Jump to content


Photo
- - - - -

Why did China become Communist?


  • Please log in to reply
65 replies to this topic

#16 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 26 March 2010 - 06:05 PM

IMHO, the most important reason was actually quote simple: KMT was the ruling party, and the authoritarian/totalitarian interventionist social order (that was common for any ruling Dynasty in China, and for that matter for most empires throughout history) was obviously not working; wheras the Communists were out of power, therefore could promise the sun and the moon and all sorts of othe impossibles. The masses were gullible enough to believe it.

You can see some of how it works in today's politics: the elephants were thrown out because they were in power, and the donkeys could promise anything; soon enough, the donkeys will be thrown out. None of the interventionist policies work.

Compared to the KMT-CCP conflict, we can easily see its similarities to the Qing-TaiPing conflict. Once again there, the authoritarian existing power structure wasn't working, the rebells won almost every single battle for years while promising the masses a wacky and utterly implausible new social order. Qing was eventually saved by decentralization and letting the TaiPings ruin their own economy; TaiPing's Nanjing turned into starvation city in an episode rather similar to the Great Leap Forward a century later. If CKS let CCP rule northern China after WWII, the Great Leap Forward probably would have killed off the CCP regime in the 1950's. In our time line, eventually some cadres in CCP under Deng became smart and realized that prosperity does not come from orders from up high but from individual initiatives . . . and undertook economic reforms following the examples of Taiwan. That's how Chinese were able to get 30+ years of relative prosperity.

The so-called KMT corruption in the 1940's was simply the inevitable problem from authoritarian rules. When run-away inflation took place in 1948, KMT made a new law demanding all Chinese citizens to hand over their private gold to the government, supposedly to form a new basis for a new currency. General Xue Yue (the most accomplished Chinese general during WWII, successfully denfinding ChangSha from three Japanese invasions/encirclements) flatly told Jiang JingGuo that the soldiers had earned the gold with their blood and the government would have to spill blood to take the gold from them. So who was the "corrupt" one in this? The soldiers who had guns and said no to government "law enforcement" or the government officials makign arbitrary hare-brained laws? Let's not forget, inflation is always the result of government expansion of money supply.

The fundamenal reason why China succumbed to communists was because they had too much faith in government, believing too often that the government could provide solutions in a top-down fashion. When government officials devise solutions in a top-down fashion sitting in a capital thousands of miles away, the man-made "laws" are almost always corrupt and dissociated from local realities on the ground. Every level of officials then try to interpret and make such rules to his/her own benefit as he/she sees fit. The result is an unworkable society over time. When things get really bad, some rebels would come along, and promise an even more unworkable top-down system. China succumbed to communists that way; Russia cucumbed for the same reason; the rest of the world are just as vulnerable.

#17 ahxiang

ahxiang

    Prime Minister (Situ/Chengxiang 司徒/丞相)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 1,617 posts

Posted 26 March 2010 - 07:43 PM

IMHO, the most important reason was actually quote simple: KMT was the ruling party, and the authoritarian/totalitarian interventionist social order (that was common for any ruling Dynasty in China, and for that matter for most empires throughout history) was obviously not working; wheras the Communists were out of power, therefore could promise the sun and the moon and all sorts of othe impossibles. The masses were gullible enough to believe it.

You can see some of how it works in today's politics: the elephants were thrown out because they were in power, and the donkeys could promise anything; soon enough, the donkeys will be thrown out. None of the interventionist policies work.

Compared to the KMT-CCP conflict, we can easily see its similarities to the Qing-TaiPing conflict. Once again there, the authoritarian existing power structure wasn't working, the rebells won almost every single battle for years while promising the masses a wacky and utterly implausible new social order. Qing was eventually saved by decentralization and letting the TaiPings ruin their own economy; TaiPing's Nanjing turned into starvation city in an episode rather similar to the Great Leap Forward a century later. If CKS let CCP rule northern China after WWII, the Great Leap Forward probably would have killed off the CCP regime in the 1950's. In our time line, eventually some cadres in CCP under Deng became smart and realized that prosperity does not come from orders from up high but from individual initiatives . . . and undertook economic reforms following the examples of Taiwan. That's how Chinese were able to get 30+ years of relative prosperity.

The so-called KMT corruption in the 1940's was simply the inevitable problem from authoritarian rules. When run-away inflation took place in 1948, KMT made a new law demanding all Chinese citizens to hand over their private gold to the government, supposedly to form a new basis for a new currency. General Xue Yue (the most accomplished Chinese general during WWII, successfully denfinding ChangSha from three Japanese invasions/encirclements) flatly told Jiang JingGuo that the soldiers had earned the gold with their blood and the government would have to spill blood to take the gold from them. So who was the "corrupt" one in this? The soldiers who had guns and said no to government "law enforcement" or the government officials makign arbitrary hare-brained laws? Let's not forget, inflation is always the result of government expansion of money supply.

The fundamenal reason why China succumbed to communists was because they had too much faith in government, believing too often that the government could provide solutions in a top-down fashion. When government officials devise solutions in a top-down fashion sitting in a capital thousands of miles away, the man-made "laws" are almost always corrupt and dissociated from local realities on the ground. Every level of officials then try to interpret and make such rules to his/her own benefit as he/she sees fit. The result is an unworkable society over time. When things get really bad, some rebels would come along, and promise an even more unworkable top-down system. China succumbed to communists that way; Russia cucumbed for the same reason; the rest of the world are just as vulnerable.



Long time no see. I am however disappointed to know that you did not weign in with facts such as the 200,000 Korean mercenaries and diehards who fought for the Chinese communist cause while the so-called communist crack troops from Shandong and Hebei were totally shattered at Sipingjie and fled all the way to Harbin. Not to mention Stalin's "China Aid Act" of hundreds of millions of USD in early 1948, on top of the transfer of Japanese guns and the "Operation Augusta" US lease goods, and the direct participataion of the Soviet engineering corps, Soviet railway army corps, and the international brigades, and the Outer Mongolia Cavalry troops.

The brave Chinese soldiers who died by millions in the civil war, plus the 5 million "bandits" who were destroyed from 1950 to 1955, were the FLOWER China ever had in the history of 5000 years !!!

About the poster who posted the gibberish. Let's zero in a bit into what he said:

"第一次高潮,在内战之初。相对而言,“国军”这一时期的倒戈数量不多,但政治影响很大。此时,“国军”与“共军”之间力量悬殊,蒋介石、陈诚夸下海口要“三个月剿灭关内共军”,结果,不但“共军”没有如期“剿灭”,青天白日下的“国军”却接二连三地“叛变投共”。先是1945年10月30日高树勋率新编第8军在河北邯郸起义,接着是1946年1月郝鹏举率第6路先遣军在山东台儿庄起义,再就是1946年5月30日潘朔端率第184师一部在辽宁海城起义。“走高树勋、潘朔端的道路”,在相当长的一段时间内,成了***军队开展敌军工作的一个很响亮、能震撼人心的口号。

第二次高潮,在1948年9月至1949年1月的战略决战时期"

Reading this in an analytical way, you could interprete it as something like this: from the 1945 to 1948, there was no "climax" of government troops defecting to the communist side; in 1945, the communists scored three big defections; ... What were those defections? Gao Shuxun, a Northwestern Army general, was with the communists for 20+ years, and his defection was a setup by the communist mole in the general staff headquarters, i.e., Liu Fei. Gao was asked to go to Peking for receiving Japan's surrender, but instead of taking the train along Long-hai and Tienstin-Pukow, he walked along the derailed Peking-Hankow RR. I do not have info on the fate of soldiers of the troops Gao took to the communist side. I doubt they had a good fate. Now, the next. Let's see the fate of those in next two examples. Hao Pengju had four division commanders at the time of Japanese surrender. However, out of the four puppet army generals, at least two were undercover communists. You would be amazed to see how successful the communist penetration into the puppet army was. What happened after the uprising was that Hao changed mind, and seperated from the communists, and were then encircled and destroyed. Why would Hao not stick with the communists? Simple. The whole country of China knew that the communists were traitors, and accomplices of the Russians, and had no mandate and "YI" or justice or moral authority. The last example is a joke. It was one regiment which was disarmed and surrendered to the communist. This regiment under Pan was made into a propaganda that the whole division had an "uprising". What happened next was that this regiment, while being sheparded northward, rebelled against the communists, and at a battle near Meihekou, completely wiped out and killed to the last person. You may ask why the soldiers rebelled against the communists???

Now the other poster talked about Huai-Hai. I had discussed at the thread about how some communist general recalled that their PLA front armies were cut in half after the Huai-Hai Campaign. Cut in half, not to mention that hundreds of thousands of bare-hand peasants were thrown in to fill the gun barrels - i.e., human wave attacks.
http://www.chinahist...49/page__st__75

Remember, before 1948, often, a government division chased several divisons of communist troops across several provinces. Check out the thread above to see how I described about the Kaifeng Siege: one and a half government divisions withdstood attacks by 200,000 communist troops from three field armies. I do not want to go into the Siege of Taiyuan, and etc. Only Russian artilleries took them out. Otherwise, you would have things similar to Mongol siege of Xiangyang, lasting like 5 years or 10 years.

Edited by ahxiang, 26 March 2010 - 07:51 PM.


#18 animerlot

animerlot

    General of the Guard (Hujun Zhongwei/Jinjun Tongshuai 护军中尉/禁军统帅)

  • Supreme Scholar (Jinshi)
  • 106 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Location:Beijing China
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    General Chinese Culture
  • Specialisation / Expertise:
    Con, Bud, Tao

Posted 27 March 2010 - 03:12 AM

Can somebody delete the duplicate posts, please.
一日不作,一日不食

#19 animerlot

animerlot

    General of the Guard (Hujun Zhongwei/Jinjun Tongshuai 护军中尉/禁军统帅)

  • Supreme Scholar (Jinshi)
  • 106 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Location:Beijing China
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    General Chinese Culture
  • Specialisation / Expertise:
    Con, Bud, Tao

Posted 27 March 2010 - 04:18 AM

gibberish , nice, you know what, I've been "educated" more than you can imagine this part of history for many years, history classes, movies,books, political classes, and people talks, but when I use these materials I use them carefully, because I know all I know are from only one side, and this side looks a little bit of perfect, and I also know there is nothing perfect.

But I just do not get it, how you make sure what you read is the truth? Do you really been to the battlefield like the people who did it? Do you really interview some of the old soldiers or generals to know this history? Do you really study the books from both sides(CCP, KMT and US), and to compare them find what is the truth and what should be suspect? If you don't, what make you so sure to judge the other people's is gibberish and your is not? And so sure to talk like you know all the facts more than others?

When you using the materials, "while being sheparded northward, rebelled against the communists, and at a battle near Meihekou, completely wiped out and killed to the last person", did you ever asked yourself, what makes you believe that? What makes you so sure it is not gibberish?

And,"The whole country of China knew that the communists were traitors,and accomplices of the Russians, and had no mandate and "YI" or justice or moral authority." Are you the "whole country"? If not, how you know what they knew?
一日不作,一日不食

#20 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 31 March 2010 - 08:48 PM

Long time no see. I am however disappointed to know that you did not weign in with facts such as the 200,000 Korean mercenaries and diehards who fought for the Chinese communist cause while the so-called communist crack troops from Shandong and Hebei were totally shattered at Sipingjie and fled all the way to Harbin. Not to mention Stalin's "China Aid Act" of hundreds of millions of USD in early 1948, on top of the transfer of Japanese guns and the "Operation Augusta" US lease goods, and the direct participataion of the Soviet engineering corps, Soviet railway army corps, and the international brigades, and the Outer Mongolia Cavalry troops.


The question was why China came under the rule of the Communists, not why KMT failed to unite the country. There is a subtle difference between the two. It should come as no surprise that third parties would try to intervene and forestall the emergence of a unified empire. It's the same reason why the US helped China during Japan's attempt to unite "all asiatic races," and the Soviets did the same thing: helping the underdog China in Japan's drive to unite East Asia. It's the same reason why US intervened in WWI after Russian collapse. It's the same reason why Britain entered Entente Cordelia when Frace+Russia seemed unable to balance against the rising Germany. It's the same reason why Britain and France helped the South during American Civil War. It's the same reason why Britain fought on the side of the anti-French forces during both the Napoleonic Wars and the French Revolutionary wars. It's the same reason why France fought on the side of the Protestants against the Catholic Hapsburg Austria/HRE in the 30-year War despite itself being a major Catholic power. BTW, it's also the same reason why China and US befriends/befriended Pakistan when India tries/tried to dominate South Asia.

If KMT/CKS actually thought he was going to carry out "the Mandate of Heaven" and monopolize all the human resources of China (i.e. 1/4 of the world population) without facing any outside powers throwing a monkey ranch or two, he'd prove himself as naive as the Qing madarins more than a century earlier who were completely ignorant of the concept of check-and-balances between peer major powers.

The question asked was not why KMT failed to completely defeat CCP. If the question were that, soviet help would be correct. Soviets certainly would prefer a buffer state in the north headed by the CCP. Even if Sun Li-Jen's New 1st Army pushed north of SongHua River and all the way to ManZhouLi, communist guerillas would still be in the hills on both sides of the Russo-Chinese border, well-supplied by the Russians.

The question asked was why KMT regime collapsed (almost) all over China under CCP attack. It was not in the Soviet interest to see CCP unification of China (or unification under KMT); nor was it in the US interest; nor was it in the interest of individual Chinese, for that matter. Monopoly is only in the interest of the owner of the monopoly, at the expense of the suppliers, customers and neighbors alike; a government can be seen as a provider of social services.

The brave Chinese soldiers who died by millions in the civil war, plus the 5 million "bandits" who were destroyed from 1950 to 1955, were the FLOWER China ever had in the history of 5000 years !!!


IMHO, a viable philosophy/ideology can not be a death-cult. Any viable philosophy/ideology has to be a celebration of life! Neither Japanese Bushido cult comparing warrior life to cherry blossom nor Nazi death cult promoting Wagnerian self-immolation really got them anywhere. Despite their initial success against ill-trained, ill-equipped and ill-motivated opponents, their death cults eventually did themselves in by perpetually searching for ways of self-immolation, and eventually finding them.

The most important task for military men is not self-sacrifice but neutralizing enemy combatants. Sometimes that neutralization goal regrettably requires death to some enemy soldiers, even that should be considered regrettable because the current enemy, if left alive, can be quite helpful as a future ally against a different future enemy. Death to oneself should certainly be something to be avoided. As Patton once said, your job is not to die for your country, but to make the other *** die for his country.

IMHO, KMT military performance during the Chinese Civil War of 1945-50 left much to be desired. This is not to belittle the self-sacrifice of some specific officers, but a comment on the overall strategic, operational and tactic capabilities and tendencies of the KMT military during that time period. Many large formations simply collapsed far too quickly for their size and time period. For example, the most important battle, JinZhou, lasted only 31hrs! The CCP field armies in 1948 was not exactly the US military in Desert Storm! How was Lin Biao able to line up those thousands of cannons without being massively interdicted by KMT air force, which had complete air superiority? After the 90-minute bombardment, where were the two divisions of KMT soldiers who should have been fighting doggedly in rubbles like the soviet defense of Stalingrad? or even like the Brest at the beginning of Babarossa onslaught?

Even at MengLiangGu, the elite 74th Division of 30k men (was really an Eastern "Army" and Western "Corps" by contemporary military standards) lasted only 4 days! A comparable sized battle like Velikiye Luki lasted a month and a half! A 30,000-men elite uit should be large enough to be self-sustainable for more than four days without being carved up like potato. Something went really wrong there. The KMT post-action report spent much ink on suicides among the high ranking officers. Why?! Their job was to go out there neutralize enemies and bring their own men back so they can neutralize more enemies the next time! Not committing suicide and abandoning their men! If the officers wanted to lead from the front, they should at least have a deputy or staff officer take care of the logistics and continued operational capability of the unit in case of the commanding officer's death.

Looking through many Chinese Civil War battles during 1946-50, I can't help getting the feeling that many KMT units were remaking the typical WWI mistakes, while some of the communist commanders (like Lin Biao and Su Yu) were fighting a much better organized WWII. KMT units on all levels were deployed way too tightly, hence completely lacking defense in depth, and when the enemy artillery shells fell, casualty rates became unnecessarily high, classic WWI mistakes. By WWII time, proper understanding of modern firepower indicated that a battalion could defend a 2-5km sector, and a division should be able to handle 10-50km's; anything tighter than that is just wasting manpower and provisions. It's ridiculous to see how tightly packed even the elite units like the 74th Division at MengLiangGu and 9th Army Group (under Liao Yao Xiang, including the 1st and 6th Corps, both KMT elite units). One can't help wondering why they were so tightly packed. Perhaps the commanders were afraid of men not fighting or even deserting? Hence the Napoleonic tight formations? Those tight formations proved disasterous as early as during the American Civil War (a mistake repeated at the beginning of WWI).

KMT units also seemed to have ignored the most basics of infantry and combined arms tactics. Due to the rapid fire weapons and artillery, combined with the lack of effective infantry body armor at the time, WWII through pre-1980's battle field favored tactical defense in infantry actions (it had been the case since ACW). That means, the proper tactic should have involved aggressive scouting, placing schwerpunkt where there was no enemy or little enemy, then dig in quickly setup rapid fire weapons and wait for enemy to waste their manpower counter-attacking; rinse and repeat. KMT units seemed to have a tendency to do the exact opposite of that and fell for the trap: they did not engage in aggressive scouting and finding out where the enemy was weak, defended entirely passively (meaning getting crushed by enemy artillery because there was no scouting to find out where enemy artillery was and neutralize it through air power; the defense line being too static gave enemy time to accumulate and set up artillery), then mass attack/counter-attack enemy strong points! Which was tantamount to suicide! Too many KMT soldiers fell into two categories:

(1) Those who tried to do the impossible: charging straight into enemy zones of rapid fire, and getting wasted;
(2) Those who ran away entirely.

Neither types were effective soldiers. The proper goal of a soldier should have been neutralize as many enemy soldiers as possible, and live to another day to neutralize more with the gained experience. There is no such thing as "experienced kamikaze" or "experienced suicide bomber"; therefore neither of them are particularly effective. The US military in the Pacific actually had a favorite tactical situation: Japanese Banzai Charge, which was the most effective way of getting rid of large numbers of Japanese soldiers.

Another reason for the quick collapse of large KMT formation was probably "Kessel Fever," the panic among soldiers who just realized that they were surrounded; German WWII military theoreticians came to the conclusion that if Kessel Fever does not cause a pocket to collapse psychologically within a few days, the pocket usually could hold out for extended period of time. Even the elite formations during MengLiangGu, Manchuria and Xu-Ben/Huai-Hai succumbed to Kessel Fever, and folded extremely rapidly. That indicates both lack of training and preparation, as well as the type of human material getting promoted in that organization, and what kind of organizational and logistical cohesion (or lack thereof) that they had experienced. Units enter battles with plans, but plans are usually the first casualties in a conflict. The same problem faced the over-confident and ill-prepared US 8th army under Walker in Korean War after an extended victorious chase when Chinese intervention fell on them like a thunderclap. However, the 1st Marine Division survived the shock through sheer tenacity in adversity. In a few months, General Matthew Ridgeway reconditioned the 8th army to survive the initial shock, and worked out the math that the CCP infantry attacks would peter out on its own after 3-4 days due to logistic limits (of the individual CCP soldier's ration carrier); massive counter-attacks at that time would utterly devastate the CCP units. Too bad most of the important KMT units' battlefield collapse fit neatly into that 3-4 day window. CKS/KMT's use of top elite units early in the war in the far northeast and northern China deprived itself the chance of tactical/operational adaptation to new field realities (i.e. CCP armies were not as badly equipped or badly trained as they had thought).

The social and military organizational and logistical structures of KMT probably did not help the organizational cohesion that was necessary to mitigate Kessel Fever. For example, the petty jealousy among various commanding officers at MengLiangGu, and the hostility between elite vs. plebian military units at ChangChun.

#21 ahxiang

ahxiang

    Prime Minister (Situ/Chengxiang 司徒/丞相)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 1,617 posts

Posted 02 April 2010 - 12:03 AM

China could have been communized in 1927, not 1949. In 1927, Soviets had funded the wars of both Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yuxiang. I already said that Soviets gave Feng Yuxiang more guns, and Soviets never trusted Chiang Kai-shek, and held off the endorsement of the northern expedition till December 1926. Looking back in history, I would rather China to be communized in 1927, then to be defeated in a world wide war while bound to the Soviet chariot, than to go through the dozens of years of civil wars and world wars.

You talked about the Sipingjie Campaign and the communist flee to Harbin. I already covered this part. Chiang was planning to leave the Qiqihar strip to the communists, and never intended to drive them out of the border. Stalin and Mao had different calculations, as well. Stalin would be happy to control China's northern belt 50-50. Mao was smart enough to have engineer Zhang Xinfu murdered so that Chiang could not have reached a joint venture agreement with the Russians. Then went the Russian order to defend Sipingjie as China's Madrid. What happened was that the so-called crack communist 8th route and new 4th armies were destroyed at Sipingjie. And Kim Il-sun had to send in 200,000 mercenaries to help Mao, not counting the Koreans who were converted from the Japanese Kwantung Army. After 4 years of war, there were only 50,000 Koreans left, to be shipped back to Kim for the 1950 Korean War.

It seems to me you had not a slight appreciation for Chiang, without whom China might have enslaved by Japan already and the lanscape of the world could have been totally different today. I will give an example as to how Chiang was thought of. In 1938, Stalin had another order for world communists, i.e., to defend Wuhan as China's Madrid. So, the communists world wide came to China, and all praised Chiang as the greatest leader. Only two persons did not buy that. One was Stilwell, who was called over for a censure by the Chinese govermnment, and the other person who disained Chiang was Mao.

You need to spend more time studying the wars and campaigns of the civil war. I had talked about the disclosures of historical facts during the cultural revolution. What was disclosed was that Lin Biao hesitated attacking Sipingjie the 3rd time after maulings he suffered, and from early 1948 to autumn 1948, loitered between Jinzhou and Sipingjie for over half a year, against Mao's repeating demands to attack Jinzhou. At one time, Lin Biao requested for a western campaign towards Jehol, which was defended by Si Jue for 3-4 years, against frequent raids by the Outer Mongolia Cavalry. (To know who Shi Jue was, check out the Battle of Huwan at republicanchina.org/campaign.html ) It was till the Soviet engineering corps and railway army corps fully laid the tracks and shipped over 900 pieces of artilleries that Lin Biao finally attacked Jinzhou. (Zhang Rong had a talk about how the shelling poured into her mother's house.)

You talked about the Battle of Menglianggu. It was a setup by two moles, Guo Rugui and Liu Fei. Zhang's reinforced division, while pressuring onto the hills, had no water supply. Their machine guns could only be cooled by human pee, and by the time pee was finished, the guns were of no use. The officers and generals who were killed on Menglianggu were the pals who had fought in the same trenches during the 1937 Battle of nanking against the Japanese, as well as the pals at the Battle of Wanjialing which saw a Japanese Shidan annihilated.

Now what I want to talk about is the "brother soldiers" - i.e., the flowers of China.

Unlike the US system, China had no draft law. American soldiers were mostly kids of age 17-20, as G MArshall said. Chinese soldiers were professionals, and treated the military career his lifelong devotion. The troops who were killed in the civil war were veterans from the 8-year-long anti-Japanese war. In contrast with the government troops, the communist soldiers were mostly the civilians and peasants. The other poster, while exaggerating the communist invincibility, claimed that the government troops numbered more than the communist troops. The fact was that government troops never bothered to replenish their lost ranks. I already gave the example of the 52nd Corps which fought in Manchuria for three years without replenishment, the same soldiers who fought across China south to north, north to south, and south to north, as was said in Zhang Mingming's song "Father's Straw Saddles". (The 52nd Corps was Tang Enbo's crack force which fought against Japanese in different war zones, as a contingency force, and participated in almost every major campaign, including the Ichigo Campaign.)

Stalin knew better what a nation's flowers were. It was not the age 17-20 foot soldiers, but the officer corps. That's why Stalin ordered to have 20000-30000 Polish officers murdered, and why Stalin wanted to shoot 50,000 German officers. Stalin himself know he made a mistake in purging his officer corps, which made it possible for the German Army to almost destroy the Soviet Union, which was saved only when the Americans went in with the help transported along the Siberian RR. The millions of ROC troops and the 5 million "bandits" were of this category of flowers that I talked about here.

#22 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 02 April 2010 - 01:52 AM


Not sure how much of what you wrote in this latest post has much to do with what I wrote earlier. I have studied the battles and campaigns of mid-20th century quite extensively. The running out urine hearsay story has been a popular description of many battles in the first half of 20th century but often by historians too lazy to check for the facts. Maxim Machine Gun indeed required a constant supply of water to operate, but that's a WWI weapon (and used by soviets in WWII). The 74th Division was equipped with WWII US equipment, which meant M2 .50cal Browning Machine Gun, which was air-cooled, and M1919 0.30cal Browning Machine Gun, which was also air cooled. Even the M1917 .30cal Browning Machine Gun of WWI vintage did not require a constant supply of water. The communists using soviet surplus Maxim copies might have required constant water supply, but such a heavy and bulky water-cooled machine gun really had no place in infantry attacks anyway. Much of the talks about running out of pee to operate water-cooled machine guns was sheer nonsense cooked up by ignorant narrators for ignorant audience, neither of whom knew much about the military technology involved.

Water supply however was and is always very important for the soldiers involved on battlefield. A man carrying 60lbs of infantry gear can consume a gallon or more water in a day! So securing water supply (either by carriers/transport or by finding water source) was and is of paramount importance in deploying troops and setting up either defense or attack. The KMT unit's failure to secure water supply for it men was indicative of basic operational and logistical failure: lacking scouting discipline.

I don't have much respect for CKS' military talents, especially after the 1937 Battle of Shanghai; starting that battle was just about the last smart military decision in his career (with one major exception later: fleeing to Taiwan instead of fighting to death on the Mainland); even there, the failure to withdraw early into the built-up defense networks between Shanghai and Nanjing was militarily inept. By the time of Chinese Civil War 1946-50, CKS was borderline senile and incapable of making important decisions in a decisive and timely manner. Like I mentioned before, Japan did not get its wished-for quick resolution to "China Incident" only because China was effectively divided. If either CKS or CCP had ruled all of China like Qing did, a quick repeat of Treaty of Shimonoseki would have followed the initial military defeats in order to preserve the existing regime.

Many KMT units did not replenish their lost head counts largely because the commanding officers would rather pocket the pay and salaries of the non-existent men instead of having to pay actual soldiers to maintain unit combat effectiveness. For combat effectiveness, it makes no sense to keep units chronically under-strength for years, as that would increase the ratio of administrative personnels to front-line troops. That's why Americans and British army units sent in replacements to front-line divisions almost every day, whereas German divisions went into battles with built-in replacement battalions. In a way, you are correct in stating that many Chinese soldiers took a career approach to military: they were careerists sitting there to collect a salary; actual combat effectiveness was of secondary if not tertiary concern . . . just like many other bureaucrats in a regime that has monopolized political power for too long. That is not to say there wasn't a few gun-ho self-immolating "heroes" that would waste themselves on impossible frontal attacks. After those self-immolationists got themselves killed quickly without achieving much, the careerists were ready to surrender in a hurry. That pretty much summarized the basic pattern of KMT debacles in 1947-49.

#23 ahxiang

ahxiang

    Prime Minister (Situ/Chengxiang 司徒/丞相)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 1,617 posts

Posted 02 April 2010 - 11:56 PM

There was a person called Deng Wenyi who was the military inspector traveling across the battlefields. He inspected the thousands of remnant wounded soldiers at Menglianggu and filed a report about the cause of the debacle. He talked about the watetr and cooling. This report convinced Chiang that Zhang Lingfu did his best, and hence Chiang named one British "bribery" warship as the Lingfu Warship. What you probably did not know, like most Chinese, was that Comintern moles in the US White House had an order to destroy all China-bound lend-lease goods by dumping them into the Indian Ocean. The one army corps which went to Manchuria, together with the non-US-equipped 52nd Corps, had only one third training ammunition left. Thereafter, you have the George Marshall ams embargo, and hence all US weapons were effectively locked up and never used. The bullets that ROC ordered with the US, for the German cabibre guns, were denied export, even though the order was placed in 1943-1944. Your claim that the 74th Division was using American weapons was wrong. To know how fierce the Menglianggu Battle was, you want to cite some communist military district commander's lecture, which was made in early 2000s, and what this guy said was what I cited somewhere,, namely, the "Odd Shoes" story. Basically, this guy's father joined the communist 8th route with 7-8 village pals, was given a pair of shoes by his mom, but never used the shoes throughout the resistance war, and survived intact with his village pals - because you know communists were friends of Japanese, and at the Battle of Menglianggu, decided to open up the wrap to wear the shoes to feel the love of his mom before possible death, found that his mom mistakenly packed two shoes for the same foot, and what this guy said was that his father's village pals all died, and the young men of China, in 2000s, should remember the sacrifice of the "revolutionary" ancestors, etc etc.

The story of Du Yuming could tell something about how the government soldiers thought about the communists. Du was among the prisoners. However, no soldier ever betrayed him. Only after Du committed suicide did the soldiers murmured among themselves that "Corps chief is dead". The communists overheard soldiers' talk, and then investigated the prisoners to find the wounded Du. What does this tell you?

About the supply of man and fodder of war. I covered this somewhere as well. There were writings by people who trekked across the communist territory. One writing mentioned that the only young man he met was someone who had no fingers at a hotel. You might say that the people supported the communist wholeheartedly that all able-bodied men went to the front. Alternatively, you could see how much fear the communists instilled in the people, by killing one class of people and distributing their land, that the peasants had no choice but to stick with the communists for ever -since they had blood in the hands. This is back to what I wrote about the reason that Chiang launched the encirclement campaign against the Red Army in the 1930s, with a slogan of 30% military solution and 70% political solution. Chiang must have heard how hundreds of thousands of people, following Heh Long's Red Army on the flee across the Yangtze, got drowned. The civilians were simply too scared to stay behind since they were forced to act as butchers to kill their wealthy villagers.

So much for today.

Edited by ahxiang, 02 April 2010 - 11:59 PM.


#24 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 03 April 2010 - 07:37 PM


I never said a word about Communists having popular support in areas under their control. In fact, the point that I was making was that KMT suffered from being the incumbent, while CCP, being the party out of power, were able to promise all sorts of impossibles. In fact, the central point that I suggested was that if CKS/KMT had let CCP run a substantial part of the country, the Maoist lies and mismanagement would have been laid bare and the red regime in Northern China would have collapsed by the 1950's.

The New 74th "Division" in 1946-47 was one of the top five KMT divisions re-organized and equipped with American WWII equipment as far as heavy equipment such as machine guns were concerned. The pre-1939 German heavy equipment were long gone or handed off to lesser units. BTW, even the German MG34 was an air-cooled machine gun, not water-cooled like the Maxim. The lack of water in the after-battle report was simply an acknowledgement that the unit failed to secure its own water supply for soldiers (as in drinking water); in other words, it was a logistic failure compounded with lack of proper scouting and perimeter defense deployment.

KMT regime faced weapons embargo from Truman administration largely because KMT tried to make lopsided campaign contributions to the Republican challenger Dewey in the 1948 US presidential election. It was fool-hardy for KMT to try to influence US domestic politics like that. The sitting US president would certainly try to prevent US Aid money from being laundered into political contributions to his own opponent in a very close election.

BTW, anecdotal stories are interesting on a certain entertainment level, but they add very little to any serious study of history. To anyone familiar with land battles of the period, it should be quite obvious that most (if not all) KMT elite units folded extremely quickly in the critical battles during 1947-49, by the standards of mid-20th century. Statistically, one can not avoid the conclusion that the units were poorly led, poorly prepared both physically and psychologically, and poorly deployed/committed. Any further argument on personal loyalty or suicide or suicide charges would only add to the point that the units were poorly organized and poorly prepared both physically and psychologically. Soldiers should not be on taxpayer dole to indulge in their Wagnerian self-immolation fantasies.

#25 ahxiang

ahxiang

    Prime Minister (Situ/Chengxiang 司徒/丞相)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 1,617 posts

Posted 06 April 2010 - 12:10 AM

I never said a word about Communists having popular support in areas under their control. In fact, the point that I was making was that KMT suffered from being the incumbent, while CCP, being the party out of power, were able to promise all sorts of impossibles. In fact, the central point that I suggested was that if CKS/KMT had let CCP run a substantial part of the country, the Maoist lies and mismanagement would have been laid bare and the red regime in Northern China would have collapsed by the 1950's.

The New 74th "Division" in 1946-47 was one of the top five KMT divisions re-organized and equipped with American WWII equipment as far as heavy equipment such as machine guns were concerned. The pre-1939 German heavy equipment were long gone or handed off to lesser units. BTW, even the German MG34 was an air-cooled machine gun, not water-cooled like the Maxim. The lack of water in the after-battle report was simply an acknowledgement that the unit failed to secure its own water supply for soldiers (as in drinking water); in other words, it was a logistic failure compounded with lack of proper scouting and perimeter defense deployment.

KMT regime faced weapons embargo from Truman administration largely because KMT tried to make lopsided campaign contributions to the Republican challenger Dewey in the 1948 US presidential election. It was fool-hardy for KMT to try to influence US domestic politics like that. The sitting US president would certainly try to prevent US Aid money from being laundered into political contributions to his own opponent in a very close election.

BTW, anecdotal stories are interesting on a certain entertainment level, but they add very little to any serious study of history. To anyone familiar with land battles of the period, it should be quite obvious that most (if not all) KMT elite units folded extremely quickly in the critical battles during 1947-49, by the standards of mid-20th century. Statistically, one can not avoid the conclusion that the units were poorly led, poorly prepared both physically and psychologically, and poorly deployed/committed. Any further argument on personal loyalty or suicide or suicide charges would only add to the point that the units were poorly organized and poorly prepared both physically and psychologically. Soldiers should not be on taxpayer dole to indulge in their Wagnerian self-immolation fantasies.


You had some chronological error here. The arms embargo was imposed on China in 1946, on the purported pretense that the civil war had flared up in Manchuria. What happened was that Chiang already conceded to Marshall in putting a stop to the push towards Harbin, with Sun Liren leaving a battalion of soldiers on the northern bank of the Sungari, where they stayed on till well after the starvation and surrender of Changchun in late 1948. Marshall still scrapped the US Exp-Imp Bank loan, nevertheless. (We never knew the fate of those soldiers on the northern bank. Most likely all shot by the PLA, as was the fate with the regiment of Yunnan Army who rebelled against the communist at Meihekou in 1946.)


Chen Lifu, at one time, held a talk with some American representatives, and during the interview, explicitly told the Americans that their guns, with the exact numbers, were mostly locked up because i) the guns ran out of ammunition; and ii) the bolts of the American guns were not made for cold weather [but for the Burma Campaign].

There was a statistical report on the artilleries of the ROC troops. The majority artillery pieces were Japanese mountain guns that were sorted through the bounty at the end of the resistance war. The wide calibre American guns numbered by single digits, and some by dozens - all of them being the supply from Stilwell for the X and Y forces. (I had an itemization of the US lead lease aid for the years 1941 to 1944, somewhere on this forum. Most of the $$ were spent on Chennault's air force, not on the Chinese army. And the numbers of 1945 included the shipping costs, as well as the weapons dumped into the Indian Ocean.)

Chiang Kai-shek never realized that the American government had been hijacked by the Comintern agents. Roosevelt did not know that, either. Roosevelt thought that his State Department was run by the "British hands", and thought that was why the State Department was hostile to China. There were rumors about Chiang Kai-shek funding Dewey's presidential election campaign. I had read through available reports and did not find any evidence of it. I tried to find something in Wellington Koo's memoirs, and could not find any, either. The most I saw among the Mme Chiang and Mme Kung were something to do with the setup of some award for some essay writing, some donation to the college they attended, and some payment towards the cost that was not uncovered by the Chinese embassy. The debunked myth about ROC's "corruption" would be a bribery that was exposed in about 1954 around. Note that China's financial dealings were scrutinized by the Americans, ROC transfers between HK and Taipei, and Americans demanded supervision especially for the funds that were contributed by the Americans.

The unwavering American support for Chiang came from the missionaries, as represented by Henry Luce, a true friend of China. Mme Chiang's American connection rested with the Henry Luce and the religious sect, nothing other than that. The American government was always hostile to ROC, with the exception of the Commerce Department and the American Navy, two places that were still retained by the true American patriots. When Mme Chiang was touring the US for rallying American support for China, Wellington Koo repeatedly passed on the advice from the American government that Mme Chiang should end her tour and go back to China.

I suggest that you find a book written by a Soviet diplomat called Ledovsky. This guy is the only person who disclosed the fact that Stalin personally endorsed a Soviet China Aid Act with the amount matching the dollars from the US China Aid Act. And, you may want to check out the records of a CCP czar sitting in Pyongyang from 1946 to 1950, who was responsible for shipping the [Operation August Storm] artilleries to Manchuria and Shandong. With this background, the Anyang Siege lasting from 1946 to 1950, and the Taiyuan Siege from 1948 to 1950, could be better understood.

Edited by ahxiang, 06 April 2010 - 12:21 AM.


#26 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 06 April 2010 - 05:39 PM


A statistic on the average KMT units equipment level has very little bearing on the New 74th "Division" in 1947 The typical KMT division had less than 7000 soldiers, far below TO&E strength. The New 74th Division at MengLiangGu however was one of the top-5 "divisions" in the KMT army, with 30,000 troops and kept at TO&E strength according to the Stillwell-Weydemere reform programs. In any case, even the Japanese army was equipped with air-cooled machine guns not water-cooled machine guns, ever since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05! Japanese army chose to license-produce air-cooled Hotchkiss machine guns instead of water-cooled Maxims as far back as the 1890's! Narratives about using pee to operate machine guns (in an army equipped with air-cooled machine guns) smack of typical nonsense "human story" conjured by ink people who have little knowledge about guns. . . and a surprisingly frequent urban legend that pop up again and again in propaganda pieces, probably due to the tangential connection to where pee comes from and machismo.

American guns performed very well in cold weather conditions in Europe, Alaska and in Korea. Cold temperature performance/reliability is usually not the function of bolt design or manufacture, but lubricant application and maintenance. It's like choice of engine oil in a car: if you don't change oil or do maintenance, the car will break down; if you use too light oil in summer, the engine pistons will get gas blow-by and eventually wear out; if you use too heavy oil in winter, the engine pistons will wear out due to lack of lubrication and jam. Pistons and mechanisms on automatic guns are just like the moving parts inside a car; a .50cal and .30cal machines gun run at the equivalent of 1000-2000rpm as the pistons and mechanisms on the guns move back and forth, and the nitrate fuel/propellant there is much more corrosive than gasoline in automotive engines. Different combat regions with different weather conditions require different lubricants, and that's the responsibility of the users and the logistics department of the army deploying these units.

Corruption among KMT (and among CCP, and among Americans and Russians) was certainly no myth. Corruption is simply the inevitable result of bureaucrats empowered to manage that which they do not own, and have a different point of view. Corruption always accompany foreign aid programs. That's the very reason why foreign aid programs continue to exist despite almost universal taxpayer opposition to those programs. In most cases, the recipient nations are clued enough to launder bribes to both political parties in the US, usually through buying goods and services by American companies at inflated prices and discretely pointing out where to allocate campaign contributions. That's the political process, a process of thievery. Oversight committees would only place another corruption layer on top of the existing layer . . . because the committee members would also be managing someone else' money for someone else.

In general, I'm not a big fan of all-pervasive and elaborate conspiracies that involve numerous people. Government interventions tend to be marked by incompetence, and that's usually the reason for their failures. An underground group of people pulling the strings is not going to do any better than similar groups of people pulling strings out in the open.

#27 ahxiang

ahxiang

    Prime Minister (Situ/Chengxiang 司徒/丞相)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 1,617 posts

Posted 07 April 2010 - 12:21 AM

A statistic on the average KMT units equipment level has very little bearing on the New 74th "Division" in 1947 The typical KMT division had less than 7000 soldiers, far below TO&E strength. The New 74th Division at MengLiangGu however was one of the top-5 "divisions" in the KMT army, with 30,000 troops and kept at TO&E strength according to the Stillwell-Weydemere reform programs. In any case, even the Japanese army was equipped with air-cooled machine guns not water-cooled machine guns, ever since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05! Japanese army chose to license-produce air-cooled Hotchkiss machine guns instead of water-cooled Maxims as far back as the 1890's! Narratives about using pee to operate machine guns (in an army equipped with air-cooled machine guns) smack of typical nonsense "human story" conjured by ink people who have little knowledge about guns. . . and a surprisingly frequent urban legend that pop up again and again in propaganda pieces, probably due to the tangential connection to where pee comes from and machismo.

American guns performed very well in cold weather conditions in Europe, Alaska and in Korea. Cold temperature performance/reliability is usually not the function of bolt design or manufacture, but lubricant application and maintenance. It's like choice of engine oil in a car: if you don't change oil or do maintenance, the car will break down; if you use too light oil in summer, the engine pistons will get gas blow-by and eventually wear out; if you use too heavy oil in winter, the engine pistons will wear out due to lack of lubrication and jam. Pistons and mechanisms on automatic guns are just like the moving parts inside a car; a .50cal and .30cal machines gun run at the equivalent of 1000-2000rpm as the pistons and mechanisms on the guns move back and forth, and the nitrate fuel/propellant there is much more corrosive than gasoline in automotive engines. Different combat regions with different weather conditions require different lubricants, and that's the responsibility of the users and the logistics department of the army deploying these units.

Corruption among KMT (and among CCP, and among Americans and Russians) was certainly no myth. Corruption is simply the inevitable result of bureaucrats empowered to manage that which they do not own, and have a different point of view. Corruption always accompany foreign aid programs. That's the very reason why foreign aid programs continue to exist despite almost universal taxpayer opposition to those programs. In most cases, the recipient nations are clued enough to launder bribes to both political parties in the US, usually through buying goods and services by American companies at inflated prices and discretely pointing out where to allocate campaign contributions. That's the political process, a process of thievery. Oversight committees would only place another corruption layer on top of the existing layer . . . because the committee members would also be managing someone else' money for someone else.

In general, I'm not a big fan of all-pervasive and elaborate conspiracies that involve numerous people. Government interventions tend to be marked by incompetence, and that's usually the reason for their failures. An underground group of people pulling the strings is not going to do any better than similar groups of people pulling strings out in the open.



Chen Lifu's memoirs had a passage on the interview with Americans in regards to the exact number of American weapons. There was a Burma Theater War published by the US Army College, where you will find a list of guns that the US supplied to the Chinese Army, exact numbers as to the 108mm, 80mm, and etc. The X-force had the light US weapons, but the Y-force had none.

As to Zhang Lingfu, and the human urine, you could find information at
http://www.boxun.tv/...ishi/5721.shtml

You want to read the writings by two eyewitnesses and they invariably said the machine guns were 水冷式, i.e., water-cooling type
# 朱夜(抗日铁军幸存将领): 孟良崮的黄昏
http://www.boxun.tv/...ishi/5720.shtml
一场惨烈血战,经过四昼夜的搏杀之后,弹尽援绝,几乎伤亡殆尽。少数轻伤的官兵,仍然坚守阵地,纷纷用刺刀、拳足齿牙和匪军展开肉搏。四天以来,这个北地战场,眼见它堆积着无数尸骸,硝烟弥漫号角悲泣裹,仍然有零星的枪声,也还有三五名战士,同冲到山头的匪军作殊死搏斗。经过了四昼夜激烈战斗,官兵们没有吃一口饭饮一滴水。北地的烈日和浓重风沙硝烟灸烤,除了唇绽肤裂之外,饥渴得使人难支。当时我躺在两座岩石之间,望着高照的火伞,极思有削一捧清泉入口。眼见伙伴们以自己的小便解渴,在几度犹豫之后,也只有不得已了,一经入口不知其味,确实感到有了精力。不远的一位女政工队员,她不肯喝自己的便溺,却也不愿把它浪费,她把那一捧黄汤从小盆倒进一个磁碗,对着伙伴们扬了一扬,立刻就有人争着把它接过喝了。看在眼裹,使我忘记了疲惫同饥渴,远远地对她唤一声聋 “施水少女”,她对我挥手一笑罢了。

# 林伟年(抗日铁军幸存将领): 张灵甫壮烈千秋
http://www.boxun.tv/...ishi/5719.shtml
孟良崮是一处东西连绵十数里的石头山,乱石遍布,怪岩错落,既无村舍,亦无树木,缺乏水源。匪军迅即调集八个纵队(军)四面围攻,战况激烈,双方伤亡惨重,我军缺弹药粮水,枵腹征战,所用水冷式重机枪因缺水无法发射(初以人尿代替后来尿亦无出),空军虽空投弹药、大饼馒头及茶水,因山陡多落敌区。在万般困难状况下,浴血苦斗,黄沙滚滚,杀声震天,至十六日中午匪军己接近军指挥所附近,张将军毅然写下遗书:“十余万之匪,向我围攻数日,今弹尽援绝,水粮俱无,我决与仁杰(副军长蔡仁杰)战至最后以一弹饮诀成仁,上报国家领袖,下对部属袍泽。老父来京,未克亲侍,希菩待之,幼子希善抚之,玉玲吾妻,今永诀矣。三十六年五月十六日灵甫绝笔。”遗书先交随从杨少校突围带出(此一遗书原件现藏凤山陆军官校校史馆)。

Edited by ahxiang, 07 April 2010 - 12:34 AM.


#28 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 07 April 2010 - 09:43 AM


To be honest, neither article sound authentic or have provenance at all. Anyone off the street could have written anything in the names of surviving officers who are long dead by now. Fake SS soldier "first-hand" accounts of WWII were quite popular on the literary scene after the war until they were exposed to be written by pretenders (some not even German but French authors) decades later. None of the three main sources that top KMT units like the new 74th Div received weapons had water-cooled machine guns: US, Germany and Japan all used air-cooled machine guns since at least the 1920's; Japan since the late 1890's.

BTW, the first article was somewhat believable in its description of drinking water shortage, although I have my doubts about the presence of women at division or corps level units during a rapid forward deployment into active battles. It wasn't like the New 74th was attacked at its base area, but the Div/Corps was in rapid pursuit/penetration into enemy controlled area. I suspect it's another piece of titillating "battlefield porn" written for teenage boys just like the pee story.

#29 ahxiang

ahxiang

    Prime Minister (Situ/Chengxiang 司徒/丞相)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 1,617 posts

Posted 08 April 2010 - 06:15 PM

To be honest, neither article sound authentic or have provenance at all. Anyone off the street could have written anything in the names of surviving officers who are long dead by now. Fake SS soldier "first-hand" accounts of WWII were quite popular on the literary scene after the war until they were exposed to be written by pretenders (some not even German but French authors) decades later. None of the three main sources that top KMT units like the new 74th Div received weapons had water-cooled machine guns: US, Germany and Japan all used air-cooled machine guns since at least the 1920's; Japan since the late 1890's.

BTW, the first article was somewhat believable in its description of drinking water shortage, although I have my doubts about the presence of women at division or corps level units during a rapid forward deployment into active battles. It wasn't like the New 74th was attacked at its base area, but the Div/Corps was in rapid pursuit/penetration into enemy controlled area. I suspect it's another piece of titillating "battlefield porn" written for teenage boys just like the pee story.



The 74th Corps was not even part of the Y Force. There are so much craapp out there about the non-existent American support for Chiang Kai-shek that it will be difficult to debunk the myth unless you cite the records from the US Army College.

After comparing the "invoice" from the Americans with the "inventory" of the Chinese Communists from 1950, http://www.republica...n-guns-1950.jpg will you be able to tell that the 155-mm guns were in fact part of the American lend-lease for the Soviet August Storm Campaign.

Now the Browning M2 guns that were used by the 74th Corps.

http://webcache.goog...n&ct=clnk&gl=us

简介 M2 勃朗宁机枪(M2 Machine Gun)俗称 0.50 重机枪(Browning Machine Gun, Cal. .50,M2HB,Flexible.),是由 约翰·摩西·勃朗宁设计的大口径重机枪,发射12.7 ×99 毫米(.50BMG)大口径弹药,常见用于步兵架设的火力阵地及军用车辆如坦克、装甲运兵车等,主要用途用途是攻击轻装甲目标,集结有生目标和低空防空。从1921 年就开始使用服役至到21 世纪。 M2 的.50BMG 弹药由美国温彻斯特连发武器公司开发,主要是对抗第一次世界大战时德国的13 毫米口径反坦克步枪弹药。


I believe this was part of the original purchase that the Peking government placed with the United States in 1917, about 10,000 to 20,000 guns in total, that was supposedly to be an award for China's declaring war on Germany. Thereafter, from 1919 onward, there was the 10-year arms embargo on China, and there is no way for the American guns to slip into China in batches.

About the women soldiers in the ROC troops. I want to remind you of a picture showing female Chinese soldiers taken prisoners of war at the 1938 Battle of Xuzhou, and the subsequent enslavement of those dozens of women soldiers as "comfort women", and the ultimate torture death.

Edited by ahxiang, 08 April 2010 - 06:16 PM.


#30 brightness

brightness

    Executive State Secretary (Shangshu Puye 尚书仆射)

  • Master Scholar (Juren)
  • 795 posts
  • Gender:Male
  • Main Interest in CHF:
    Chinese History

Posted 08 April 2010 - 09:24 PM


Not sure why it was necessary to take up space with M2 .50cal specs. The only relevant spec to this discussion is that fact that it was an air-cooled machine gun, not water-cooled at all. So the story about using pee for water-cooling makes no sense at all. BTW, M2 .50cal was introduced into US service only in the 1920's, so it was quite improbable to have been purchased by Peking government in 1917.

The New 74th Division was certainly one of the top KMT divisions, regardless whether it was part of Y-Force or not. Over-confidence was a major contributor to its down fall. Not sure why the American lend-lease 155mm to soviets was even relevant to this discussion. None of them were used at MengLiangGu; plenty were probably used by the Communists at JinZhou. The real question there is how did KMT troops allow LinBiao to line up over a thousand field pieces in an open field when the KMT airforce had absolute air superiority. Where was the scouting and reconnasance work that one would normally expect? The Soviets received the 155mm through Lend-lease because they were facing German 15cm field pieces (and Hummel, the self-propelled version). Soviets probably tried to get rid of them because their domestic manufacture in the 6" range was the 152mm; most armies were streamlining ammo logistics after the war, with one uniform size in the 4" range, and one uniform size in the 6" range; CKS/KMT advance into Manchuria and whipping of public hysteria against soviets gave the perfect reason for the soviets to give those weapons to the communists. Americans did have a habit of giving allies (including KMT) only the 105mm instead of the 155mm under normal circumstances; the French found that out the hard way at DienBienFu.

The 1938 XuZhou Campaign involved 60+ divisions on the KMT side (and 8 divisions on the Japanese side). It was an army-group level engagement, much much (an order of maganitute) larger than the Division/Corps level engagement at MengLiangGu. It's quite understandable to have women aux at army-group level, especially since the army-group was being engaged in its own base area by advancing enemy. However, at the Division/Corps level on a forward deploymeb/attack like at MengLiangGu, it makes little sense to have women there. The single woman description makes it even more suspect. How was she housed the night before? With whom did she share a foxhole?




2 user(s) are reading this topic

0 members, 2 guests, 0 anonymous users