nationalists' loss of popular support in these Japanese dominated regions, because the local population already blamed them for losing the regions to the Japanese, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as Nationalist forces to fight alongside of Japanese soldiers against the communists only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment towards Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. The first post-war peace negotiation, attended by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in Chongqing from Aug 28, 1945 to Oct 11, 1945 had little effect in stopping these clashes between the communists and the warlords. Battles between the two sides continued even as the peace negotiation was in progress, until the agreement was reached in January 1946. However, large campaigns and full scale confrontations between the communists and Chiang's own troops were temporarily avoided.

In the last month of World War II in East Asia, Soviet forces launched the mammoth Operation August Storm in Manchuria. This operation destroyed the fighting capability of the Kwantung Army and left the USSR in occupation of all of Manchuria at the end of the war. Consequently, the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region surrendered. Later in the year, Chiang Kai-shek came to the painful realization that he lacked the resources to prevent a CCP takeover of Manchuria following the scheduled Soviet departure. He therefore made a deal with the Russians to delay their withdrawal until he had moved enough of his best-trained men and modern materiel into the region. Nationalist troops were then airlifted by the United States to occupy key cities in North China, while the countryside was already dominated by the CCP. The Soviets spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to 2 billion dollars) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country.[1]

[edit] Post-war power struggle (1946–1947)
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American General George Marshall arrived in China and was part of negotiations over a ceasefire between the KMT and the CCP, the terms of which would build a coalition government that would include all of the contending political/military groups in China. Neither the Communists (represented by Zhou Enlai) nor Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were willing to compromise on certain fundamental issues or relinquish the territories they had seized in the wake of the Japanese surrender.
In the front row, Mao Zedong is on the right, Chiang Kai-shek is in the middle and general Patrick Hurley is on the left.
In the front row, Mao Zedong is on the right, Chiang Kai-shek is in the middle and general Patrick Hurley is on the left.

The Nationalists demilitarized 1.5 million troops, ostensibly to support the Marshall Mission; this turned out to be a fatal mistake for Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalists. Chiang and his associates used this excuse to reduce the power and influence of warlords who were allied with Nationalists: almost none of the 1.5 million troops discharged belonged to Chiang's own forces, most of them belonging to warlords, including those who had collaborated with the Japanese during the war and later pledged their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalists. This move alienated many within the Nationalists. As for the ordinary soldiers who were discharged, their prospects changed for the worse as nothing effective was done to help them integrate into civilian life. Many protests and riots by the discharged soldiers broke out, particularly in Chongqing by discharged former soldiers of the Sichuan warlords. Faced with such desperate situations, these former soldiers turned against Chiang and the Nationalist government, and while some turned to banditry, most of them decided to join the Communists. The Communists welcomed these new recruits because their resentment towards the Nationalists made them sympathetic to the Communist cause. The largest Nationalist defection to the Communists occurred in Manchuria, where over half a million discharged Nationalist soldiers (mostly former Japanese puppet government troops) joined the Communist force, which previously had never exceeded 50,000--a more than 1000% boost for Lin Biao's forces.

In addition to this, the Nationalist demilitarization also provided Communists with much needed weaponry. When Chiang Kai-shek attempted to solve the problem of the warlords by discharging their troops, the action backfired badly for him and the Nationalists in Manchuria when it was combined with other critical mistakes the Nationalists made. The Japanese wartime strategy had been to give up Japan rather than give up Manchuria because the latter was so industrially vital, and thus, they had stockpiled large amounts of weaponry (enough to sustain more than 700,000 troops for several years) in hidden remote and hard-to-reach areas all over Manchuria. Although the Soviets captured a large quantity of Japanese weaponry, the majority of the Japanese stock survived. The Nationalists were infatuated with obtaining as many urban centers as possible; therefore, the rural and hard-to-reach areas were ignored. Militarily, the Nationalist did not have any incentive to recover this large stockpile of weaponry because the American weaponry used by Nationalist forces was superior. More importantly, since operating modern weaponry needed considerable knowledge and training, the Nationalists believed that even if these weapons were to reach Communist hands, it would be impossible for the Communists to use them because most of their troops were uneducated and illiterate. Therefore, the Nationalist regime generally ignored the information on these Japanese secret depots because they deemed it not worth the effort to recover or destroy the weapons. Furthermore, since the information was provided by former warlords' troops, and they were to be discharged, the Nationalists considered their actions no other than attempting to show their importance and to ask for financial rewards, and thus failed to take proper actions to prevent these weapons falling into the wrong hands. Chiang and the Nationalists were correct on the matter originally but when Nationalist demilitarization began, things turned out to be completely opposite. Because the discharged troops had the experience and training needed to handle the weaponry, communists in Manchuria had hit a gold mine when these troops joined them en masse. Not only were these valuable troops able to teach the rest of communists how to operate these weapons, but more importantly, these new troops knew exactly where the Japanese secret depots were. Unlike the Nationalists, the communists were extremely appreciative of the information and weaponry obtained, because what was less advanced to the Nationalists was of great value to the poorly equipped Communist troops.

Contrary to the Nationalist propaganda that the Soviets had given huge quantity of weapons to the Communists in Manchuria, the actual amount was extremely low: the total Soviet weaponry and Japanese weaponry captured by the Soviet Union that was given to the communists was only enough to equip 30 infantry regiments and 2 mountain gun battalions, equipping a mere 20,000 communist troops out of a total of 400,000 (as of the end of 1947), and the Soviet aid to Communists completely stopped by the end of 1947. The Communists originally expected the Soviets to play a much larger role and Lin Biao personally wrote a letter to Joseph Stalin on June 25, 1947, asking for Japanese weaponry to be turned over to the Communists, even as he asked for captured German weaponry. Stalin, however, did not even bother to respond. On December 28, 1947, Lin Biao wrote another letter directly to Stalin, asking for more weaponry. Again, Lin Biao appealed to Stalin in the letter that if such demand could not be met with captured Japanese weaponry, then captured German weaponry could fill the gap. Stalin, just like he had done previously, did not respond. However, the nearly nonexistent Soviet help proved not to be a problem for the Communists; in the mean time, the huge Communist need was filled by an unexpected source: their adversaries, the Nationalists. Due to the fatal mistake the Nationalists made in their demilitarization, the Communists were able to pinpoint nearly every Japanese secret depot with the help of former Nationalist troops in their ranks, and the total amount of Japanese weaponry recovered was enough to sustain the Communists for 2 years before relying on captured American weaponry from the Nationalists in the later stage of the war. For example, a single secret depot typically contained as much as 150,000 artillery rounds. By February 1947, hundreds of artillery pieces were recovered by the communists, including: 49 howitzers, 300 heavy mortars, 137 anti-aircraft artilleries, 141 anti-tank guns, 108 mountain guns, 97 cannons, and many other smaller artillery pieces, almost one-third of the Nationalist weaponry. More importantly, due to the rapid expansion of their ranks, filled by former Nationalist troops discharged from the demilitarization, the sudden increase of troops of the Communists meant that the original Communist peasantry army that was largely illiterate had suddenly became an army with 90% of its force being well trained, technically capable and combat hardened veterans that were more than a match for the Nationalist forces, who now had only three-quarters of the amount of Communist weaponry, with a handful of tanks and aircraft. However, even at this stage, Nationalist troops still greatly underestimated their Communist counterparts because the American weaponry used by Nationalist troops was superior to the Japanese weaponry used by the Communist troops. Thus, the huge qualitative advantage of the Nationalist would, they believed, be more than enough to make up for the numerical superiority of the Communists, a bad miscalulation for which they would have to pay later.

During the Nationalist demilitarization, the Communists did not sit idly either; it also reduced its troops by a million both in the regular army and in militia to ostensibly support the Marshall Mission. However, such reduction was the result of Mao Zedong's class struggle theory; in fact, most were discharged due to political persecution and "rectification" campaigns. As a result, the Communist force reduction was much harsher than that of Nationalist because it was a political purge. Most of those targeted in the Communist force reduction were from the wealthy, land owning and middle classes, and despite their loyalty to the Communists, they were considered unreliable due to their class background and thus were purged. These unfortunates did not have the luxury like those discharged Nationalist soldiers who at least were able to live on the streets. Those discharged by the Communists were considered "class enemies" and were targeted by their former comrades, and were often executed, jailed, or forced to commit suicide.[citation needed] As a result, most Communist members from well-to-do family backgrounds chose to desert, with the majority defecting to the Nationalist and becoming ardent anti-Communists. The defection rate was particularly high in those Communist-controlled regions where the struggles of persecutions were brutal, and in Mao's own admission, "in Shandong alone, over 300,000 (former Communists) were driven to the enemy (Nationalist) side."[citation needed] In addition to joining the regular Nationalist force, Communist defectors also formed their own militias to help the Nationalist to exterminate the Communists in the civil war that soon followed. The Communists also used the cease-fire period ushered by Marshall to arm and train huge numbers of peasants who had joined the People's Liberation Army during the war with Japan. The political persecution and purges during this era was an extension of Mao's Rectification Movement and was kept secret by the Chinese government, and it was not until the 1990s that the bloody details were allowed to surface in the domestic Chinese media.

The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full scale war broke out on June 26, and although negotiations continued, Marshall was recalled in January 1947, the same time when the last Communist envoys in Nationalist controlled regions were recalled back to Yan'an.

[edit] Fighting on mainland China (1946–1950)

With the breakdown of talks, an all out war resumed. This stage is referred to in Communist media and historiography as the "War of Liberation" (Simplified Chinese: 解放战争; Pinyin: Jiěfŕng Zhŕnzhēng).

The United States assisted the Nationalists with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new surplus military supplies and generous loans of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment.[2] They also airlifted many Nationalist troops from central China to Manchuria. Nevertheless, the Communists, who had already situated themselves in the north and northeast, were poised to strike.

General Marshall himself stated that he knew of no evidence that the Chinese communists were being supplied by the Soviet Union.[3] However, Soviet Union provided some aid, modest compared to the American efforts but important to the Chinese communists. Arms included hundreds of thousands of rifles, 3,700 artillery pieces and ammunition, 900 aircraft, 700 tanks, and 12,000 machine guns made available from Japanese arms depots. However, due to communists' lack of ability to maintain advanced hardware, most of the aircraft and tanks were soon cannibalized, and it was not until large numbers of well trained nationalist troops joined the communist force were the communists finally able to master the hardware.[4] In other Soviet assistance, tens of thousands of Japanese POWs were sent to train the CCP, and many also directly participated in fightings.[5] The Japanese soldiers who died for the communists in Tianjin Campaign (1949) alone numbered hundreds. According to the communists, Japanese civilians were enlisted in the arms factories for the communists, whom in addition to producing the badly needed weaponry, also trained large numbers of communist workers. North Korea also played an important role, with 30-40 thousand Korean troops from Soviet-occupied North Korea were provided[6] in addition to allowing the CCP to use North Korea as a sanctuary in general,[7] and repairing Manchurian railroads and bridges which were used by Mao.[8]

Belatedly, the Nationalist government sought to enlist popular support through internal reforms. The effort was in vain, however, because of rampant corruption in government and accompanying political and economic chaos including massive hyperinflation. By late 1948, the Nationalist position was bleak. The Nationalists had already taken the brunt of heavy fighting against the Japanese during World War II, while the Communists (for the most part) took part in guerrilla warfare. As a result, the demoralized Nationalist troops proved unable to stop the People's Liberation Army's advance. Although the Nationalists had an advantage in their numbers and weapons, and benefited from considerable international support, their low morale hindered their ability to fight. Furthermore, though they administered a larger and more populous territory, their corruption effectively stifled any civilian support.

The Communists were ultimately able to seize Manchuria after struggling through numerous set-backs while trying to take the cities, with the decisive Liaoshen Campaign. The capture of large Nationalist formations provided them with the tanks, heavy artillery, and other combined-arms assets needed to prosecute offensive operations south of the Great Wall. The Huaihai Campaign of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for communist forces, while the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China, including Beiping (now Beijing), which was taken by the Communists without a fight on January 31, 1949. On April 21, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River, capturing Nanjing, capital of the Nationalist's Republic of China, two days later. In most cases, the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities.

By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remnants of Nationalist forces southwards in southern China. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China with its capital at Beiping, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and 600,000 Nationalist troops and 2,000,000 refugees, predominantly from the government and business community, retreated from the mainland to the island of Taiwan, and there remained only isolated pockets of resistance, particularly in the far south. A PRC attempt to take the ROC controlled island of Kinmen was thwarted in the Battle of Kuningtou halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan. In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed Taipei, Taiwan, the temporary capital of the Republic of China and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China. The last of the fighting ended with the Communist conquest of Hainan Island in May 1950. However, no legal document to officially end the Chinese Civil War has ever been signed. Legally speaking, with both contending governments PRC and ROC still existing, the Chinese Civil War has not been resolved.

According to the communist claim, from the beginning of July 1946 through June 1950, the communists managed to destroy a total of 8.07 million nationalist troops (including capturing/accepting the surrender of 4.59 million nationalist troops), while losing 1.52 million of its own, including 260,000 fatalities, 1.06 million wounded, 20,000 captured by the enemy, and 180,000 missing and desertions.[citation needed] The Kuomintang disagrees with the communist claim on the nationalist losses, claiming the figure is improbable.

[edit] Relationship between the two sides since 1950

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the United States initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, thus triggering the Korean War. At this point, allowing a total Communist victory over Chiang became politically impossible in the United States, and President Harry S. Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Taiwan straits, ending any immediate possibility for a successful Communist invasion.

Some American historians have theorized that the loss of mainland China to the Communists enabled Joseph McCarthy to purge the China Hands from the U.S. State Department.[citation needed] In turn, it is possible that John F. Kennedy lacked the advice of any real experts on East Asia when he was trying to formulate a policy on Vietnam, which would imply that the Chinese Civil War can be linked causally to the Vietnam War. In addition, Lyndon Johnson's belief that the loss of China cost Truman and the Democratic Party its political support made Johnson determined to uphold South Vietnam at all costs.

Meanwhile, on Taiwan, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, intermittent skirmishes occurred throughout the mainland's coastal and peripheral regions, though American reluctance to be drawn into a larger conflict left Chiang Kai-shek too weak to "retake the mainland" as he constantly vowed. ROC fighter aircraft bombed mainland targets and commandos, sometimes numbering up to 80, landed repeatedly on the mainland to kill PLA soldiers, kidnap CCP cadres, destroy infrastructure, and seize documents. The ROC lost about 150 men in one raid in 1964.

The ROC navy conducted low intensity naval raids, and lost some ships in several small battles with the PLA. In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships, mainly of British and Soviet-bloc origin. Since the mainland's railroad network was underdeveloped, north-south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland fishermen.

After losing the mainland, a group of approximately 1,200 KMT soldiers escaped to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China. Their leader, General Li Mi, was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of Yunnan. Initially, the United States supported these remnants and the Central Intelligence Agency provided them with aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times. Raids into mainland China gradually ended by the late 1960s as PLA infrastructure improved. Remnants of these KMT loyalists remain in the area and are active in the opium trade.[citation needed]

After the Republic of China complained to the United Nations against the Soviet Union supporting the Chinese communists, the UN General Assembly Resolution 505 was adopted on February 1, 1952 to condemn the Soviet Union.

Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in Fujian as vital for any future campaign to retake the mainland. On September 3, 1954, the First Taiwan Strait crisis began when the PLA started shelling Quemoy and threatened to take the Dachen Islands. On January 20, 1955, the PLA took nearby Yijiangshan Island, with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed defending the island. On January 24 of the same year, the United States Congress passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands. Instead of committing to defend the ROC's offshore islands, President Eisenhower pressured Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate his 11,000 troops and 20,000 civilians from the Dachen Islands, leaving them for PLA takeover. Nanchi Island was abandoned as well, leaving Quemoy and Matsu the only major islands remaining. The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment, amid United States threats of escalation and use of nuclear weapons.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on August 23, 1958 with another intense artillery bombardment of Quemoy and ended on November of the same year. PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the United States rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided amphibious assault ships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On September 7, the United States escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing. On October 25, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire" — the PLA would only shell Quemoy on odd-numbered days. By the end of the crisis, Quemoy had been struck with 500,000 artillery rounds and 3000 civilians and 1000 soldiers had been killed or wounded. Quemoy and Matsu were major campaign issues in the 1960 U.S. presidential election. Gradually through the 1960s live artillery was replaced by propaganda.

In January 1979, the PRC announced it would stop shelling Quemoy and Matsu. Though the PRC conducted missile tests in 1995–96 and escalated tensions, armed clashes between the two countries have ceased. Since the late 1980s, there has been growing economic exchanges on both sides while the Taiwan straits remain a dangerous flashpoint.


Edited by T98G, 10 September 2007 - 03:48 AM.

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

George Santayana (1863 - 1952)

Against logic there is no armor like ignorance.

Laurence J. Peter (1919 - 1988)

#15 bayonet

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Posted 10 September 2007 - 09:32 AM

wow, T-98, a very informative article, and your choice to put it here for discussion is right. I m sure many can't wait to throw out their theories about the civil war. I think this article is balanced and tells truths (at least not bias intentionally). You will see many different versions about the civil war from other members here.




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